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GREEK-TURKISH MILITARY ALTERCATIONS EXPECTED AS CYPRUS READIES FOR OFFSHORE OIL EXPLORATION
By Ioannis Michaletos and Christopher Deliso
Balkanalysis.com, AZ
April 22 2007
A major military face-off between perennial rivals Greece and Turkey
is looming, motivated by Turkish alarm over the imminent plan of the
Cypriot government to explore for oil in the Mediterranean Sea. The
showdown will reach a peak sometime between May 20-July 20, according
to Greek media reports, now confirmed by high-level sources in Athens
and in Western Europe.
This violence will most likely come about through yet another
provocative encounter between military aircraft over the eastern
Aegean, as was witnessed with last summer's F-16 collision that left
one Greek pilot dead. The Greek fighter planes encountered Turkish
planes near the island of Karpathos, well within Greek territory. The
majority of simulated dogfights, which take place on a regular basis
and have one positive result (of giving the pilots some real-life
training), however take place closer to Turkey and the Aegean coast
where several islets disputed by Turkey lie. The closest Greece and
Turkey came to war was a decade ago, over such an islet near Kalymnos.
The summer 2006 altercation occurred, Greek media widely speculated,
because of intense Turkish interest in state-of-the-art Russian-made
mobile anti-aircraft units in place in the Lassithi prefecture of
eastern Crete. This suspicion was quickly confirmed by military
sources in Athens. The question now is whether Turkey's level of
interest would exceed that of last year, in relation to the emerging
situation in Cyprus.
Nicosia's bold initiative to explore for oil, with the assistance
of multinational oil companies, has brought the Turkish military to
near-panic mode. A successful find and subsequent investment would
dramatically increase the Greek Cypriot government's foreign support
and thus bargaining position with Turkey over the divided island.
Cyprus' geopolitical value, even preliminary to hydrocarbons, lies
in its strategic location, between three continents, near Israel and
a stop en route to Suez. During the Israeli-Lebanese conflict last
summer, thousands of foreign tourists, including many Americans, were
evacuated quickly to Cyprus- a fact gratefully acknowledged by the US
government when it sent a naval vessel to Cyprus on a goodwill visit
meant to recognize the Cypriot contribution to securing the safety
of Americans during the fighting.
Until now, the international community has tended to view Cyprus only
in terms of its perennial security problem, resulting from the 1974
Turkish invasion and occupation, in an operation called Attila (1
&2). However, 2007 looks likely to be the year in which Cyprus takes
the first steps towards becoming an energy hub- if the government's
plan to proceed in exploiting the rumored hydrocarbon reservoirs
deep beneath the Eastern Mediterranean Basin are allowed to go on
unimpeded by military provocations further north.
In December 2006, the first media reports came out of Nicosia revealing
the intention of the Cypriot government to search for oil assumed to
be found offshore, southwest of the island. Moreover, Cyprus then
signed agreements with Lebanon and Egypt so as to draw lines in
relation with the zones allocated to each state.
In late January 2007, the Turkish leader of the self-proclaimed
Republic of North Cyprus, Mehmet Ali Talat, stated that an
unpredictable situation might occur should Cyprus go along with its
initial plan. Basically, the Turkish leader formulated a threatening
scenario backed by the government of Turkey, considering that it was
soon followed by a warning from Ankara to Beirut and Cairo not to
proceed along with Cyprus in exploiting oil deposits in the region.
When the Cypriot announcement was made, Turkey seemed to be caught
off-guard diplomatically; it had assumed Cyprus would not be able
to initiate such a dramatic decision that could alter the political
realities in the Eastern Mediterranean should oil is found. Greece
has not voiced full support for Cyprus yet, deciding not to inflame
the already delicate Greek-Turkish relations.
However, behind the scenes the Greeks are taking great care to ensure
that the situation does not escalate, and if it does, that the military
is prepared. According to information received by Balkanalysis.com
from high-level military sources in Athens, the Greek army went on
an emergency footing on April 7, in anticipation of a new Turkish
provocation in the eastern Aegean. This source also cited the period
of greatest danger as being roughly between May 20-July 20.
Among the likely spillover effects of this will be to dramatically
alter the discussions that will take place on the sidelines at NATO's
upcoming round-table discussion, set for late June in Ohrid. While
most of the private discussion between officials (delegations are
expected from dozens of countries) is expected to center around
NATO enlargement, energy security and the Kosovo issue, a breakout
of hostilities between Greece and Turkey would put these issues on
the back burner, at least temporarily.
