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THE TRUE MEANING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY
By Levent Koker*
Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 14 2007
The fact that the Turkish Parliament was unable to carry out its duty
of electing the president, and that the laws in reference to this from
the 1982 Constitution became -- or were made -- unworkable, brought
a slowdown to democracy in Turkey, in as much as there is a settled,
rooted justice system here.
This is not to say that there was already a flawless liberal-democratic
system in Turkey, and that it was disrupted. No, instead this is to
say that an important aspect of Turkish democracy, the Parliament, was
brought to the point of not being able to do its job. In situations
where parliaments can not do their jobs, democracy can turn straight
to the people in order to keep working or to be stopped, and forces
outside of democracy begin to make their voices heard more loudly. In
any case this is the point that Turkey reached during the presidential
elections. But of course a certain ambiguity reigns now. And so
now the process of electing the president goes to the people of
the country. Elections were destined to go to the people anyway,
but for the normal parliamentary elections. Now what is faced is
a referendum, or perhaps a direct election. In any case though, no
matter what happens at this point, the general parliamentary elections
will now be like a "referendum" on the events that took place during
the unsuccessful rounds of the presidential ballot.
No matter what the outcome of the upcoming elections is, Turkey,
which has for a long while been on the road towards democratization
in an uninterrupted fashion, will not have a fully formed,
strong democracy, at least as long as the "civil societal bedrock"
created by the bureaucratic guardianship -- the same bedrock that
has forced the country to a crossroads of choice between democracy
and an authoritarian regime -- does not change. For this reason,
the following points must be clearly understood:
1- Civil society, no matter how it is interpreted, must be outside
the state.
2- Civil society demands rights and freedoms for the citizenry,
countered in balance to the state.
3- The demands for rights and freedoms made by civil society are
shaped by and expressed for different identities and interests.
4- Differences are a result of the pluralistic nature that must be
present in civil society.
5- Differences are explained with terms such as "we" and "they," or
"me" and "the others."
6- In these expressions of differences, it is not to be understood that
people not included in the "we" are enemies. For as long as anyone
different is perceived as an enemy threatening "we," the survival of
pluralism based on differences is impossible.
7- Democracies based on the differences between citizens are for the
above reasons the highest levels of union achieved in human history
As opposed to the state-centered "so-called and real" civil society
definitions summarized previously, true civil society embodies
and embraces the above examples of what civil society should be,
and is thus the real guarantor of democracy. For this reason the
events of "spring 2007" were opposed to democracy, not just because
they included interventions debatable in terms of their legality,
but because they presented support for an authoritarian regime in
the guise of societal support.
Turkey is finally at the point where it can put down a real foundation
for a strong civil society. At this crossroads Turkey's journey into
a more democratic future depends on the continuation of EU-based
reforms, and on the execution of democratic processes at home. For
this reason the "so-called civil society" with its slogans of "Neither
the US nor the EU," and as if that weren't enough, its creation of
not only "foreign" but "domestic" enemies as well, coupled with its
unwillingness to afford anyone outside of the authoritarian regime
the chance to rule, makes contributions to democracy on any level an
impossibility. And in a state where democracy has become impossible,
it is also completely impossible for that state to be a republic.
As is known, a republic, in terms of its state and its government, has
two definitions. The first, and narrower, definition of a republic is
an expression of a system wherein the position of the head of state
is not hereditary or passed on, and is, in this sense, the opposite
of a monarchy. Just as it is implicitly understood herein that not
every republic is a democracy, similarly it would thus translate that
not all monarchies are necessarily in opposition to democracies. To
the contrary, just as there have been in the past and continue on
today to be republics that are not democratic, and which are run
by military or civil authority, there are also deep-rooted, strong
democracies which are not simultaneously republics.
In addition to the above definition of what a republic is, there is
a definition that goes more to the root of the essence of the term.
According to this definition, a republic is a style of leadership
aimed at ensuring the good of the people, or the public. Since a
leadership style that aims to achieve the best for its people would
not, naturally, exclude the people themselves, this definition of
what a republic is then describes a style of leadership or governing
wherein the people have a voice. In this sense then, this definition
more approaches the definition of democracy.
So let's take a look at a variety of ideas of how it is that these
two above definitions of a republic have separated from each other
in the modern world, and how it is that they need to come together
again. But first let me make the following clear, so that we can
better understand the issues we are examining here: the republic, as
many significant modern thinkers and politicians have stressed, means
being against tyranny. In order to eliminate tyranny, it is enough
that the state uses its power according to the law. The highest-level
guarantee that the state will use its power according to the law is
the idea that the law will in fact be made by the people. In this
way the society itself, rather than a being simply a gathering and
assortment of people, becomes a "society of citizenry," or as we were
saying before, a "civil society."
In a republic the citizenry of the republic sets out the order of
the society and the state through laws it creates by its own free will.
Thus it is the citizenry that limits and defines its own freedoms,
but it should be remembered that they are doing it themselves. In
order for citizens to be able to make up the laws to which they
themselves will be subject to, they must first be equal holders of
the individual and political freedoms guaranteed by law. And thus in
a modern state where everyone is counted as a citizen (slave-master,
male-female, worker-bourgeoisie, black-white, racist, ethnicist,
sexist and other categories like these) a republic in a modern state
is then in fact obliged to be a democracy.
In Turkey the same thing has been being repeated since the formation
of the republic. Since the passage from the Ottoman system to the
republican system, the transformation of the Turkish people from
vassals into a citizenry has been talked about frequently at every
level of our educational life. In addition to this it is always
stressed that it was the democratic aspect of the republic that
brought about the most wonderful of the changes.
"Well in that case what exactly is the problem?" The problem is
rooted in the lack of understanding that the modern interpretation
of the republic-democracy coupling is that it mandates a pluralistic
participation by the citizens of the country. The Turkish republic
can not seem to keep itself from falling into situations that prevent
the unity of the republic and democracy.
This is where the meaning of the events Turkey witnessed in the spring
of 2007 lies; according to this way of seeing things, democracy is
actually threatening the republic, and perhaps even more so than the
republic, the Turkish nation-state. What we see here is a very serious
paradox. The paradox is this: according to these claims the republic,
which by definition is composed of the citizenry, is actually being
threatened by this same citizenry. For this reason then limitations
must be put on how much authority these citizens can have in the
leadership of the republic. This paradox is rooted in the "founding
ideology" of the Turkish republic, Kemalism. In order to transcend
this paradox it is an inescapable necessity that the republic fully
and truly realize itself, and this is a quest that is only possible
through the deepening and widening of democracy. In order for the
Turkish republic to be able to experience such a process, a civil
society which stands behind the freedom necessary to talk about
differences in the public arena is an indispensable factor.
Quite in opposition to this though, what happened in Turkey during
the spring of 2007 was that the guardianship bureaucracy moved into
action to bring society out into the city squares, with some of the
factions being set into motion by the previously mentioned "so-called
civil society organizations." With this, the tableau presented was
not of simply a republic under threat, but going further still, the
presentation of citizens who did not see or acknowledge the "clear
and present danger" as the "enemy in the form of the other." This
itself turned into a presentation of these factions not seeing the
threats facing Turkey as being "co-conspirators" with the "imperialist
enemies."
'Neither the US nor the EU, but a completely independent Turkey':
Meaning what?
So in this sense another paradox contained in all these spring
events is that those wishing to take action based on the dangers and
threat facing Turkey all stood up against both the US and the EU. In
terms of its ties to the US, this stance is based on the political
strengths gained by the Kurds in northern Iraq, and the belief that
one region of Turkey now faces a threat from these relatively new
Kurdish strengths. Choruses ringing out about the ineffectiveness
of the US against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror are brought
constantly to the forefront in the press. As for the EU there are
the constant complaints that it is both trying to divide Turkey and
that it has persistently taken the side of the Greek Cypriots. These
and topics like the so-called "genocide" matter with the Armenians
are brought up often in the public forum as topics with the high
potential of affecting and influencing public opinion. In any case,
these expressions of opposition against both the US and the EU take
from time to time an "anti-imperialism" tone, and at other times are
couched with an emphasis on the strength of the Turkish nation-state.
When you combine the perceptions of the "domestic enemies" with the
"foreign enemies" perception (which itself is based on much incorrect
information and spreading of incorrect information) you get yet another
paradox that sits on the daily agenda of the Kemalist republic. This
is a paradox in connection with the EU. As already known, Turkey went
through a series of rapid and widespread reforms after 2002, arriving
in October 2005 at the point of starting up full membership talks with
the EU. The basic paradox is that while Kemalism is often defined
as being a modernization project for Turkey, the very EU reforms
which are the most concrete expression of Kemalism's main goal,
the achievement of a "modern civilization level," are opposed on the
basis that they threaten the republic.
This sort of "hostility to foreigners," which is sometimes of a
xenophobic character, does not make it clear in which direction it
expects Turkey's international relations to develop. And since the
slogan "Neither the US nor the EU, but a fully independent Turkey"
became so popular during the rallies, in fact became synonymous with
the expressions of opposition to the administration, it is a valid
question. Yes, what is the suggestion then? If we interpret this point
of view's essence as being based on opposition to a "concessionist"
stance, and embracing more of a "nationalist" stance, then you could
also extrapolate that what this really means is "isolationism" or
"autocracy." This in turn looks to resemble the story of Kemalism in
the 1930s, along with the byline of single-party rule.
The purpose of clarifying all the above is not to prophesy that
Turkey is going to turn into an isolationist, autocratic and thus
authoritarian and even fascist political regime. But along with that it
should be noted that it is clear that there are those with inclinations
for an undemocratic regime in the military and the civil bureaucracy,
as well as the "civil society" and the political parties. These
factions, who base the reasons for their actions on the idea that
they are protecting the state, can push the need for democracy in a
state back to the second, even the third plan when necessary. What's
more they even have the capacity to completely ignore this need for
democracy. And it was the spring of 2007 in Turkey that proved they
could find support for these inclinations from civil society. This is
of course a situation that increases the likelihood that Turkey can
and might be swayed from its path to democratization. In order then to
prevent this from happening, the citizens of the republic must make
clear their support of a pluralistic and freedom-loving democracy,
by putting their will and volition front and center.
*Levent Koker is a lecturer at Gazi University
By Levent Koker*
Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 14 2007
The fact that the Turkish Parliament was unable to carry out its duty
of electing the president, and that the laws in reference to this from
the 1982 Constitution became -- or were made -- unworkable, brought
a slowdown to democracy in Turkey, in as much as there is a settled,
rooted justice system here.
This is not to say that there was already a flawless liberal-democratic
system in Turkey, and that it was disrupted. No, instead this is to
say that an important aspect of Turkish democracy, the Parliament, was
brought to the point of not being able to do its job. In situations
where parliaments can not do their jobs, democracy can turn straight
to the people in order to keep working or to be stopped, and forces
outside of democracy begin to make their voices heard more loudly. In
any case this is the point that Turkey reached during the presidential
elections. But of course a certain ambiguity reigns now. And so
now the process of electing the president goes to the people of
the country. Elections were destined to go to the people anyway,
but for the normal parliamentary elections. Now what is faced is
a referendum, or perhaps a direct election. In any case though, no
matter what happens at this point, the general parliamentary elections
will now be like a "referendum" on the events that took place during
the unsuccessful rounds of the presidential ballot.
No matter what the outcome of the upcoming elections is, Turkey,
which has for a long while been on the road towards democratization
in an uninterrupted fashion, will not have a fully formed,
strong democracy, at least as long as the "civil societal bedrock"
created by the bureaucratic guardianship -- the same bedrock that
has forced the country to a crossroads of choice between democracy
and an authoritarian regime -- does not change. For this reason,
the following points must be clearly understood:
1- Civil society, no matter how it is interpreted, must be outside
the state.
2- Civil society demands rights and freedoms for the citizenry,
countered in balance to the state.
3- The demands for rights and freedoms made by civil society are
shaped by and expressed for different identities and interests.
4- Differences are a result of the pluralistic nature that must be
present in civil society.
5- Differences are explained with terms such as "we" and "they," or
"me" and "the others."
6- In these expressions of differences, it is not to be understood that
people not included in the "we" are enemies. For as long as anyone
different is perceived as an enemy threatening "we," the survival of
pluralism based on differences is impossible.
7- Democracies based on the differences between citizens are for the
above reasons the highest levels of union achieved in human history
As opposed to the state-centered "so-called and real" civil society
definitions summarized previously, true civil society embodies
and embraces the above examples of what civil society should be,
and is thus the real guarantor of democracy. For this reason the
events of "spring 2007" were opposed to democracy, not just because
they included interventions debatable in terms of their legality,
but because they presented support for an authoritarian regime in
the guise of societal support.
Turkey is finally at the point where it can put down a real foundation
for a strong civil society. At this crossroads Turkey's journey into
a more democratic future depends on the continuation of EU-based
reforms, and on the execution of democratic processes at home. For
this reason the "so-called civil society" with its slogans of "Neither
the US nor the EU," and as if that weren't enough, its creation of
not only "foreign" but "domestic" enemies as well, coupled with its
unwillingness to afford anyone outside of the authoritarian regime
the chance to rule, makes contributions to democracy on any level an
impossibility. And in a state where democracy has become impossible,
it is also completely impossible for that state to be a republic.
As is known, a republic, in terms of its state and its government, has
two definitions. The first, and narrower, definition of a republic is
an expression of a system wherein the position of the head of state
is not hereditary or passed on, and is, in this sense, the opposite
of a monarchy. Just as it is implicitly understood herein that not
every republic is a democracy, similarly it would thus translate that
not all monarchies are necessarily in opposition to democracies. To
the contrary, just as there have been in the past and continue on
today to be republics that are not democratic, and which are run
by military or civil authority, there are also deep-rooted, strong
democracies which are not simultaneously republics.
In addition to the above definition of what a republic is, there is
a definition that goes more to the root of the essence of the term.
According to this definition, a republic is a style of leadership
aimed at ensuring the good of the people, or the public. Since a
leadership style that aims to achieve the best for its people would
not, naturally, exclude the people themselves, this definition of
what a republic is then describes a style of leadership or governing
wherein the people have a voice. In this sense then, this definition
more approaches the definition of democracy.
So let's take a look at a variety of ideas of how it is that these
two above definitions of a republic have separated from each other
in the modern world, and how it is that they need to come together
again. But first let me make the following clear, so that we can
better understand the issues we are examining here: the republic, as
many significant modern thinkers and politicians have stressed, means
being against tyranny. In order to eliminate tyranny, it is enough
that the state uses its power according to the law. The highest-level
guarantee that the state will use its power according to the law is
the idea that the law will in fact be made by the people. In this
way the society itself, rather than a being simply a gathering and
assortment of people, becomes a "society of citizenry," or as we were
saying before, a "civil society."
In a republic the citizenry of the republic sets out the order of
the society and the state through laws it creates by its own free will.
Thus it is the citizenry that limits and defines its own freedoms,
but it should be remembered that they are doing it themselves. In
order for citizens to be able to make up the laws to which they
themselves will be subject to, they must first be equal holders of
the individual and political freedoms guaranteed by law. And thus in
a modern state where everyone is counted as a citizen (slave-master,
male-female, worker-bourgeoisie, black-white, racist, ethnicist,
sexist and other categories like these) a republic in a modern state
is then in fact obliged to be a democracy.
In Turkey the same thing has been being repeated since the formation
of the republic. Since the passage from the Ottoman system to the
republican system, the transformation of the Turkish people from
vassals into a citizenry has been talked about frequently at every
level of our educational life. In addition to this it is always
stressed that it was the democratic aspect of the republic that
brought about the most wonderful of the changes.
"Well in that case what exactly is the problem?" The problem is
rooted in the lack of understanding that the modern interpretation
of the republic-democracy coupling is that it mandates a pluralistic
participation by the citizens of the country. The Turkish republic
can not seem to keep itself from falling into situations that prevent
the unity of the republic and democracy.
This is where the meaning of the events Turkey witnessed in the spring
of 2007 lies; according to this way of seeing things, democracy is
actually threatening the republic, and perhaps even more so than the
republic, the Turkish nation-state. What we see here is a very serious
paradox. The paradox is this: according to these claims the republic,
which by definition is composed of the citizenry, is actually being
threatened by this same citizenry. For this reason then limitations
must be put on how much authority these citizens can have in the
leadership of the republic. This paradox is rooted in the "founding
ideology" of the Turkish republic, Kemalism. In order to transcend
this paradox it is an inescapable necessity that the republic fully
and truly realize itself, and this is a quest that is only possible
through the deepening and widening of democracy. In order for the
Turkish republic to be able to experience such a process, a civil
society which stands behind the freedom necessary to talk about
differences in the public arena is an indispensable factor.
Quite in opposition to this though, what happened in Turkey during
the spring of 2007 was that the guardianship bureaucracy moved into
action to bring society out into the city squares, with some of the
factions being set into motion by the previously mentioned "so-called
civil society organizations." With this, the tableau presented was
not of simply a republic under threat, but going further still, the
presentation of citizens who did not see or acknowledge the "clear
and present danger" as the "enemy in the form of the other." This
itself turned into a presentation of these factions not seeing the
threats facing Turkey as being "co-conspirators" with the "imperialist
enemies."
'Neither the US nor the EU, but a completely independent Turkey':
Meaning what?
So in this sense another paradox contained in all these spring
events is that those wishing to take action based on the dangers and
threat facing Turkey all stood up against both the US and the EU. In
terms of its ties to the US, this stance is based on the political
strengths gained by the Kurds in northern Iraq, and the belief that
one region of Turkey now faces a threat from these relatively new
Kurdish strengths. Choruses ringing out about the ineffectiveness
of the US against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror are brought
constantly to the forefront in the press. As for the EU there are
the constant complaints that it is both trying to divide Turkey and
that it has persistently taken the side of the Greek Cypriots. These
and topics like the so-called "genocide" matter with the Armenians
are brought up often in the public forum as topics with the high
potential of affecting and influencing public opinion. In any case,
these expressions of opposition against both the US and the EU take
from time to time an "anti-imperialism" tone, and at other times are
couched with an emphasis on the strength of the Turkish nation-state.
When you combine the perceptions of the "domestic enemies" with the
"foreign enemies" perception (which itself is based on much incorrect
information and spreading of incorrect information) you get yet another
paradox that sits on the daily agenda of the Kemalist republic. This
is a paradox in connection with the EU. As already known, Turkey went
through a series of rapid and widespread reforms after 2002, arriving
in October 2005 at the point of starting up full membership talks with
the EU. The basic paradox is that while Kemalism is often defined
as being a modernization project for Turkey, the very EU reforms
which are the most concrete expression of Kemalism's main goal,
the achievement of a "modern civilization level," are opposed on the
basis that they threaten the republic.
This sort of "hostility to foreigners," which is sometimes of a
xenophobic character, does not make it clear in which direction it
expects Turkey's international relations to develop. And since the
slogan "Neither the US nor the EU, but a fully independent Turkey"
became so popular during the rallies, in fact became synonymous with
the expressions of opposition to the administration, it is a valid
question. Yes, what is the suggestion then? If we interpret this point
of view's essence as being based on opposition to a "concessionist"
stance, and embracing more of a "nationalist" stance, then you could
also extrapolate that what this really means is "isolationism" or
"autocracy." This in turn looks to resemble the story of Kemalism in
the 1930s, along with the byline of single-party rule.
The purpose of clarifying all the above is not to prophesy that
Turkey is going to turn into an isolationist, autocratic and thus
authoritarian and even fascist political regime. But along with that it
should be noted that it is clear that there are those with inclinations
for an undemocratic regime in the military and the civil bureaucracy,
as well as the "civil society" and the political parties. These
factions, who base the reasons for their actions on the idea that
they are protecting the state, can push the need for democracy in a
state back to the second, even the third plan when necessary. What's
more they even have the capacity to completely ignore this need for
democracy. And it was the spring of 2007 in Turkey that proved they
could find support for these inclinations from civil society. This is
of course a situation that increases the likelihood that Turkey can
and might be swayed from its path to democratization. In order then to
prevent this from happening, the citizens of the republic must make
clear their support of a pluralistic and freedom-loving democracy,
by putting their will and volition front and center.
*Levent Koker is a lecturer at Gazi University