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WHY EUROPE IS "ABOVE ALL" FOR GEORGIA?
By Nodar Tangiashvili
Daily Georgian Times, Georgia
April 5 2007
"Europe above all - this is the main slogan of our foreign policy
and it is the main landmark," stated President Mikhail Saakashvili
during his March 15 annual address to the Parliament, emphasizing
that orientation towards "Europe" remained Georgia's top foreign
policy priority. He proudly pointed out that "Europe is coming back
to Georgia just the way Georgia is returning to Europe."
Ten days after these pro-EU statements were voiced in the Georgian
legislature, prompting positive reactions both from the majority and
opposition leaders, representatives of EU member states to Georgia
gathered on March 25 in the Youth Palace near the Parliament building
to celebrate the EU's 50th anniversary. Fifty years ago, in 1957, six
European states (Germany, Italy, France and the Benelux trio) signed
the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community,
which eventually emerged as what we collectively call the European
Union. Since then, the EU has had as many achievements as years of
existence, including the consolidation of frequently-breached peace and
democracy in Europe, soaring economies, unprecedented social welfare
for European citizens, the "four freedoms," a strengthening Common
Foreign and Security Policy, and inclusion of a dozen post-communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, to mention just a few.
Now that the EU has become a union of 27 democracies stretching from
the North to the Black Sea and encompassing Bulgaria and Romania,
it is time to recap why our 50-year old neighbor has been and still
is important to our development. Why should "Europe above all" be a
primary principle for Georgians?
EU as Donor to Georgia
Before the "Rose Revolution" of 2003, EU-Georgia relations boiled down
to a donor-recipient relationship which fell short of integration or
even Georgia's full commitment to the basic values of the EU. Even so,
the EU (which is the world's largest economy and second leading donor
organization) backed Georgia's development on many occasions since the
country gained independence in the early 1990s. Quite impressively,
between 1991 and 2006, the EU's funding for the fledgling Georgian
democracy amounted to almost 670 million Euros - primarily distributed
within the framework of the Tacis technical assistance program -
and fell only behind the US in terms of financial assistance.
>>From the outset, the EU approached Georgia from a regional
standpoint, striving for equal relations with all the three South
Caucasus republics. In 1993 the EU launched important regional projects
such as the TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe - Caucasus - Asia), and
in 1995 the INOGATE (the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe),
aimed at developing the South Caucasus region, especially Georgia,
as a transit route linking the Caspian Sea basin with Europe. These
projects planted the first seeds of dream that Georgia would serve
as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and that dream is now manifestly
coming to fruition.
Between 1997 and 2006, the EU spent 33 million euros in funding
humanitarian programs for Georgia's war-torn regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia.
1999 was a groundbreaking year for EU-Georgia relations. That year,
the EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Georgia,
which laid the foundation for ten years of cooperation in legal,
economic and political fields, came into force.
What ordinary Georgians citizens should understand is that the EU
has linked the benefits Georgia could receive from its cooperation
with the EU to the advancement of democratic values and market economy
principles in Georgia. Unfortunately, the EU's generous financial aid,
along with its policy of so-called "conditionality" attached, mostly
went down the drain, as Georgia's performance in terms of democratic
institutions and market economy remained poor throughout the tenure
of Shevardnadze's government.
Nevertheless, by requiring our country to take steps towards
implementing an approximation of a EU-style legal system in Georgia,
the PCA enabled us to move closer to the EU. The PCA remained in
force under President Saakashvili's administration, and working on
legislation reform has become more intense. For example, the Georgian
parliament has renovated legislation in such fields as taxation,
agriculture, education, customs, energy, social protection, and
economic development. Between 2004 and 2005 Tacis allocated funding for
reforms in Georgia's state institutions, including the Prosecutor's
Office, the ministries of interior and justice, the Parliament,
taxation, and customs services. Over the course of the past several
years, the EU gradually evolved from a donor into a partner-which
means much more than a mere donor has traditionally meant for Georgia.
EU as Friend of Georgia
The "Rose Revolution" of 2003 and its aftermath showed Europe that
Georgia would need help from the EU in its efforts to build a new
state and accomplish its proclaimed European objectives. Despite some
criticism that the EU is doing less than it could, in many ways it
appears to be becoming a true friend of Georgia.
We must appreciate that the EU's complex decision-making procedures in
foreign policy and its dependence on Russia as a strategic partner in
energy, trade and security often inhibit its ability to help Georgia
solve many of Georgia's vital problems. But this does not mean that
the EU does not support Georgia.
It was for Georgia that the EU sent its first-ever civilian mission to
the former Soviet Union under its European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP). The EUJUST Themis Rule of Law Mission, which was launched in
July 2004 for one year, assisted and advised Georgian law-enforcement
agencies on how to reform the judiciary, criminal law, police and
penitentiary systems and at how to eradicate corruption there. As a
result, in May 2005 the Georgian government adopted a Strategy for
Criminal Justice Reform.
The EU also supplied Georgia with a Border Support Team. Although the
EU unfortunately did not take over the functions of the OSCE Border
Monitoring Operation (BMO), whose operation was vetoed by Russia,
the EU Special Representative's Border Support Team has aimed at
preventing conflict between Georgia and Russia on the issue of border
control by transforming the border management system in Georgia.
During Georgia's tense relations with Russia, when our northern
neighbor was expelling hundreds of our compatriots and harassing
Georgian-owned businesses, the EU was also one of the first to extend a
hand of support. Whether in Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg or Lahti,
EU institutions - the European Commission, the Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament alike - have unequivocally condemned
Russian xenophobia against Georgians.
All of this has proven that the EU is no less a friend of Georgia
than of Russia.
We need the EU's support most in conflict resolution, as this
influential union can serve as an "honest broker," not only between
Georgia and Russia, but also between Georgia and the separatist
entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To a significant extent, the
EU has realized and welcomed such a role. According to the recently
revealed plan proposed by EU Special Representative Peter Semneby,
and judging from what the EU has already accomplished in this regard,
the EU will continue its efforts to build confidence between the
conflicting parties and to fund rehabilitation and economic development
program in the conflict zones. No other single actor is as good as
the EU is at doing these things.
Moreover, the EU conducts dialogue on that issue with Russia and does
not rule out sending EU peacekeeping troops to the regions to replace
Russians, should the separatists and Russian authorities consent to
such a change. In brief, in terms of the EU's participation as an
observer or a full actor in the negotiation formats for the conflict
zones, there is a lot of what our great neighbor could do to our
advantage and that it is actually doing.
EU as Point of Attraction
In 2004, the EU included Georgia together with Armenia and Azerbaijan
in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is a new instrument
of EU foreign policy that is designed to consolidate prosperity and
stability in sixteen European and Middle East nations by offering
them prospects of partial integration with the EU in exchange for
tangible reforms of state institutions.
On November 15 2006, the EU and Georgia adopted an Action Plan that
lists seven priorities and specific actions for cooperation between
the two partners. Its due implementation, to be facilitated by an
allocation of over 120 million euros by the EU between 2007 and 2013,
will on the one hand enable Georgia to make maximum use of the ENP,
and on the other hand help the EU to forge Georgia's further European
integration without offering Georgia full membership in the foreseeable
future.
One could ask: why should Georgians be content to be a part of the
same policy that includes such non-European countries as Morocco
and Israel? Why is the ENP worth being serious about if it does not
promise full EU membership to our country? The answer is simple: thanks
to the ENP, Georgia has the opportunity to reform and modernize its
political and economic systems with considerable financial assistance
and expertise. In this way, Georgia makes progress towards functional
integration with the EU, regardless of how long institutional
integration might take.
The EU has thus become a point of attraction, a model, towards
which we-like Ukrainians and Moldavians-should be oriented in our
drive to post-transitional modernization and Europeanization. This
is how "Europe" has become an inevitable part of Georgia's domestic
development agenda. The final destination is a Georgia with essentially
Europeanized spheres of life, ranging from food security to viable
social protection to improved human rights protection and an improved
business environment. Georgia will increase the harmonization of
its legislation with that of the EU. Furthermore, the anticipated
Free Trade Agreement and a facilitated visa regime with the EU will
bring an improved standard of life for all Georgians and a subsequent
rapprochement with the EU.
If the envisaged actions are indeed fulfilled in three, instead of
five, years as the government wishes, Georgia will have achieved two
goals in the shortest possible time: first, it will truly look like
a European country, with almost the same degree of Europeanization
as EU candidate countries have, awaiting accession; second, inspired
by the Action Plan's current provision that "the European Union takes
note of the European aspirations Georgia has expressed", Georgia will
have an actual chance to use its legal right - also present in the
Action Plan - to call for a new agreement with the EU that could
ideally make its EU membership irreversible (or at least make it
dependent basically on how successfully the EU manages its internal
constraints, such as those connected with the "enlargement fatigue"
or constitutional arrangement).
So, in three to five years from now, when Georgia will have to
present its achievements within the European Neighborhood Policy,
we will be able to say for sure whether the president was right in
that Georgia is really returning to Europe. For the moment, we can
say that, without a doubt, Europe is indeed returning to Georgia.
Editor's Note: Nodar Tangiashvili holds an MA in International
Relations and European Studies from Central European University,
and is a Georgian Parliamentary Intern at the National-Democratic
Institute for International Affairs (NDI).
