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ABKHAZIA IN GEOPOLITICAL GAME IN THE CAUCASUS
RIA Novosti
13:45 | 13/ 08/ 2007
MOSCOW. (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - Fifteen years ago, on
August 14, 1992, one of the worst ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus
- between Georgia and Abkhazia - developed into a full-scale war,
which lasted for 14 months.
Its main results were:
8,000 dead on both sides;
$11.3 billion worth of economic damage;
a changed ethno-demographic situation in Abkhazia: the Georgians
have become an ethnic minority (in different estimates, between
150,000-200,000 Georgians were displaced; Georgia puts the figure
at 300,000);
Abkhazia's ethno-demographic losses in 1992-1993 were comparable to
the Muhajirism of the 1860-1870s.
It would be no exaggeration to say that today the unrecognized republic
of Abkhazia is playing the biggest role in a major geopolitical game
in the Caucasus. The Abkhazian issue is the main bone of contention
between Russia and Georgia. Pro-Abkhazian sentiments of some part
of the Russian military and political establishment are conducive
to Georgia's pro-Western course, which is also influencing Russia's
chief political ally in the Greater Caucasus - Armenia.
De jure, Abkhazia is part of Georgia. De facto, Georgian sovereignty
does not extend to the territory from the Psou River to the Inguri
River. The Abkhazian leaders do not control only a small part of the
republic in the upper reaches of the Kodori River. Until July 2006,
Georgia did not control it, either. But now Tbilisi is trying to turn
this hard-to-access area into a bridgehead.
Georgia's military defeat in 1993 was not limited to geopolitical
losses (Georgia lost 12.5% of its territory and 200 km of the Black Sea
coast). As distinct from South Ossetia, it led to the massive Georgian
exodus from Abkhazia. In different estimates, about 200,000 Georgians
left Abkhazia. The Abkhazian leaders were ready to discuss the refugees
-- the most urgent problem for Georgia. They merely wanted to sort out
those Georgians who fought against Abkhazia in 1992-1993. Abkhazia
has repeatedly voiced apprehensions that the return of the Georgian
refugees and a change in the ethno-demographic balance in their favor
might result in a new ethnic purge, this time by Georgia. The Abkhazian
leaders were particularly concerned over the return of the Georgian
(Mengrel) refugees to the predominantly Georgian Galsky region -
as of 1989, Georgians accounted for 93% of its population.
They have repeatedly rejected the idea of the "broadest possible
autonomy" under Georgian jurisdiction. Until 1992, Abkhazia had all
attributes of autonomy de jure, and the Abkhazians consider return
to the autonomous status no more than idle talk.
In its approach to both the South Ossetian and Abkhazian problems,
the team of the incumbent Georgian president is trying to change
the format of these inter-ethnic conflicts and turn them into a
Russian-Georgian issue. The ultimate goal of this transformation is
to internationalize the problem and deprive Russia of its status of an
exclusive guarantor of ethno-political stability in Abkhazia. Mikheil
Saakashvili named the United States, Ukraine and Turkey as potential
co-sponsors of the peace process.
We believe that under the circumstances, the most rational decision
is to delay all issues pertaining to the republic's status until
the settlement of major humanitarian problems (education, medical
treatment, conduct of business, free movement and contacts between
Georgians and Abkhazians). Only after progress is achieved in their
resolution, it will be possible to discuss Abkhazia's status. This
plan may seem cynical but this is the only chance to avoid re-division
of property and spheres of influence and escalation of inter-ethnic
tensions in Abkhazia. Russia and the United States could guarantee
the immunity of property and power in Abkhazia.
Obviously, the Abkhazian elite, which have been propelled to their
current position by the military victory in 1993, will be ready to
discuss the republic's status with Georgia only after receiving
guarantees of keeping the acquired resources and administrative
rents. In this way Russia will ensure peace and stability in its
southern frontiers.
