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TO BE SEEN AS DEMOCRATS
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile, Russia
July 19 2007
Following the May parliamentary elections in Armenia and the formation
of a republican government in June, political life in the "Armenian
world" failed to free itself of turbulence. Today come the presidential
elections in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). In terms of their
significance, these elections will be a major event with repercussions
way beyond the borders of the Caucasus region.
Firstly, Karabakh today, as was the case at the beginning of the
1990s, remains something of a beacon for Armenia and for the Armenian
diaspora. While keeping watch as various candidates for the post
of head of state in Karabakh carry out meaningful and competitive
campaigns, Yerevan's potential maneuvers in terms of extending the
mandate of the current president of the republic are very limited. He
will have to fit in with the image of a protector of freedom-loving
Karabakh. It's no secret that there are many in Yerevan who would
like to see President Robert Kocharyan's mandate extended. As an
important national symbol for Armenia, Karabakh serves as an example
of a civilized transfer of the upper tier of power and all leading
political forces in Armenia will be addressing and referring to this.
Secondly, the situation within NKR remains a key problem for
Azerbaijan, whose "soft sultanate" has weakened Baku's position in the
eyes of the world community with regard to returning Karabakh to its
jurisdiction. Democratic standards in unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh
are higher than in recognized Azerbaijan.
Thirdly, Karabakh poses a large number of inconvenient questions for
the international community. It's axiomatic for the USA, the countries
of Europe and influential international organizations (UN, OBSE, PACE,
the Council of Europe) that democratization forms a key component in
regulating ethno-political conflicts. The reality, however, does not
always reflect the theory. None of the candidates for the top post in
NKR would claim to be against democratic principles. On the contrary,
democracy in Karabakh has long since been regarded not as an abstract
value but as an effective mechanism for garnering international
legitimacy. In this sense, a consensus has been reached among the
elite of NKR.
One of the main contenders for the presidential post, Bako Saakyan
(ex-chief of the NKR National Security Service), in one of his first
campaign appearances, announced that: "Our people has always been
faithful to democratic principles and observers have been unanimous
in noting not only the high level of organization in the elections
but also our commitment to democratic principles. I think that our
traditions won't be infringed upon in these elections."
Other candidates have taken the same line. The NKR deputy foreign
affairs minister Masis Mailyan (considered to be the second most
likely candidate for the presidency) gave the following definition
of the main political goal of the 2007 presidential campaign: "The
holding of civilized elections should become the key goal for the
departing executive leadership and the political forces of Nagorny
Karabakh. It's on this that the international image of the country
and its subsequent development depends."
The leading communist in Nagorny Karabakh, Grant Melumyan, also
regards embedding democracy as the main task facing the republic,
as does parliamentary deputy and professor at the local university
Vanya Avanisyan and parliamentary deputy Armeny Abgaryan, once one
of the republic's military leaders.
At the same time, within NKR there isn't a single candidate who sees
the future of the unrecognized state as being with Azerbaijan.
Democracy isn't viewed here as being synonymous with the "surrender"
of independence and ideas of self-determination. Consequently,
the strengthening of democratic standards in NKR (and this has been
established as a priority) does not demonstrate a readiness among
the Karabakh elite to make concessions to Azerbaijan.
In addition, even those candidates considered to be most liberal in
Karabakh demonstrate "imperial" tendencies in their perceptions of
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Masis Mailyan believes that "the
republic can't ensure its security within the originally recognized
borders of the NKAO," which is to say the former Nagorny Karabakh
Autonous Oblast within the Azerbaijani SSR of the Soviet era. Thus,
Mailyan, who has a well-earned reputation as a democrat and liberal
(in the context of Karabakh, at least), has no great desire to
put the regions occupied during the Karabakh War of 1991-1994 back
under the control of Baku. Democracy is one thing, and security is
another matter entirely. This formula could become the slogan not
only of the 2007 presidential campaign but of Karabakh politics in
general. In addition, democratic procedures - universal suffrage in
presidential and parliamentary elections - merely enforce this Karabakh
"imperialism", as it does not only derive from the elite. It also
expresses local public opinion, which in turn expresses itself through
voting. In July of 2007, this opinion will again be demonstrated.
