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Genocide: rethinking the concept

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  • Genocide: rethinking the concept

    Open Democracy, UK
    Feb 1 2007

    Genocide: rethinking the concept
    Martin Shaw
    1 - 2 - 2007


    An understanding of the term "genocide" that draws afresh on the
    experience of the last century is needed to ensure greater human
    security in the next, says Martin Shaw.

    A routine feature of public discussion of large-scale, anti-civilian
    violence is that it is so important to protect the victims that time
    should not be wasted on arguing about how the violence is described.
    Indeed, this view is often voiced by aid workers, as well as
    politicians and officials - amid the assaults perpetrated by the
    Sudanese government and their janjaweed militia proxies, to take but
    one example.

    In such circumstances, calls to recognise these attacks as "genocide"
    are often seen as quibbling about language while people die. The
    hypocrisy of the powerful seems to reinforce this argument: after
    all, in 2004 the then United States secretary of state Colin Powell
    did recognise the sustained atrocities in Darfur as "genocide", but
    promptly evaded the corresponding international duty (under the
    United Nations genocide convention of 1948) to "prevent" the violence
    and "punish" the perpetrators.

    The right label, then, is not enough. At the same time, using the
    "wrong" words offers a potent opportunity to perpetrators and
    bystanders to confuse and defuse effective international responses.
    For a long time, the preferred terminology for Darfur in UN circles
    was "humanitarian crisis" - but this implied that humanitarian action
    (such as providing food, shelter and medicines) would be enough to
    save the victims of violence. It was not: however necessary such aid
    was, it couldn't stop them bombing and burning villages or killing
    and raping civilians, and indeed the Sudanese government has
    deliberately disrupted humanitarian efforts.

    When the centrality of violence is recognised, the Darfur events is
    often described as a "civil war". There certainly is civil war in
    Darfur, and the policy of destroying the black "African" peoples of
    the region has been part of Khartoum's response to armed rebellions.

    Yet the idea that this was "only" a civil war, in which civilians
    unfortunately got in the way, has been the prime notion that the
    regime (like many génocidaires before it) has used to obfuscate the
    genocide. And international authorities like the UN's international
    commission on Darfur also bought into this idea (as the UN did in
    Rwanda in 1994), because it enabled the UN to avoid the demanding and
    controversial task of intervening to fully protect the victims.

    A narrowing focus

    The other term used by politicians, officials and journalists was
    "ethnic cleansing". Certainly forced migration, for which "cleansing"
    is a euphemism, was from the start the central policy of Khartoum's
    destructive campaign.

    There were three problem with this usage. First, "ethnic cleansing"
    implied that there was a crucial difference between what was
    happening on the ground and genocide: if people were "only" being
    "cleansed" (forced to leave their homes) rather than "exterminated"
    as the Jews were by the Nazis, the harm was somehow not quite so
    grave.

    Second, "ethnic cleansing" was not legally defined and alleging its
    existence carried no clear international obligation to act. Third,
    the distinction between it and genocide was in any case spurious,
    since killing, rape and other violence were used to expel the
    targeted groups, and these were all means of "destroying" them as
    peoples - which is how genocide has been understood since it was
    first defined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944.

    These flaws notwithstanding, the idea that "ethnic cleansing" is a
    lesser form of anti-civilian violence than genocide has been
    prevalent since the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early
    1990s. It followed, moreover, the longstanding trend f to narrow the
    definition of genocide itself. Lemkin had originally argued that
    genocide was comprehensive social destruction, attacking the
    economic, political and cultural foundations of the life of
    particular nations and groups as well as, often, their physical
    existence.

    In the adoption of the genocide convention, however, this idea was
    narrowed to groups' physical and biological destruction, and attacks
    on social and cultural forms were only seen as genocidal when they
    led to killing and physical harm. To reinstate a broader
    understanding, lawyers have had to interpret the convention's
    terminology creatively, for example seeing a reference to "mental
    harm" as outlawing expulsions.

    Many academic commentators only accentuated the narrowing trend,
    until for some genocide became simply and solely "mass killing".
    Often this narrowing is exploited for political reasons - the idea
    that genocide only occurs when there is an attempt to murder all the
    members of a group both helps to make the Nazi holocaust "unique" (a
    useful point for some Zionist advocates) and enables the dismissal of
    "genocide" to describe other targeted anti-civilian destruction (a
    favourite argument of all those who wish to defuse international
    responses).

