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Today's Zaman, Turkey
July 15 2007
Election watch
The shift to the `right' has been widely debated in Turkey lately. In
fact the `surge of nationalism' is one of the most highlighted issues
in Turkish media reporting and political analysis. However
nationalism is the founding principle of the republic (nation-state).
These terms are interchangeable in the Turkish political vocabulary.
Nationalism is also the backbone of the educational system. Every
child that starts elementary school is reared as a nationalist
(servant of the nation-state) first, a citizen second and, finally,
as a human being. So, a rise or surge of nationalism is not a correct
diagnosis. What we witness as rising is a dense feeling of loss of
stability, fear emanating from the incapacity of the system to solve
its age-old problems and loss of trust to a world outside the borders
that is perceived as hostile to Turkey.
In sum, what we witness today is an assiduous feeling of defeatism.
One source of this feeling is the entropy of the system to produce
solutions to fundamental needs and structural problems. The other is
the alarming atmosphere created by the old middle class, faced with
losing power and privilege. The old middle class had attained its
status and power through state service. It is through the state
apparatus that it ruled over society, set its own standards, set the
pace and direction of change and controlled the economy. However in
the past decade and a half a new middle class has emerged through the
market place and services. It came out of Anatolia; it transferred
its ambition and capital to the cities, enlivening both the
metropolitan areas and its place of origin. This network that
connected Anatolia and the urban centers not only acted as a medium
to carry capital and entrepreneurship from the countryside, but also
to carry traditional habits (dress codes, etc.) and parochial values
as well.
The old middle class began to lose ground to its traditional, but
more vibrant and private counterpart. The latter is richer, more
innovative and independent (of the state), but at the same time it is
culturally conservative, religious and more parochial concerning
living habits. They owed nothing to the state for their status,
wealth and business while the old middle class relied on the state
for status, position, power and livelihood. When the state began to
be `infiltrated' by the new middle class by way of political prowess
and electoral victories, i.e., by forming governments and a series of
privatization initiatives that reduced the state's economic power
previously wielded by the old middle class, the latter began to sound
alarm bells. It claimed that the regime was under an unprecedented
degree of danger and that Turkey was about to be partitioned by
`internal and external enemies.' If this is a `surge of nationalism,'
we are on the wrong track. That is why electoral debates add up to
nothing but a cacophony of accusations and negative labeling. Real
issues are not discussed, except perhaps superficially.
Yet there is a shift to the `right.' This happened in particular when
the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government
lost its EU perspective and adopted an anti-Western stance recently.
Reforms and public expectations toward future membership of the union
provided both an incentive and a frame of reference. Once this was
lost the farther right began to cultivate anti-EU, anti-American,
anti-Kurdish and anti-Armenian feelings. If these negative feelings
are internalized by wider masses and those masses believe that so
much threat to national integrity can only be warded off by military
might, then we will have fascism around the corner.
Who will be bearer of possible fascism in Turkey? Have no doubt, it
will be the Republican People's Party (CHP), the party of the old
(republican) middle class that yearns to reclaim the state power it
has lost to a new middle class. The second bearer will be the
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), an ardent defender of corporatism
and ethnic purity. This party might be called `lumpen nationalist'
because it is supported by poorer and excluded groups of Central
Anatolia and more modest districts of towns that are of ethnic
Turkish stock. These groups have always looked to the state for
support and protectionism. The MHP provided many services and favors
to its clientele at periods when it shared state power through
coalition governments. It became the conveyor belt of state spoils
for lower middle classes that feel that the state is infiltrated by
non-Turkish elements and the country is betrayed by ethnic groups
that are not of Turkish origin, who share a sinister plan to divide
and to devour the country.
We may call the CHP's nationalism an `elite (or elite's)
nationalism,' while we may call that of the MHP `parochial (I prefer
lumpen) nationalism.' By looking at pre-election public opinion
polls, both parties will make the election threshold. No doubt they
will try to form a `nationalist front' coalition if the number of
seats they command allows it. One is tempted to ask what good such a
xenophobic and contentious nationalism could contribute to a Turkey
that has solved few basic problems and been bleeding internally due
to exclusive ethnic nationalism? It is with this major concern that
many people will still vote for the AK Party: not that this party
caters to the needs of secular, urban and modern social groups fully,
it is because this party has not been duped with nationalism on the
one hand and it is more market friendly, which makes it more
sensitive to international liaisons and realities.
If this statement is true, it is quite a pity to see how limited the
choices of the Turkish electorate are. On the one hand there are
parties that people will vote for without genuine enthusiasm. On the
other, the names they will vote for are put before them by a few men
who have drawn up the lists. Caught between an authoritarian system
that may be even worse and party bosses who have little regard for
public preferences, the electors will vote for the lesser evil rather
than the best choice that is beyond their reach.
