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BALANCING THE POWERS
by Marina Kozlova
Transitions Online, Czech Republic
March 29 2007
Recent talks with Russia and the United States may yet yield surprising
results for Uzbekistan.
TASHKENT, Uzbekistan | Two state visits to Uzbekistan in March
highlighted the country's complex relations with its economic and
security partners - and those who would like to be.
The trip by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evan Feigenbaum,
the State Department's top official in charge of Central Asia, was
long and rather strange. For six days, Feigenbaum held meetings with a
wide range of government officials, members of the business community,
and civil society representatives, but he was not received by either
the Uzbek president or the prime minister, and no agreements were
signed during the visit.
Asked whether his visit was evidence of improving U.S.-Uzbek relations,
Feigenbaum told reporters in Tashkent on 2 March, "I do not think my
visit in itself symbolizes anything."
A few days later, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov arrived in
Tashkent and met with President Islam Karimov and Prime Minister
Shavkat Mirziyoev. "We ... confirmed our mutual commitment to
strengthen partnership, strategic, and alliance relations," he told
journalists. The two sides signed an agreement to establish a joint
venture to repair helicopters that is planned to start later this year,
with Russian companies holding at least 51 percent of the shares in
the venture.
But even if this looked like relations with Russia were on the
upswing while those with the United States are frozen in place,
quite the opposite seems to be the case.
Feigenbaum's visit appears to have strengthened Uzbekistan's hand
in dealing with Moscow. Tashkent made it known that it was unhappy
with the time frame and the amounts invested in two of the three
natural-gas projects Russian energy giant Gazprom is implementing
in the country. Gazprom has so far invested just $30 million of an
expected investment figure of $300 million. That this is due to delays
in granting Gazprom the development licenses for new gas deposits,
which were given only in late December, doesn't seem to interest
the Uzbeks.
According to unofficial information, Uzbek officials now threaten to
develop gas export routes that would bypass Russia and link Uzbekistan
directly with some of its markets.
TASHKENT-MOSCOW TENSIONS
Both sides seem to be unhappy with the current state of relations.
Russian officials quoted by the local media said Russia was unhappy
that Uzbekistan had exported 67,000 cars to Russia in 2006 while
only some 3,500 went in the other direction. Russia's deputy minister
for economic development and trade, Andrei Sharonov, also said that
Russian capital faced problems with convertibility and the repatriation
of profits.
For its part, Uzbekistan is displeased with a quota introduced by
Moscow on migrant workers - according to Russian media, some 1.5
million illegal Uzbek migrants now work in Russia. But Russia is
unlikely to change its policies just because of Uzbek concerns.
Moscow's support of Uzbekistan after the brutal suppression of an
uprising in the town of Andijan in May 2005, where scores were
killed by troops firing on demonstrators, has pulled Uzbekistan
closer to Russia. When the government ignored numerous calls by
inter-governmental bodies and international human rights organizations
for an independent, international investigation into the Andijan
massacre, the country's relations with the United States and other
Western states soured while Russia stood by its side.
In late 2005, both states signed a security pact that created a
military alliance and allowed each country to intervene if the other
were the victim of aggression by a third state. The agreement also
allows the use by either party of the other's military facilities.
Uzbekistan's ties with Russia were also strengthened when Uzbekistan
in 2006 joined the Eurasian Economic Community comprising Russia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and rejoined the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, a grouping of the same member
states and Armenia, from which it withdrew in 1999.
GAS HOLDS THE KEY
But at the center of Uzbekistan's relations with the outside world
may well be energy.
The country sits on massive reserves of natural gas, and annually
produces 60 billion cubic meters of gas. Five billion cubic meters
is exported to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and even more
to Russia: 9 billion cubic meters in 2006 and an expected 13 billion
cubic meters this year. (Most of the gas Uzbekistan produces goes to
domestic consumption.)
Given demand for cheap energy on world markets, Uzbekistan may well
feel that the virtual stranglehold Russia has on Uzbek exports
is depriving Tashkent of much-needed revenue and restricting its
foreign-policy options.
It is by no means clear that Feigenbaum promised Tashkent help with
alternative routes to bypass Russia, thereby allowing Uzbekistan more
control over who it sells to and at what price. But Feigenbaum had
this to say during his 2 March news conference: "For the last 200
years, Central Asia has been oriented toward the north and west. We
respect that and we acknowledge it. But the most dynamic economies
in the world today are to the east and south of Central Asia, in the
Pacific Rim and in the areas around India. One thing we hope to do
is to help create economic opportunity by working with Central Asian
countries to forge links to the global economy, including South Asia."
