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GUDAUTA BASE AND UNACCOUNTED-FOR TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT: ONGOING RUSSIAN BREACHES OF CFE TREATY COMMITMENTS
By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
June 18 2007
General Konstantin Totsky In a formulation reminiscent of Soviet
five-year plan-fulfillment reports, senior Russian officials claim
that Russia has completely "fulfilled and over-fulfilled" its 1999
treaty commitments to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova.
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and General Konstantin Totsky,
Russia's permanent representative at NATO, reiterated that claim
during the June 14 session of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the
level of defense ministers in Brussels (Interfax, June 14).
The NRC chairman's concluding statement (NATO Data Service, June
14) mentions only that the issue of the 1999 treaty was "discussed"
-- a one-word treatment indicative of deep differences that could
be papered over. The NRC meeting overlapped with the June 11-15
extraordinary conference in Vienna on the implementation of the Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the treaty that entails those
Russian commitments. At the Vienna conference as well, Russia insisted
that it has completely fulfilled them.
While the Vienna conference focused on the Russian troops in Moldova
(the top issue among the unfulfilled commitments on troop-withdrawal),
other unfulfilled commitments seem to receive less attention there. One
such issue is that of Russia's base at Gudauta in Georgia. The United
States and other countries raised this issue in the closed-door
conference and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried,
delegation leader at the conference, raised Gudauta publicly as well
(State Department transcript, June 12).
As part of its 1999 commitments, enshrined in the CFE Final Act at
that year's Istanbul summit, Russia was to close the Gudauta base,
evacuate the personnel and equipment, and hand the base over to Georgia
by July 1, 2001. However, Russia retains the base to the present day,
albeit with a reduced garrison.
According to data supplied by Moscow, some 400 Russians -- about
half of them active military personnel, the remainder being military
retirees and dependents -- are stationed at Gudauta, along with some
combat and transport helicopters, various military vehicles, a fuel
storage area, and some other facilities. That information remains
largely unverified. Moscow has not allowed international inspection
of the base and has provided no data on suspected stockpiles of
arms and ammunition or the content of container-type structures at
the base. The Russian military also clings to the Bombora airfield,
which is part of the Gudauta base complex.
Gudauta is located inside Abkhaz-controlled territory, where Moscow
can hide behind its proxies to frustrate international inspection
of the base. In this vein, Russia has periodically claimed that it
is up to Georgia to guarantee the safety of any international arms
control team that would wish to inspect Gudauta. At the same time,
Moscow has plainly been stating that it would allow an inspection
under OSCE aegis provided that it concludes that the base is "closed."
In the last three years, German diplomacy has attempted to promote
some kind of compromise solution over Gudauta. A tripartite group
of Germany, Russia, and Georgia has negotiated intermittently within
the OSCE over the modalities of an observation mission at the base.
Moscow has sought a one-time, non-intrusive inspection, with
Moscow-vetted participation, without a follow-up process, and
predetermined to close the issue. For its part, Tbilisi seeks
modalities for a genuinely international observation mission and a
continuing observation process, in accordance with the CFE Treaty's
verification procedures.
Georgia will regard Gudauta as closed when multinational observation
missions with unrestricted access confirm the complete evacuation,
and the base and other facilities are transferred to Georgia in
a legal sense (a physical transfer would be precluded by Abkhaz de
facto control of the surrounding area). NATO allies support Georgia's
position and did so again at the Vienna conference. At the same time,
Georgia and its Western partners expressed appreciation for the ongoing
withdrawal of Russian forces from the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases. As
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili noted in Vienna, the
withdrawal is being carried out in accordance with the agreed schedule
(Georgian Mission statement, June 14).
The problem of Unaccounted-For Treaty-Limited Equipment (UTLE) is
closely connected with the secessionist conflicts in Transnistria,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. Treaty-Limited Equipment
(TLE) is the overall category of weaponry that falls under CFE Treaty
restrictions (whether numerical limits under national or territorial
quotas; or mandatory scrapping; or removal to Russia, from case to
case). UTLE is the official, euphemistic designation of TLE-types of
weaponry held by secessionist forces.
Those unlawful forces possess combat hardware -- including armored
vehicles, artillery systems, and helicopters -- that fall under
CFE Treaty restrictions. The Russian military handed those arsenals
over to secessionist authorities on the territories of Moldova and
Georgia. The Armenian military did so in the territory of Azerbaijan,
where part of the UTLEs is located beyond Karabakh, deep inside
Azerbaijan. Consequently, Armenia has found it inexpedient to campaign
for ratification of the 1999 CFE Treaty even as allied Russia does so.
Those arsenals are "unaccounted-for" because the areas of deployment
are under Russian and secessionist control, inaccessible to on-site
verification and inspection.
The CFE Treaty (both the 1990 original in force and its unratified
1999 adaptation) provides for an elaborate inspection mechanism by
the state-parties, but this is not allowed to operate in any of the
secessionist enclaves. The presence of those arsenals generates
military tensions, constitutes a major impediment to political
settlements of those conflicts, and deals a major breach to the
international verification regime.
Russia cannot be deemed to have fulfilled the terms of the CFE Treaty
and Istanbul Commitments as long as the problems of the Gudauta base
and the UTLEs remain unresolved.
