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"NO CONSENSUS IN EUROPE AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH EU'S EASTERN NEIGHBORS," - NICU POPESCU
Nona Abazyan
Daily Georgian Times, Georgia
March 14 2007
Armenian foreign policy "complementarity," which in essence may be
identified as a partial granting of state sovereignty to Russia for
the sake of national security, inevitably becomes a driving force for
EU-Russia bargaining in Armenia, and the South Caucasus. Thus, this
"complementarity" makes EU-Armenia relations dependent on Russia's
polices towards Armenia.
The Russian government, and currently ruling political party "Edinaya
Rosia" (United Russia) view Western (US and EU) penetration into
post-Soviet space as "squeezing" out Russian influence.
In fact, while the EU brings social welfare, democracy, rule of law,
etc. Russia guarantees energy security and military cooperation
for the South Caucasus. This is the optimal path. However, regional
politics do not only depend on Armenia's balanced interrelation with
the West and Russia. Meanwhile, the starting point in Armenia might
have reflective impact on the region
Nicu Popescu is the OSI Research Fellow at the Center for European
Policy Studies, a PhD candidate at Central European University in
Budapest.
Q: What are EU interests in the South Caucasus and in general, in
Post-Soviet states?
A: All any of us wants is decent and quiet neighbors. It is the
same in international politics. The EU wants stable and peaceful
neighbors, because otherwise if neighbors have a problem, the EU will
be affected. The EU does not want to control these countries. It just
wants to help them "Europeanize" because the EU sees from its own
post-World war II history that "Europeanization" is a good recipe for
peace and stability. That's the EU's main interest in its neighborhood.
But the EU also has energy interests in the region, and Georgia is
a key country for any transit of gas and oil from Central Asia and
the Caspian to Europe. A Commission memo on energy policy for the
enlarged EU and its neighbors stated that "secure and safe export
routes for Caspian oil and gas will be important for the EU's security
of energy supply as well as crucial for the development (economic,
but also social and political) of the Caspian region."
Georgia is a key state in the transit of oil and gas.
Q: How have the EU-Russian relations been for the last 5 years?
A: They have been marked by a great lack of trust, but also by an
understanding that cooperation must continue. Thus both are forced
to cooperate, while both would in many respects prefer to be less
dependent on each other.
Q: What has changed in EU foreign policy towards Russia after the
energy crisis in Europe?
A: The energy crises just highlighted many trends visible before in
Russia. They are another alarm bell for Europe that Russia is far
from positive progression.
Q: Considering the experience of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, what
challenges will the Armenian Government encounter from Russia while
integrating into European institutions and NATO?
A: The first problem is real democratization. No significant progress
towards NATO and the EU can happen without building democracy. A
second crucial issue is gaining the ability to withstand Russian
pressure aimed at harassing those willing to engage more with the
West. Such harassment is extremely damaging for the economy and
democracy of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. The biggest challenge for
Armenia though is Nagorno-Karabakh.
But Armenia's smaller dependence on Russian gas can be a positive
factor. Another positive factor is that Armenia has better functioning
institutions than Georgia had before the Rose Revolution.
If Armenia moves toward the West it will not have to be as engaged
in state building as Georgia is. Another advantage is Armenia's
homogeneity. It is not as divided as Ukraine.
Q: How does EU view the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh? And what is the
EU position on this frozen conflict and its resolution?
A: The EU is ready to help if there is an agreement on settlement.
This is another reason to solve the conflict. The EU cannot get
involved the way the conflict looks now.
Q: What is the official view of Moscow on EU enlargement programs
and EU policies in the post-Soviet space? Is it viewed as intrusion?
A: Yes. Russia sees the EU as if the EU has the same domination motives
as Russia. This is not true. EU and Russia are simply different
actors. Russia wants control of its neighbors. The EU wants stable
and peaceful neighbors.
Q: Who in Russia is primarily against further EU integration for the
post-Soviet states?