In a speech in Washington two weeks earlier, Feigenbaum said: "What
we want to do is to help Central Asians forge some new connections:
to trade and investment opportunities, cross-border energy projects,
additional deep-water ports, and the enormous possibilities of the
global market."
As if on cue, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, who visited
Tashkent later in March, told officials that his country wished to
buy Uzbek natural gas and electricity.
There are signs that one potential huge gas customer may be moving
toward closer ties with Uzbekistan. In May, the European Union is due
to consider lifting the mild sanctions it imposed to punish Tashkent
for its intransigence over Andijan.
In November, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told
journalists in Bukhara, "There is no reason to stick to the sanctions
or to stick to them in the present form."
In late February, the official newspaper Pravda Vostoka ran an
article by Rafik Saifulin, a political scientist from Tashkent,
praising recent attempts at dialogue between Uzbekistan and the EU,
United States, and Japan. "It is necessary to think jointly about
ways to create new, promising opportunities for cooperation and to
modernize traditional relations [with world powers]," Saifulin wrote.
BACK TO RUSSIA?
Some believe, however, that Uzbekistan's foreign relations are not
just a matter of laying a few pipes. The government's willingness to
work with Western companies also took a dive as Tashkent upped its
pressure on Western organizations of all kinds over the past two years.
Gas deliveries to China could be hampered by mountainous terrain
while deliveries to Pakistan would be affected by instability in
Afghanistan. There have been suggestions Uzbekistan could supply
Europe through proposed new westbound pipelines. Here too the potential
pitfalls are many. Iran's mixed reputation makes a route across that
country liable to political uncertainty, while Uzbek participation
in the U.S.-backed trans-Caspian Sea pipe could be hampered by poor
relations with Turkmenistan, underscored by Karimov's failure to
attend the funeral of Turkmen president Saparmurat Niyazov in December.
"Uzbekistan has little choice but to stay close to Russia," Dosym
Satpayev, director of the Assessment Risks Group, a non-profit research
organization based in Almaty, Kazakhstan, told TOL.
And even if Karimov turns to the West again, there is no guarantee
that Western investors will return to Uzbekistan. Karimov needs the
West so that he will not be considered a dictator and Uzbekistan will
be taken as a civilized state, the analyst said, similar to successful
Kazakhstan. In addition, he said, Karimov feels "regional jealousy"
when he looks at his more prosperous neighbor, Kazakhstan.
On top of that, Russia recently reminded Uzbekistan of its debt of
some $700 million, which Tashkent has not serviced since 1998.
Cutting ties with Russia may yet prove harder than the Uzbek government
may hope.
Marina Kozlova is a journalist based in Tashkent.
by Marina Kozlova
Transitions Online, Czech Republic
March 29 2007
Recent talks with Russia and the United States may yet yield surprising
results for Uzbekistan.
TASHKENT, Uzbekistan | Two state visits to Uzbekistan in March
highlighted the country's complex relations with its economic and
security partners - and those who would like to be.
The trip by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evan Feigenbaum,
the State Department's top official in charge of Central Asia, was
long and rather strange. For six days, Feigenbaum held meetings with a
wide range of government officials, members of the business community,
and civil society representatives, but he was not received by either
the Uzbek president or the prime minister, and no agreements were
signed during the visit.
Asked whether his visit was evidence of improving U.S.-Uzbek relations,
Feigenbaum told reporters in Tashkent on 2 March, "I do not think my
visit in itself symbolizes anything."
A few days later, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov arrived in
Tashkent and met with President Islam Karimov and Prime Minister
Shavkat Mirziyoev. "We ... confirmed our mutual commitment to
strengthen partnership, strategic, and alliance relations," he told
journalists. The two sides signed an agreement to establish a joint
venture to repair helicopters that is planned to start later this year,
with Russian companies holding at least 51 percent of the shares in
the venture.
But even if this looked like relations with Russia were on the
upswing while those with the United States are frozen in place,
quite the opposite seems to be the case.
Feigenbaum's visit appears to have strengthened Uzbekistan's hand
in dealing with Moscow. Tashkent made it known that it was unhappy
with the time frame and the amounts invested in two of the three
natural-gas projects Russian energy giant Gazprom is implementing
in the country. Gazprom has so far invested just $30 million of an
expected investment figure of $300 million. That this is due to delays
in granting Gazprom the development licenses for new gas deposits,
which were given only in late December, doesn't seem to interest
the Uzbeks.