Sergei Markedonov is head of the ethnic relations department at the
Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
RIA Novosti
13:45 | 13/ 08/ 2007
MOSCOW. (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - Fifteen years ago, on
August 14, 1992, one of the worst ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus
- between Georgia and Abkhazia - developed into a full-scale war,
which lasted for 14 months.
Its main results were:
8,000 dead on both sides;
$11.3 billion worth of economic damage;
a changed ethno-demographic situation in Abkhazia: the Georgians
have become an ethnic minority (in different estimates, between
150,000-200,000 Georgians were displaced; Georgia puts the figure
at 300,000);
Abkhazia's ethno-demographic losses in 1992-1993 were comparable to
the Muhajirism of the 1860-1870s.
It would be no exaggeration to say that today the unrecognized republic
of Abkhazia is playing the biggest role in a major geopolitical game
in the Caucasus. The Abkhazian issue is the main bone of contention
between Russia and Georgia. Pro-Abkhazian sentiments of some part
of the Russian military and political establishment are conducive
to Georgia's pro-Western course, which is also influencing Russia's
chief political ally in the Greater Caucasus - Armenia.
De jure, Abkhazia is part of Georgia. De facto, Georgian sovereignty
does not extend to the territory from the Psou River to the Inguri
River. The Abkhazian leaders do not control only a small part of the
republic in the upper reaches of the Kodori River. Until July 2006,
Georgia did not control it, either. But now Tbilisi is trying to turn
this hard-to-access area into a bridgehead.
Georgia's military defeat in 1993 was not limited to geopolitical
losses (Georgia lost 12.5% of its territory and 200 km of the Black Sea
coast). As distinct from South Ossetia, it led to the massive Georgian
exodus from Abkhazia. In different estimates, about 200,000 Georgians
left Abkhazia. The Abkhazian leaders were ready to discuss the refugees
-- the most urgent problem for Georgia. They merely wanted to sort out
those Georgians who fought against Abkhazia in 1992-1993. Abkhazia
has repeatedly voiced apprehensions that the return of the Georgian
refugees and a change in the ethno-demographic balance in their favor
might result in a new ethnic purge, this time by Georgia. The Abkhazian
leaders were particularly concerned over the return of the Georgian
(Mengrel) refugees to the predominantly Georgian Galsky region -
as of 1989, Georgians accounted for 93% of its population.
They have repeatedly rejected the idea of the "broadest possible
autonomy" under Georgian jurisdiction. Until 1992, Abkhazia had all
attributes of autonomy de jure, and the Abkhazians consider return
to the autonomous status no more than idle talk.
In its approach to both the South Ossetian and Abkhazian problems,
the team of the incumbent Georgian president is trying to change
the format of these inter-ethnic conflicts and turn them into a
Russian-Georgian issue. The ultimate goal of this transformation is
to internationalize the problem and deprive Russia of its status of an
exclusive guarantor of ethno-political stability in Abkhazia. Mikheil
Saakashvili named the United States, Ukraine and Turkey as potential
co-sponsors of the peace process.
We believe that under the circumstances, the most rational decision
is to delay all issues pertaining to the republic's status until
the settlement of major humanitarian problems (education, medical
treatment, conduct of business, free movement and contacts between
Georgians and Abkhazians). Only after progress is achieved in their
resolution, it will be possible to discuss Abkhazia's status. This
plan may seem cynical but this is the only chance to avoid re-division
of property and spheres of influence and escalation of inter-ethnic
tensions in Abkhazia. Russia and the United States could guarantee
the immunity of property and power in Abkhazia.
Obviously, the Abkhazian elite, which have been propelled to their
current position by the military victory in 1993, will be ready to
discuss the republic's status with Georgia only after receiving
guarantees of keeping the acquired resources and administrative
rents. In this way Russia will ensure peace and stability in its
southern frontiers.
Sergei Markedonov is head of the ethnic relations department at the
Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.