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A TIME-BOMB FOR THE C.I.S.; SCENARIOS OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE CIS
by Anatoly Tsyganok
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
December 17, 2007 Monday
Hypothetical conflict scenarios for the Caucasus and Central Asia; The
basic hypothetical conflict scenario with the potential to destabilize
security in the Caucasus could start in a similar way to the Balkans
scenario: "restoring justice according to the NATO model." This might
happen almost simultaneously in Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia.
The basic hypothetical conflict scenario with the potential to
destabilize security in the Caucasus could start in a similar way
to the Balkans scenario: "restoring justice according to the NATO
model." This might happen almost simultaneously in Nagorno-Karabakh
and Georgia. It could be triggered if Azerbaijan and Georgia decide
to appeal to the European Union for police assistance to "protect
returning refugees and the provisional government of Abkhazia,
located in the Kodori Gorge, and the Sanakoyev government in South
Ossetia." It would be proposed that in addition to the peacekeeping
forces operating in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there should also be
a police corps to force the "unlawful governments" of Sergei Bagapsh
(in Abkhazia) and Eduard Kokoity (in South Ossetia) to resettle the
returning refugees. A similar scenario could happen in the seven
districts "occupied by Armenia" in Nagorno-Karabakh.
With the European Union's approval, police forces could include
military personnel from Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, the
Czech Republic, and Britain; these governments have already stated
that they may contribute personnel. The forces could be sent in from
NATO bases in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria; by sea from the Romanian
port of Constanza; by land via Turkey; or via NATO's air corridors
toward Central Asia. At the request of Tbilisi and Baku, NATO could
assign part of the troops to guard NATO communications missions and
the property of oil companies; this could be done by transferring
several brigades of rapid response forces to the Caucasus - eastern
Georgia and areas near the Iranian border.
In those circumstances, Russia would speak out against destabilization
of the Caucasus situation; presumably, it would have to recognize
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Without absorbing
these recognized states into the Russian Federation, Russia would
send one division of Interior Troops into each of them "to protect
Russian citizens living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia." At the same
time, declaring that its southern borders are under threat, Russia
would appeal to the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for diplomatic, political,
economic, and military support; it would close its airspace to NATO
aircraft in the Afghanistan direction.
Supporting Russia, the Asian CIS countries would also close their
airspace to NATO aircraft and shut down NATO military bases on their
territories.
Volunteers from the highland peoples and Cossacks of the Kuban, Don,
Terek, and North Ossetia, and partisan detachments, would move toward
the Georgian border, while also causing "technical interruptions" to
oil supplies along the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. At the same time,
Russia would start maintenance work on pipelines leading to Poland,
the Baltic states, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
Iran would provide material and humanitarian aid to Armenia. To fight
the "separatists of Southern Azerbaijan," it might even announce a
significant shift of its sea borders to the north, thus blocking the
Azeri Navy.
Military scenarios across the security area of Central Asia could go
in any of several directions. The first possible scenario would entail
the empire of Communist China collapsing like Yugoslavia or the Soviet
Union. That might lead to instability zones emerging along the borders
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, with peoples in the Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Region and Jungaria seeking self-determination.
The second scenario posing a danger to Central Asian security might
entail border disputes between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, given
that around 20% of their state border has yet to be defined on a map
(let alone demarcated on the ground). A conflict between these two
Central Asian CIS countries, possibly escalating to hostilities,
could be triggered if Tajikistan were to take unilateral measures
to clear landmines from the border area. Experts have estimated
that Tajikistan still has 25 million square meters of minefields,
with 150 districts at constant risk from landmines. The government
of Tajikistan and locan non-governmental organizations, working with
international mediators, have cleared only 500,000 square meters in
recent years, destroying 3,200 mines.
The third military conflict scenario could involve an abrupt increase
in Islamic extremism and radicalism, striving to establish a kind of
"Islamic cordon sanitaire" along the southern borders of the CIS. As
in 1999, attacks on the CIS security zone could be led by the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan. If the NATO operation in Afghanistan fails
to achieve its objectives in rebuilding Afghnaistan's statehood,
Afghan drug-traffickers interested in expanding their northern route
for transporting heroin to Russia and Western Europe might attempt
to take advantage of this situation in order to increase their drug
deliveries; thus, they would assist Islamic extremists and radicals.
A phase of tension in the Ferghana Valley and along the southern
borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan might be followed by attacks on
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and southern Kyrgyzstan - an area populated
by ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks, who are more Islamized than the Kyrgyz
people.
The fourth potential scenario could happen within the next few years,
in the event of an unsuccessful conclusion to NATO's operation in
Afghanistan, which has been under way since 2001. This might involve
a combined offensive by mujaheddin groups, Al Qaeda guerrillas,
Afghan militia, detachments led by field commanders from Turkmen,
Uzbek, Tajik, and Pushti tribes, and armed detachments from the
drug trade. These combined forces could take over whole provinces of
Afghanistan, with NATO unable to repel simultaneous attacks from all
directions; hostilities would spread to adjacent countries hosting
NATO and US bases. Pakistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan would
be vulnerable. The evacuation of coalition forces might be similar
to the Soviet withdrawal scenario.
It's hard to imagine the dispute between Russia and Japan over the
status of the Kurile Islands escalating into a military conflict.
Alterations to the sea borders between the Russian Federation and the
Unites States, approved by former Soviet foreign affairs minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, are also unlikely to become a pretext for
a conflict.
