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The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency

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  • The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency

    ZNet, MA
    March 10 2007


    The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency

    by Mahmood Mamdani
    March 09, 2007

    London Review of Books

    The similarities between Iraq and Darfur are remarkable. The estimate
    of the number of civilians killed over the past three years is
    roughly similar. The killers are mostly paramilitaries, closely
    linked to the official military, which is said to be their main
    source of arms. The victims too are by and large identified as
    members of groups, rather than targeted as individuals. But the
    violence in the two places is named differently. In Iraq, it is said
    to be a cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency; in Darfur, it is
    called genocide. Why the difference? Who does the naming? Who is
    being named? What difference does it make?

    The most powerful mobilisation in New York City is in relation to
    Darfur, not Iraq. One would expect the reverse, for no other reason
    than that most New Yorkers are American citizens and so should feel
    directly responsible for the violence in occupied Iraq. But Iraq is a
    messy place in the American imagination, a place with messy politics.
    Americans worry about what their government should do in Iraq. Should
    it withdraw? What would happen if it did? In contrast, there is
    nothing messy about Darfur. It is a place without history and without
    politics; simply a site where perpetrators clearly identifiable as
    `Arabs' confront victims clearly identifiable as `Africans'.

    A full-page advertisement has appeared several times a week in the
    New York Times calling for intervention in Darfur now. It wants the
    intervening forces to be placed under `a chain of command allowing
    necessary and timely military action without approval from distant
    political or civilian personnel'. That intervention in Darfur should
    not be subject to `political or civilian' considerations and that the
    intervening forces should have the right to shoot - to kill - without
    permission from distant places: these are said to be `humanitarian'
    demands. In the same vein, a New Republic editorial on Darfur has
    called for `force as a first-resort response'. What makes the
    situation even more puzzling is that some of those who are calling
    for an end to intervention in Iraq are demanding an intervention in
    Darfur; as the slogan goes, `Out of Iraq and into Darfur.'

    What would happen if we thought of Darfur as we do of Iraq, as a
    place with a history and politics - a messy politics of insurgency
    and counter-insurgency? Why should an intervention in Darfur not turn
    out to be a trigger that escalates rather than reduces the level of
    violence as intervention in Iraq has done? Why might it not create
    the actual possibility of genocide, not just rhetorically but in
    reality? Morally, there is no doubt about the horrific nature of the
    violence against civilians in Darfur. The ambiguity lies in the
    politics of the violence, whose sources include both a
    state-connected counter-insurgency and an organised insurgency, very
    much like the violence in Iraq.

    The insurgency and counter-insurgency in Darfur began in 2003. Both
    were driven by an intermeshing of domestic tensions in the context of
    a peace-averse international environment defined by the War on
    Terror. On the one hand, there was a struggle for power within the
    political class in Sudan, with more marginal interests in the west
    (following those in the south and in the east) calling for reform at
    the centre. On the other, there was a community-level split inside
    Darfur, between nomads and settled farmers, who had earlier forged a
    way of sharing the use of semi-arid land in the dry season. With the
    drought that set in towards the late 1970s, co-operation turned into
    an intense struggle over diminishing resources.

    As the insurgency took root among the prospering peasant tribes of
    Darfur, the government trained and armed the poorer nomads and formed
    a militia - the Janjawiid - that became the vanguard of the unfolding
    counter-insurgency. The worst violence came from the Janjawiid, but
    the insurgent movements were also accused of gross violations. Anyone
    wanting to end the spiralling violence would have to bring about
    power-sharing at the state level and resource-sharing at the
    community level, land being the key resource.

    Since its onset, two official verdicts have been delivered on the
    violence, the first from the US, the second from the UN. The American
    verdict was unambiguous: Darfur was the site of an ongoing genocide.
    The chain of events leading to Washington's proclamation began with
    `a genocide alert' from the Management Committee of the Washington
    Holocaust Memorial Museum; according to the Jerusalem Post, the alert
    was `the first ever of its kind, issued by the US Holocaust Museum'.
    The House of Representatives followed unanimously on 24 June 2004.
    The last to join the chorus was Colin Powell.

    The UN Commission on Darfur was created in the aftermath of the
    American verdict and in response to American pressure. It was more
    ambiguous. In September 2004, the Nigerian president Olusegun
    Obasanjo, then the chair of the African Union, visited UN
    headquarters in New York. Darfur had been the focal point of
    discussion in the African Union. All concerned were alert to the
    extreme political sensitivity of the issue. At a press conference at
    the UN on 23 September Obasanjo was asked to pronounce on the
    violence in Darfur: was it genocide or not? His response was very
    clear:

    Before you can say that this is genocide or ethnic cleansing, we will
    have to have a definite decision and plan and programme of a
    government to wipe out a particular group of people, then we will be
    talking about genocide, ethnic cleansing. What we know is not that.
    What we know is that there was an uprising, rebellion, and the
    government armed another group of people to stop that rebellion.
    That's what we know. That does not amount to genocide from our own
    reckoning. It amounts to of course conflict. It amounts to violence.

    By October, the Security Council had established a five-person
    commission of inquiry on Darfur and asked it to report within three
    months on `violations of international humanitarian law and human
    rights law in Darfur by all parties', and specifically to determine
    `whether or not acts of genocide have occurred'. Among the members of
    the commission was the chief prosecutor of South Africa's TRC, Dumisa
    Ntsebeza. In its report, submitted on 25 January 2005, the commission
    concluded that `the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy
    of genocide . . . directly or through the militias under its
    control.' But the commission did find that the government's violence
    was `deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians'.
    Indeed, `even where rebels may have been present in villages, the
    impact of attacks on civilians shows that the use of military force
    was manifestly disproportionate to any threat posed by the rebels.'
    These acts, the commission concluded, `were conducted on a widespread
    and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against
    humanity' (my emphasis). Yet, the commission insisted, they did not
    amount to acts of genocide: `The crucial element of genocidal intent
    appears to be missing . . . it would seem that those who planned and
    organised attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims
    from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency
    warfare.'

    At the same time, the commission assigned secondary responsibility to
    rebel forces - namely, members of the Sudan Liberation Army and the
    Justice and Equality Movement - which it held `responsible for
    serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
    which may amount to war crimes' (my emphasis). If the government
    stood accused of `crimes against humanity', rebel movements were
    accused of `war crimes'. Finally, the commission identified
    individual perpetrators and presented the UN secretary-general with a
    sealed list that included `officials of the government of Sudan,
    members of militia forces, members of rebel groups and certain
    foreign army officers acting in their personal capacity'. The list
    named 51 individuals.

    The commission's findings highlighted three violations of
    international law: disproportionate response, conducted on a
    widespread and systematic basis, targeting entire groups (as opposed
    to identifiable individuals) but without the intention to eliminate
    them as groups. It is for this last reason that the commission ruled
    out the finding of genocide. Its less grave findings of `crimes
    against humanity' and `war crimes' are not unique to Darfur, but fit
    several other situations of extreme violence: in particular, the US
    occupation of Iraq, the Hema-Lendu violence in eastern Congo and the
    Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Among those in the counter-insurgency
    accused of war crimes were the `foreign army officers acting in their
    personal capacity', i.e. mercenaries, presumably recruited from armed
    forces outside Sudan. The involvement of mercenaries in perpetrating
    gross violence also fits the occupation in Iraq, where some of them
    go by the name of `contractors'.

    The journalist in the US most closely identified with
    consciousness-raising on Darfur is the New York Times op-ed columnist
    Nicholas Kristof, often identified as a lone crusader on the issue.
    To peruse Kristof's Darfur columns over the past three years is to
    see the reduction of a complex political context to a morality tale
    unfolding in a world populated by villains and victims who never
    trade places and so can always and easily be told apart. It is a
    world where atrocities mount geometrically, the perpetrators so evil
    and the victims so helpless that the only possibility of relief is a
    rescue mission from the outside, preferably in the form of a military
    intervention.

    Kristof made six highly publicised trips to Darfur, the first in
    March 2004 and the sixth two years later. He began by writing of it
    as a case of `ethnic cleansing': `Sudan's Arab rulers' had `forced
    700,000 black African Sudanese to flee their villages' (24 March
    2004). Only three days later, he upped the ante: this was no longer
    ethnic cleansing, but genocide. `Right now,' he wrote on 27 March,
    `the government of Sudan is engaged in genocide against three large
    African tribes in its Darfur region.' He continued: `The killings are
    being orchestrated by the Arab-dominated Sudanese government' and
    `the victims are non-Arabs: blacks in the Zaghawa, Massalliet and Fur
    tribes.' He estimated the death toll at a thousand a week. Two months
    later, on 29 May, he revised the estimates dramatically upwards,
    citing predictions from the US Agency for International Development
    to the effect that `at best, `only' 100,000 people will die in Darfur
    this year of malnutrition and disease' but `if things go badly, half
    a million will die.'

    The UN commission's report was released on 25 February 2005. It
    confirmed `massive displacement' of persons (`more than a million'
    internally displaced and `more than 200,000' refugees in Chad) and
    the destruction of `several hundred' villages and hamlets as
    `irrefutable facts'; but it gave no confirmed numbers for those
    killed. Instead, it noted rebel claims that government-allied forces
    had `allegedly killed over 70,000 persons'. Following the publication
    of the report, Kristof began to scale down his estimates. For the
    first time, on 23 February 2005, he admitted that `the numbers are
    fuzzy.' Rather than the usual single total, he went on to give a
    range of figures, from a low of 70,000, which he dismissed as `a UN
    estimate', to `independent estimates [that] exceed 220,000'. A
    warning followed: `and the number is rising by about ten thousand a
    month.'

    The publication of the commission's report had considerable effect.
    Internationally, it raised doubts about whether what was going on in
    Darfur could be termed genocide. Even US officials were unwilling to
    go along with the high estimates propagated by the broad alliance of
    organisations that subscribe to the Save Darfur campaign. The effect
    on American diplomacy was discernible. Three months later, on 3 May,
    Kristof noted with dismay that not only had `Deputy Secretary of
    State Robert Zoellick pointedly refused to repeat the
    administration's past judgment that the killings amount to genocide':
    he had `also cited an absurdly low estimate of Darfur's total death
    toll: 60,000 to 160,000'. As an alternative, Kristof cited the latest
    estimate of deaths from the Coalition for International Justice as
    `nearly 400,000, and rising by 500 a day'. In three months, Kristof's
    estimates had gone up from 10,000 to 15,000 a month. Six months
    later, on 27 November, Kristof warned that `if aid groups pull out .
    . . the death toll could then rise to 100,000 a month.' Anyone
    keeping a tally of the death toll in Darfur as reported in the
    Kristof columns would find the rise, fall and rise again very
    bewildering. First he projected the number of dead at 320,000 for
    2004 (16 June 2004) but then gave a scaled down estimate of between
    70,000 and 220,000 (23 February 2005). The number began once more to
    climb to `nearly 400,000' (3 May 2005), only to come down yet again
    to 300,000 (23 April 2006). Each time figures were given with equal
    confidence but with no attempt to explain their basis. Did the
    numbers reflect an actual decline in the scale of killing in Darfur
    or was Kristof simply making an adjustment to the changing mood
    internationally?

    In the 23 April column, Kristof expanded the list of perpetrators to
    include an external power: `China is now underwriting its second
    genocide in three decades. The first was in Pol Pot's Cambodia, and
    the second is in Darfur, Sudan. Chinese oil purchases have financed
    Sudan's pillage of Darfur, Chinese-made AK-47s have been the main
    weapons used to slaughter several hundred thousand people in Darfur
    so far and China has protected Sudan in the UN Security Council.' In
    the Kristof columns, there is one area of deafening silence, to do
    with the fact that what is happening in Darfur is a civil war. Hardly
    a word is said about the insurgency, about the civilian deaths
    insurgents mete out, about acts that the commission characterised as
    `war crimes'. Would the logic of his 23 April column not lead one to
    think that those with connections to the insurgency, some of them
    active in the international campaign to declare Darfur the site of
    genocide, were also guilty of `underwriting' war crimes in Darfur?