For the first time in its history, perhaps, Cyprus is with the
oil issue formatting a policy that will empower its diplomatic
arsenal without having to rely on Athens. Of course, this does not
mean any breakdown in the traditional alliance and common national
bonds between these two states populated by the same nation. What
is essential, though, is that the entrance of Cyprus into the EU,
and the overall economic dynamism of the island have enabled it to
become more resilient in promoting its national interests. A first
consequence of this new confidence would be the ability of Greece
to concentrate its efforts around Greek-Turkish relations in a more
advantageous level than before. Simply put, if Cyprus is strong enough
to look after itself on its own, Greece will have more resources to
spare on other fronts relating to Turkish territorial claims that
have led the two countries towards conflict, as was seen in 1955,
1964, 1974, 1987 and 1996.
Following the oil announcement, the Turkish Navy reportedly patrolled
the area in question, even though no concrete date on its activities
could be found. During the past few months, quite a few Turkish
analysts, journalists and public officials have proclaimed a looming
crisis in case Cyprus becomes an oil-producing country, thus creating
the perfect framework by which the European Union could accuse Ankara
of not conforming to European norms. This would, of course, hinder
Turkey's ability to seek an eventual entrance in the union
On the purely business level, the possibility of oil underneath
Mediterranean Sea in a period of global concern on energy
security; has attracted the attention of most of the world's oil
multinationals. Large oil companies from the USA, Russia, UK and China,
Norway, France and Germany seem to be interested in investing in the
assumed hydrocarbon reserves offshore Cyprus.
Despite Turkish opposition, Cyprus has already begun the process of
initiating a bidding procedure for the aforementioned oil fields. 11
areas off of southern Cyprus will be the first where the tests for
oil will begin. The total surface area is around 70,000 sq. km,
and there are also good indications of discovering natural gas as well.
French consultants employed by the Cypriot government have already
stated that at depths in excess of 3,000 meters there is also a high
probability of discovering gas fields as well.
Cyprus has already stated that it will issue three types of permit
in relation to the oil fields. The first will be for tests covering a
one-year time-frame, the second for three years and lastly a 25-year
development license according to which the companies will be able to
produce and process oil and gas. As part of its marketing endeavors,
from now until mid-July (when the first permits are set to be issued),
the Cypriot government plans to organize trips across the major oil
capitals of the world in order to market the new riches of the island
to prospective investors.
The Americans, who traditionally have placed more weight on the special
relationship with Ankara than with Nicosia, have expressed a neutral
position and the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Ronald Schilcher, has stated
in Cypriot media that it is a sovereign right of the Cypriot Republic
to conduct any kind or research on its territory.
Currently, American interests dictate a wide interest in every new
oil field that could produce adequate amounts of oil, so as to secure
the West from either Russian or Arab control. Therefore, if Cyprus
is a country abundant with that resource, the US would be more than
happy to support its initiatives and of course to gain a percentage
through their own oil conglomerates. Cyprus could thus be considered
to be traveling a course towards a NATO entrance, since the alliance
has apparently been reincarnated as an armed safeguard of Western
'energy security' vis-a-vis Russia.
What is most interesting is the absence of any Greek interference
during the past few months, even at the level of mere rhetoric,
against Turkey's aggressive threats to Cyprus. Even though there are
still quite a few incidents between Greece and Turkey due to continuous
airspace violations by Turkish fighter planes, and a sense of stressful
relations between the two states; Greece did not take advantage of
this situation to bash Ankara in Brussels, or to protest before the
international community about Turkey's hardline attitude against Cyprus
(a nation with 1/100 of its population). Most probably, the Greek
government wants to let international interests make their intentions
known - a process that will unfold over the coming months and until
July - before it makes a statement. That is, unless the anticipated
showdown in the Aegean occurs, and forces Athens' hand in advance.
Western consulting firms to the oil and gas industries have had their
hands full with the Cyprus dossier for the past several months.
According to one consultant closely related with the American
intelligence establishment, "some of the companies interested are
leery about the risk of potential violence, which we have been aware
of and relayed to them." And so, the source states, oil interests find
themselves trying to decide whether the anticipated riches outweigh
the reward.