By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
June 18 2007
General Konstantin Totsky In a formulation reminiscent of Soviet
five-year plan-fulfillment reports, senior Russian officials claim
that Russia has completely "fulfilled and over-fulfilled" its 1999
treaty commitments to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova.
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and General Konstantin Totsky,
Russia's permanent representative at NATO, reiterated that claim
during the June 14 session of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the
level of defense ministers in Brussels (Interfax, June 14).
The NRC chairman's concluding statement (NATO Data Service, June
14) mentions only that the issue of the 1999 treaty was "discussed"
-- a one-word treatment indicative of deep differences that could
be papered over. The NRC meeting overlapped with the June 11-15
extraordinary conference in Vienna on the implementation of the Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the treaty that entails those
Russian commitments. At the Vienna conference as well, Russia insisted
that it has completely fulfilled them.
While the Vienna conference focused on the Russian troops in Moldova
(the top issue among the unfulfilled commitments on troop-withdrawal),
other unfulfilled commitments seem to receive less attention there. One
such issue is that of Russia's base at Gudauta in Georgia. The United
States and other countries raised this issue in the closed-door
conference and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried,
delegation leader at the conference, raised Gudauta publicly as well
(State Department transcript, June 12).
As part of its 1999 commitments, enshrined in the CFE Final Act at
that year's Istanbul summit, Russia was to close the Gudauta base,
evacuate the personnel and equipment, and hand the base over to Georgia
by July 1, 2001. However, Russia retains the base to the present day,
albeit with a reduced garrison.
According to data supplied by Moscow, some 400 Russians -- about
half of them active military personnel, the remainder being military
retirees and dependents -- are stationed at Gudauta, along with some
combat and transport helicopters, various military vehicles, a fuel
storage area, and some other facilities. That information remains
largely unverified. Moscow has not allowed international inspection
of the base and has provided no data on suspected stockpiles of
arms and ammunition or the content of container-type structures at
the base. The Russian military also clings to the Bombora airfield,
which is part of the Gudauta base complex.
Gudauta is located inside Abkhaz-controlled territory, where Moscow
can hide behind its proxies to frustrate international inspection
of the base. In this vein, Russia has periodically claimed that it
is up to Georgia to guarantee the safety of any international arms
control team that would wish to inspect Gudauta. At the same time,
Moscow has plainly been stating that it would allow an inspection
under OSCE aegis provided that it concludes that the base is "closed."
In the last three years, German diplomacy has attempted to promote
some kind of compromise solution over Gudauta. A tripartite group
of Germany, Russia, and Georgia has negotiated intermittently within
the OSCE over the modalities of an observation mission at the base.
Moscow has sought a one-time, non-intrusive inspection, with
Moscow-vetted participation, without a follow-up process, and
predetermined to close the issue. For its part, Tbilisi seeks
modalities for a genuinely international observation mission and a
continuing observation process, in accordance with the CFE Treaty's
verification procedures.
Georgia will regard Gudauta as closed when multinational observation
missions with unrestricted access confirm the complete evacuation,
and the base and other facilities are transferred to Georgia in
a legal sense (a physical transfer would be precluded by Abkhaz de
facto control of the surrounding area). NATO allies support Georgia's
position and did so again at the Vienna conference. At the same time,
Georgia and its Western partners expressed appreciation for the ongoing
withdrawal of Russian forces from the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases. As
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili noted in Vienna, the
withdrawal is being carried out in accordance with the agreed schedule
(Georgian Mission statement, June 14).
The problem of Unaccounted-For Treaty-Limited Equipment (UTLE) is
closely connected with the secessionist conflicts in Transnistria,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. Treaty-Limited Equipment
(TLE) is the overall category of weaponry that falls under CFE Treaty
restrictions (whether numerical limits under national or territorial
quotas; or mandatory scrapping; or removal to Russia, from case to
case). UTLE is the official, euphemistic designation of TLE-types of
weaponry held by secessionist forces.
Those unlawful forces possess combat hardware -- including armored
vehicles, artillery systems, and helicopters -- that fall under
CFE Treaty restrictions. The Russian military handed those arsenals
over to secessionist authorities on the territories of Moldova and
Georgia. The Armenian military did so in the territory of Azerbaijan,
where part of the UTLEs is located beyond Karabakh, deep inside
Azerbaijan. Consequently, Armenia has found it inexpedient to campaign
for ratification of the 1999 CFE Treaty even as allied Russia does so.
Those arsenals are "unaccounted-for" because the areas of deployment
are under Russian and secessionist control, inaccessible to on-site
verification and inspection.
The CFE Treaty (both the 1990 original in force and its unratified
1999 adaptation) provides for an elaborate inspection mechanism by
the state-parties, but this is not allowed to operate in any of the
secessionist enclaves. The presence of those arsenals generates
military tensions, constitutes a major impediment to political
settlements of those conflicts, and deals a major breach to the
international verification regime.
Russia cannot be deemed to have fulfilled the terms of the CFE Treaty
and Istanbul Commitments as long as the problems of the Gudauta base
and the UTLEs remain unresolved.