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POLITICAL TENSIONS INCREASE AS TURKISH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS APPROACH
By Kerem Kaya and Sinan Ikinci
World Socialist Web Site, MI
April 16 2007
As presidential elections approach, Turkey's political tensions
are continuing to intensify both domestically, between the Kemalist
establishment and the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government, as well as internationally, between the Turkish
establishment and the Iraqi Kurds.
The Turkish military is decisively leading both campaigns with support
from the "unarmed forces," a euphemism invented to describe supporters
of the military within influential business and political circles. The
principal protagonists of these forces are Deniz Baykal of Republican
People's Party (CHP), the main opposition leader, and the outgoing
president Ahmet Necdet Sezer. It also includes the Kemalist Thought
Association (ADD) and the Association for Supporting Modern Life
(CYDD), which are both by-products of the events of February 28,
1997, when the military intervened to oust a coalition government
led by the Islamic-based Welfare Party.
The head of ADD, Sener Eruygur, is a former general. Democratic
Left Party (DSP), and the Social Democrat People's Party (SHP) also
supported a march organized by the "unarmed forces" late last year.
CHP has long been acting as the civilian spokesman of the Turkish
military. In short, all the social democratic or "left-wing Kemalist"
parties, are included.
Less prominent members of this camp are the Turkish Industrialists'
and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) and the Union of Chambers of
Commerce (TTOBB). The Turkish Trade Union Confederation (Turk-Is)
and the Revolutionary Trade Union Confederation (DISK) are also active
together with Kemalist-Maoist Workers Party of Dogu Perincek.
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (who does not have a party affiliation)
also sides frequently with the military against the government.
It appears that the strategy of the military is to heighten tensions
domestically while capitalizing on the deteriorating Kurdish situation
in the east to increase pressure on the elected AKP government before
the general elections currently set for November.
In addition, the first round of parliamentary voting in the
presidential elections is scheduled for April 27.
The AKP government represents the moderate wing of political Islam in
Turkey. It was elected on November 3, 2004, with 34 percent of the
vote, a large enough margin to form a single party government. It
lost some of its base after establishing close relationships with
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implementing far reaching
austerity measures on behalf of the big business. Despite this, the
government still enjoys a measure of public support partly due to its
relative success in stabilizing the country's financial situation,
after 30 years of uninterrupted high inflation. The latest polls
show that the AKP enjoys the support of 25 to 30 percent of the
electorate. This level of support makes it very difficult to topple
an elected government via an outright military intervention and hence
comes the critical role played by the "unarmed forces."
A common feature of these forces, armed or otherwise, is their
determination to whip up a nationalist mood throughout the country.
In so doing they seek to exploit the international situation. The US
aggression in Iraq has destabilized Turkey's neighbors and created
an environment that the political establishment has used to spread
chauvinist and nationalist sentiments. Similarly, the brushing aside
of Turkey in the accession talks with the EU and the subsequent
nationalist rhetoric from both sides-especially the use of Kurdish,
Armenian and Cyprus questions by the EU as a means of pressure-played
into the hands of the nationalists in Turkey.
The Kurdish crisis
There is growing social unrest in eastern Turkey within the
predominantly Kurdish population. Social unrest in the region has
intensified since the Semdinli events of November 9, 2005, when
police intelligence officers (JIT) were caught in a provocative
bombing campaign against the civilian population and General Yasar
Buyukanit, the current chief of general staff, publicly praised one
of the bombers.
Last month, during the Kurdish New Year (Newroz) celebrations there
were many banners supporting the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party-the Kurdish
nationalist guerilla organisation) and pictures of Abdullah Ocalan,
the former PKK leader currently jailed by Turkey-despite the ban on
such Kurdish symbols. Since ending its 15-year long military campaign
towards the end of the 1990s and fruitless attempts to curry favor
with Turkish establishment, the PKK has now increased its military and
political activity inside Turkey. In response, there are reports that
Turkish military has drawn up a 250,000-strong contingency force in
the southeast region to combat the PKK near the Iraqi border. Buyukanit
said on Thursday that an all out offensive has started against PKK. On
April 8, Kurdish rebels killed nine members of Turkish security forces.
There is a growing threat that the Turkish army will invade northern
Iraq in the coming days to clamp down on PKK forces in their Iraqi
safe haven. As a result, tensions between Ankara, Washington and
the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, namely Barzani and Talabani,
have been growing over the last few months. Last month witnessed a
harsh clash of words between Ankara and Kurdish leaders, particularly
Barzani, the president of the Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Iraq.
The high point in this campaign was a press conference by Chief of
General Staff Buyukanit on Thursday attended by all military force
commanders in uniform. He accused the EU of "inventing" minorities
in Turkey, but made no direct criticism of the US. Buyukanit instead
declared that a cross-border operation to northern Iraq was necessary
and that the Turkish military was ready to move, but he emphasized
that the go-ahead was a political decision. This provoked defiant
responses from Iraqi Kurdish leaders, as well as conciliatory noises
from Washington.
Kemal Kerkuki, vice-president of Kurdish autonomous zone in northern
Iraq, remarked that "a military operation on Kurdish regional soils
would constitute a declaration of war directly against Iraq." He
said that there was no basis for claims by Turkey that the PKK is
receiving military and economic aid from the northern Iraqi government.
This comes on top of Barzani's remarks in an interview made at the
end of February but broadcast only recently in which he said that if
Turkey interferes with Kurdish plans to attach the oil-rich Iraqi city
of Kirkuk to the Kurdish autonomous zone, Iraq's Kurds would retaliate
by intervening in southeast Turkey, where the PKK mainly operates.
After Barzani's remarks Ankara sent an official ultimatum to the
Iraqi government. Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul said
they will do "whatever is necessary" unless Baghdad responds "as
expected." Spokesman for the ministry said that the ultimatum asks
for border security and the capture of members of the PKK and their
return to Turkey.
After this Washington immediately stepped in. Having acknowledged
that the PKK must be dealt with, US State Department spokesman Sean
McCormack said this should not be done unilaterally by Turkey.
Washington has also criticized Barzani for not being helpful in
dampening down the crisis. Assistant secretary of state for European
and Eurasian affairs Dan Fried went further and accused Barzani of
being "unwise."
In the past, Washington has issued harsher reactions against Turkish
threats to undertake military intervention in northern Iraq. This time,
however, they have clearly taken into account the fragile domestic
political situation in Turkey due to the imminent presidential
elections and the general elections later this year.
Should the AKP government follow Buyukanit proposal and order a
cross-border operation, it would lead to a break between the AKP and
the US. If not, the AKP could be attacked for capitulating to Kurdish
"separatism."
The presidential election
The crisis between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey could hardly come at a
better time for the military. The military had exerted enormous
pressure on the AKP government with regard to the election of the
new president of Turkey. AKP leader and current prime minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has long indicated his ambitions for the presidential
seat. Now, the military is putting pressure on the AKP government to
allow a cross-border military operation, thus pushing the AKP into
a political mine field just before the presidential election.
The president is elected by the parliament for a seven-year term in
office and holds some important powers such as appointing rectors of
universities, the members of the Higher Education Council, the members
and the chairman of the state Supervisory Council, the members of the
Constitutional Court and one-fourth of the members of the Council of
State. He also appoints the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy
Chief Public Prosecutor of the Higher Court of Appeals, the members
of the Military High Court of Appeals, the members of the Supreme
Military Administrative Court and the members of the Supreme Council
of Judges and Public Prosecutors. These are the strongholds of the
Kemalist establishment and in a space of seven years with an Islamist
President, Islamists could seize them all one by one.
For his part, CHP leader Baykal chose to attack Erdogan personally,
accusing him of referring to then PKK leader Ocalan as "Mr. Ocalan"
on January 15, 2000, long before he became prime minister. The acronym
"Mr" in Turkey is exclusively reserved for respected members of the
society. Erdogan, on his part, managed to brush away this flimsy
attack. Even though the claim went to court based on Article 215
of Turkish Penal Code for the "crime" of "praising a crime and the
criminal," Erdogan was soon acquitted of all charges.
Other attempts are desperately being made. In particular, the idea of
reinterpreting the constitution came to fore. It is being argued that
two thirds of the parliamentary majority is required to "open" the
session to elect the president. AKP currently holds 354 parliamentary
seats and the presidential candidate cannot vote. By this logic,
AKP would be short of 14 seats to elect the president outright. AKP
argues that in 1989 during the election of 8th President Turgut Ozal,
the session was opened with a majority below two thirds. Against this,
CHP asserts that "a bad example cannot be the rule."
The nationalism that has been deliberately whipped up since 2005 is now
expected to play a decisive role in the decisions of the AKP. It has
already produced an atmosphere of intimidation by dragging writers,
translators, activists and other intellectuals into the courts, not
to mention open political opponents of the state. The stage has now
been set for a confrontation with AKP if Erdogan insists on himself
or another Islamist taking the summit of the state power in Turkey.
A similar episode occurred in 1997. After an ultimatum to weaken
the religious training schools the military put pressure on the
Islamist-led government to implement eight years of uninterrupted
compulsory primary education. On May 1997 hundreds of thousands
Islamists attended a huge demonstration in Istanbul as a display of
power, and in the wake of this demonstration Dogu Ergil of Turkish
Daily News wrote, "as the latest Sultanahmet demonstration proves,
they can rally together and bring one million people onto the streets
with a snap of the fingers." However this counter attack by Islamist
forces backfired when the military and the "secularist" front used
it as further proof of an immediate reactionary threat.
It appears that AKP would like to avoid such a confrontation. This
time, however, the Kemalist establishment organized a demonstration
against the Islamist government. Saturday's "Republic Rally" organized
by ADD and supported by CHP, DSP, IP, trade union federation Turk-Is,
but also right-wing extremist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party,
"Grey wolves"), managed to bring "hundreds of thousands" to the
streets according to the organizers, mainly from middle-class and
well educated layers. Some estimates put numbers at 100,000 to 200,000.
This was a large demonstration by any measure but it came after two
years of sustained campaigning against the government. Last Friday,
president Sezer himself tacitly supported the campaign by declaring
before military commanders, "Since the foundation of the Republic
Turkey's political regime has never been under this much threat ...
For the first time in history the fundamental values of the Republic
has been questioned and both domestic and foreign forces seek Turkey
to conform to the model of conservative Islam."
In a thinly veiled warning against an AKP president, Sezer said, "The
President represents the Republic's principles and constitution. In
other words, these principles and constitution defines the red lines
of the Turkish Republic's regime." Buyukanit at his press conference
on Thursday said almost the same, "We hope that someone who truly
respects the principles of the republic [becomes president], not
someone who pretends to do so."
After the demonstration, Erdogan did not appear unduly impressed and
remarked calmly that he was "happy to see a peaceful demonstration
like this in a democratic Turkey." In the Islamist media there were
no signs of panic.
In the face of growing pressure, Erdogan made a minor concession in
November 2006 by saying, "I have no bet to become the president."
However he ruled out the possibility of appointing someone outside of
the parliament, "Selecting an external candidate for presidency is an
example of helplessness. We will not be in such a helpless situation."
Since then AKP has tried to keep a low profile and avoid any clash with
the military. The party announced is would not select its presidential
candidate until April 25-the day before the deadline-in order to
limit controversy.
The Kemalist establishment argues that if elected as president,
the Islamists will usurp the regime and change the character of the
state. There is a grain of truth in this; however, history shows that
the interventionist methods currently promoted by the Kemalists have
consistently strengthened the Islamic parties. After the 1980 military
coup, Turgut Ozal came to power-a man with close links to political
Islamist circles. After the February 28, 1997, military intervention,
the Islamists swept to power with the AKP in the elections of 2002.
The root cause of the rise of the Islamic parties is the betrayal
of Stalinism and collapse of bourgeois nationalism in Turkey and
internationally, which has created a huge political vacuum that is
being exploited by the reactionary religious and ethnic nationalist
political tendencies. In the parliamentary elections of 2002, more
than ninety percent of all parliamentarians were voted out of office
at a time when parliament was dominated by the Kemalist clique.
The Kemalists represent the corrupt state bureaucracy, army and the
traditional big banks and corporations, while the Islamists represent
newer bourgeois layers who are no less ruthless, but keen to break up
the established structures in order make their own enrichment easier.
There is nothing progressive in either camp. The campaign of
nationalism and repression by the Kemalists under the battle cry of
secularism is in the final analysis directed against the democratic
rights of the working class.
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/apr2007/ turk-a16.shtml
By Kerem Kaya and Sinan Ikinci
World Socialist Web Site, MI
April 16 2007
As presidential elections approach, Turkey's political tensions
are continuing to intensify both domestically, between the Kemalist
establishment and the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government, as well as internationally, between the Turkish
establishment and the Iraqi Kurds.
The Turkish military is decisively leading both campaigns with support
from the "unarmed forces," a euphemism invented to describe supporters
of the military within influential business and political circles. The
principal protagonists of these forces are Deniz Baykal of Republican
People's Party (CHP), the main opposition leader, and the outgoing
president Ahmet Necdet Sezer. It also includes the Kemalist Thought
Association (ADD) and the Association for Supporting Modern Life
(CYDD), which are both by-products of the events of February 28,
1997, when the military intervened to oust a coalition government
led by the Islamic-based Welfare Party.
The head of ADD, Sener Eruygur, is a former general. Democratic
Left Party (DSP), and the Social Democrat People's Party (SHP) also
supported a march organized by the "unarmed forces" late last year.
CHP has long been acting as the civilian spokesman of the Turkish
military. In short, all the social democratic or "left-wing Kemalist"
parties, are included.
Less prominent members of this camp are the Turkish Industrialists'
and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) and the Union of Chambers of
Commerce (TTOBB). The Turkish Trade Union Confederation (Turk-Is)
and the Revolutionary Trade Union Confederation (DISK) are also active
together with Kemalist-Maoist Workers Party of Dogu Perincek.
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (who does not have a party affiliation)
also sides frequently with the military against the government.
It appears that the strategy of the military is to heighten tensions
domestically while capitalizing on the deteriorating Kurdish situation
in the east to increase pressure on the elected AKP government before
the general elections currently set for November.
In addition, the first round of parliamentary voting in the
presidential elections is scheduled for April 27.
The AKP government represents the moderate wing of political Islam in
Turkey. It was elected on November 3, 2004, with 34 percent of the
vote, a large enough margin to form a single party government. It
lost some of its base after establishing close relationships with
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implementing far reaching
austerity measures on behalf of the big business. Despite this, the
government still enjoys a measure of public support partly due to its
relative success in stabilizing the country's financial situation,
after 30 years of uninterrupted high inflation. The latest polls
show that the AKP enjoys the support of 25 to 30 percent of the
electorate. This level of support makes it very difficult to topple
an elected government via an outright military intervention and hence
comes the critical role played by the "unarmed forces."
A common feature of these forces, armed or otherwise, is their
determination to whip up a nationalist mood throughout the country.
In so doing they seek to exploit the international situation. The US
aggression in Iraq has destabilized Turkey's neighbors and created
an environment that the political establishment has used to spread
chauvinist and nationalist sentiments. Similarly, the brushing aside
of Turkey in the accession talks with the EU and the subsequent
nationalist rhetoric from both sides-especially the use of Kurdish,
Armenian and Cyprus questions by the EU as a means of pressure-played
into the hands of the nationalists in Turkey.
The Kurdish crisis
There is growing social unrest in eastern Turkey within the
predominantly Kurdish population. Social unrest in the region has
intensified since the Semdinli events of November 9, 2005, when
police intelligence officers (JIT) were caught in a provocative
bombing campaign against the civilian population and General Yasar
Buyukanit, the current chief of general staff, publicly praised one
of the bombers.
Last month, during the Kurdish New Year (Newroz) celebrations there
were many banners supporting the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party-the Kurdish
nationalist guerilla organisation) and pictures of Abdullah Ocalan,
the former PKK leader currently jailed by Turkey-despite the ban on
such Kurdish symbols. Since ending its 15-year long military campaign
towards the end of the 1990s and fruitless attempts to curry favor
with Turkish establishment, the PKK has now increased its military and
political activity inside Turkey. In response, there are reports that
Turkish military has drawn up a 250,000-strong contingency force in
the southeast region to combat the PKK near the Iraqi border. Buyukanit
said on Thursday that an all out offensive has started against PKK. On
April 8, Kurdish rebels killed nine members of Turkish security forces.