Relevant to this is another side effect of possible Turkish
aggression, about which the Greek intelligence services are not
entirely unaware. That is the specter, on the other side of the
Turkish frontier, of an increase in activity from the Kurdish PKK
and intensified activity on the Turkish-Iraqi border. Whether such
activity could be orchestrated by Greece as a defensive mechanism,
or materialize simply as a Kurdish tactic for taking advantage of a
moment when Turkey's military is looking westward rather than eastward,
is unclear (Greece did, of course, support former PKK leader Abdullah
Ocalan surreptitiously in the 1990's). In either case, however, it
is likely that in the case of violence in the Aegean within the May
20-July 20 time-frame, Kurdish insurgents will try to take advantage of
the situation and fighting in eastern Turkey is expected to increase.
Turkey indeed feels immensely pressed by four very challenging
factors. Firstly, the Kurdish affair interrelates with American and
Israeli strategies in the Middle East, and Turkey finds itself in
a most unpleasant situation, since its interests do not harmonize
with those of these others. Further applicable issues show why the
industry analysts and defense experts on the region are concerned
about the potentially chaotic and unpredictable outcome of the next
few months in Turkey.
A declaration of an independent Kurdish state that would act as
a bulwark against Iran and Syria and, most importantly, become a
staunch ally in the post -Saddam Iraq for the Americans would be a
disaster of staggering proportions for internal Turkish politics.
Roughly 20 percent of Turkish citizens have Kurdish descent and the
prospect of a future disintegration of the southeastern provinces
could not be excluded in such a case. Secondly, the Presidential
elections in Turkey have once again revealed the wide chasm between the
secular Kemalist classes against the populist Islamist one associated
with the AK Party of Prime Minister (and presidential candidate)
Erdogan. Further, the always doubtful prospect of successful accession
negotiations between Brussels and Turkey is fading, and with it the
major justification from the Turkish political class for internal
'pro-Western' reforms. Since the Cypriot initiative to search
for oil might result in a diminishing of Turkish influence in the
East Mediterranean and promote Cyprus to the status of an oil-rich
country protected by the all-powerful global corporations, Turkey
is understandably nervous about the future of an island which its
generals like to refer to as a 'dagger pointed at the heart of Turkey.'
Related Issues: the French, British and Germans Eye Cyprus
In 1960, with the creation of an independent Cypriot Republic,
Greece, Turkey and the UK were identified as the guarantors of the
island, and under that pretext Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. Since
then Cyprus has developed strong relations with the USA, Russia and
surprisingly, over the past few months with France. The war in Lebanon
last summer gave a tremendous boost to the bilateral relations of the
two states. France is the guarantor power for the Lebanese Maronites
and has played over the centuries an active role in the region. Cyprus
was an integral base that secured the evacuation of more than 150,000
refugees from the war-torn area, which led to a program of cooperation
with Paris on a technical and military level (on a symbolic level,
perhaps this new friendship was hinted at it when Cyprus selected a
French-language song as its Eurovision entry for 2007).
In late February 2007, the two states signed a defense agreement that
is of profound importance for all countries involved in the Cyprus
quagmire. The agreement details exchange of information, military
training, joint naval exercises and cooperation in S&R missions as
well as with issues concerning illegal immigration, terrorism and
organized crime. Furthermore, France was allowed to use the military
base situated in Pafos in order to deploy its naval and air force
units when necessary.
The Cypriot minister of foreign affairs has noted that "the crisis in
Lebanon gave both countries the chance to cooperate in the military
field with benefits not only for both countries but mainly for Middle
East countries. I wish and hope that just as Cyprus proved to be a
factor of stability in the Middle East region, the solution to the
Cyprus problem and Cyprus' reunification will prove that Cyprus can,
be reunited with the cooperation of all partners such as France,
help in peace and stability in the region."
A key factor now, therefore, is the likely extension of French
influence in the most strategically critical state in the region,
and the results that this will have for the position of the United
Kingdom. In comparison to Greece and Turkey; the UK does not
have ethnological or historical ties with Cyprus, apart from its
80-year stint as a colonial (and unpopular) administrative power. A
French-British rivalry played out in Cyprus over the coming years
thus becomes likely. And this will involve some regional alliances
and antipathies as well.
Turkey, for its part, has long experienced strained relations with
Paris due to the latter's suspiciously timely decision to recognize the
so-called Armenian genocide of 1915-1921 The French electorate is also
rather opposed to Turkish EU membership and a Sarkozy presidential
victory could further chill relations. Through Cyprus, the French
have finally found a way to expand their influence in the Eastern
Mediterranean, with or without Turkish assistance. The British, by
contrast, have been far more conciliatory to the Turks, with the Blair
government one of the strongest supporters of Turkish EU membership.
http://www.balkanalysis.com/2007/04/2 2/greek-turkish-military-altercations-expected-as- cyprus-readies-for-offshore-oil-exploration/
By Ioannis Michaletos and Christopher Deliso
Balkanalysis.com, AZ
April 22 2007
A major military face-off between perennial rivals Greece and Turkey
is looming, motivated by Turkish alarm over the imminent plan of the
Cypriot government to explore for oil in the Mediterranean Sea. The
showdown will reach a peak sometime between May 20-July 20, according
to Greek media reports, now confirmed by high-level sources in Athens
and in Western Europe.
This violence will most likely come about through yet another
provocative encounter between military aircraft over the eastern
Aegean, as was witnessed with last summer's F-16 collision that left
one Greek pilot dead. The Greek fighter planes encountered Turkish
planes near the island of Karpathos, well within Greek territory. The
majority of simulated dogfights, which take place on a regular basis
and have one positive result (of giving the pilots some real-life
training), however take place closer to Turkey and the Aegean coast
where several islets disputed by Turkey lie. The closest Greece and
Turkey came to war was a decade ago, over such an islet near Kalymnos.
The summer 2006 altercation occurred, Greek media widely speculated,
because of intense Turkish interest in state-of-the-art Russian-made
mobile anti-aircraft units in place in the Lassithi prefecture of
eastern Crete. This suspicion was quickly confirmed by military
sources in Athens. The question now is whether Turkey's level of
interest would exceed that of last year, in relation to the emerging
situation in Cyprus.
Nicosia's bold initiative to explore for oil, with the assistance
of multinational oil companies, has brought the Turkish military to
near-panic mode. A successful find and subsequent investment would
dramatically increase the Greek Cypriot government's foreign support
and thus bargaining position with Turkey over the divided island.
Cyprus' geopolitical value, even preliminary to hydrocarbons, lies
in its strategic location, between three continents, near Israel and
a stop en route to Suez. During the Israeli-Lebanese conflict last
summer, thousands of foreign tourists, including many Americans, were
evacuated quickly to Cyprus- a fact gratefully acknowledged by the US
government when it sent a naval vessel to Cyprus on a goodwill visit
meant to recognize the Cypriot contribution to securing the safety
of Americans during the fighting.
Until now, the international community has tended to view Cyprus only
in terms of its perennial security problem, resulting from the 1974
Turkish invasion and occupation, in an operation called Attila (1
&2). However, 2007 looks likely to be the year in which Cyprus takes
the first steps towards becoming an energy hub- if the government's
plan to proceed in exploiting the rumored hydrocarbon reservoirs
deep beneath the Eastern Mediterranean Basin are allowed to go on
unimpeded by military provocations further north.
In December 2006, the first media reports came out of Nicosia revealing
the intention of the Cypriot government to search for oil assumed to
be found offshore, southwest of the island. Moreover, Cyprus then
signed agreements with Lebanon and Egypt so as to draw lines in
relation with the zones allocated to each state.
In late January 2007, the Turkish leader of the self-proclaimed
Republic of North Cyprus, Mehmet Ali Talat, stated that an
unpredictable situation might occur should Cyprus go along with its
initial plan. Basically, the Turkish leader formulated a threatening
scenario backed by the government of Turkey, considering that it was
soon followed by a warning from Ankara to Beirut and Cairo not to
proceed along with Cyprus in exploiting oil deposits in the region.
When the Cypriot announcement was made, Turkey seemed to be caught
off-guard diplomatically; it had assumed Cyprus would not be able
to initiate such a dramatic decision that could alter the political
realities in the Eastern Mediterranean should oil is found. Greece
has not voiced full support for Cyprus yet, deciding not to inflame
the already delicate Greek-Turkish relations.
However, behind the scenes the Greeks are taking great care to ensure
that the situation does not escalate, and if it does, that the military
is prepared. According to information received by Balkanalysis.com
from high-level military sources in Athens, the Greek army went on
an emergency footing on April 7, in anticipation of a new Turkish
provocation in the eastern Aegean. This source also cited the period
of greatest danger as being roughly between May 20-July 20.
Among the likely spillover effects of this will be to dramatically
alter the discussions that will take place on the sidelines at NATO's
upcoming round-table discussion, set for late June in Ohrid. While
most of the private discussion between officials (delegations are
expected from dozens of countries) is expected to center around
NATO enlargement, energy security and the Kosovo issue, a breakout
of hostilities between Greece and Turkey would put these issues on
the back burner, at least temporarily.
For the first time in its history, perhaps, Cyprus is with the
oil issue formatting a policy that will empower its diplomatic
arsenal without having to rely on Athens. Of course, this does not
mean any breakdown in the traditional alliance and common national
bonds between these two states populated by the same nation. What
is essential, though, is that the entrance of Cyprus into the EU,
and the overall economic dynamism of the island have enabled it to
become more resilient in promoting its national interests. A first
consequence of this new confidence would be the ability of Greece
to concentrate its efforts around Greek-Turkish relations in a more
advantageous level than before. Simply put, if Cyprus is strong enough
to look after itself on its own, Greece will have more resources to
spare on other fronts relating to Turkish territorial claims that
have led the two countries towards conflict, as was seen in 1955,
1964, 1974, 1987 and 1996.
Following the oil announcement, the Turkish Navy reportedly patrolled
the area in question, even though no concrete date on its activities
could be found. During the past few months, quite a few Turkish
analysts, journalists and public officials have proclaimed a looming
crisis in case Cyprus becomes an oil-producing country, thus creating
the perfect framework by which the European Union could accuse Ankara
of not conforming to European norms. This would, of course, hinder
Turkey's ability to seek an eventual entrance in the union
On the purely business level, the possibility of oil underneath
Mediterranean Sea in a period of global concern on energy
security; has attracted the attention of most of the world's oil
multinationals. Large oil companies from the USA, Russia, UK and China,
Norway, France and Germany seem to be interested in investing in the
assumed hydrocarbon reserves offshore Cyprus.
Despite Turkish opposition, Cyprus has already begun the process of
initiating a bidding procedure for the aforementioned oil fields. 11
areas off of southern Cyprus will be the first where the tests for
oil will begin. The total surface area is around 70,000 sq. km,
and there are also good indications of discovering natural gas as well.
French consultants employed by the Cypriot government have already
stated that at depths in excess of 3,000 meters there is also a high
probability of discovering gas fields as well.
Cyprus has already stated that it will issue three types of permit
in relation to the oil fields. The first will be for tests covering a
one-year time-frame, the second for three years and lastly a 25-year
development license according to which the companies will be able to
produce and process oil and gas. As part of its marketing endeavors,
from now until mid-July (when the first permits are set to be issued),
the Cypriot government plans to organize trips across the major oil
capitals of the world in order to market the new riches of the island
to prospective investors.
The Americans, who traditionally have placed more weight on the special
relationship with Ankara than with Nicosia, have expressed a neutral
position and the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Ronald Schilcher, has stated
in Cypriot media that it is a sovereign right of the Cypriot Republic
to conduct any kind or research on its territory.
Currently, American interests dictate a wide interest in every new
oil field that could produce adequate amounts of oil, so as to secure
the West from either Russian or Arab control. Therefore, if Cyprus
is a country abundant with that resource, the US would be more than
happy to support its initiatives and of course to gain a percentage
through their own oil conglomerates. Cyprus could thus be considered
to be traveling a course towards a NATO entrance, since the alliance
has apparently been reincarnated as an armed safeguard of Western
'energy security' vis-a-vis Russia.
What is most interesting is the absence of any Greek interference
during the past few months, even at the level of mere rhetoric,
against Turkey's aggressive threats to Cyprus. Even though there are
still quite a few incidents between Greece and Turkey due to continuous
airspace violations by Turkish fighter planes, and a sense of stressful
relations between the two states; Greece did not take advantage of
this situation to bash Ankara in Brussels, or to protest before the
international community about Turkey's hardline attitude against Cyprus
(a nation with 1/100 of its population). Most probably, the Greek
government wants to let international interests make their intentions
known - a process that will unfold over the coming months and until
July - before it makes a statement. That is, unless the anticipated
showdown in the Aegean occurs, and forces Athens' hand in advance.
Western consulting firms to the oil and gas industries have had their
hands full with the Cyprus dossier for the past several months.
According to one consultant closely related with the American
intelligence establishment, "some of the companies interested are
leery about the risk of potential violence, which we have been aware
of and relayed to them." And so, the source states, oil interests find
themselves trying to decide whether the anticipated riches outweigh
the reward.
Relevant to this is another side effect of possible Turkish
aggression, about which the Greek intelligence services are not
entirely unaware. That is the specter, on the other side of the
Turkish frontier, of an increase in activity from the Kurdish PKK
and intensified activity on the Turkish-Iraqi border. Whether such
activity could be orchestrated by Greece as a defensive mechanism,
or materialize simply as a Kurdish tactic for taking advantage of a
moment when Turkey's military is looking westward rather than eastward,
is unclear (Greece did, of course, support former PKK leader Abdullah
Ocalan surreptitiously in the 1990's). In either case, however, it
is likely that in the case of violence in the Aegean within the May
20-July 20 time-frame, Kurdish insurgents will try to take advantage of
the situation and fighting in eastern Turkey is expected to increase.