    Newspaper writing on Darfur has sketched a pornography of violence.
    It seems fascinated by and fixated on the gory details, describing
    the worst of the atrocities in gruesome detail and chronicling the
    rise in the number of them. The implication is that the motivation of
    the perpetrators lies in biology (`race') and, if not that, certainly
    in `culture'. This voyeuristic approach accompanies a moralistic
    discourse whose effect is both to obscure the politics of the
    violence and position the reader as a virtuous, not just a concerned
    observer.

    Journalism gives us a simple moral world, where a group of
    perpetrators face a group of victims, but where neither history nor
    motivation is thinkable because both are outside history and context.
    Even when newspapers highlight violence as a social phenomenon, they
    fail to understand the forces that shape the agency of the
    perpetrator. Instead, they look for a clear and uncomplicated moral
    that describes the victim as untainted and the perpetrator as simply
    evil. Where yesterday's victims are today's perpetrators, where
    victims have turned perpetrators, this attempt to find an African
    replay of the Holocaust not only does not work but also has perverse
    consequences. Whatever its analytical weaknesses, the
    depoliticisation of violence has given its proponents distinct
    political advantages.

    The conflict in Darfur is highly politicised, and so is the
    international campaign. One of the campaign's constant refrains has
    been that the ongoing genocide is racial: `Arabs' are trying to
    eliminate `Africans'. But both `Arab' and `African' have several
    meanings in Sudan. There have been at least three meanings of `Arab'.
    Locally, `Arab' was a pejorative reference to the lifestyle of the
    nomad as uncouth; regionally, it referred to someone whose primary
    language was Arabic. In this sense, a group could become `Arab' over
    time. This process, known as Arabisation, was not an anomaly in the
    region: there was Amharisation in Ethiopia and Swahilisation on the
    East African coast. The third meaning of `Arab' was `privileged and
    exclusive'; it was the claim of the riverine political aristocracy
    who had ruled Sudan since independence, and who equated Arabisation
    with the spread of civilisation and being Arab with descent.

    `African', in this context, was a subaltern identity that also had
    the potential of being either exclusive or inclusive. The two
    meanings were not only contradictory but came from the experience of
    two different insurgencies. The inclusive meaning was more political
    than racial or even cultural (linguistic), in the sense that an
    `African' was anyone determined to make a future within Africa. It
    was pioneered by John Garang, the leader of the Sudan People's
    Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south, as a way of holding together the
    New Sudan he hoped to see. In contrast, its exclusive meaning came in
    two versions, one hard (racial) and the other soft (linguistic) -
    `African' as Bantu and `African' as the identity of anyone who spoke
    a language indigenous to Africa. The racial meaning came to take a
    strong hold in both the counter-insurgency and the insurgency in
    Darfur. The Save Darfur campaign's characterisation of the violence
    as `Arab' against `African' obscured both the fact that the violence
    was not one-sided and the contest over the meaning of `Arab' and
    `African': a contest that was critical precisely because it was
    ultimately about who belonged and who did not in the political
    community called Sudan. The depoliticisation, naturalisation and,
    ultimately, demonisation of the notion `Arab', as against `African',
    has been the deadliest effect, whether intended or not, of the Save
    Darfur campaign.

    The depoliticisation of the conflict gave campaigners three
    advantages. First, they were able to occupy the moral high ground.
    The campaign presented itself as apolitical but moral, its concern
    limited only to saving lives. Second, only a single-issue campaign
    could bring together in a unified chorus forces that are otherwise
    ranged as adversaries on most important issues of the day: at one
    end, the Christian right and the Zionist lobby; at the other, a
    mainly school and university-based peace movement. Nat Hentoff of the
    Village Voice wrote of the Save Darfur Coalition as `an alliance of
    more than 515 faith-based, humanitarian and human rights
    organisations'; among the organisers of their Rally to Stop the
    Genocide in Washington last year were groups as diverse as the
    American Jewish World Service, the American Society for Muslim
    Advancement, the National Association of Evangelicals, the US
    Conference of Catholic Bishops, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, the
    American Anti-Slavery Group, Amnesty International, Christian
    Solidarity International, Physicians for Human Rights and the
    National Black Church Initiative. Surely, such a wide coalition would
    cease to hold together if the issue shifted to, say, Iraq.

    To understand the third advantage, we have to return to the question
    I asked earlier: how could it be that many of those calling for an
    end to the American and British intervention in Iraq are demanding an
    intervention in Darfur? It's tempting to think that the advantage of
    Darfur lies in its being a small, faraway place where those who drive
    the War on Terror do not have a vested interest. That this is hardly
    the case is evident if one compares the American response to Darfur
    to its non-response to Congo, even though the dimensions of the
    conflict in Congo seem to give it a mega-Darfur quality: the numbers
    killed are estimated in the millions rather than the hundreds of
    thousands; the bulk of the killing, particularly in Kivu, is done by
    paramilitaries trained, organised and armed by neighbouring
    governments; and the victims on both sides - Hema and Lendu - are
    framed in collective rather than individual terms, to the point that
    one influential version defines both as racial identities and the
    conflict between the two as a replay of the Rwandan genocide. Given
    all this, how does one explain the fact that the focus of the most
    widespread and ambitious humanitarian movement in the US is on Darfur
    and not on Kivu?

    Nicholas Kristof was asked this very question by a university
    audience: `When I spoke at Cornell University recently, a woman asked
    why I always harp on Darfur. It's a fair question. The number of
    people killed in Darfur so far is modest in global terms: estimates
    range from 200,000 to more than 500,000. In contrast, four million
    people have died since 1998 as a result of the fighting in Congo, the
    most lethal conflict since World War Two.' But instead of answering
    the question, Kristof - now writing his column rather than facing the
    questioner at Cornell - moved on: `And malaria annually kills one
    million to three million people - meaning that three years' deaths in
    Darfur are within the margin of error of the annual global toll from
    malaria.' And from there he went on to compare the deaths in Darfur
    to the deaths from malaria, rather than from the conflict in Congo:
    `We have a moral compass within us and its needle is moved not only
    by human suffering but also by human evil. That's what makes genocide
    special - not just the number of deaths but the government policy
    behind them. And that in turn is why stopping genocide should be an
    even higher priority than saving lives from Aids or malaria.' That
    did not explain the relative silence on Congo. Could the reason be
    that in the case of Congo, Hema and Lendu militias - many of them no
    more than child soldiers - were trained by America's allies in the
    region, Rwanda and Uganda? Is that why the violence in Darfur - but
    not the violence in Kivu - is named as a genocide?

    It seems that genocide has become a label to be stuck on your worst
    enemy, a perverse version of the Nobel Prize, part of a rhetorical
    arsenal that helps you vilify your adversaries while ensuring
    impunity for your allies. In Kristof's words, the point is not so
    much `human suffering' as `human evil'. Unlike Kivu, Darfur can be
    neatly integrated into the War on Terror, for Darfur gives the
    Warriors on Terror a valuable asset with which to demonise an enemy:
    a genocide perpetrated by Arabs. This was the third and most valuable
    advantage that Save Darfur gained from depoliticising the conflict.
    The more thoroughly Darfur was integrated into the War on Terror, the
    more the depoliticised violence in Darfur acquired a racial
    description, as a genocide of `Arabs' killing `Africans'. Racial
    difference purportedly constituted the motive force behind the mass
    killings. The irony of Kristof's columns is that they mirror the
    ideology of Arab supremacism in Sudan by demonising entire
    communities.[*]