By Nodar Tangiashvili
Daily Georgian Times, Georgia
April 5 2007
"Europe above all - this is the main slogan of our foreign policy
and it is the main landmark," stated President Mikhail Saakashvili
during his March 15 annual address to the Parliament, emphasizing
that orientation towards "Europe" remained Georgia's top foreign
policy priority. He proudly pointed out that "Europe is coming back
to Georgia just the way Georgia is returning to Europe."
Ten days after these pro-EU statements were voiced in the Georgian
legislature, prompting positive reactions both from the majority and
opposition leaders, representatives of EU member states to Georgia
gathered on March 25 in the Youth Palace near the Parliament building
to celebrate the EU's 50th anniversary. Fifty years ago, in 1957, six
European states (Germany, Italy, France and the Benelux trio) signed
the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community,
which eventually emerged as what we collectively call the European
Union. Since then, the EU has had as many achievements as years of
existence, including the consolidation of frequently-breached peace and
democracy in Europe, soaring economies, unprecedented social welfare
for European citizens, the "four freedoms," a strengthening Common
Foreign and Security Policy, and inclusion of a dozen post-communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, to mention just a few.
Now that the EU has become a union of 27 democracies stretching from
the North to the Black Sea and encompassing Bulgaria and Romania,
it is time to recap why our 50-year old neighbor has been and still
is important to our development. Why should "Europe above all" be a
primary principle for Georgians?
EU as Donor to Georgia
Before the "Rose Revolution" of 2003, EU-Georgia relations boiled down
to a donor-recipient relationship which fell short of integration or
even Georgia's full commitment to the basic values of the EU. Even so,
the EU (which is the world's largest economy and second leading donor
organization) backed Georgia's development on many occasions since the
country gained independence in the early 1990s. Quite impressively,
between 1991 and 2006, the EU's funding for the fledgling Georgian
democracy amounted to almost 670 million Euros - primarily distributed
within the framework of the Tacis technical assistance program -
and fell only behind the US in terms of financial assistance.
>>From the outset, the EU approached Georgia from a regional
standpoint, striving for equal relations with all the three South
Caucasus republics. In 1993 the EU launched important regional projects
such as the TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe - Caucasus - Asia), and
in 1995 the INOGATE (the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe),
aimed at developing the South Caucasus region, especially Georgia,
as a transit route linking the Caspian Sea basin with Europe. These
projects planted the first seeds of dream that Georgia would serve
as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and that dream is now manifestly
coming to fruition.
Between 1997 and 2006, the EU spent 33 million euros in funding
humanitarian programs for Georgia's war-torn regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia.
1999 was a groundbreaking year for EU-Georgia relations. That year,
the EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Georgia,
which laid the foundation for ten years of cooperation in legal,
economic and political fields, came into force.
What ordinary Georgians citizens should understand is that the EU
has linked the benefits Georgia could receive from its cooperation
with the EU to the advancement of democratic values and market economy
principles in Georgia. Unfortunately, the EU's generous financial aid,
along with its policy of so-called "conditionality" attached, mostly
went down the drain, as Georgia's performance in terms of democratic
institutions and market economy remained poor throughout the tenure
of Shevardnadze's government.
Nevertheless, by requiring our country to take steps towards
implementing an approximation of a EU-style legal system in Georgia,
the PCA enabled us to move closer to the EU. The PCA remained in
force under President Saakashvili's administration, and working on
legislation reform has become more intense. For example, the Georgian
parliament has renovated legislation in such fields as taxation,
agriculture, education, customs, energy, social protection, and
economic development. Between 2004 and 2005 Tacis allocated funding for
reforms in Georgia's state institutions, including the Prosecutor's
Office, the ministries of interior and justice, the Parliament,
taxation, and customs services. Over the course of the past several
years, the EU gradually evolved from a donor into a partner-which
means much more than a mere donor has traditionally meant for Georgia.
EU as Friend of Georgia
The "Rose Revolution" of 2003 and its aftermath showed Europe that
Georgia would need help from the EU in its efforts to build a new
state and accomplish its proclaimed European objectives. Despite some
criticism that the EU is doing less than it could, in many ways it
appears to be becoming a true friend of Georgia.
We must appreciate that the EU's complex decision-making procedures in
foreign policy and its dependence on Russia as a strategic partner in
energy, trade and security often inhibit its ability to help Georgia
solve many of Georgia's vital problems. But this does not mean that
the EU does not support Georgia.
It was for Georgia that the EU sent its first-ever civilian mission to
the former Soviet Union under its European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP). The EUJUST Themis Rule of Law Mission, which was launched in
July 2004 for one year, assisted and advised Georgian law-enforcement
agencies on how to reform the judiciary, criminal law, police and
penitentiary systems and at how to eradicate corruption there. As a
result, in May 2005 the Georgian government adopted a Strategy for
Criminal Justice Reform.