A: Almost everybody who has decision-making abilities. But the issue
of integration of former Soviet states in the EU is not primarily
a Russian problem. The first problem is a lack of economic and
political and democratic reforms in these countries. The second is EU's
reluctance to engage with them. And only third is Russian opposition.
Q: If a CIS member state applies for EU membership, should it leave
CIS or may remain in both Unions?
A: EU accession comes through real reforms. CIS is a virtual
organization. It does not really exist. It cannot hamper EU accession
if reforming states are firm in their democratization.
Q: What structures and mechanisms function in the EU under the
Common Foreign and Security Policy for the security-guarantee of
its member-states?
A: Mainly soft security guarantees, and instruments for peace support
operations. Unlike NATO the EU does not have a solidarity clause where
an attack against one state is considered an attack on all states.
Q: Do you see the possibility of EU integration for the three South
Caucasus states?
A: Not in the next 15-20 years. It took 18 years for Romania and
Bulgaria to integrate into the EU-from 1990 to 2007. The South Caucasus
states are at the beginning of a VERY long road. But the faster they
start moving towards this goal, the better for them.
Q: Why do some EU representatives refer to ENP as a kind of initial
step for membership, while others reject the idea of membership and
state that this region would remain as the "near Europe"?
A: Because there is no consensus in Europe as to what should be done
with EU's Eastern neighbors. When there is no consensus, the issue is
usually deferred in the EU. It has to be tackled at a later stage when
the situation is clearer. We all like to postpone important decision
until the last moment
Q: Do you think that the EU sometimes has a mismatch of policies? If
yes, please specify.
A: [The EU is] full of mismatches. The EU is constrained by internal
contradictions, inconsistencies and competing priorities. That's how
the EU works. That is normal. It works slowly.
Q: If EU was for the self-determination of people living in the former
Yugoslavia, then, self-determination was a priority over territorial
integrity. May we conclude that this model may be applied for the
resolution of frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus? If no, why?
A: Self-determination does not mean necessarily separation. It means
the right of people to have their cultural, political, etc. rights
respected. This can be done inside existing states, through power
sharing arrangements.
In the Balkans there are three big precedents: 1) Bosnia - a weak
federation close to confederation. 2) Macedonia where the conflict
has been solved through decentralization and devolution of power to
Albanians. 3) Kosovo - which will probably get independence.
All three are cases of self-determination. So far each of them is
discussing power sharing, instead of secession.
Q: Armenia's last referendum for constitutional amendments according
to local observers and opposition was held with a great amount of
fraud and irregularities. Why do you think the EU observers kept
their eyes closed to these falsified results of the referendum?
A: Of course they did. And the Council of Europe did criticize the
way it was conducted.
Q: What might be common interests of Russia and EU in the South
Caucasus that may cause confrontation while both of them are active
in the region?
A: There are many potential issues for conflict and for cooperation.
Tension can arise on the de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and attempts to hamper EU and US access to the Caspian
basin's gas and oil. Cooperation is necessary on solving conflicts,
including Karabakh.
Q: Do you believe that peaceful co-existence of the EU and Russia is
possible? Can there be a clear division of lines and limitations on
their roles and interests in the South Caucasus, especially Armenia?
A: Peaceful coexistence happens between rivals. EU and Russia will
have peaceful relations. That's clear.
Q: Do you think Armenia will succeed with its "complementarity"
in the next 5-10 years, balancing cooperation with EU and Russia,
without hitting the economic, military, energy, communication and
political cooperation between Armenia and Russia?
A: Armenia has to make reforms. Many in Armenia understand that
exclusive reliance on Russia is not in its best interests. And that
Russia is less and less ready to listen to its allies - Armenia,
but also Belarus etc. And that Russia often wants concessions from
allies without giving anything in exchange. But it's Armenia's choice
what kind of foreign policy it wants to pursue. The problem is that
time is running out, and the corridor of complementarity is narrowing.
Solving Nagorno-Karabakh will greatly help Armenia diversify its
foreign policy options.
Nona Abazyan is a graduate of OSI-Funded MA program Transformation
in South Caucasus administered by Center for Social Sciences (CSS).
