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THERE IS WAY OUT OF "KOSOVO DEADLOCK"
Sergey Markedonov, Political And Military Research Institute
Azat Artsakh Daily, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh [NKR]
15 Feb 07
The issues in the post-Yugoslavian and post-Soviet spaces remain
urgent international topics. It is evident, however, that final
self-determination of Kosovo is perhaps impossible in the nearest
future. The parliamentary election in Serbia confirmed that democratic
ceremonies do not guarantee progress towards peace building. All the
political forces of the country (the radical party, Boris Tadic's
democrats and Voislaw Kosztunica's Democrats) voted for territorial
integrity. Only the Lib Dem Party led by Cedomir Iovanovic did not.
Nevertheless, about 40 percent of Serbian voters voted for the
forces which accept ethnonationalism. Today Serbia is in the focus of
attention of the CIS political elites. Kosovo self-determination will
enable the leaders of the de-facto states of the post-Soviet space
to demand reconsideration of their issues. Today the "Kosovo knot"
lives with its international rules as a definite political slogan
and algorithm of actions. Actually, the leaders of Nagorno Karabakh,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnyestr are not concerned whether the
problems of their countries have anything in common with the Serbian
and Albanian controversies and the political claims of the former
Serbian sovereignty. For them, self-determination (which used to be
approved by the world powers) is highly convenient and beneficial. At
the same time, the behavior of the Serbian politicians (their ability
or inability to find compromise for the sake of the national cause)
will be scrutinized in Georgia, Moldavia and Azerbaijan. The Serbian,
Azerbaijani and Georgian elites do not have possibilities for the
integration of disputed areas. In Kosovo with a 90 percent Albanian
population any "Serbian idea" will be rejected by the majority. The
same will be witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh, which is ethnically
homogeneous.
Georgia does not have the political resource to "get" Abkhazia. In
South Ossetia, Tbilisi has South Ossetian supporters but does not
have the support of the Ossetial population. Consequently, Georgia's
integration potential here is also limited. With regard to Moldavia,
the main obstacle for the integration of Trandnyestr is the economic
weakness of the "mainland". The other side of the problem is that the
"Kosovo knot" strikes Serbia or helps Russia to establish its influence
in the CIS. It definitely works against European integration and for
national self-determination. Therefore, the necessity to work out
common rules of the game, common benchmarks for the recognition of one
unit or another arises. The first benchmark for the recognition of
unrecognized states can be their public administration systems. Why
cannot Kosovo be recognized? Not because of the orthodox Serbs
but because of the clan replacing public administration. The
second benchmark can be the ability of the "mainland" to control
the "separatist area" in any way except displacement and ethnic
cleansing. What can Georgia offer to Abkhazia and Azerbaijan to
Nagorno Karabakh besides the expression of "broad sovereignty"? For
in case of integration Azerbaijan gets new citizens, Armenians, and
Georgia Ossetians, Abkhazians, Armenians, Russians. In other words,
integration is impossible if it may lead to a military conflict. The
fourth benchmark can be real guarantees (non-Kosovo) for the rights of
the ethnic minorities, not merely legal but real guarantees. The fifth
benchmark can be the establishment of bilateral (economic, diplomatic,
etc.) relations between the separating area and the "mainland".
The international community may find a way out of the Kosovo deadlock
if clear benchmarks for the recognition of the unrecognized states
are worked out. It can thereby prevent (or reduce) new hotbeds in
Europe or the Eurasian space.
Sergey Markedonov, Political And Military Research Institute
Azat Artsakh Daily, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh [NKR]
15 Feb 07
The issues in the post-Yugoslavian and post-Soviet spaces remain
urgent international topics. It is evident, however, that final
self-determination of Kosovo is perhaps impossible in the nearest
future. The parliamentary election in Serbia confirmed that democratic
ceremonies do not guarantee progress towards peace building. All the
political forces of the country (the radical party, Boris Tadic's
democrats and Voislaw Kosztunica's Democrats) voted for territorial
integrity. Only the Lib Dem Party led by Cedomir Iovanovic did not.
Nevertheless, about 40 percent of Serbian voters voted for the
forces which accept ethnonationalism. Today Serbia is in the focus of
attention of the CIS political elites. Kosovo self-determination will
enable the leaders of the de-facto states of the post-Soviet space
to demand reconsideration of their issues. Today the "Kosovo knot"
lives with its international rules as a definite political slogan
and algorithm of actions. Actually, the leaders of Nagorno Karabakh,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnyestr are not concerned whether the
problems of their countries have anything in common with the Serbian
and Albanian controversies and the political claims of the former
Serbian sovereignty. For them, self-determination (which used to be
approved by the world powers) is highly convenient and beneficial. At
the same time, the behavior of the Serbian politicians (their ability
or inability to find compromise for the sake of the national cause)
will be scrutinized in Georgia, Moldavia and Azerbaijan. The Serbian,
Azerbaijani and Georgian elites do not have possibilities for the
integration of disputed areas. In Kosovo with a 90 percent Albanian
population any "Serbian idea" will be rejected by the majority. The
same will be witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh, which is ethnically
homogeneous.
Georgia does not have the political resource to "get" Abkhazia. In
South Ossetia, Tbilisi has South Ossetian supporters but does not
have the support of the Ossetial population. Consequently, Georgia's
integration potential here is also limited. With regard to Moldavia,
the main obstacle for the integration of Trandnyestr is the economic
weakness of the "mainland". The other side of the problem is that the
"Kosovo knot" strikes Serbia or helps Russia to establish its influence
in the CIS. It definitely works against European integration and for
national self-determination. Therefore, the necessity to work out
common rules of the game, common benchmarks for the recognition of one
unit or another arises. The first benchmark for the recognition of
unrecognized states can be their public administration systems. Why
cannot Kosovo be recognized? Not because of the orthodox Serbs
but because of the clan replacing public administration. The
second benchmark can be the ability of the "mainland" to control
the "separatist area" in any way except displacement and ethnic
cleansing. What can Georgia offer to Abkhazia and Azerbaijan to
Nagorno Karabakh besides the expression of "broad sovereignty"? For
in case of integration Azerbaijan gets new citizens, Armenians, and
Georgia Ossetians, Abkhazians, Armenians, Russians. In other words,
integration is impossible if it may lead to a military conflict. The
fourth benchmark can be real guarantees (non-Kosovo) for the rights of
the ethnic minorities, not merely legal but real guarantees. The fifth
benchmark can be the establishment of bilateral (economic, diplomatic,
etc.) relations between the separating area and the "mainland".
The international community may find a way out of the Kosovo deadlock
if clear benchmarks for the recognition of the unrecognized states
are worked out. It can thereby prevent (or reduce) new hotbeds in
Europe or the Eurasian space.