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How precise is the analysis of Stratfor?
Or: About the Western stereotypes on Armenia
The Noyan Tapan Highlights weekly, issue July 9 (with minor
modifications)
By Haroutiun Khachatrian
Last week, an analysis of Stratfor, one of the most respected Western
think tanks, entitled `Armenia, Azerbaijan: A Conflict of Convenience
for Moscow and Washington' was published. The piece bearing the date
July 03, has one principal sentence, namely: `Expectations of a
renewed fight between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh
region are rising, since Azerbaijan has started using the huge
windfall of cash from its new pipeline to quintuple its defense
budget.' The second part of this sentence is of course, correct,
however, this does not necessarily mean that the first part is also
correct. However the impression is that Stratfor had a strong desire
to prove that `Expectations of a renewed fight' are indeed rising, so
it has brought a great deal of additional facts to that end. To make
the potential conflict more attractive for readers, the analysis
contains another notion, namely `the conflict could serve as a spark
for the larger struggle between the United States and Russia'. As
shown below, most of the arguments brought by the respected think tank
are either arguable or simply incorrect. What is worth mentioning is
that many of these arguments are typical stereotypes circulating in
the Western media, and most analysts simply do not take care to notice
that they are, to put it mildly, out-of-date.
Here is my analysis of the `Analysis' section of the Stratfor
material.
Stratfor: `The conflict between Armenia and its neighbor Azerbaijan
over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region has crescendoed in recent
months, since Azerbaijan has started seeing the enormous cash windfall
from its new pipeline and Armenia has scrambled to secure a protective
Russian presence within its borders'.
As said, the increase in the military expenditures does not
necessarily mean that the conflict has `crescendoed'.
Stratfor: `But the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is about
more than the two states and their disputed territory; the United
States and Russia are using that conflict as a foothold to strengthen
their positions in the region as they try to expel each other.'
A bounce of stereotypes, as shown below.
Stratfor: `International pressure, lack of support from every nation
but Russia and Iran, and fear of Azeri retaliation have kept Armenia
from annexing the territory.'
Largely wrong, as shown later.
Stratfor: `Azerbaijan began to see the possibility of change in 2006
with the completion of its Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline,
which Western companies developed to feed oil to Europe. Azerbaijan
not only became increasingly pro-Western, but it also saw tremendous
new income. In 2004, Azerbaijan's defense spending was approximately
$175 million, but by the beginning of 2008, the country will begin
spending at least $1 billion on defense. Armenia recently increased
its defense spending by 20 percent -- from $125 million to $150
million, which obviously pales in comparison to Azerbaijan's
increase. Azerbaijan's spending will go mostly toward air offensive
capabilities, with Armenia's going to air defense, though both now are
looking to expand their ground capabilities.'
Everything is more or less correct. Let us turn a blind eye to the
fact that the military budget of Armenia for 2007 is 96 billion drams,
which, at the rate of late 2006 was 260 million dollars (not 150
million as Stratror claims, and, given the rapid depreciation of
dollar in Armenia, it will make even more dollars before the end of
the year). All the same, it is less than the expected one billion
dollars of Azerbaijan. But what is really worth mentioning is the the
stereotype: `Azerbaijan not only became increasingly pro-Western'
which will be one of the key errors on which the analysis is based.
Stratfor: ` Armenia simply lacks the influx of energy income that
Azerbaijan has. The enormous Armenian diaspora inside the United
States has ensured that Armenia is one of the largest recipients of
U.S. foreign aid, but Armenia's neighbors -- Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey -- have shunned it economically and politically, leaving it
with little opportunity for trade or expansion.'
What about the title `Caucasus Tiger' given to Armenia by the World
Bank to acknowledge its two-digit GDP growth for six years in line?
Stratfor is also unaware that in 2005 Armenia re-gained its GDP level
of 1989, whereas Georgia, which according to Stratfor, `had shunned'
Armenia, had only half of its Soviet-era GDP and its growth has never
exceeded 8% a year.