The EU also supplied Georgia with a Border Support Team. Although the
EU unfortunately did not take over the functions of the OSCE Border
Monitoring Operation (BMO), whose operation was vetoed by Russia,
the EU Special Representative's Border Support Team has aimed at
preventing conflict between Georgia and Russia on the issue of border
control by transforming the border management system in Georgia.
During Georgia's tense relations with Russia, when our northern
neighbor was expelling hundreds of our compatriots and harassing
Georgian-owned businesses, the EU was also one of the first to extend a
hand of support. Whether in Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg or Lahti,
EU institutions - the European Commission, the Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament alike - have unequivocally condemned
Russian xenophobia against Georgians.
All of this has proven that the EU is no less a friend of Georgia
than of Russia.
We need the EU's support most in conflict resolution, as this
influential union can serve as an "honest broker," not only between
Georgia and Russia, but also between Georgia and the separatist
entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To a significant extent, the
EU has realized and welcomed such a role. According to the recently
revealed plan proposed by EU Special Representative Peter Semneby,
and judging from what the EU has already accomplished in this regard,
the EU will continue its efforts to build confidence between the
conflicting parties and to fund rehabilitation and economic development
program in the conflict zones. No other single actor is as good as
the EU is at doing these things.
Moreover, the EU conducts dialogue on that issue with Russia and does
not rule out sending EU peacekeeping troops to the regions to replace
Russians, should the separatists and Russian authorities consent to
such a change. In brief, in terms of the EU's participation as an
observer or a full actor in the negotiation formats for the conflict
zones, there is a lot of what our great neighbor could do to our
advantage and that it is actually doing.
EU as Point of Attraction
In 2004, the EU included Georgia together with Armenia and Azerbaijan
in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is a new instrument
of EU foreign policy that is designed to consolidate prosperity and
stability in sixteen European and Middle East nations by offering
them prospects of partial integration with the EU in exchange for
tangible reforms of state institutions.
On November 15 2006, the EU and Georgia adopted an Action Plan that
lists seven priorities and specific actions for cooperation between
the two partners. Its due implementation, to be facilitated by an
allocation of over 120 million euros by the EU between 2007 and 2013,
will on the one hand enable Georgia to make maximum use of the ENP,
and on the other hand help the EU to forge Georgia's further European
integration without offering Georgia full membership in the foreseeable
future.
One could ask: why should Georgians be content to be a part of the
same policy that includes such non-European countries as Morocco
and Israel? Why is the ENP worth being serious about if it does not
promise full EU membership to our country? The answer is simple: thanks
to the ENP, Georgia has the opportunity to reform and modernize its
political and economic systems with considerable financial assistance
and expertise. In this way, Georgia makes progress towards functional
integration with the EU, regardless of how long institutional
integration might take.
The EU has thus become a point of attraction, a model, towards
which we-like Ukrainians and Moldavians-should be oriented in our
drive to post-transitional modernization and Europeanization. This
is how "Europe" has become an inevitable part of Georgia's domestic
development agenda. The final destination is a Georgia with essentially
Europeanized spheres of life, ranging from food security to viable
social protection to improved human rights protection and an improved
business environment. Georgia will increase the harmonization of
its legislation with that of the EU. Furthermore, the anticipated
Free Trade Agreement and a facilitated visa regime with the EU will
bring an improved standard of life for all Georgians and a subsequent
rapprochement with the EU.
If the envisaged actions are indeed fulfilled in three, instead of
five, years as the government wishes, Georgia will have achieved two
goals in the shortest possible time: first, it will truly look like
a European country, with almost the same degree of Europeanization
as EU candidate countries have, awaiting accession; second, inspired
by the Action Plan's current provision that "the European Union takes
note of the European aspirations Georgia has expressed", Georgia will
have an actual chance to use its legal right - also present in the
Action Plan - to call for a new agreement with the EU that could
ideally make its EU membership irreversible (or at least make it
dependent basically on how successfully the EU manages its internal
constraints, such as those connected with the "enlargement fatigue"
or constitutional arrangement).
So, in three to five years from now, when Georgia will have to
present its achievements within the European Neighborhood Policy,
we will be able to say for sure whether the president was right in
that Georgia is really returning to Europe. For the moment, we can
say that, without a doubt, Europe is indeed returning to Georgia.
Editor's Note: Nodar Tangiashvili holds an MA in International
Relations and European Studies from Central European University,
and is a Georgian Parliamentary Intern at the National-Democratic
Institute for International Affairs (NDI).