Nona Abazyan
Daily Georgian Times, Georgia
March 14 2007
Armenian foreign policy "complementarity," which in essence may be
identified as a partial granting of state sovereignty to Russia for
the sake of national security, inevitably becomes a driving force for
EU-Russia bargaining in Armenia, and the South Caucasus. Thus, this
"complementarity" makes EU-Armenia relations dependent on Russia's
polices towards Armenia.
The Russian government, and currently ruling political party "Edinaya
Rosia" (United Russia) view Western (US and EU) penetration into
post-Soviet space as "squeezing" out Russian influence.
In fact, while the EU brings social welfare, democracy, rule of law,
etc. Russia guarantees energy security and military cooperation
for the South Caucasus. This is the optimal path. However, regional
politics do not only depend on Armenia's balanced interrelation with
the West and Russia. Meanwhile, the starting point in Armenia might
have reflective impact on the region
Nicu Popescu is the OSI Research Fellow at the Center for European
Policy Studies, a PhD candidate at Central European University in
Budapest.
Q: What are EU interests in the South Caucasus and in general, in
Post-Soviet states?
A: All any of us wants is decent and quiet neighbors. It is the
same in international politics. The EU wants stable and peaceful
neighbors, because otherwise if neighbors have a problem, the EU will
be affected. The EU does not want to control these countries. It just
wants to help them "Europeanize" because the EU sees from its own
post-World war II history that "Europeanization" is a good recipe for
peace and stability. That's the EU's main interest in its neighborhood.
But the EU also has energy interests in the region, and Georgia is
a key country for any transit of gas and oil from Central Asia and
the Caspian to Europe. A Commission memo on energy policy for the
enlarged EU and its neighbors stated that "secure and safe export
routes for Caspian oil and gas will be important for the EU's security
of energy supply as well as crucial for the development (economic,
but also social and political) of the Caspian region."
Georgia is a key state in the transit of oil and gas.
Q: How have the EU-Russian relations been for the last 5 years?
A: They have been marked by a great lack of trust, but also by an
understanding that cooperation must continue. Thus both are forced
to cooperate, while both would in many respects prefer to be less
dependent on each other.
Q: What has changed in EU foreign policy towards Russia after the
energy crisis in Europe?
A: The energy crises just highlighted many trends visible before in
Russia. They are another alarm bell for Europe that Russia is far
from positive progression.
Q: Considering the experience of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, what
challenges will the Armenian Government encounter from Russia while
integrating into European institutions and NATO?
A: The first problem is real democratization. No significant progress
towards NATO and the EU can happen without building democracy. A
second crucial issue is gaining the ability to withstand Russian
pressure aimed at harassing those willing to engage more with the
West. Such harassment is extremely damaging for the economy and
democracy of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. The biggest challenge for
Armenia though is Nagorno-Karabakh.
But Armenia's smaller dependence on Russian gas can be a positive
factor. Another positive factor is that Armenia has better functioning
institutions than Georgia had before the Rose Revolution.
If Armenia moves toward the West it will not have to be as engaged
in state building as Georgia is. Another advantage is Armenia's
homogeneity. It is not as divided as Ukraine.
Q: How does EU view the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh? And what is the
EU position on this frozen conflict and its resolution?
A: The EU is ready to help if there is an agreement on settlement.
This is another reason to solve the conflict. The EU cannot get
involved the way the conflict looks now.
Q: What is the official view of Moscow on EU enlargement programs
and EU policies in the post-Soviet space? Is it viewed as intrusion?
A: Yes. Russia sees the EU as if the EU has the same domination motives
as Russia. This is not true. EU and Russia are simply different
actors. Russia wants control of its neighbors. The EU wants stable
and peaceful neighbors.
Q: Who in Russia is primarily against further EU integration for the
post-Soviet states?
A: Almost everybody who has decision-making abilities. But the issue
of integration of former Soviet states in the EU is not primarily
a Russian problem. The first problem is a lack of economic and
political and democratic reforms in these countries. The second is EU's
reluctance to engage with them. And only third is Russian opposition.