15.07.2007
July 15 2007
Election watch
The shift to the `right' has been widely debated in Turkey lately. In
fact the `surge of nationalism' is one of the most highlighted issues
in Turkish media reporting and political analysis. However
nationalism is the founding principle of the republic (nation-state).
These terms are interchangeable in the Turkish political vocabulary.
Nationalism is also the backbone of the educational system. Every
child that starts elementary school is reared as a nationalist
(servant of the nation-state) first, a citizen second and, finally,
as a human being. So, a rise or surge of nationalism is not a correct
diagnosis. What we witness as rising is a dense feeling of loss of
stability, fear emanating from the incapacity of the system to solve
its age-old problems and loss of trust to a world outside the borders
that is perceived as hostile to Turkey.
In sum, what we witness today is an assiduous feeling of defeatism.
One source of this feeling is the entropy of the system to produce
solutions to fundamental needs and structural problems. The other is
the alarming atmosphere created by the old middle class, faced with
losing power and privilege. The old middle class had attained its
status and power through state service. It is through the state
apparatus that it ruled over society, set its own standards, set the
pace and direction of change and controlled the economy. However in
the past decade and a half a new middle class has emerged through the
market place and services. It came out of Anatolia; it transferred
its ambition and capital to the cities, enlivening both the
metropolitan areas and its place of origin. This network that
connected Anatolia and the urban centers not only acted as a medium
to carry capital and entrepreneurship from the countryside, but also
to carry traditional habits (dress codes, etc.) and parochial values
as well.
The old middle class began to lose ground to its traditional, but
more vibrant and private counterpart. The latter is richer, more
innovative and independent (of the state), but at the same time it is
culturally conservative, religious and more parochial concerning
living habits. They owed nothing to the state for their status,
wealth and business while the old middle class relied on the state
for status, position, power and livelihood. When the state began to
be `infiltrated' by the new middle class by way of political prowess
and electoral victories, i.e., by forming governments and a series of
privatization initiatives that reduced the state's economic power
previously wielded by the old middle class, the latter began to sound
alarm bells. It claimed that the regime was under an unprecedented
degree of danger and that Turkey was about to be partitioned by
`internal and external enemies.' If this is a `surge of nationalism,'
we are on the wrong track. That is why electoral debates add up to
nothing but a cacophony of accusations and negative labeling. Real
issues are not discussed, except perhaps superficially.
Yet there is a shift to the `right.' This happened in particular when
the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government
lost its EU perspective and adopted an anti-Western stance recently.
Reforms and public expectations toward future membership of the union
provided both an incentive and a frame of reference. Once this was
lost the farther right began to cultivate anti-EU, anti-American,
anti-Kurdish and anti-Armenian feelings. If these negative feelings
are internalized by wider masses and those masses believe that so
much threat to national integrity can only be warded off by military
might, then we will have fascism around the corner.
Who will be bearer of possible fascism in Turkey? Have no doubt, it
will be the Republican People's Party (CHP), the party of the old
(republican) middle class that yearns to reclaim the state power it
has lost to a new middle class. The second bearer will be the
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), an ardent defender of corporatism
and ethnic purity. This party might be called `lumpen nationalist'
because it is supported by poorer and excluded groups of Central
Anatolia and more modest districts of towns that are of ethnic
Turkish stock. These groups have always looked to the state for
support and protectionism. The MHP provided many services and favors
to its clientele at periods when it shared state power through
coalition governments. It became the conveyor belt of state spoils
for lower middle classes that feel that the state is infiltrated by
non-Turkish elements and the country is betrayed by ethnic groups
that are not of Turkish origin, who share a sinister plan to divide
and to devour the country.
We may call the CHP's nationalism an `elite (or elite's)
nationalism,' while we may call that of the MHP `parochial (I prefer
lumpen) nationalism.' By looking at pre-election public opinion
polls, both parties will make the election threshold. No doubt they
will try to form a `nationalist front' coalition if the number of
seats they command allows it. One is tempted to ask what good such a
xenophobic and contentious nationalism could contribute to a Turkey
that has solved few basic problems and been bleeding internally due
to exclusive ethnic nationalism? It is with this major concern that
many people will still vote for the AK Party: not that this party
caters to the needs of secular, urban and modern social groups fully,
it is because this party has not been duped with nationalism on the
one hand and it is more market friendly, which makes it more
sensitive to international liaisons and realities.
If this statement is true, it is quite a pity to see how limited the
choices of the Turkish electorate are. On the one hand there are
parties that people will vote for without genuine enthusiasm. On the
other, the names they will vote for are put before them by a few men
who have drawn up the lists. Caught between an authoritarian system
that may be even worse and party bosses who have little regard for
public preferences, the electors will vote for the lesser evil rather
than the best choice that is beyond their reach.
15.07.2007