    Kristof chides Arab peoples and the Arab press for not having the
    moral fibre to respond to this Muslim-on-Muslim violence, presumably
    because it is a violence inflicted by Arab Muslims on African
    Muslims. In one of his early columns in 2004, he was outraged by the
    silence of Muslim leaders: `Do they care about dead Muslims only when
    the killers are Israelis or Americans?' Two years later he asked:
    `And where is the Arab press? Isn't the murder of 300,000 or more
    Muslims almost as offensive as a Danish cartoon?' Six months later,
    Kristof pursued this line on NBC's Today Show. Elaborating on the
    `real blind spot' in the Muslim world, he said: `You are beginning to
    get some voices in the Muslim world . . . saying it's appalling that
    you have evangelical Christians and American Jews leading an effort
    to protect Muslims in Sudan and in Chad.'

    If many of the leading lights in the Darfur campaign are fired by
    moral indignation, this derives from two events: the Nazi Holocaust
    and the Rwandan genocide. After all, the seeds of the Save Darfur
    campaign lie in the tenth-anniversary commemoration of what happened
    in Rwanda. Darfur is today a metaphor for senseless violence in
    politics, as indeed Rwanda was a decade before. Most writing on the
    Rwandan genocide in the US was also done by journalists. In We wish
    to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families, the
    most widely read book on the genocide, Philip Gourevitch envisaged
    Rwanda as a replay of the Holocaust, with Hutu cast as perpetrators
    and Tutsi as victims. Again, the encounter between the two seemed to
    take place outside any context, as part of an eternal encounter
    between evil and innocence. Many of the journalists who write about
    Darfur have Rwanda very much in the back of their minds. In December
    2004, Kristof recalled the lessons of Rwanda: `Early in his
    presidency, Mr Bush read a report about Bill Clinton's paralysis
    during the Rwandan genocide and scrawled in the margin: `Not on my
    watch.' But in fact the same thing is happening on his watch, and I
    find that heartbreaking and baffling.'

    With very few exceptions, the Save Darfur campaign has drawn a single
    lesson from Rwanda: the problem was the US failure to intervene to
    stop the genocide. Rwanda is the guilt that America must expiate, and
    to do so it must be ready to intervene, for good and against evil,
    even globally. That lesson is inscribed at the heart of Samantha
    Power's book, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.
    But it is the wrong lesson. The Rwandan genocide was born of a civil
    war which intensified when the settlement to contain it broke down.
    The settlement, reached at the Arusha Conference, broke down because
    neither the Hutu Power tendency nor the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda
    Patriotic Front (RPF) had any interest in observing the power-sharing
    arrangement at the core of the settlement: the former because it was
    excluded from the settlement and the latter because it was unwilling
    to share power in any meaningful way.

    What the humanitarian intervention lobby fails to see is that the US
    did intervene in Rwanda, through a proxy. That proxy was the RPF,
    backed up by entire units from the Uganda Army. The green light was
    given to the RPF, whose commanding officer, Paul Kagame, had recently
    returned from training in the US, just as it was lately given to the
    Ethiopian army in Somalia. Instead of using its resources and
    influence to bring about a political solution to the civil war, and
    then strengthen it, the US signalled to one of the parties that it
    could pursue victory with impunity. This unilateralism was part of
    what led to the disaster, and that is the real lesson of Rwanda.
    Applied to Darfur and Sudan, it is sobering. It means recognising
    that Darfur is not yet another Rwanda. Nurturing hopes of an external
    military intervention among those in the insurgency who aspire to
    victory and reinforcing the fears of those in the counter-insurgency
    who see it as a prelude to defeat are precisely the ways to ensure
    that it becomes a Rwanda. Strengthening those on both sides who stand
    for a political settlement to the civil war is the only realistic
    approach. Solidarity, not intervention, is what will bring peace to
    Darfur.

