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KOSOVO ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA
RIA Novosti, Russia
April 17 2007
MOSCOW. (Fyodor Lukyanov for RIA Novosti) - The process of determining
Kosovo's future status has entered its final stage.
Western officials keep saying that this case is unique and has nothing
to do with other breakaway territories (i.e. Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Transdnestr, Nagorny Karabakh, and potentially, several hotbeds within
the European Union).
But the closer the verdict, the clearer it becomes that Kosovo's
sovereignty will tangibly influence international affairs regardless
of whether Moscow insists on a uniform approach to all frozen conflicts
or not.
It is beyond doubt that the Kosovo scenario cannot be a model for other
cases. Outwardly similar, these national territorial conflicts have
very different backgrounds. Since times immemorial, such disputes have
been settled not by their direct participants but by the great powers.
Since the 19th century they have been mapping out the national borders
in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in Africa and other parts of the
globe, guided by their own perception of historical justice.
As a rule, these division lines generated more strife but there was
no other way of resolving the problem. Today, the question boils down
to how correctly the powers that be calculate potential consequences -
for themselves and for the general course of development.
For Russia, defining a clear-cut position on the Kosovo problem
is a real conundrum because too many different factors have to be
considered.
Under the circumstances, implementation of Ahtisaari's proposal will
create a precedent - the recognized borders of a sovereign state are
being changed without its consent and after the use of outside force.
This is a dangerous step in the context of international law, and any
country giving its consent to such a scenario, particularly such a
heterogeneous one as Russia, is bound to project it onto itself. For
this reason, many Russian experts are not particularly enthusiastic
about the ideas of the former Finnish president.
Although the EU has officially backed the settlement proposal, some
EU countries are doubtful about its validity, while Slovakia has
openly opposed it. It is abundantly clear that separatists of all
hues will be the first to view Kosovo as a precedent. Nobody will
convince people in Abkhazia or even the Basque Country, for example,
that the Kosovars have the right to independence but they do not.
Importantly, everyone (including Serbia) understands that the Kosovo
Albanians will not tolerate Belgrade's control again, and trying to
achieve this makes no sense. Russia can display Slavic solidarity
by dragging out the time and giving the Serbs chips for intensive
bargaining and changing the suggested format. Belgrade's hopes for
a Russian veto in the Security Council are probably not justified.
Moscow is not likely to risk its versatile interests in relations
with the West for the sake of a patently unrealistic goal.
Incidentally, Russia's potential veto may have very dangerous
consequences. The United States and some of its European partners
may well recognize Kosovo unilaterally. Everyone who remembers the
Balkan events in the early 1990s knows what such actions can lead to.
Be that as it may, but Kosovo's legal independence will encourage
unrecognized territories and domestic political forces to subject the
Russian leaders to tremendous pressure. The latter include national
populists who want to increase the Russian territory at all costs and
the elites of North Ossetia and republics with Circassian population -
Adyghe, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Circassia. This is the last
thing the Kremlin wants at the peak of the election season. But Russia
cannot distance itself from the self-proclaimed republics, either -
having supported them for many years, it has become responsible for
their destiny.
Perhaps Russia should use the situation and recognize their
independence? In theory, this is possible but in practice it is
difficult to predict all the consequences.
To start with, Moscow's attitude to these conflicts is different.
While openly supporting the drive for independence in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Transdnestr, it has refrained from any statements
on Nagorny Karabakh. The reason is clear - in the past several years,
Azerbaijan has become an influential and strategically important
country, and Moscow does not want to quarrel with it. However, if
the process gets underway, Nagorny Karabakh will not remain neutral.
Chaos on both sides of the Caucasus ridge is not in Russia's interests.
Transdnestr is a special case, too. It has no borders with Russia,
and if it comes to self-determination, the form and speed of the
process will primarily depend on neighboring Ukraine. If Moscow is
ready to recognize Tiraspol unilaterally, it will have to supply
Transdnestr with goods via an air bridge like the U.S. did when it
helped West Berlin in 1948.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been largely integrated into Russian
legal and political space. But their unilateral recognition will
substantially complicate the situation because Moscow will have to
assume full responsibility both for these territories and further
events in the Caucasus. Russia will have to deal with the direct
and tough resistance of the West that does not approve of Russia's
current policy towards these territories. It makes sense to weigh
all pros and cons of such an action.
Kosovo settlement is a political example of a situation that is
called zugzwang in chess - it is time to make a move but any move
will potentially worsen the situation. Russia is aware of that and
this is why its position is vague. Regrettably, the Western powers,
particularly the U.S., do not seem to realize that, and are rushing
to finish the game, thereby laying the foundation for even more
complicated conflicts.