Stratfor: `The one neighbor Armenia has an open relationship with is
Iran.'
Evidently wrong. Armenia has very good relations with Georgia as well,
and the bulk of Armenian cargos passes through that country. However
Stratfor does not (perhaps, does not want to) see that fact, as it
needs to show that Georgia is pro-Western and Armenia is not.
Stratfor: `In March, Iran and Armenia opened the Iran-Armenia natural
gas pipeline; Iran ships natural gas north and Armenia converts the
natural gas to electricity to export back south to Iran. The pipeline
itself is owned by Russia, as is much of Armenia's energy
infrastructure, so Yerevan is seeing little money from the project.'
The ownership of energy assets (as well as specially, of the gas
pipeline) has no direct relations to the money Armenia `sees'. As a
part of its market reforms, the Armenian government has long given up
the strategy to keep ownership of commercial assets (this is a key
difference between the `pro-Russian' Armenia and Russia, which many in
the West fail to notice). But it does not mean that the government
does not get money of them. The energy assets of Britain do not belong
to the British government either (and many of their real owners are
foreigners). Does it mean that Britain `is seeing little money' from
them?
Stratfor: `The Armenian-Iranian project is another step in the
Armenian-Azeri power struggle and the impetus for Washington to take
sides in the power shift in the Caucasus. In March, U.S. President
George W. Bush requested a substantial aid cut -- nearly 50 percent of
economic aid and 30 percent of military aid -- for Armenia, provoking
an outcry from the Armenian-American lobby. Around the same time, the
United States announced plans to increase aid to Azerbaijan by about
the same amount. The U.S. State Department has cited Armenia's ties
with Iran as the reason for the cut, though a larger battle is brewing
in the Caucasus.
The Stratfor analysts might be aware that the game between the
U.S. administration and Congress has been repeating for many years
now. The administration used to propose cutting of Armenian funding,
but Congress allocates much more, only a couple of million less than
in the preceding year. Just the same is happening this year, and the
process has started shortly before the publication of the Stratfor
analysis.
To end up with the stereotype of the division of pro-Western
Azerbaijan against pro-Russian Armenia, what about the 235 million
Millennium Challenge Account given by the USA to Armenia as
recognition of its market transition success confirmed recently after
the May 12 elections? What about the tightening ties between Armenia
and the EU, in which Azerbaijan is also far behind? And, as for the
military aspects, cooperation of Armenia with NATO is hardly less
active than that of Azerbaijan.
Stratfor: `Russia has watched as Azerbaijan and Georgia -- two of the
three former Soviet states in the Caucasus -- grow more pro-Western
and caused Russia's strategic set of military bases to slip
away. After the 2004 Rose Revolution in Georgia, Tbilisi ordered
Russia to begin removing its vast military and equipment from its
territory.' More or less correct except for the `pro-Western'
Azerbaijan.
Stratfor: `Baku has formally expressed its outrage over Russia's
military ramp-up in Armenia, though Moscow vows it is not supporting
Armenia more than Azerbaijan. But Baku is also making larger and more
serious threats against the Kremlin. Russia has a strategic and
important anti-ballistic missile (ABM) base, Gabala, in Azerbaijan,
for which it holds a lease through 2016. This is the same base Russia
has offered to the United States for the location of a joint ABM
facility. Since Russia began moving farther into Armenia, Azerbaijan
has been "reconsidering" Russia's lease.'
This may be correct, but I have never heard about the threats of
Azerbaijan to use Gabala as a blackmailing tool. Especially given the
new ABM radar base in Armavir which Stratfor mentions in the next
paragraph. `It is as if Russia realized it would eventually be evicted
from Azerbaijan.' Stratfor says in trying to keep the dilemma
`pro-Western Azerbaijan against pro-Russian Armenia.'