Turkey indeed feels immensely pressed by four very challenging
factors. Firstly, the Kurdish affair interrelates with American and
Israeli strategies in the Middle East, and Turkey finds itself in
a most unpleasant situation, since its interests do not harmonize
with those of these others. Further applicable issues show why the
industry analysts and defense experts on the region are concerned
about the potentially chaotic and unpredictable outcome of the next
few months in Turkey.
A declaration of an independent Kurdish state that would act as
a bulwark against Iran and Syria and, most importantly, become a
staunch ally in the post -Saddam Iraq for the Americans would be a
disaster of staggering proportions for internal Turkish politics.
Roughly 20 percent of Turkish citizens have Kurdish descent and the
prospect of a future disintegration of the southeastern provinces
could not be excluded in such a case. Secondly, the Presidential
elections in Turkey have once again revealed the wide chasm between the
secular Kemalist classes against the populist Islamist one associated
with the AK Party of Prime Minister (and presidential candidate)
Erdogan. Further, the always doubtful prospect of successful accession
negotiations between Brussels and Turkey is fading, and with it the
major justification from the Turkish political class for internal
'pro-Western' reforms. Since the Cypriot initiative to search
for oil might result in a diminishing of Turkish influence in the
East Mediterranean and promote Cyprus to the status of an oil-rich
country protected by the all-powerful global corporations, Turkey
is understandably nervous about the future of an island which its
generals like to refer to as a 'dagger pointed at the heart of Turkey.'
Related Issues: the French, British and Germans Eye Cyprus
In 1960, with the creation of an independent Cypriot Republic,
Greece, Turkey and the UK were identified as the guarantors of the
island, and under that pretext Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. Since
then Cyprus has developed strong relations with the USA, Russia and
surprisingly, over the past few months with France. The war in Lebanon
last summer gave a tremendous boost to the bilateral relations of the
two states. France is the guarantor power for the Lebanese Maronites
and has played over the centuries an active role in the region. Cyprus
was an integral base that secured the evacuation of more than 150,000
refugees from the war-torn area, which led to a program of cooperation
with Paris on a technical and military level (on a symbolic level,
perhaps this new friendship was hinted at it when Cyprus selected a
French-language song as its Eurovision entry for 2007).
In late February 2007, the two states signed a defense agreement that
is of profound importance for all countries involved in the Cyprus
quagmire. The agreement details exchange of information, military
training, joint naval exercises and cooperation in S&R missions as
well as with issues concerning illegal immigration, terrorism and
organized crime. Furthermore, France was allowed to use the military
base situated in Pafos in order to deploy its naval and air force
units when necessary.
The Cypriot minister of foreign affairs has noted that "the crisis in
Lebanon gave both countries the chance to cooperate in the military
field with benefits not only for both countries but mainly for Middle
East countries. I wish and hope that just as Cyprus proved to be a
factor of stability in the Middle East region, the solution to the
Cyprus problem and Cyprus' reunification will prove that Cyprus can,
be reunited with the cooperation of all partners such as France,
help in peace and stability in the region."
A key factor now, therefore, is the likely extension of French
influence in the most strategically critical state in the region,
and the results that this will have for the position of the United
Kingdom. In comparison to Greece and Turkey; the UK does not
have ethnological or historical ties with Cyprus, apart from its
80-year stint as a colonial (and unpopular) administrative power. A
French-British rivalry played out in Cyprus over the coming years
thus becomes likely. And this will involve some regional alliances
and antipathies as well.
Turkey, for its part, has long experienced strained relations with
Paris due to the latter's suspiciously timely decision to recognize the
so-called Armenian genocide of 1915-1921 The French electorate is also
rather opposed to Turkish EU membership and a Sarkozy presidential
victory could further chill relations. Through Cyprus, the French
have finally found a way to expand their influence in the Eastern
Mediterranean, with or without Turkish assistance. The British, by
contrast, have been far more conciliatory to the Turks, with the Blair
government one of the strongest supporters of Turkish EU membership.
http://www.balkanalysis.com/2007/04/2 2/greek-turkish-military-altercations-expected-as- cyprus-readies-for-offshore-oil-exploration/