There is a growing threat that the Turkish army will invade northern
Iraq in the coming days to clamp down on PKK forces in their Iraqi
safe haven. As a result, tensions between Ankara, Washington and
the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, namely Barzani and Talabani,
have been growing over the last few months. Last month witnessed a
harsh clash of words between Ankara and Kurdish leaders, particularly
Barzani, the president of the Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Iraq.
The high point in this campaign was a press conference by Chief of
General Staff Buyukanit on Thursday attended by all military force
commanders in uniform. He accused the EU of "inventing" minorities
in Turkey, but made no direct criticism of the US. Buyukanit instead
declared that a cross-border operation to northern Iraq was necessary
and that the Turkish military was ready to move, but he emphasized
that the go-ahead was a political decision. This provoked defiant
responses from Iraqi Kurdish leaders, as well as conciliatory noises
from Washington.
Kemal Kerkuki, vice-president of Kurdish autonomous zone in northern
Iraq, remarked that "a military operation on Kurdish regional soils
would constitute a declaration of war directly against Iraq." He
said that there was no basis for claims by Turkey that the PKK is
receiving military and economic aid from the northern Iraqi government.
This comes on top of Barzani's remarks in an interview made at the
end of February but broadcast only recently in which he said that if
Turkey interferes with Kurdish plans to attach the oil-rich Iraqi city
of Kirkuk to the Kurdish autonomous zone, Iraq's Kurds would retaliate
by intervening in southeast Turkey, where the PKK mainly operates.
After Barzani's remarks Ankara sent an official ultimatum to the
Iraqi government. Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul said
they will do "whatever is necessary" unless Baghdad responds "as
expected." Spokesman for the ministry said that the ultimatum asks
for border security and the capture of members of the PKK and their
return to Turkey.
After this Washington immediately stepped in. Having acknowledged
that the PKK must be dealt with, US State Department spokesman Sean
McCormack said this should not be done unilaterally by Turkey.
Washington has also criticized Barzani for not being helpful in
dampening down the crisis. Assistant secretary of state for European
and Eurasian affairs Dan Fried went further and accused Barzani of
being "unwise."
In the past, Washington has issued harsher reactions against Turkish
threats to undertake military intervention in northern Iraq. This time,
however, they have clearly taken into account the fragile domestic
political situation in Turkey due to the imminent presidential
elections and the general elections later this year.
Should the AKP government follow Buyukanit proposal and order a
cross-border operation, it would lead to a break between the AKP and
the US. If not, the AKP could be attacked for capitulating to Kurdish
"separatism."
The presidential election
The crisis between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey could hardly come at a
better time for the military. The military had exerted enormous
pressure on the AKP government with regard to the election of the
new president of Turkey. AKP leader and current prime minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has long indicated his ambitions for the presidential
seat. Now, the military is putting pressure on the AKP government to
allow a cross-border military operation, thus pushing the AKP into
a political mine field just before the presidential election.
The president is elected by the parliament for a seven-year term in
office and holds some important powers such as appointing rectors of
universities, the members of the Higher Education Council, the members
and the chairman of the state Supervisory Council, the members of the
Constitutional Court and one-fourth of the members of the Council of
State. He also appoints the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy
Chief Public Prosecutor of the Higher Court of Appeals, the members
of the Military High Court of Appeals, the members of the Supreme
Military Administrative Court and the members of the Supreme Council
of Judges and Public Prosecutors. These are the strongholds of the
Kemalist establishment and in a space of seven years with an Islamist
President, Islamists could seize them all one by one.
For his part, CHP leader Baykal chose to attack Erdogan personally,
accusing him of referring to then PKK leader Ocalan as "Mr. Ocalan"
on January 15, 2000, long before he became prime minister. The acronym
"Mr" in Turkey is exclusively reserved for respected members of the
society. Erdogan, on his part, managed to brush away this flimsy
attack. Even though the claim went to court based on Article 215
of Turkish Penal Code for the "crime" of "praising a crime and the
criminal," Erdogan was soon acquitted of all charges.
Other attempts are desperately being made. In particular, the idea of
reinterpreting the constitution came to fore. It is being argued that
two thirds of the parliamentary majority is required to "open" the
session to elect the president. AKP currently holds 354 parliamentary
seats and the presidential candidate cannot vote. By this logic,
AKP would be short of 14 seats to elect the president outright. AKP
argues that in 1989 during the election of 8th President Turgut Ozal,
the session was opened with a majority below two thirds. Against this,
CHP asserts that "a bad example cannot be the rule."