Stratfor: `Washington could have a unique advantage in the
Armenian-Azeri-Russian spat. Though the United States does not want a
joint base with the Russians at Gabala, it would not pass up taking
the base for itself. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates will travel
to Baku on July 9 to discuss this idea, along with the possibility of
lily pad bases in the country. An eviction from Azerbaijan does not
mean Russia will lose its hold in the Caucasus. Russia is expanding
its bases in Armenia and has made plans to expand the small country's
energy infrastructure through a series of refineries and deals with
Iran. Moreover, Russia knows that a conflict within the
Nagorno-Karabakh region would not only cause Azerbaijan to spend a
good deal of its money on a war, but also would throw most of the
region into chaos -- leaving it vulnerable and ripe for Russia to move
in and provide "stability."'
It turns out (according to Stratfor) that Russia is the only
superpower interested in keeping stability in the region, while the
USA and the West in general are not. However, it is evident that in
case of the restoration of war, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan would be the
first target of the Armenian missiles, so the West is by no mean less
interested in keeping its supplies. This is, by the way, a factor,
fully counter-balancing the danger of war resumption due to growing
military spending in Azerbaijan.
Stratfor: `Nagorno-Karabakh has been a fight waiting to happen between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, though now it seems the United States and
Russia are behind much of the pressure on these countries.'
Even if the `pressure' does occur, it has no evident link with the
perspective of the renovation of war over Karabakh.
In conclusion, most of the Stafor arguments are based on the following
stereotypes, most of which, at best, need to be checked. 1. Armenia is
pro-Russian and anti-Western, and Azerbaijan has a reciprocal
policy. 2. Russia is more interested in stability in the South
Caucasus than the West is. 3. Armenia has nothing to counter the Azeri
oil dollars except for its shield of the Russian military
support. 4. Not only the military forces, but also all the economy of
Armenia is governed by Russians. 5. Azerbaijan sees no other option to
settle the Karabakh conflict except for resuming war. This latter
stereotype is especially wrong given the fact of the unprecedented
trip of the Armenian-Azeri delegation on June 28-29. Again, it
happened just a few days before the publication of the Stratfor
analysis.
It is very regrettable that many people worldwide learn about the
situation in our region from this type of material.
mailto:[email protected]
Or: About the Western stereotypes on Armenia
The Noyan Tapan Highlights weekly, issue July 9 (with minor
modifications)
By Haroutiun Khachatrian
Last week, an analysis of Stratfor, one of the most respected Western
think tanks, entitled `Armenia, Azerbaijan: A Conflict of Convenience
for Moscow and Washington' was published. The piece bearing the date
July 03, has one principal sentence, namely: `Expectations of a
renewed fight between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh
region are rising, since Azerbaijan has started using the huge
windfall of cash from its new pipeline to quintuple its defense
budget.' The second part of this sentence is of course, correct,
however, this does not necessarily mean that the first part is also
correct. However the impression is that Stratfor had a strong desire
to prove that `Expectations of a renewed fight' are indeed rising, so
it has brought a great deal of additional facts to that end. To make
the potential conflict more attractive for readers, the analysis
contains another notion, namely `the conflict could serve as a spark
for the larger struggle between the United States and Russia'. As
shown below, most of the arguments brought by the respected think tank
are either arguable or simply incorrect. What is worth mentioning is
that many of these arguments are typical stereotypes circulating in
the Western media, and most analysts simply do not take care to notice
that they are, to put it mildly, out-of-date.
Here is my analysis of the `Analysis' section of the Stratfor
material.
Stratfor: `The conflict between Armenia and its neighbor Azerbaijan
over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region has crescendoed in recent
months, since Azerbaijan has started seeing the enormous cash windfall
from its new pipeline and Armenia has scrambled to secure a protective
Russian presence within its borders'.
As said, the increase in the military expenditures does not
necessarily mean that the conflict has `crescendoed'.
Stratfor: `But the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is about
more than the two states and their disputed territory; the United
States and Russia are using that conflict as a foothold to strengthen
their positions in the region as they try to expel each other.'
A bounce of stereotypes, as shown below.
Stratfor: `International pressure, lack of support from every nation
but Russia and Iran, and fear of Azeri retaliation have kept Armenia
from annexing the territory.'
Largely wrong, as shown later.
Stratfor: `Azerbaijan began to see the possibility of change in 2006
with the completion of its Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline,
which Western companies developed to feed oil to Europe. Azerbaijan
not only became increasingly pro-Western, but it also saw tremendous
new income. In 2004, Azerbaijan's defense spending was approximately
$175 million, but by the beginning of 2008, the country will begin
spending at least $1 billion on defense. Armenia recently increased
its defense spending by 20 percent -- from $125 million to $150
million, which obviously pales in comparison to Azerbaijan's
increase. Azerbaijan's spending will go mostly toward air offensive
capabilities, with Armenia's going to air defense, though both now are
looking to expand their ground capabilities.'
Everything is more or less correct. Let us turn a blind eye to the
fact that the military budget of Armenia for 2007 is 96 billion drams,
which, at the rate of late 2006 was 260 million dollars (not 150
million as Stratror claims, and, given the rapid depreciation of
dollar in Armenia, it will make even more dollars before the end of
the year). All the same, it is less than the expected one billion
dollars of Azerbaijan. But what is really worth mentioning is the the
stereotype: `Azerbaijan not only became increasingly pro-Western'
which will be one of the key errors on which the analysis is based.
Stratfor: ` Armenia simply lacks the influx of energy income that
Azerbaijan has. The enormous Armenian diaspora inside the United
States has ensured that Armenia is one of the largest recipients of
U.S. foreign aid, but Armenia's neighbors -- Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey -- have shunned it economically and politically, leaving it
with little opportunity for trade or expansion.'
What about the title `Caucasus Tiger' given to Armenia by the World
Bank to acknowledge its two-digit GDP growth for six years in line?
Stratfor is also unaware that in 2005 Armenia re-gained its GDP level
of 1989, whereas Georgia, which according to Stratfor, `had shunned'
Armenia, had only half of its Soviet-era GDP and its growth has never
exceeded 8% a year.
Stratfor: `The one neighbor Armenia has an open relationship with is
Iran.'
Evidently wrong. Armenia has very good relations with Georgia as well,
and the bulk of Armenian cargos passes through that country. However
Stratfor does not (perhaps, does not want to) see that fact, as it
needs to show that Georgia is pro-Western and Armenia is not.
Stratfor: `In March, Iran and Armenia opened the Iran-Armenia natural
gas pipeline; Iran ships natural gas north and Armenia converts the
natural gas to electricity to export back south to Iran. The pipeline
itself is owned by Russia, as is much of Armenia's energy
infrastructure, so Yerevan is seeing little money from the project.'
The ownership of energy assets (as well as specially, of the gas
pipeline) has no direct relations to the money Armenia `sees'. As a
part of its market reforms, the Armenian government has long given up
the strategy to keep ownership of commercial assets (this is a key
difference between the `pro-Russian' Armenia and Russia, which many in
the West fail to notice). But it does not mean that the government
does not get money of them. The energy assets of Britain do not belong
to the British government either (and many of their real owners are
foreigners). Does it mean that Britain `is seeing little money' from
them?
Stratfor: `The Armenian-Iranian project is another step in the
Armenian-Azeri power struggle and the impetus for Washington to take
sides in the power shift in the Caucasus. In March, U.S. President
George W. Bush requested a substantial aid cut -- nearly 50 percent of
economic aid and 30 percent of military aid -- for Armenia, provoking
an outcry from the Armenian-American lobby. Around the same time, the
United States announced plans to increase aid to Azerbaijan by about
the same amount. The U.S. State Department has cited Armenia's ties
with Iran as the reason for the cut, though a larger battle is brewing
in the Caucasus.
The Stratfor analysts might be aware that the game between the
U.S. administration and Congress has been repeating for many years
now. The administration used to propose cutting of Armenian funding,
but Congress allocates much more, only a couple of million less than
in the preceding year. Just the same is happening this year, and the
process has started shortly before the publication of the Stratfor
analysis.