Fyodor Lukyanov is chief editor of the Russia in Global Affairs
magazine and member of the RIA Novosti Expert Council
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
RIA Novosti, Russia
April 17 2007
MOSCOW. (Fyodor Lukyanov for RIA Novosti) - The process of determining
Kosovo's future status has entered its final stage.
Western officials keep saying that this case is unique and has nothing
to do with other breakaway territories (i.e. Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Transdnestr, Nagorny Karabakh, and potentially, several hotbeds within
the European Union).
But the closer the verdict, the clearer it becomes that Kosovo's
sovereignty will tangibly influence international affairs regardless
of whether Moscow insists on a uniform approach to all frozen conflicts
or not.
It is beyond doubt that the Kosovo scenario cannot be a model for other
cases. Outwardly similar, these national territorial conflicts have
very different backgrounds. Since times immemorial, such disputes have
been settled not by their direct participants but by the great powers.
Since the 19th century they have been mapping out the national borders
in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in Africa and other parts of the
globe, guided by their own perception of historical justice.
As a rule, these division lines generated more strife but there was
no other way of resolving the problem. Today, the question boils down
to how correctly the powers that be calculate potential consequences -
for themselves and for the general course of development.
For Russia, defining a clear-cut position on the Kosovo problem
is a real conundrum because too many different factors have to be
considered.
Under the circumstances, implementation of Ahtisaari's proposal will
create a precedent - the recognized borders of a sovereign state are
being changed without its consent and after the use of outside force.
This is a dangerous step in the context of international law, and any
country giving its consent to such a scenario, particularly such a
heterogeneous one as Russia, is bound to project it onto itself. For
this reason, many Russian experts are not particularly enthusiastic
about the ideas of the former Finnish president.
Although the EU has officially backed the settlement proposal, some
EU countries are doubtful about its validity, while Slovakia has
openly opposed it. It is abundantly clear that separatists of all
hues will be the first to view Kosovo as a precedent. Nobody will
convince people in Abkhazia or even the Basque Country, for example,
that the Kosovars have the right to independence but they do not.
Importantly, everyone (including Serbia) understands that the Kosovo
Albanians will not tolerate Belgrade's control again, and trying to
achieve this makes no sense. Russia can display Slavic solidarity
by dragging out the time and giving the Serbs chips for intensive
bargaining and changing the suggested format. Belgrade's hopes for
a Russian veto in the Security Council are probably not justified.
Moscow is not likely to risk its versatile interests in relations
with the West for the sake of a patently unrealistic goal.
Incidentally, Russia's potential veto may have very dangerous
consequences. The United States and some of its European partners
may well recognize Kosovo unilaterally. Everyone who remembers the
Balkan events in the early 1990s knows what such actions can lead to.
Be that as it may, but Kosovo's legal independence will encourage
unrecognized territories and domestic political forces to subject the
Russian leaders to tremendous pressure. The latter include national
populists who want to increase the Russian territory at all costs and
the elites of North Ossetia and republics with Circassian population -
Adyghe, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Circassia. This is the last
thing the Kremlin wants at the peak of the election season. But Russia
cannot distance itself from the self-proclaimed republics, either -
having supported them for many years, it has become responsible for
their destiny.
Perhaps Russia should use the situation and recognize their
independence? In theory, this is possible but in practice it is
difficult to predict all the consequences.
To start with, Moscow's attitude to these conflicts is different.
While openly supporting the drive for independence in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Transdnestr, it has refrained from any statements
on Nagorny Karabakh. The reason is clear - in the past several years,
Azerbaijan has become an influential and strategically important
country, and Moscow does not want to quarrel with it. However, if
the process gets underway, Nagorny Karabakh will not remain neutral.
Chaos on both sides of the Caucasus ridge is not in Russia's interests.
Transdnestr is a special case, too. It has no borders with Russia,
and if it comes to self-determination, the form and speed of the
process will primarily depend on neighboring Ukraine. If Moscow is
ready to recognize Tiraspol unilaterally, it will have to supply
Transdnestr with goods via an air bridge like the U.S. did when it
helped West Berlin in 1948.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been largely integrated into Russian
legal and political space. But their unilateral recognition will
substantially complicate the situation because Moscow will have to
assume full responsibility both for these territories and further
events in the Caucasus. Russia will have to deal with the direct
and tough resistance of the West that does not approve of Russia's
current policy towards these territories. It makes sense to weigh
all pros and cons of such an action.
Kosovo settlement is a political example of a situation that is
called zugzwang in chess - it is time to make a move but any move
will potentially worsen the situation. Russia is aware of that and
this is why its position is vague. Regrettably, the Western powers,
particularly the U.S., do not seem to realize that, and are rushing
to finish the game, thereby laying the foundation for even more
complicated conflicts.
Fyodor Lukyanov is chief editor of the Russia in Global Affairs
magazine and member of the RIA Novosti Expert Council
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress