Tweet
TURKISH-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE ARMENIAN ISSUE
By Murat Yulek
Today's Zaman, Turkey
March 20 2007
"The Sultan expressed his sympathy with the government of the United
States for the troubles in which it is involved, and the hope that
the war would soon terminate with maintenance of the American Union
in all its original power and integrity with the restoration of peace
and concord among the American people. I am happy in thus being able
to report to you that the United States has a true and loyal friend
in the sovereign of this great empire."
So wrote Edward Joy Morris, "Minister to Turkey," to Secretary of
State William E. Seward in 1861, after his initial audience with the
sultan. In 1862, the Turkish grand vizier gave tangible support to
the Union position by issuing a decree interdicting entrance into
Ottoman waters and ports of privateers operating against US shipping.
In 1865, Mr. Joy commented on the joyful excitement created in
Turkey by General Grant's victories at Petersburg and Richmond and
the sadness following President Lincoln's assassination. (R. Trask
(1971), The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform
1914- 1939, The University of Minnesota Press)
Early relations between the US and the Ottoman Empire were cordial
and supportive. The bulk of the relationship centered around commerce
and missionary activities. Until World War I, tangible results of
these relations were a trade surplus in favor of the Ottoman Empire
and many missionary schools, including Robert College.
In the post-World War II period, major aspects of that picture
changed significantly. Turkey, now a smaller country, gained political
importance during the Cold War: It was the "standard bearer of the
free world" and possibly the only major army in the East that could
selflessly fight the communist monsters -- as they did with US soldiers
in Korean War. Or so we thought in Turkey.
That theory fell apart when Turks realized that their American allies
were reluctant to support Turkey's protests of local Greek pressures
and, at times, horrible brutalities against the Turkish Cypriots. US
President Lyndon B. Johnson's letter in 1964 was just the beginning
of that frustration.
The Turkish-American relationship continued to have its ups and
downs. The Turkish government enthusiastically supported Bush Sr. in
the first Gulf war. But frustration followed: Turkey was unable to
obtain any compensation for its ensuing economic losses.
Subsequently, the Turkish Parliament rejected supporting Bush Jr. in
the Iraq war. While that probably didn't frustrate its people, it
did frustrate the US government. The Turkish people were generally
sympathetic to the US until the Iraq war. The US invasion of Iraq
changed all that, as it has in many other countries.
It is fair to say that the Turkish-American economic relationship
has generally been overshadowed by these greater political ebbs
and flows. Note, for example, that Turkish exports to the largest
economy in the world is only around $5 billion (less than 6 percent
of Turkey's total exports and 0.5 percent total US imports) while
its imports are around $6 billion (4.5 percent of Turkish imports
and 0.7 percent of US exports). It is fair to say that Turkey does
not benefit from any special commercial treatment from the US (unlike
Israel), while it is frequently lobbied by larger US interests such
as weapons or aircraft manufacturers.
However, it is also known that Turkey is criticized from time to time
by Washington circles for exporting critical weapons systems. But
Turkey never got back the uranium it had sent the US in the 1960s
to be enriched under mutual agreement for use in its small, peaceful
research reactors.
The powerful Armenian diaspora is now trying to bring the genocide
claims to Congress. Renowned US historians such as Bernard Lewis
and Justin McCarthy have a lot to say about the truth behind these
claims, which are becoming a major international case of sheer abuse
of historical tribulations by Armenians and Turks alike.
That abuse by the diaspora Armenians does not help Armenia, which
currently is busy trying to feed its military invasion force in
Azerbaijan by taking away valuable economic resources from its people
and development.
But if taken seriously by the US Congress, that abuse, which has
a proven ability to mislead many ordinary people, will not help
Turkish-American economic relations, which are so far from where they
could be.
By Murat Yulek
Today's Zaman, Turkey
March 20 2007
"The Sultan expressed his sympathy with the government of the United
States for the troubles in which it is involved, and the hope that
the war would soon terminate with maintenance of the American Union
in all its original power and integrity with the restoration of peace
and concord among the American people. I am happy in thus being able
to report to you that the United States has a true and loyal friend
in the sovereign of this great empire."
So wrote Edward Joy Morris, "Minister to Turkey," to Secretary of
State William E. Seward in 1861, after his initial audience with the
sultan. In 1862, the Turkish grand vizier gave tangible support to
the Union position by issuing a decree interdicting entrance into
Ottoman waters and ports of privateers operating against US shipping.
In 1865, Mr. Joy commented on the joyful excitement created in
Turkey by General Grant's victories at Petersburg and Richmond and
the sadness following President Lincoln's assassination. (R. Trask
(1971), The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform
1914- 1939, The University of Minnesota Press)
Early relations between the US and the Ottoman Empire were cordial
and supportive. The bulk of the relationship centered around commerce
and missionary activities. Until World War I, tangible results of
these relations were a trade surplus in favor of the Ottoman Empire
and many missionary schools, including Robert College.
In the post-World War II period, major aspects of that picture
changed significantly. Turkey, now a smaller country, gained political
importance during the Cold War: It was the "standard bearer of the
free world" and possibly the only major army in the East that could
selflessly fight the communist monsters -- as they did with US soldiers
in Korean War. Or so we thought in Turkey.
That theory fell apart when Turks realized that their American allies
were reluctant to support Turkey's protests of local Greek pressures
and, at times, horrible brutalities against the Turkish Cypriots. US
President Lyndon B. Johnson's letter in 1964 was just the beginning
of that frustration.
The Turkish-American relationship continued to have its ups and
downs. The Turkish government enthusiastically supported Bush Sr. in
the first Gulf war. But frustration followed: Turkey was unable to
obtain any compensation for its ensuing economic losses.
Subsequently, the Turkish Parliament rejected supporting Bush Jr. in
the Iraq war. While that probably didn't frustrate its people, it
did frustrate the US government. The Turkish people were generally
sympathetic to the US until the Iraq war. The US invasion of Iraq
changed all that, as it has in many other countries.
It is fair to say that the Turkish-American economic relationship
has generally been overshadowed by these greater political ebbs
and flows. Note, for example, that Turkish exports to the largest
economy in the world is only around $5 billion (less than 6 percent
of Turkey's total exports and 0.5 percent total US imports) while
its imports are around $6 billion (4.5 percent of Turkish imports
and 0.7 percent of US exports). It is fair to say that Turkey does
not benefit from any special commercial treatment from the US (unlike
Israel), while it is frequently lobbied by larger US interests such
as weapons or aircraft manufacturers.
However, it is also known that Turkey is criticized from time to time
by Washington circles for exporting critical weapons systems. But
Turkey never got back the uranium it had sent the US in the 1960s
to be enriched under mutual agreement for use in its small, peaceful
research reactors.
The powerful Armenian diaspora is now trying to bring the genocide
claims to Congress. Renowned US historians such as Bernard Lewis
and Justin McCarthy have a lot to say about the truth behind these
claims, which are becoming a major international case of sheer abuse
of historical tribulations by Armenians and Turks alike.
That abuse by the diaspora Armenians does not help Armenia, which
currently is busy trying to feed its military invasion force in
Azerbaijan by taking away valuable economic resources from its people
and development.
But if taken seriously by the US Congress, that abuse, which has
a proven ability to mislead many ordinary people, will not help
Turkish-American economic relations, which are so far from where they
could be.