To end up with the stereotype of the division of pro-Western
Azerbaijan against pro-Russian Armenia, what about the 235 million
Millennium Challenge Account given by the USA to Armenia as
recognition of its market transition success confirmed recently after
the May 12 elections? What about the tightening ties between Armenia
and the EU, in which Azerbaijan is also far behind? And, as for the
military aspects, cooperation of Armenia with NATO is hardly less
active than that of Azerbaijan.
Stratfor: `Russia has watched as Azerbaijan and Georgia -- two of the
three former Soviet states in the Caucasus -- grow more pro-Western
and caused Russia's strategic set of military bases to slip
away. After the 2004 Rose Revolution in Georgia, Tbilisi ordered
Russia to begin removing its vast military and equipment from its
territory.' More or less correct except for the `pro-Western'
Azerbaijan.
Stratfor: `Baku has formally expressed its outrage over Russia's
military ramp-up in Armenia, though Moscow vows it is not supporting
Armenia more than Azerbaijan. But Baku is also making larger and more
serious threats against the Kremlin. Russia has a strategic and
important anti-ballistic missile (ABM) base, Gabala, in Azerbaijan,
for which it holds a lease through 2016. This is the same base Russia
has offered to the United States for the location of a joint ABM
facility. Since Russia began moving farther into Armenia, Azerbaijan
has been "reconsidering" Russia's lease.'
This may be correct, but I have never heard about the threats of
Azerbaijan to use Gabala as a blackmailing tool. Especially given the
new ABM radar base in Armavir which Stratfor mentions in the next
paragraph. `It is as if Russia realized it would eventually be evicted
from Azerbaijan.' Stratfor says in trying to keep the dilemma
`pro-Western Azerbaijan against pro-Russian Armenia.'
Stratfor: `Washington could have a unique advantage in the
Armenian-Azeri-Russian spat. Though the United States does not want a
joint base with the Russians at Gabala, it would not pass up taking
the base for itself. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates will travel
to Baku on July 9 to discuss this idea, along with the possibility of
lily pad bases in the country. An eviction from Azerbaijan does not
mean Russia will lose its hold in the Caucasus. Russia is expanding
its bases in Armenia and has made plans to expand the small country's
energy infrastructure through a series of refineries and deals with
Iran. Moreover, Russia knows that a conflict within the
Nagorno-Karabakh region would not only cause Azerbaijan to spend a
good deal of its money on a war, but also would throw most of the
region into chaos -- leaving it vulnerable and ripe for Russia to move
in and provide "stability."'
It turns out (according to Stratfor) that Russia is the only
superpower interested in keeping stability in the region, while the
USA and the West in general are not. However, it is evident that in
case of the restoration of war, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan would be the
first target of the Armenian missiles, so the West is by no mean less
interested in keeping its supplies. This is, by the way, a factor,
fully counter-balancing the danger of war resumption due to growing
military spending in Azerbaijan.
Stratfor: `Nagorno-Karabakh has been a fight waiting to happen between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, though now it seems the United States and
Russia are behind much of the pressure on these countries.'
Even if the `pressure' does occur, it has no evident link with the
perspective of the renovation of war over Karabakh.
In conclusion, most of the Stafor arguments are based on the following
stereotypes, most of which, at best, need to be checked. 1. Armenia is
pro-Russian and anti-Western, and Azerbaijan has a reciprocal
policy. 2. Russia is more interested in stability in the South
Caucasus than the West is. 3. Armenia has nothing to counter the Azeri
oil dollars except for its shield of the Russian military
support. 4. Not only the military forces, but also all the economy of
Armenia is governed by Russians. 5. Azerbaijan sees no other option to
settle the Karabakh conflict except for resuming war. This latter
stereotype is especially wrong given the fact of the unprecedented
trip of the Armenian-Azeri delegation on June 28-29. Again, it
happened just a few days before the publication of the Stratfor
analysis.
It is very regrettable that many people worldwide learn about the
situation in our region from this type of material.
mailto:[email protected]