The nationalism that has been deliberately whipped up since 2005 is now
expected to play a decisive role in the decisions of the AKP. It has
already produced an atmosphere of intimidation by dragging writers,
translators, activists and other intellectuals into the courts, not
to mention open political opponents of the state. The stage has now
been set for a confrontation with AKP if Erdogan insists on himself
or another Islamist taking the summit of the state power in Turkey.
A similar episode occurred in 1997. After an ultimatum to weaken
the religious training schools the military put pressure on the
Islamist-led government to implement eight years of uninterrupted
compulsory primary education. On May 1997 hundreds of thousands
Islamists attended a huge demonstration in Istanbul as a display of
power, and in the wake of this demonstration Dogu Ergil of Turkish
Daily News wrote, "as the latest Sultanahmet demonstration proves,
they can rally together and bring one million people onto the streets
with a snap of the fingers." However this counter attack by Islamist
forces backfired when the military and the "secularist" front used
it as further proof of an immediate reactionary threat.
It appears that AKP would like to avoid such a confrontation. This
time, however, the Kemalist establishment organized a demonstration
against the Islamist government. Saturday's "Republic Rally" organized
by ADD and supported by CHP, DSP, IP, trade union federation Turk-Is,
but also right-wing extremist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party,
"Grey wolves"), managed to bring "hundreds of thousands" to the
streets according to the organizers, mainly from middle-class and
well educated layers. Some estimates put numbers at 100,000 to 200,000.
This was a large demonstration by any measure but it came after two
years of sustained campaigning against the government. Last Friday,
president Sezer himself tacitly supported the campaign by declaring
before military commanders, "Since the foundation of the Republic
Turkey's political regime has never been under this much threat ...
For the first time in history the fundamental values of the Republic
has been questioned and both domestic and foreign forces seek Turkey
to conform to the model of conservative Islam."
In a thinly veiled warning against an AKP president, Sezer said, "The
President represents the Republic's principles and constitution. In
other words, these principles and constitution defines the red lines
of the Turkish Republic's regime." Buyukanit at his press conference
on Thursday said almost the same, "We hope that someone who truly
respects the principles of the republic [becomes president], not
someone who pretends to do so."
After the demonstration, Erdogan did not appear unduly impressed and
remarked calmly that he was "happy to see a peaceful demonstration
like this in a democratic Turkey." In the Islamist media there were
no signs of panic.
In the face of growing pressure, Erdogan made a minor concession in
November 2006 by saying, "I have no bet to become the president."
However he ruled out the possibility of appointing someone outside of
the parliament, "Selecting an external candidate for presidency is an
example of helplessness. We will not be in such a helpless situation."
Since then AKP has tried to keep a low profile and avoid any clash with
the military. The party announced is would not select its presidential
candidate until April 25-the day before the deadline-in order to
limit controversy.
The Kemalist establishment argues that if elected as president,
the Islamists will usurp the regime and change the character of the
state. There is a grain of truth in this; however, history shows that
the interventionist methods currently promoted by the Kemalists have
consistently strengthened the Islamic parties. After the 1980 military
coup, Turgut Ozal came to power-a man with close links to political
Islamist circles. After the February 28, 1997, military intervention,
the Islamists swept to power with the AKP in the elections of 2002.
The root cause of the rise of the Islamic parties is the betrayal
of Stalinism and collapse of bourgeois nationalism in Turkey and
internationally, which has created a huge political vacuum that is
being exploited by the reactionary religious and ethnic nationalist
political tendencies. In the parliamentary elections of 2002, more
than ninety percent of all parliamentarians were voted out of office
at a time when parliament was dominated by the Kemalist clique.
The Kemalists represent the corrupt state bureaucracy, army and the
traditional big banks and corporations, while the Islamists represent
newer bourgeois layers who are no less ruthless, but keen to break up
the established structures in order make their own enrichment easier.
There is nothing progressive in either camp. The campaign of
nationalism and repression by the Kemalists under the battle cry of
secularism is in the final analysis directed against the democratic
rights of the working class.
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/apr2007/ turk-a16.shtml