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Economist, UK -
July 21 2007
A turning point for Turkey?
Jul 21st 2007 | ANKARA, DIYARBAKIR AND ISTANBUL
>>From Economist.com
Why this weekend's general election matters for the whole region
AFP
ON JULY 22nd Turkey goes to the polls. The event is being followed
carefully far from its own borders. For one thing, the country is of
great strategic importance. Outsiders are also monitoring one of the
Muslim world~Rs rare examples of a working democracy. But the election
has been joyless if feverish, marked by huge rallies and
demonstrations. Underlying the tensions is a battle over which way
Turkey will go.
The army, claiming to detect a dangerous slide towards Islamic
radicalism, had threatened to intervene against the government,
casting a pall over the entire campaign. The trigger was the decision
by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister and leader of the ruling
Justice and Development (AK) Party, to nominate his foreign minister,
Abdullah Gul, to replace President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was due to
step down on May 16th. Like Mr Erdogan, Mr Gul once dabbled in
political Islam. And both men~Rs wives wear the Muslim headscarf,
which in accordance with Ataturk~Rs secular tradition is banned in all
public buildings.
The army, always suspicious of the AK Party because of its Islamist
roots, deemed the prospect a threat to the secular republic.
Meanwhile, millions of secular Turks protested against the
government. The pressure proved too strong: Mr Erdogan withdrew Mr
Gul~Rs candidacy and called an early general election.
To most Turkish voters the election is a referendum on the AK Party~Rs
record, which is strikingly good. The effects of AK~Rs ~Ssilent
revolution~T are evident everywhere. Largely thanks to constitutional
changes and an improving economy, the European Union agreed to open
membership talks with Turkey in 2005. Many European and American
diplomats agree that Mr Erdogan is the man most fit to lead Turkey.
Their views are shared by millions of Turks, who recall the economic
mismanagement and corruption of the string of secular coalitions that
crippled Turkey before AK.
Indeed, opinion polls suggest that the voters may give AK quite a bit
more than the 34% that catapulted it to single-party rule in 2002. If
it were to win a sufficiently big majority (two-thirds of the 550
parliamentary seats) to change the constitution and force through its
own choice of president, the army might well step in. The president
has considerable power. He can approve the expulsion of overtly pious
officers, and appoints judges and university rectors. He can also
veto legislation deemed to violate the secular constitution. To the
generals, and millions of secular Turks, no AK man can be trusted in
this role.
The generals have other concerns. Among the reforms that earned
Turkey membership talks with the EU were provisions to trim the
influence of the army. But the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as
France~Rs president is a blow because he is strongly against Turkey~Rs
membership. And the impasse in Cyprus has become an excuse for all
who want to derail talks. Not surprisingly, popular support in Turkey
for the EU has diminished.
The EU~Rs focus on issues such as free speech and minority rights has
also helped to feed a dangerous nationalism. This was most chillingly
demonstrated in January when a Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor was
shot dead because he had ~Sinsulted the Turks~T. Renewed nationalism is
also affecting Turkey~Rs other big foreign-policy issue: northern
Iraq.
Kurds in the quasi-independent state in northern Iraq are fearful
about what may happen after the election. The new political landscape
is likely to determine whether the army makes good on its repeated
threats to attack separatist guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers~R
Party (PKK) who are based in northern Iraq.
An invasion would destabilise the only fairly calm bit of Iraq and
wreck Turkey~Rs relations with America and the EU. Worse, it might not
succeed. Mr Erdogan has resisted the army~Rs calls for a cross-border
incursion, while quietly testing the ground for a ~Sgrand bargain~T.
Turkey would recognise the Iraqi Kurds~R semi-independent status; the
Iraqi Kurds would coax PKK fighters to give up their guns and pledge
to respect Turkey~Rs borders. Relieved of the pressure of having to
choose between its Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish allies, America would be
delighted, as would Turkey~Rs own Kurds.
But the generals refuse to play along. They still hope that, after
the election, they will get the nod to stomp into northern Iraq. It
is not only the future of Turkish democracy that is at stake this
weekend; it may be the future of the whole region.