    The dynamic of civil war in Sudan has fed on multiple sources: first,
    the post-independence monopoly of power enjoyed by a tiny `Arabised'
    elite from the riverine north of Khartoum, a monopoly that has bred
    growing resistance among the majority, marginalised populations in
    the south, east and west of the country; second, the rebel movements
    which have in their turn bred ambitious leaders unwilling to enter
    into power-sharing arrangements as a prelude to peace; and, finally,
    external forces that continue to encourage those who are interested
    in retaining or obtaining a monopoly of power.

    The dynamic of peace, by contrast, has fed on a series of
    power-sharing arrangements, first in the south and then in the east.
    This process has been intermittent in Darfur. African Union-organised
    negotiations have been successful in forging a power-sharing
    arrangement, but only for that arrangement to fall apart time and
    again. A large part of the explanation, as I suggested earlier, lies
    in the international context of the War on Terror, which favours
    parties who are averse to taking risks for peace. To reinforce the
    peace process must be the first commitment of all those interested in
    Darfur.

    The camp of peace needs to come to a second realisation: that peace
    cannot be built on humanitarian intervention, which is the language
    of big powers. The history of colonialism should teach us that every
    major intervention has been justified as humanitarian, a `civilising
    mission'. Nor was it mere idiosyncrasy that inspired the devotion
    with which many colonial officers and archivists recorded the details
    of barbarity among the colonised - sati, the ban on widow marriage or
    the practice of child marriage in India, or slavery and female
    genital mutilation in Africa. I am not suggesting that this was all
    invention. I mean only to point out that the chronicling of
    atrocities had a practical purpose: it provided the moral pretext for
    intervention. Now, as then, imperial interventions claim to have a
    dual purpose: on the one hand, to rescue minority victims of ongoing
    barbarities and, on the other, to quarantine majority perpetrators
    with the stated aim of civilising them. Iraq should act as a warning
    on this score. The worst thing in Darfur would be an Iraq-style
    intervention. That would almost certainly spread the civil war to
    other parts of Sudan, unravelling the peace process in the east and
    south and dragging the whole country into the global War on Terror.

    Footnotes

    * Contrast this with the UN commission's painstaking effort to make
    sense of the identities `Arab' and `African'. The commission's report
    concentrated on three related points. First, the claim that the
    Darfur conflict pitted `Arab' against `African' was facile. `In fact,
    the commission found that many Arabs in Darfur are opposed to the
    Janjawiid, and some Arabs are fighting with the rebels, such as
    certain Arab commanders and their men from the Misseriya and Rizeigat
    tribes. At the same time, many non-Arabs are supporting the
    government and serving in its army.' Second, it has never been easy
    to sort different tribes into the categories `Arab' and `African':
    `The various tribes that have been the object of attacks and killings
    (chiefly the Fur, Massalit and Zeghawa tribes) do not appear to make
    up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic groups to which persons or
    militias that attack them belong. They speak the same language
    (Arabic) and embrace the same religion (Muslim). In addition, also
    due to the high measure of intermarriage, they can hardly be
    distinguished in their outward physical appearance from the members
    of tribes that allegedly attacked them. Apparently, the sedentary and
    nomadic character of the groups constitutes one of the main
    distinctions between them' (emphasis mine). Finally, the commission
    put forward the view that political developments are driving the
    rapidly growing distinction between `Arab' and `African'. On the one
    hand, `Arab' and `African' seem to have become political identities:
    `Those tribes in Darfur who support rebels have increasingly come to
    be identified as `African' and those supporting the government as the
    `Arabs'. A good example to illustrate this is that of the Gimmer, a
    pro-government African tribe that is seen by the African tribes
    opposed to the government as having been `Arabised'.' On the other
    hand, this development was being promoted from the outside: `The
    Arab-African divide has also been fanned by the growing insistence on
    such divide in some circles and in the media.'

    Mahmood Mamdani is Herbert Lehman Professor of Government and a
    professor of anthropology at Columbia University. His most recent
    book is Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots
    of Terror.

    http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.c fm?SectionID=15&ItemID=12299
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