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RIA Novosti, Russia
Dec 5 2007
Treaty back to life
14:40 | 05/ 12/ 2007
MOSCOW. (Alexei Arbatov for RIA Novosti) - What does Moscow hope to
achieve by imposing a moratorium on the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) on December 13?
If Russia wanted the treaty to be abolished, it would simply withdraw
from it in accordance with the relevant article and notify the other
participants about its decision in advance. But Moscow prefers to
impose a moratorium on the CFE Treaty, which shows that it wants to
save it by encouraging NATO to ratify its adapted version as soon as
possible.
In this case, Russia will lift its moratorium and will resume
implementing the treaty, which it ratified in 2004.
Moscow is not satisfied with the response of its partners in the
treaty. The West keeps criticizing Russia for its failure to abide by
the 1999 Istanbul agreements. Russia has recently removed its
military bases from Georgia - ahead of schedule, but it still has
peacekeepers in Abkhasia and South Ossetia. It also has peacekeepers
in Transdnestr, as well as a small contingent guarding an ammunition
depot.
NATO keeps voicing its concern in this connection, pleading the
Istanbul agreements. Moscow replies that the Istanbul agreements did
not imply the withdrawal of troops by a certain date. They only
provide for a relevant agreement, for instance with Georgia, where
Russia only has peacekeepers rather than bases, which is a
fundamental difference. Withdrawal of peacekeepers is linked with the
settlement of the relevant conflicts rather than the CFE Treaty.
In general, Russia does not believe that NATO has serious grounds for
not ratifying the new draft of the CFE Treaty and considers its
adamant refusal to do so as an attempt to conduct policy from a
position of strength, all the more so since NATO is expanding
eastward, closer to Russia's borders and increasing its conventional
forces superiority. So the CFE Treaty is only a hindrance to it.
In turn, Moscow does not find the CFE Treaty in its 1999 version
quite suitable. In its opinion, it is merely a step toward the
formation of a more stable and equitable system of confidence and
security in Europe. But Russia still ratified it in 2004 in the hope
that it will be supplemented by a number of important conditions,
which it advanced on a special CFE session last summer. If NATO
countries ratified the adapted treaty as it is, these conditions
could be discussed later.
What would happen if the West continues ignoring Moscow's signals? In
this case, Russia will stop granting information on conventional
force deployment, receiving NATO inspections, and abiding by the
flank restrictions. If deemed necessary, additional troops will be
deployed in the Caucasus, say, in Armenia (exclusively as an
example). But we won't violate the CFE-imposed limits on conventional
arms. We do not have such plans and we are not in a position to
surpass these limits, judging by the acquisition of conventional arms
by our forces.
Our primary concern is NATO's eastward expansion. Russia also makes
wrong signals from time to time, which aggravates the situation, but
NATO is still the main problem. Its policy is making both the
original and the adapted CFE Treaty versions pointless. NATO could
ease Moscow's concern by promising not to exceed, during its
expansion, the aggregate ceilings for arms imposed by the treaty in
1990 on its 16 members. But instead it is simply pocketing the arms
quotas, which were originally allocated to the Warsaw Pact and the
Soviet Union. This is the root of all the problems with the CFE
Treaty.
Russia has many more reasons to walk out of the treaty than the
United States had for withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in 2002. But
Moscow is not rushing to burn the bridges and hopes that the West
will display common sense.
Alexei Arbatov is a member of the research council of the Moscow
Carnegie Center
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Dec 5 2007
Treaty back to life
14:40 | 05/ 12/ 2007
MOSCOW. (Alexei Arbatov for RIA Novosti) - What does Moscow hope to
achieve by imposing a moratorium on the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) on December 13?
If Russia wanted the treaty to be abolished, it would simply withdraw
from it in accordance with the relevant article and notify the other
participants about its decision in advance. But Moscow prefers to
impose a moratorium on the CFE Treaty, which shows that it wants to
save it by encouraging NATO to ratify its adapted version as soon as
possible.
In this case, Russia will lift its moratorium and will resume
implementing the treaty, which it ratified in 2004.
Moscow is not satisfied with the response of its partners in the
treaty. The West keeps criticizing Russia for its failure to abide by
the 1999 Istanbul agreements. Russia has recently removed its
military bases from Georgia - ahead of schedule, but it still has
peacekeepers in Abkhasia and South Ossetia. It also has peacekeepers
in Transdnestr, as well as a small contingent guarding an ammunition
depot.
NATO keeps voicing its concern in this connection, pleading the
Istanbul agreements. Moscow replies that the Istanbul agreements did
not imply the withdrawal of troops by a certain date. They only
provide for a relevant agreement, for instance with Georgia, where
Russia only has peacekeepers rather than bases, which is a
fundamental difference. Withdrawal of peacekeepers is linked with the
settlement of the relevant conflicts rather than the CFE Treaty.
In general, Russia does not believe that NATO has serious grounds for
not ratifying the new draft of the CFE Treaty and considers its
adamant refusal to do so as an attempt to conduct policy from a
position of strength, all the more so since NATO is expanding
eastward, closer to Russia's borders and increasing its conventional
forces superiority. So the CFE Treaty is only a hindrance to it.
In turn, Moscow does not find the CFE Treaty in its 1999 version
quite suitable. In its opinion, it is merely a step toward the
formation of a more stable and equitable system of confidence and
security in Europe. But Russia still ratified it in 2004 in the hope
that it will be supplemented by a number of important conditions,
which it advanced on a special CFE session last summer. If NATO
countries ratified the adapted treaty as it is, these conditions
could be discussed later.
What would happen if the West continues ignoring Moscow's signals? In
this case, Russia will stop granting information on conventional
force deployment, receiving NATO inspections, and abiding by the
flank restrictions. If deemed necessary, additional troops will be
deployed in the Caucasus, say, in Armenia (exclusively as an
example). But we won't violate the CFE-imposed limits on conventional
arms. We do not have such plans and we are not in a position to
surpass these limits, judging by the acquisition of conventional arms
by our forces.
Our primary concern is NATO's eastward expansion. Russia also makes
wrong signals from time to time, which aggravates the situation, but
NATO is still the main problem. Its policy is making both the
original and the adapted CFE Treaty versions pointless. NATO could
ease Moscow's concern by promising not to exceed, during its
expansion, the aggregate ceilings for arms imposed by the treaty in
1990 on its 16 members. But instead it is simply pocketing the arms
quotas, which were originally allocated to the Warsaw Pact and the
Soviet Union. This is the root of all the problems with the CFE
Treaty.
Russia has many more reasons to walk out of the treaty than the
United States had for withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in 2002. But
Moscow is not rushing to burn the bridges and hopes that the West
will display common sense.
Alexei Arbatov is a member of the research council of the Moscow
Carnegie Center
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.