On June 20, the NKR Central Election Commission officially got the
election campaign underway. The real battle for the presidential
post began long before candidates registered for the election. The
actual start of the election campaign in the NKR came in October 2006
when Arkady Gukasyan voluntarily refused to take part in the coming
election campaign. He explained his decision by saying that NKR's
observation of democratic principals opened up the opportunity for
international legitimatization of this de facto state. A prolongation
of his presidential mandate would merely interfere with and impede
the strategic aims of the Karabakh Armenians.
At the same time, Gukasyan's decision is a result of planting the
experience of Kosovo in the Karabakh soil. During the course of
the parliamentary elections in NKR in 2005, the Kosovo principle -
first democratic standards, then self-determination - was cited as
one of the basic demands being required by Karabakh politics and of
Karabakh politicians. Thus, even before Russian President Vladimir
Putin announced the possibility of using "the Kosovo precedent"
in the post-Soviet territories, the Balkan experience had been not
only addressed in NKR but even copied. Thus, the Karabakh elite has
tried to distance itself from "parallel CIS" summits and the leaders
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestr, as well as diversifying
its foreign policies. An exception to this trend was the attendance
of Arman Melikyan, advisor to the NKR president on foreign policy
issues, at a meeting of the heads of foreign ministries of unrecognized
republics in Tiraspol.
The logic of the Karabakh leadership is clear: NKR needs to intensify
the resonance of the presidential elections. Nagorny Karabakh is
becoming a trendsetter for democratic fashions among unrecognized
republics. Thus, presenting its republic as a unique leader of other de
facto states, showing its competency in general and in the diplomatic
sphere in particular, has been the aim of the Karabakh elite. For
this reason, the presidential campaign in the NKR will also in a
certain way provide a political lesson to the "parallel CIS."
Today, the election campaign in Karabakh presents the full range
of political views to be found in the post-Soviet landscape. Here
we have representatives of the "party of power", Bako Saakyan (the
main Karabakh "chekist") and Masis Mailyan (one of the strategists of
Karabakh diplomacy), plus those who have come into severe conflict with
the authorities. In 1999-2001, in the conflict between Samvel Babayan
and Arkady Gukasyan, the current presidential candidate Armen Abgaryan
supported the commander of the republic's defense forces rather than
the leader of the NKR. Grant Melkumyan represents the communists (he
was even put forward at a party forum rather than by an initiative
group) and Vanya Avanisyan represents the "creative intelligentsia."
As is the case everywhere in the CIS, the role of parties in the
election process in NKR is not so significant. The personal factor
plays a much more important role. Administrative resources are also of
consequence. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the chief of the
National Security Service, Bako Saakyan, was relieved of his duties
on the eve of the campaign. The fact that representatives of power
(Saakyan and Mailyan) didn't create a united front and that each is
conducting his own campaign (although their criticism is kept within
the limits of political decency) indirectly indicates that no single
political vision dominates.
Any leader of the NKR, whatever structure he or she comes from, will
strive to remain within the framework of democratic discourse. And
this is not down to ideological considerations. Among the Karabakh
politicians, both those for and against the authorities, there
is a consensus on the future of the republic. And that future is
envisaged as bringing international recognition. And, as we know,
self-determination without democratic standards is problematic.
Ignoring this fact would amount to a rejection of NKR's national
aspirations. Such a rejection would drastically reduce the impact
and prospects of any Karabakh leader. This means that opportunities
for democratic development and maintenance of a positive dynamic will
be preserved.
The author, Sergei Markedonov, is the head of International Relations
Issues at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis and a
Candidate of Historical Sciences.
