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PEACEKEEPING AS MOOT POINT: RETURN OF RUNAWAY TERRITORIES IS SOMETHING TO BE LEFT TO POLITICIANS
by Alexander Skakov, Tamara Guzenkova (both of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies)
Translated by A. Ignatkin
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 2, 2007, p. 17
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
April 4, 2007 Wednesday
PROBLEMS OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE COMMONWEALTH; Analysis of peacekeeping
in the post-Soviet zone.
The artificial "revival" of "suspended" conflicts attaches previously
unprecedented importance to the problem of peacekeeping in the
post-Soviet zone. On the one hand, Russian peacekeeping operations in
Abkhazia (under the CIS auspices), South Ossetia (four-sided), and in
the Trans-Dniester region may be viewed a success. They did put an end
to conflicts and allowed for the return of at least some refugees,
brought down crime rates and made restoration of the infrastructure
somewhat easier. On the other hand, Georgia and Moldova are grumbling,
encouraged by their Western patrons, by the lack of progress in the
matter of "restoring territorial integrity."
Attempts to revise the form of peacekeeping operations in the
Commonwealth can be seen in the decision of GUAM to establish its
own international peacekeeping contingent, in Ukrainian President
Victor Yuschenko's proclaimed readiness to send his peacekeepers
to the Caucasus, and in the draft resolution on conflicts in GUAM
countries presented to the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly.
Georgia is particularly active in all of this. Tbilisi never misses a
chance to bring up resolutions of its parliaments (dated October 11,
2005 and July 28, 2006) and to demand an end to Russian peacekeeping
operations and replacement of Russian troops with international police
forces. There is one other factor that revived interest in peacekeeping
operations in the Commonwealth. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution plan the OSCE Minsk Group charted in 2006 stipulates
the employment of peacekeepers on the territories of Azerbaijan
currently controlled by the Armenians. Once the Armenians are out,
these peacekeepers are supposed to maintain a functioning corridor
between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. The question is, what kind of
peacekeepers will they be and what countries will they represent? Many
countries are loath to see the Russian peacekeepers there.
The replacement of Russian peacekeepers and internationalization of
peacekeeping missions are an obsession with Tbilisi. If the Russians
in the runaway regions are replaced with NATO peacekeepers and their
GUAM partners, their zone of responsibility will cover all of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, which will give Georgia a chance to regain the
territories in question. Kishinev must be thinking along these lines
in application to the problem of the Trans-Dniester region.
Washington's stand on the subject of the Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-Ossetian conflicts underwent a starling change in the late
summer and early autumn of 2006. US Senators Richard Lugar and John
McCain visited Tbilisi in late August of 2006. Speaking on behalf
of the US Administration, the US lawmakers suggested withdrawal of
the Russian peacekeepers from Georgia and their replacement with a
"neutral force". It stands to reason to assume that some powerful
circles in the American establishment are encouraging President Mikhail
Saakashvili to revive the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The statement
of the US Mission to the OSCE (August 12, 2006) also included a call
for employing an "international civilian police forces" in Abkhazia.
Aware of the support it can count on in the US establishment,
Georgian leadership is clearly out to do away with the Russian
peacekeepers' presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The operation
in the Kodor Gorge in summer 2006 could be a dress rehearsal. Tbilisi
may have chosen its new targets by now - a control unit of the Inguri
Hydroelectric Power Plant or the Lower Gal District.
Should the Georgians mount an offensive in the Gal district and Russian
peacekeepers choose to stay away from the conflict, Georgian-Abkhazian
clashes will be inevitable, and that will be used to blemish the
Russian peacekeepers.
There is another problem to be considered. The parameters of
peacekeeping operations in the future are currently being designed,
and the very notion of peacekeeping is being dramatically altered. An
emphasis is made on coercion by force, on splitting the world into
zones of responsibility, on the support of "loyal" regimes and the
discrediting of "disloyal" ones. The emphasis in international security
is shifting to brute force.
by Alexander Skakov, Tamara Guzenkova (both of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies)
Translated by A. Ignatkin
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 2, 2007, p. 17
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
April 4, 2007 Wednesday
PROBLEMS OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE COMMONWEALTH; Analysis of peacekeeping
in the post-Soviet zone.
The artificial "revival" of "suspended" conflicts attaches previously
unprecedented importance to the problem of peacekeeping in the
post-Soviet zone. On the one hand, Russian peacekeeping operations in
Abkhazia (under the CIS auspices), South Ossetia (four-sided), and in
the Trans-Dniester region may be viewed a success. They did put an end
to conflicts and allowed for the return of at least some refugees,
brought down crime rates and made restoration of the infrastructure
somewhat easier. On the other hand, Georgia and Moldova are grumbling,
encouraged by their Western patrons, by the lack of progress in the
matter of "restoring territorial integrity."
Attempts to revise the form of peacekeeping operations in the
Commonwealth can be seen in the decision of GUAM to establish its
own international peacekeeping contingent, in Ukrainian President
Victor Yuschenko's proclaimed readiness to send his peacekeepers
to the Caucasus, and in the draft resolution on conflicts in GUAM
countries presented to the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly.
Georgia is particularly active in all of this. Tbilisi never misses a
chance to bring up resolutions of its parliaments (dated October 11,
2005 and July 28, 2006) and to demand an end to Russian peacekeeping
operations and replacement of Russian troops with international police
forces. There is one other factor that revived interest in peacekeeping
operations in the Commonwealth. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution plan the OSCE Minsk Group charted in 2006 stipulates
the employment of peacekeepers on the territories of Azerbaijan
currently controlled by the Armenians. Once the Armenians are out,
these peacekeepers are supposed to maintain a functioning corridor
between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. The question is, what kind of
peacekeepers will they be and what countries will they represent? Many
countries are loath to see the Russian peacekeepers there.
The replacement of Russian peacekeepers and internationalization of
peacekeeping missions are an obsession with Tbilisi. If the Russians
in the runaway regions are replaced with NATO peacekeepers and their
GUAM partners, their zone of responsibility will cover all of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, which will give Georgia a chance to regain the
territories in question. Kishinev must be thinking along these lines
in application to the problem of the Trans-Dniester region.
Washington's stand on the subject of the Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-Ossetian conflicts underwent a starling change in the late
summer and early autumn of 2006. US Senators Richard Lugar and John
McCain visited Tbilisi in late August of 2006. Speaking on behalf
of the US Administration, the US lawmakers suggested withdrawal of
the Russian peacekeepers from Georgia and their replacement with a
"neutral force". It stands to reason to assume that some powerful
circles in the American establishment are encouraging President Mikhail
Saakashvili to revive the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The statement
of the US Mission to the OSCE (August 12, 2006) also included a call
for employing an "international civilian police forces" in Abkhazia.
Aware of the support it can count on in the US establishment,
Georgian leadership is clearly out to do away with the Russian
peacekeepers' presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The operation
in the Kodor Gorge in summer 2006 could be a dress rehearsal. Tbilisi
may have chosen its new targets by now - a control unit of the Inguri
Hydroelectric Power Plant or the Lower Gal District.
Should the Georgians mount an offensive in the Gal district and Russian
peacekeepers choose to stay away from the conflict, Georgian-Abkhazian
clashes will be inevitable, and that will be used to blemish the
Russian peacekeepers.
There is another problem to be considered. The parameters of
peacekeeping operations in the future are currently being designed,
and the very notion of peacekeeping is being dramatically altered. An
emphasis is made on coercion by force, on splitting the world into
zones of responsibility, on the support of "loyal" regimes and the
discrediting of "disloyal" ones. The emphasis in international security
is shifting to brute force.