Source: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 44, December 14, 2007, p. 5
Translated by Elena Leonova
by Anatoly Tsyganok
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
December 17, 2007 Monday
Hypothetical conflict scenarios for the Caucasus and Central Asia; The
basic hypothetical conflict scenario with the potential to destabilize
security in the Caucasus could start in a similar way to the Balkans
scenario: "restoring justice according to the NATO model." This might
happen almost simultaneously in Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia.
The basic hypothetical conflict scenario with the potential to
destabilize security in the Caucasus could start in a similar way
to the Balkans scenario: "restoring justice according to the NATO
model." This might happen almost simultaneously in Nagorno-Karabakh
and Georgia. It could be triggered if Azerbaijan and Georgia decide
to appeal to the European Union for police assistance to "protect
returning refugees and the provisional government of Abkhazia,
located in the Kodori Gorge, and the Sanakoyev government in South
Ossetia." It would be proposed that in addition to the peacekeeping
forces operating in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there should also be
a police corps to force the "unlawful governments" of Sergei Bagapsh
(in Abkhazia) and Eduard Kokoity (in South Ossetia) to resettle the
returning refugees. A similar scenario could happen in the seven
districts "occupied by Armenia" in Nagorno-Karabakh.
With the European Union's approval, police forces could include
military personnel from Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, the
Czech Republic, and Britain; these governments have already stated
that they may contribute personnel. The forces could be sent in from
NATO bases in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria; by sea from the Romanian
port of Constanza; by land via Turkey; or via NATO's air corridors
toward Central Asia. At the request of Tbilisi and Baku, NATO could
assign part of the troops to guard NATO communications missions and
the property of oil companies; this could be done by transferring
several brigades of rapid response forces to the Caucasus - eastern
Georgia and areas near the Iranian border.
In those circumstances, Russia would speak out against destabilization
of the Caucasus situation; presumably, it would have to recognize
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Without absorbing
these recognized states into the Russian Federation, Russia would
send one division of Interior Troops into each of them "to protect
Russian citizens living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia." At the same
time, declaring that its southern borders are under threat, Russia
would appeal to the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for diplomatic, political,
economic, and military support; it would close its airspace to NATO
aircraft in the Afghanistan direction.
Supporting Russia, the Asian CIS countries would also close their
airspace to NATO aircraft and shut down NATO military bases on their
territories.
Volunteers from the highland peoples and Cossacks of the Kuban, Don,
Terek, and North Ossetia, and partisan detachments, would move toward
the Georgian border, while also causing "technical interruptions" to
oil supplies along the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. At the same time,
Russia would start maintenance work on pipelines leading to Poland,
the Baltic states, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
Iran would provide material and humanitarian aid to Armenia. To fight
the "separatists of Southern Azerbaijan," it might even announce a
significant shift of its sea borders to the north, thus blocking the
Azeri Navy.
Military scenarios across the security area of Central Asia could go
in any of several directions. The first possible scenario would entail
the empire of Communist China collapsing like Yugoslavia or the Soviet
Union. That might lead to instability zones emerging along the borders
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, with peoples in the Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Region and Jungaria seeking self-determination.
The second scenario posing a danger to Central Asian security might
entail border disputes between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, given
that around 20% of their state border has yet to be defined on a map
(let alone demarcated on the ground). A conflict between these two
Central Asian CIS countries, possibly escalating to hostilities,
could be triggered if Tajikistan were to take unilateral measures
to clear landmines from the border area. Experts have estimated
that Tajikistan still has 25 million square meters of minefields,
with 150 districts at constant risk from landmines. The government
of Tajikistan and locan non-governmental organizations, working with
international mediators, have cleared only 500,000 square meters in
recent years, destroying 3,200 mines.
The third military conflict scenario could involve an abrupt increase
in Islamic extremism and radicalism, striving to establish a kind of
"Islamic cordon sanitaire" along the southern borders of the CIS. As
in 1999, attacks on the CIS security zone could be led by the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan. If the NATO operation in Afghanistan fails
to achieve its objectives in rebuilding Afghnaistan's statehood,
Afghan drug-traffickers interested in expanding their northern route
for transporting heroin to Russia and Western Europe might attempt
to take advantage of this situation in order to increase their drug
deliveries; thus, they would assist Islamic extremists and radicals.
A phase of tension in the Ferghana Valley and along the southern
borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan might be followed by attacks on
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and southern Kyrgyzstan - an area populated
by ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks, who are more Islamized than the Kyrgyz
people.
The fourth potential scenario could happen within the next few years,
in the event of an unsuccessful conclusion to NATO's operation in
Afghanistan, which has been under way since 2001. This might involve
a combined offensive by mujaheddin groups, Al Qaeda guerrillas,
Afghan militia, detachments led by field commanders from Turkmen,
Uzbek, Tajik, and Pushti tribes, and armed detachments from the
drug trade. These combined forces could take over whole provinces of
Afghanistan, with NATO unable to repel simultaneous attacks from all
directions; hostilities would spread to adjacent countries hosting
NATO and US bases. Pakistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan would
be vulnerable. The evacuation of coalition forces might be similar
to the Soviet withdrawal scenario.
It's hard to imagine the dispute between Russia and Japan over the
status of the Kurile Islands escalating into a military conflict.
Alterations to the sea borders between the Russian Federation and the
Unites States, approved by former Soviet foreign affairs minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, are also unlikely to become a pretext for
a conflict.
Source: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 44, December 14, 2007, p. 5
Translated by Elena Leonova