Q: If a CIS member state applies for EU membership, should it leave
CIS or may remain in both Unions?
A: EU accession comes through real reforms. CIS is a virtual
organization. It does not really exist. It cannot hamper EU accession
if reforming states are firm in their democratization.
Q: What structures and mechanisms function in the EU under the
Common Foreign and Security Policy for the security-guarantee of
its member-states?
A: Mainly soft security guarantees, and instruments for peace support
operations. Unlike NATO the EU does not have a solidarity clause where
an attack against one state is considered an attack on all states.
Q: Do you see the possibility of EU integration for the three South
Caucasus states?
A: Not in the next 15-20 years. It took 18 years for Romania and
Bulgaria to integrate into the EU-from 1990 to 2007. The South Caucasus
states are at the beginning of a VERY long road. But the faster they
start moving towards this goal, the better for them.
Q: Why do some EU representatives refer to ENP as a kind of initial
step for membership, while others reject the idea of membership and
state that this region would remain as the "near Europe"?
A: Because there is no consensus in Europe as to what should be done
with EU's Eastern neighbors. When there is no consensus, the issue is
usually deferred in the EU. It has to be tackled at a later stage when
the situation is clearer. We all like to postpone important decision
until the last moment
Q: Do you think that the EU sometimes has a mismatch of policies? If
yes, please specify.
A: [The EU is] full of mismatches. The EU is constrained by internal
contradictions, inconsistencies and competing priorities. That's how
the EU works. That is normal. It works slowly.
Q: If EU was for the self-determination of people living in the former
Yugoslavia, then, self-determination was a priority over territorial
integrity. May we conclude that this model may be applied for the
resolution of frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus? If no, why?
A: Self-determination does not mean necessarily separation. It means
the right of people to have their cultural, political, etc. rights
respected. This can be done inside existing states, through power
sharing arrangements.
In the Balkans there are three big precedents: 1) Bosnia - a weak
federation close to confederation. 2) Macedonia where the conflict
has been solved through decentralization and devolution of power to
Albanians. 3) Kosovo - which will probably get independence.
All three are cases of self-determination. So far each of them is
discussing power sharing, instead of secession.
Q: Armenia's last referendum for constitutional amendments according
to local observers and opposition was held with a great amount of
fraud and irregularities. Why do you think the EU observers kept
their eyes closed to these falsified results of the referendum?
A: Of course they did. And the Council of Europe did criticize the
way it was conducted.
Q: What might be common interests of Russia and EU in the South
Caucasus that may cause confrontation while both of them are active
in the region?
A: There are many potential issues for conflict and for cooperation.
Tension can arise on the de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and attempts to hamper EU and US access to the Caspian
basin's gas and oil. Cooperation is necessary on solving conflicts,
including Karabakh.
Q: Do you believe that peaceful co-existence of the EU and Russia is
possible? Can there be a clear division of lines and limitations on
their roles and interests in the South Caucasus, especially Armenia?
A: Peaceful coexistence happens between rivals. EU and Russia will
have peaceful relations. That's clear.
Q: Do you think Armenia will succeed with its "complementarity"
in the next 5-10 years, balancing cooperation with EU and Russia,
without hitting the economic, military, energy, communication and
political cooperation between Armenia and Russia?
A: Armenia has to make reforms. Many in Armenia understand that
exclusive reliance on Russia is not in its best interests. And that
Russia is less and less ready to listen to its allies - Armenia,
but also Belarus etc. And that Russia often wants concessions from
allies without giving anything in exchange. But it's Armenia's choice
what kind of foreign policy it wants to pursue. The problem is that
time is running out, and the corridor of complementarity is narrowing.
Solving Nagorno-Karabakh will greatly help Armenia diversify its
foreign policy options.
Nona Abazyan is a graduate of OSI-Funded MA program Transformation
in South Caucasus administered by Center for Social Sciences (CSS).