    It is therefore very important to clarify the meaning of genocide for
    our times. Lemkin was right to see that "social" and "physical" group
    destruction were not different processes or phenomena, but two sides
    of the same coin. His broad concept of genocide, rather than the UN
    definition, is in this sense the essential starting-point.

    Raphael Lemkin's legacy

    Yet Lemkin made two serious errors. First, he assumed that genocide
    was practiced against straightforwardly defined types of groups
    (nations, or ethnic groups); later scholars have pointed out both
    that other types of group (class, political) are targeted, and that
    in any case the point is not whether the attacked people fit into a
    particular category (they sometimes don't), but that a perpetrator
    organisation defines them as a group to be destroyed.

    Second, Lemkin rather mechanically presented physical attacks on
    targeted populations as only one "element" of genocide. We can see
    that the destruction of societies, groups and populations must
    involve extensive violence against them, even if this takes many
    forms, including wounding and rape as well as murder.

    Thus genocide studies need theoretical clarification, as well as the
    comparative historical analysis that currently dominates the field.
    Indeed a clear general idea of genocide is the necessary basis for
    evaluating and comparing cases - you can't decide whether Darfur or
    Bosnia constitutes genocide by comparing it to one other case, even
    if that is the holocaust.

    In addition, thinking about genocide has been hampered by rigid
    interpretations of other ideas in the convention, such as the idea
    that it must be the "intentional" action of perpetrators. This aspect
    has been understood as meaning that the perpetrators have to have a
    single, consistent, racist intention to commit extensive mass murder.
    Yet studies like Michael Mann's The Dark Side of Democracy:
    Explaining Ethnic Cleansing have shown that perpetrators' intentions
    evolve in response to events: the most extreme policies are never
    Plan A, or even usually Plan B, but Plan C that is adopted after
    other policies have failed.

    Moreover, understanding genocide only or mainly through the
    perpetrators' intentions leaves out the conflictual dynamics of
    genocide. Genocide generally arises out of political and armed
    conflicts, and of course genocidal attacks on populations inevitably
    produce new conflict. Attacked groups always resist - not necessarily
    with arms, because civilian populations cannot always improvise armed
    resistance - but through individual and collective acts of civilian
    resistance that do their best to frustrate the enemy.

    Relationships between "victim" populations and armed groups are a
    general feature of genocide. Victims both look to armed bodies, as
    the Bosnians did to the Bosnian army, the Rwandan Tutsis to the
    Rwandan Patriotic Front and the "African" peoples of Darfur do to the
    Darfur rebel organisations, and also sometimes fear the effects that
    their campaigns have in provoking genocidal attacks. Largely civilian
    populations also look to international military intervention as a way
    of evening up the power imbalance between themselves and their
    usually highly armed enemies.

    Sociology, not legalism

    This suggests that we need to understand genocide not just as
    one-sided violence, but as uneven conflict. I therefore argue for a
    "structural" concept - genocide is a distinctive structure of armed
    conflict that is also linked closely to other types of armed conflict
    such as war.

    This, of course, is a sociological rather than a legal approach to
    the question. Political discussions of cases like Bosnia and Darfur
    often get tangled up trying to interpret historical situations in
    terms of a legal definition (which was itself the result of political
    compromises in the 1940s). While the legal definition is still very
    important, because it lays down obligations on states, a broader,
    more coherent sociological approach to genocide can clarify the
    public debate and cut through some of the problems that have arisen
    from an excessive reliance on the law.

    Thus the politics of genocide demand that we move away from the
    obsessive legalism manifested in attempts to legislate how people
    talk about historical events (e.g. the attempted French law against
    Armenian genocide denial, the proposed European law on
    holocaust-denial). Instead what we need is open debate that -
    learning from evolving historical understanding - focuses on present
    dangers, galvanising the public to demand action wherever civilians
    are attacked because political leaders see particular groups as
    "enemies". The idea of genocide cannot be confined within the bounds
    of 1948: it must develop to help us meet the challenges of our times.

    Martin Shaw is professor of international relations and politics at
    the University of Sussex, where he teaches on the MA in war, violence
    and security. He is the author of Dialectics of War (Pluto, 1988),
    War and Genocide: Organised Killing in Modern Society (Polity, 2003),
    The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq
    (Polity, 2005), and What is Genocide? (Polity [forthcoming, December
    2006] ). His personal website is at www.martinshaw.org

    http://www.opendemocracy.net/g lobalization-vision_reflections/genocide_4309.jsp

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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