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SUAT KINIKLIOGLU [email protected] Columnists
The return of Ottomanism - II
March 27, 2006
Antique shops in Turkey's major cities are booming as the revival of
Ottomanism continues. TuÄ=9Fras, berats calligraphic scripts in
Ottoman,the Ottoman coat of arms, postcards from Ottoman times --
simply anything that has the crescent and the star or any Ottoman
symbol on it -- is worth respectable amounts of money.
The Ä°stanbul bourgeoisie, in particular, pay a handsome price for
original pieces of Ottoman art. Their offices are decorated with maps
of the Ottoman Empire, and their luxurious houses boast significant
collections of Ottoman artistry. Ankara's elite is also quietly
stocking up on the long-forgotten Ottoman heritage. Paintings of
Sultan Mehmet II are as popular as that of Mustafa Kemal. Ottomania is
in full swing with the Turkish elite, reflecting the determined
revival of a culture long denied and discredited by the Turkish
Republic.
The revival of Ottomanism among the Turkish elite signifies two
parallel trends. First, it challenges the positivist-modernist
republican narrative of Turkish history, which is based on a
`rejection of heritage'(red-i miras) and thus traditionally distances
itself from anything Ottoman. In this respect, Ottomanism reflects a
certain amount of self confidence as its outlook is not merely
national but regional and legitimizes Turkish outreach to a distinctly
Ottoman geopolitical space. This sort of intellectualvein in foreign
policy is most aptly represented by Ahmet DavutoÄ=9Flu and his
disciples.
Second, it generates a significant amount of tension with the
nationalist-paranoid upsurge, which is extremely suspicious and feels
threatened by the impact of globalization and Turkey's EU drive. This
tension is most visible in the foreign policy field as well as on
issues such as further democratization of Turkey. While the
neo-Ottoman streak favors normalization with Arabs, Muslims and Kurds
as Ottoman cosmopolitanism allows it to do, the other camp feverishly
resists such a rapprochement and views it with stark skepticism.
>From a liberal perspective, neo-Ottoman thinking, particularly within
a domestic political context, is more progressive. This is most
visibly demonstrated by the fact that most Muslim Democrats (Justice
and Development Party members) tend to embrace neo-Ottoman
thinking. These elements favor a more open, transparent and democratic
Turkey and thus challenge the status quo.
Of course, most of the intellectual battles take place in interpreting
Turkish history. While Sultan Abdülhamit represents all possible evil
and backwardness for the republicans, he is an enlightened and
visionary leader for the neo-Ottomans. The neo-Ottomans also have it
easier to deal with the Armenian issue, while the republicans are
staunchly against any compromise onthe Armenian issue. The
neo-Ottomans also have less difficulty in understanding Turkey's
Kurdish citizens. More recent history is even more contentious.
Another stark contrast is to be seen in the conceptualization of our
foreign policy. While the neo-Ottoman outlook naturally embraces the
Ottoman geopolitical space and has no qualms about being a proactive
actor in this geography, the traditionally conservative foreign policy
establishment remains reluctant to come out of the comfort of not
being a significant player. There is no doubt that events in our
immediate neighborhood have helped the neo-Ottomans to strengthen
their case as areas of the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and the Middle
East have become hotspots where Turkey had to become more active. Yet
the rise and rapid embrace of neo-Ottoman thinking in foreign policy
cannot be explained by the impact of events in our immediate
neighborhood only.
The ascendancy of Ottomanism in Turkish society is likely to continue
for some time. The challenge for Turkey followers will be to see
whether neo-Ottomanism will be able to turn into a coherent and
well-articulated ideology that will provide the intellectual
legitimacy to transform Turkey both domestically and regionally. One
thing is for certain though -- Osman is recoveringand is on his way to
being fully liberated from the prevalent ideological interpretation
that did much injustice to him.
27.03.2007
The return of Ottomanism - II
March 27, 2006
Antique shops in Turkey's major cities are booming as the revival of
Ottomanism continues. TuÄ=9Fras, berats calligraphic scripts in
Ottoman,the Ottoman coat of arms, postcards from Ottoman times --
simply anything that has the crescent and the star or any Ottoman
symbol on it -- is worth respectable amounts of money.
The Ä°stanbul bourgeoisie, in particular, pay a handsome price for
original pieces of Ottoman art. Their offices are decorated with maps
of the Ottoman Empire, and their luxurious houses boast significant
collections of Ottoman artistry. Ankara's elite is also quietly
stocking up on the long-forgotten Ottoman heritage. Paintings of
Sultan Mehmet II are as popular as that of Mustafa Kemal. Ottomania is
in full swing with the Turkish elite, reflecting the determined
revival of a culture long denied and discredited by the Turkish
Republic.
The revival of Ottomanism among the Turkish elite signifies two
parallel trends. First, it challenges the positivist-modernist
republican narrative of Turkish history, which is based on a
`rejection of heritage'(red-i miras) and thus traditionally distances
itself from anything Ottoman. In this respect, Ottomanism reflects a
certain amount of self confidence as its outlook is not merely
national but regional and legitimizes Turkish outreach to a distinctly
Ottoman geopolitical space. This sort of intellectualvein in foreign
policy is most aptly represented by Ahmet DavutoÄ=9Flu and his
disciples.
Second, it generates a significant amount of tension with the
nationalist-paranoid upsurge, which is extremely suspicious and feels
threatened by the impact of globalization and Turkey's EU drive. This
tension is most visible in the foreign policy field as well as on
issues such as further democratization of Turkey. While the
neo-Ottoman streak favors normalization with Arabs, Muslims and Kurds
as Ottoman cosmopolitanism allows it to do, the other camp feverishly
resists such a rapprochement and views it with stark skepticism.
>From a liberal perspective, neo-Ottoman thinking, particularly within
a domestic political context, is more progressive. This is most
visibly demonstrated by the fact that most Muslim Democrats (Justice
and Development Party members) tend to embrace neo-Ottoman
thinking. These elements favor a more open, transparent and democratic
Turkey and thus challenge the status quo.
Of course, most of the intellectual battles take place in interpreting
Turkish history. While Sultan Abdülhamit represents all possible evil
and backwardness for the republicans, he is an enlightened and
visionary leader for the neo-Ottomans. The neo-Ottomans also have it
easier to deal with the Armenian issue, while the republicans are
staunchly against any compromise onthe Armenian issue. The
neo-Ottomans also have less difficulty in understanding Turkey's
Kurdish citizens. More recent history is even more contentious.
Another stark contrast is to be seen in the conceptualization of our
foreign policy. While the neo-Ottoman outlook naturally embraces the
Ottoman geopolitical space and has no qualms about being a proactive
actor in this geography, the traditionally conservative foreign policy
establishment remains reluctant to come out of the comfort of not
being a significant player. There is no doubt that events in our
immediate neighborhood have helped the neo-Ottomans to strengthen
their case as areas of the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and the Middle
East have become hotspots where Turkey had to become more active. Yet
the rise and rapid embrace of neo-Ottoman thinking in foreign policy
cannot be explained by the impact of events in our immediate
neighborhood only.
The ascendancy of Ottomanism in Turkish society is likely to continue
for some time. The challenge for Turkey followers will be to see
whether neo-Ottomanism will be able to turn into a coherent and
well-articulated ideology that will provide the intellectual
legitimacy to transform Turkey both domestically and regionally. One
thing is for certain though -- Osman is recoveringand is on his way to
being fully liberated from the prevalent ideological interpretation
that did much injustice to him.
27.03.2007