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile, Russia
July 19 2007
Following the May parliamentary elections in Armenia and the formation
of a republican government in June, political life in the "Armenian
world" failed to free itself of turbulence. Today come the presidential
elections in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). In terms of their
significance, these elections will be a major event with repercussions
way beyond the borders of the Caucasus region.
Firstly, Karabakh today, as was the case at the beginning of the
1990s, remains something of a beacon for Armenia and for the Armenian
diaspora. While keeping watch as various candidates for the post
of head of state in Karabakh carry out meaningful and competitive
campaigns, Yerevan's potential maneuvers in terms of extending the
mandate of the current president of the republic are very limited. He
will have to fit in with the image of a protector of freedom-loving
Karabakh. It's no secret that there are many in Yerevan who would
like to see President Robert Kocharyan's mandate extended. As an
important national symbol for Armenia, Karabakh serves as an example
of a civilized transfer of the upper tier of power and all leading
political forces in Armenia will be addressing and referring to this.
Secondly, the situation within NKR remains a key problem for
Azerbaijan, whose "soft sultanate" has weakened Baku's position in the
eyes of the world community with regard to returning Karabakh to its
jurisdiction. Democratic standards in unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh
are higher than in recognized Azerbaijan.
Thirdly, Karabakh poses a large number of inconvenient questions for
the international community. It's axiomatic for the USA, the countries
of Europe and influential international organizations (UN, OBSE, PACE,
the Council of Europe) that democratization forms a key component in
regulating ethno-political conflicts. The reality, however, does not
always reflect the theory. None of the candidates for the top post in
NKR would claim to be against democratic principles. On the contrary,
democracy in Karabakh has long since been regarded not as an abstract
value but as an effective mechanism for garnering international
legitimacy. In this sense, a consensus has been reached among the
elite of NKR.
One of the main contenders for the presidential post, Bako Saakyan
(ex-chief of the NKR National Security Service), in one of his first
campaign appearances, announced that: "Our people has always been
faithful to democratic principles and observers have been unanimous
in noting not only the high level of organization in the elections
but also our commitment to democratic principles. I think that our
traditions won't be infringed upon in these elections."
Other candidates have taken the same line. The NKR deputy foreign
affairs minister Masis Mailyan (considered to be the second most
likely candidate for the presidency) gave the following definition
of the main political goal of the 2007 presidential campaign: "The
holding of civilized elections should become the key goal for the
departing executive leadership and the political forces of Nagorny
Karabakh. It's on this that the international image of the country
and its subsequent development depends."
The leading communist in Nagorny Karabakh, Grant Melumyan, also
regards embedding democracy as the main task facing the republic,
as does parliamentary deputy and professor at the local university
Vanya Avanisyan and parliamentary deputy Armeny Abgaryan, once one
of the republic's military leaders.
At the same time, within NKR there isn't a single candidate who sees
the future of the unrecognized state as being with Azerbaijan.
Democracy isn't viewed here as being synonymous with the "surrender"
of independence and ideas of self-determination. Consequently,
the strengthening of democratic standards in NKR (and this has been
established as a priority) does not demonstrate a readiness among
the Karabakh elite to make concessions to Azerbaijan.
In addition, even those candidates considered to be most liberal in
Karabakh demonstrate "imperial" tendencies in their perceptions of
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Masis Mailyan believes that "the
republic can't ensure its security within the originally recognized
borders of the NKAO," which is to say the former Nagorny Karabakh
Autonous Oblast within the Azerbaijani SSR of the Soviet era. Thus,
Mailyan, who has a well-earned reputation as a democrat and liberal
(in the context of Karabakh, at least), has no great desire to
put the regions occupied during the Karabakh War of 1991-1994 back
under the control of Baku. Democracy is one thing, and security is
another matter entirely. This formula could become the slogan not
only of the 2007 presidential campaign but of Karabakh politics in
general. In addition, democratic procedures - universal suffrage in
presidential and parliamentary elections - merely enforce this Karabakh
"imperialism", as it does not only derive from the elite. It also
expresses local public opinion, which in turn expresses itself through
voting. In July of 2007, this opinion will again be demonstrated.