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm ?story_id=9531036
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
July 21 2007
A turning point for Turkey?
Jul 21st 2007 | ANKARA, DIYARBAKIR AND ISTANBUL
>>From Economist.com
Why this weekend's general election matters for the whole region
AFP
ON JULY 22nd Turkey goes to the polls. The event is being followed
carefully far from its own borders. For one thing, the country is of
great strategic importance. Outsiders are also monitoring one of the
Muslim world~Rs rare examples of a working democracy. But the election
has been joyless if feverish, marked by huge rallies and
demonstrations. Underlying the tensions is a battle over which way
Turkey will go.
The army, claiming to detect a dangerous slide towards Islamic
radicalism, had threatened to intervene against the government,
casting a pall over the entire campaign. The trigger was the decision
by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister and leader of the ruling
Justice and Development (AK) Party, to nominate his foreign minister,
Abdullah Gul, to replace President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was due to
step down on May 16th. Like Mr Erdogan, Mr Gul once dabbled in
political Islam. And both men~Rs wives wear the Muslim headscarf,
which in accordance with Ataturk~Rs secular tradition is banned in all
public buildings.
The army, always suspicious of the AK Party because of its Islamist
roots, deemed the prospect a threat to the secular republic.
Meanwhile, millions of secular Turks protested against the
government. The pressure proved too strong: Mr Erdogan withdrew Mr
Gul~Rs candidacy and called an early general election.
To most Turkish voters the election is a referendum on the AK Party~Rs
record, which is strikingly good. The effects of AK~Rs ~Ssilent
revolution~T are evident everywhere. Largely thanks to constitutional
changes and an improving economy, the European Union agreed to open
membership talks with Turkey in 2005. Many European and American
diplomats agree that Mr Erdogan is the man most fit to lead Turkey.
Their views are shared by millions of Turks, who recall the economic
mismanagement and corruption of the string of secular coalitions that
crippled Turkey before AK.
Indeed, opinion polls suggest that the voters may give AK quite a bit
more than the 34% that catapulted it to single-party rule in 2002. If
it were to win a sufficiently big majority (two-thirds of the 550
parliamentary seats) to change the constitution and force through its
own choice of president, the army might well step in. The president
has considerable power. He can approve the expulsion of overtly pious
officers, and appoints judges and university rectors. He can also
veto legislation deemed to violate the secular constitution. To the
generals, and millions of secular Turks, no AK man can be trusted in
this role.
The generals have other concerns. Among the reforms that earned
Turkey membership talks with the EU were provisions to trim the
influence of the army. But the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as
France~Rs president is a blow because he is strongly against Turkey~Rs
membership. And the impasse in Cyprus has become an excuse for all
who want to derail talks. Not surprisingly, popular support in Turkey
for the EU has diminished.
The EU~Rs focus on issues such as free speech and minority rights has
also helped to feed a dangerous nationalism. This was most chillingly
demonstrated in January when a Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor was
shot dead because he had ~Sinsulted the Turks~T. Renewed nationalism is
also affecting Turkey~Rs other big foreign-policy issue: northern
Iraq.
Kurds in the quasi-independent state in northern Iraq are fearful
about what may happen after the election. The new political landscape
is likely to determine whether the army makes good on its repeated
threats to attack separatist guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers~R
Party (PKK) who are based in northern Iraq.
An invasion would destabilise the only fairly calm bit of Iraq and
wreck Turkey~Rs relations with America and the EU. Worse, it might not
succeed. Mr Erdogan has resisted the army~Rs calls for a cross-border
incursion, while quietly testing the ground for a ~Sgrand bargain~T.
Turkey would recognise the Iraqi Kurds~R semi-independent status; the
Iraqi Kurds would coax PKK fighters to give up their guns and pledge
to respect Turkey~Rs borders. Relieved of the pressure of having to
choose between its Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish allies, America would be
delighted, as would Turkey~Rs own Kurds.
But the generals refuse to play along. They still hope that, after
the election, they will get the nod to stomp into northern Iraq. It
is not only the future of Turkish democracy that is at stake this
weekend; it may be the future of the whole region.
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm ?story_id=9531036
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress