Tweet
A 'TOUGH BUT SWEET' VISIT
by Ali Aslan
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 19 2007
Turkish military Chief of Staff Gen. Yasar Buyukanýt, breezed his
way through Washington this past week. In general, the winds that
blew with Buyukanýt's visit were both sweet and tough. Thanks to the
accreditation policies in place with regards to Zaman, we were partly
hit, but never mind. I really do think that in the final analysis,
the words that best describe Buyukanýt Pasha's style and latest state
of Turkish-American relations are both "tough" and "sweet."
Let's begin by touching on the symbolic value of this visit.
Washington, in having hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul one
week in advance of Buyukanýt's visit, attempted to respect the balance
between civilian and military power in the Turkish government. The
basic symbolic message issued through US Vice President Dick Cheney's
reception of both men was: "We do not prefer military to civilians,
nor civilians to military."
When it comes to the symbolic values which the pasha wanted to load
onto his visit, first and foremost, by wearing civilian clothing
to the public events during his time in Washington, and by taking
great care with his words, he made a clear effort not to appear to be
delivering a hard face towards the democratically elected government.
This does not, however, mean that he neglected to deliver a few
"gems of wisdom" while on this visit.
There was a small but noisy Washington-based group consisted of
the usual suspects who provoked the pashas towards the February
28 military intervention in Turkey present at the Turkish Embassy
during the reception held for Buyukanýt there. Their cries of "We
have domestic problems pasha," or "Save us pasha," or even "We are
not afraid pasha" rang out at the Embassy, but Buyukanýt pasha stayed
faithful to his pre-planned points, and said nothing which could be
interpreted as a message straight to the administration in Ankara.
For example, while talking about threats faced by Turkey, he never once
used that key phrase "irtica," (religious reactionaryism.) He later
explained the risky phrase "dynamic forces" as meaning "everyone
working for the longevity of the Turkish Republic." As a matter
of fact, it would not have been fitting for the pasha to issue a
message regarding Turkey's domestic situation while in a foreign
country. Especially during a period when the commitment of Turkish
Armed Forces to democracy is under so much scrutiny, in both America
and the rest of the world...
Buyukanýt also avoided using any expressions in his speech which had
the potential to hurt his American military or civilian counterparts.
While making it clear that he did not embrace the talk of threatening
speech in regards to the passage of the Armenian genocide resolution,
Buyukanýt made reference to the intimations some in Ankara have
made that US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq could be in danger
due to passage of the resolution. In general, the messages relayed
by Buyukanýt to the Americans, whether over the Armenian resolution
or the PKK, were of the type: "We will be hurt if we don't get the
support we desire".
I wish that some of our political leaders, when making public
statements about highly sensitive countries like the US and Israel,
could use more diplomatic language. This applies in particular
to expressions that might make the Jewish lobbies uncomfortable,
especially at a time when we are working to make sure they help us
prevent the Armenian resolution, a resolution which has the potential
to damage not only Turkey but Erdogan administration.
I am doubtful that Buyukanýt pasha had much success in convincing
Washington, an administration which when it comes to the PKK is full
of sweet talk, but when the topic turns to concrete action in North
Iraq, stands rocklike and impassive in the face of Ankara's desires.
A well-placed American friend of mine noted: "It's better not to
expect anything dramatic from the US, like what happened before with
the turning over of Abdullah Ocalan to Turkey. If anything at all
happens in North Iraq, it might involve some action in the Mahmur
camp. The struggle against the PKK will be gradual." There is still
no green light from Washington in regards to a wide-ranging operation
against the PKK.
Perhaps the pasha's most potentially hurtful move while in the US
was the one which could put the diplomatic bargaining plans also
advised by Washington between Ankara and the northern Iraqi Kurdish
leaders into trouble. To be fair, the Pasha did not go as far as saying
"Administration should not meet with the Kurdish leaders." But he did
say as soldiers, they don't have anything to talk with them. But the
portrayal of Barzani's and Talabani's political parties as being some
of the main supporters of the PKK - and this is not necessarily untrue
- may well wind up dealing a blow to public support for this sort of
diplomatic venture. His remarks pointing out that military is only
responsible for dealing with the warfare aspect of the terror problem,
and that there were also the sociological, economic, psychological
and other aspects to be dealt by other divisions of the state was
quite well-placed.
I have learned that in his closed talks at the National Defense
University and the Washington Institute, Buyukanýt largely touched on
the topic of the PKK, and that he didn't say anything too different
from what he said in public. At one point, he reportedly said:
"In Turkey, we are busy cutting off the tail of the snake, but the
head remains in place in North Iraq." I am quite sure Americans did
find Buyukanýt a little tough vis-a-vis overall resolution of the
Kurdish question.
There are of course certain issues which everyone agrees not to
declare to the public on visits like these. For example, I would be
very surprised if it turned out that Buyukanýt and Cheney had not
discussed Iran during their meetings.
In the end, Buyukanýt's visit to the US was in fact helpful. He
solidified and clarified most of the messages already extended to the
US on Iraq, the PKK, and the Armenian genocide resolution. Of course,
if there were better coordination between the various wings of the
state, better results could have been achieved. In Washington,
the contributions by both Gul and Buyukanýt to Turkish-American
relations have general been found positive by most circles. While the
US administration sees Erdogan's stance volatile, and Sezer's as much
tougher, Ankara's overall position these days looks "tough but sweet."
--Boundary_(ID_W6v9Znsdw3yPMm3wOILM8 Q)--
by Ali Aslan
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 19 2007
Turkish military Chief of Staff Gen. Yasar Buyukanýt, breezed his
way through Washington this past week. In general, the winds that
blew with Buyukanýt's visit were both sweet and tough. Thanks to the
accreditation policies in place with regards to Zaman, we were partly
hit, but never mind. I really do think that in the final analysis,
the words that best describe Buyukanýt Pasha's style and latest state
of Turkish-American relations are both "tough" and "sweet."
Let's begin by touching on the symbolic value of this visit.
Washington, in having hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul one
week in advance of Buyukanýt's visit, attempted to respect the balance
between civilian and military power in the Turkish government. The
basic symbolic message issued through US Vice President Dick Cheney's
reception of both men was: "We do not prefer military to civilians,
nor civilians to military."
When it comes to the symbolic values which the pasha wanted to load
onto his visit, first and foremost, by wearing civilian clothing
to the public events during his time in Washington, and by taking
great care with his words, he made a clear effort not to appear to be
delivering a hard face towards the democratically elected government.
This does not, however, mean that he neglected to deliver a few
"gems of wisdom" while on this visit.
There was a small but noisy Washington-based group consisted of
the usual suspects who provoked the pashas towards the February
28 military intervention in Turkey present at the Turkish Embassy
during the reception held for Buyukanýt there. Their cries of "We
have domestic problems pasha," or "Save us pasha," or even "We are
not afraid pasha" rang out at the Embassy, but Buyukanýt pasha stayed
faithful to his pre-planned points, and said nothing which could be
interpreted as a message straight to the administration in Ankara.
For example, while talking about threats faced by Turkey, he never once
used that key phrase "irtica," (religious reactionaryism.) He later
explained the risky phrase "dynamic forces" as meaning "everyone
working for the longevity of the Turkish Republic." As a matter
of fact, it would not have been fitting for the pasha to issue a
message regarding Turkey's domestic situation while in a foreign
country. Especially during a period when the commitment of Turkish
Armed Forces to democracy is under so much scrutiny, in both America
and the rest of the world...
Buyukanýt also avoided using any expressions in his speech which had
the potential to hurt his American military or civilian counterparts.
While making it clear that he did not embrace the talk of threatening
speech in regards to the passage of the Armenian genocide resolution,
Buyukanýt made reference to the intimations some in Ankara have
made that US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq could be in danger
due to passage of the resolution. In general, the messages relayed
by Buyukanýt to the Americans, whether over the Armenian resolution
or the PKK, were of the type: "We will be hurt if we don't get the
support we desire".
I wish that some of our political leaders, when making public
statements about highly sensitive countries like the US and Israel,
could use more diplomatic language. This applies in particular
to expressions that might make the Jewish lobbies uncomfortable,
especially at a time when we are working to make sure they help us
prevent the Armenian resolution, a resolution which has the potential
to damage not only Turkey but Erdogan administration.
I am doubtful that Buyukanýt pasha had much success in convincing
Washington, an administration which when it comes to the PKK is full
of sweet talk, but when the topic turns to concrete action in North
Iraq, stands rocklike and impassive in the face of Ankara's desires.
A well-placed American friend of mine noted: "It's better not to
expect anything dramatic from the US, like what happened before with
the turning over of Abdullah Ocalan to Turkey. If anything at all
happens in North Iraq, it might involve some action in the Mahmur
camp. The struggle against the PKK will be gradual." There is still
no green light from Washington in regards to a wide-ranging operation
against the PKK.
Perhaps the pasha's most potentially hurtful move while in the US
was the one which could put the diplomatic bargaining plans also
advised by Washington between Ankara and the northern Iraqi Kurdish
leaders into trouble. To be fair, the Pasha did not go as far as saying
"Administration should not meet with the Kurdish leaders." But he did
say as soldiers, they don't have anything to talk with them. But the
portrayal of Barzani's and Talabani's political parties as being some
of the main supporters of the PKK - and this is not necessarily untrue
- may well wind up dealing a blow to public support for this sort of
diplomatic venture. His remarks pointing out that military is only
responsible for dealing with the warfare aspect of the terror problem,
and that there were also the sociological, economic, psychological
and other aspects to be dealt by other divisions of the state was
quite well-placed.
I have learned that in his closed talks at the National Defense
University and the Washington Institute, Buyukanýt largely touched on
the topic of the PKK, and that he didn't say anything too different
from what he said in public. At one point, he reportedly said:
"In Turkey, we are busy cutting off the tail of the snake, but the
head remains in place in North Iraq." I am quite sure Americans did
find Buyukanýt a little tough vis-a-vis overall resolution of the
Kurdish question.
There are of course certain issues which everyone agrees not to
declare to the public on visits like these. For example, I would be
very surprised if it turned out that Buyukanýt and Cheney had not
discussed Iran during their meetings.
In the end, Buyukanýt's visit to the US was in fact helpful. He
solidified and clarified most of the messages already extended to the
US on Iraq, the PKK, and the Armenian genocide resolution. Of course,
if there were better coordination between the various wings of the
state, better results could have been achieved. In Washington,
the contributions by both Gul and Buyukanýt to Turkish-American
relations have general been found positive by most circles. While the
US administration sees Erdogan's stance volatile, and Sezer's as much
tougher, Ankara's overall position these days looks "tough but sweet."
--Boundary_(ID_W6v9Znsdw3yPMm3wOILM8 Q)--