On June 20, the NKR Central Election Commission officially got the
election campaign underway. The real battle for the presidential
post began long before candidates registered for the election. The
actual start of the election campaign in the NKR came in October 2006
when Arkady Gukasyan voluntarily refused to take part in the coming
election campaign. He explained his decision by saying that NKR's
observation of democratic principals opened up the opportunity for
international legitimatization of this de facto state. A prolongation
of his presidential mandate would merely interfere with and impede
the strategic aims of the Karabakh Armenians.
At the same time, Gukasyan's decision is a result of planting the
experience of Kosovo in the Karabakh soil. During the course of
the parliamentary elections in NKR in 2005, the Kosovo principle -
first democratic standards, then self-determination - was cited as
one of the basic demands being required by Karabakh politics and of
Karabakh politicians. Thus, even before Russian President Vladimir
Putin announced the possibility of using "the Kosovo precedent"
in the post-Soviet territories, the Balkan experience had been not
only addressed in NKR but even copied. Thus, the Karabakh elite has
tried to distance itself from "parallel CIS" summits and the leaders
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestr, as well as diversifying
its foreign policies. An exception to this trend was the attendance
of Arman Melikyan, advisor to the NKR president on foreign policy
issues, at a meeting of the heads of foreign ministries of unrecognized
republics in Tiraspol.
The logic of the Karabakh leadership is clear: NKR needs to intensify
the resonance of the presidential elections. Nagorny Karabakh is
becoming a trendsetter for democratic fashions among unrecognized
republics. Thus, presenting its republic as a unique leader of other de
facto states, showing its competency in general and in the diplomatic
sphere in particular, has been the aim of the Karabakh elite. For
this reason, the presidential campaign in the NKR will also in a
certain way provide a political lesson to the "parallel CIS."
Today, the election campaign in Karabakh presents the full range
of political views to be found in the post-Soviet landscape. Here
we have representatives of the "party of power", Bako Saakyan (the
main Karabakh "chekist") and Masis Mailyan (one of the strategists of
Karabakh diplomacy), plus those who have come into severe conflict with
the authorities. In 1999-2001, in the conflict between Samvel Babayan
and Arkady Gukasyan, the current presidential candidate Armen Abgaryan
supported the commander of the republic's defense forces rather than
the leader of the NKR. Grant Melkumyan represents the communists (he
was even put forward at a party forum rather than by an initiative
group) and Vanya Avanisyan represents the "creative intelligentsia."
As is the case everywhere in the CIS, the role of parties in the
election process in NKR is not so significant. The personal factor
plays a much more important role. Administrative resources are also of
consequence. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the chief of the
National Security Service, Bako Saakyan, was relieved of his duties
on the eve of the campaign. The fact that representatives of power
(Saakyan and Mailyan) didn't create a united front and that each is
conducting his own campaign (although their criticism is kept within
the limits of political decency) indirectly indicates that no single
political vision dominates.
Any leader of the NKR, whatever structure he or she comes from, will
strive to remain within the framework of democratic discourse. And
this is not down to ideological considerations. Among the Karabakh
politicians, both those for and against the authorities, there
is a consensus on the future of the republic. And that future is
envisaged as bringing international recognition. And, as we know,
self-determination without democratic standards is problematic.
Ignoring this fact would amount to a rejection of NKR's national
aspirations. Such a rejection would drastically reduce the impact
and prospects of any Karabakh leader. This means that opportunities
for democratic development and maintenance of a positive dynamic will
be preserved.
The author, Sergei Markedonov, is the head of International Relations
Issues at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis and a
Candidate of Historical Sciences.