According to unofficial information, Uzbek officials now threaten to
develop gas export routes that would bypass Russia and link Uzbekistan
directly with some of its markets.
TASHKENT-MOSCOW TENSIONS
Both sides seem to be unhappy with the current state of relations.
Russian officials quoted by the local media said Russia was unhappy
that Uzbekistan had exported 67,000 cars to Russia in 2006 while
only some 3,500 went in the other direction. Russia's deputy minister
for economic development and trade, Andrei Sharonov, also said that
Russian capital faced problems with convertibility and the repatriation
of profits.
For its part, Uzbekistan is displeased with a quota introduced by
Moscow on migrant workers - according to Russian media, some 1.5
million illegal Uzbek migrants now work in Russia. But Russia is
unlikely to change its policies just because of Uzbek concerns.
Moscow's support of Uzbekistan after the brutal suppression of an
uprising in the town of Andijan in May 2005, where scores were
killed by troops firing on demonstrators, has pulled Uzbekistan
closer to Russia. When the government ignored numerous calls by
inter-governmental bodies and international human rights organizations
for an independent, international investigation into the Andijan
massacre, the country's relations with the United States and other
Western states soured while Russia stood by its side.
In late 2005, both states signed a security pact that created a
military alliance and allowed each country to intervene if the other
were the victim of aggression by a third state. The agreement also
allows the use by either party of the other's military facilities.
Uzbekistan's ties with Russia were also strengthened when Uzbekistan
in 2006 joined the Eurasian Economic Community comprising Russia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and rejoined the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, a grouping of the same member
states and Armenia, from which it withdrew in 1999.
GAS HOLDS THE KEY
But at the center of Uzbekistan's relations with the outside world
may well be energy.
The country sits on massive reserves of natural gas, and annually
produces 60 billion cubic meters of gas. Five billion cubic meters
is exported to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and even more
to Russia: 9 billion cubic meters in 2006 and an expected 13 billion
cubic meters this year. (Most of the gas Uzbekistan produces goes to
domestic consumption.)
Given demand for cheap energy on world markets, Uzbekistan may well
feel that the virtual stranglehold Russia has on Uzbek exports
is depriving Tashkent of much-needed revenue and restricting its
foreign-policy options.
It is by no means clear that Feigenbaum promised Tashkent help with
alternative routes to bypass Russia, thereby allowing Uzbekistan more
control over who it sells to and at what price. But Feigenbaum had
this to say during his 2 March news conference: "For the last 200
years, Central Asia has been oriented toward the north and west. We
respect that and we acknowledge it. But the most dynamic economies
in the world today are to the east and south of Central Asia, in the
Pacific Rim and in the areas around India. One thing we hope to do
is to help create economic opportunity by working with Central Asian
countries to forge links to the global economy, including South Asia."
In a speech in Washington two weeks earlier, Feigenbaum said: "What
we want to do is to help Central Asians forge some new connections:
to trade and investment opportunities, cross-border energy projects,
additional deep-water ports, and the enormous possibilities of the
global market."
As if on cue, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, who visited
Tashkent later in March, told officials that his country wished to
buy Uzbek natural gas and electricity.
There are signs that one potential huge gas customer may be moving
toward closer ties with Uzbekistan. In May, the European Union is due
to consider lifting the mild sanctions it imposed to punish Tashkent
for its intransigence over Andijan.
In November, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told
journalists in Bukhara, "There is no reason to stick to the sanctions
or to stick to them in the present form."
In late February, the official newspaper Pravda Vostoka ran an
article by Rafik Saifulin, a political scientist from Tashkent,
praising recent attempts at dialogue between Uzbekistan and the EU,
United States, and Japan. "It is necessary to think jointly about
ways to create new, promising opportunities for cooperation and to
modernize traditional relations [with world powers]," Saifulin wrote.
BACK TO RUSSIA?
Some believe, however, that Uzbekistan's foreign relations are not
just a matter of laying a few pipes. The government's willingness to
work with Western companies also took a dive as Tashkent upped its
pressure on Western organizations of all kinds over the past two years.
Gas deliveries to China could be hampered by mountainous terrain
while deliveries to Pakistan would be affected by instability in
Afghanistan. There have been suggestions Uzbekistan could supply
Europe through proposed new westbound pipelines. Here too the potential
pitfalls are many. Iran's mixed reputation makes a route across that
country liable to political uncertainty, while Uzbek participation
in the U.S.-backed trans-Caspian Sea pipe could be hampered by poor
relations with Turkmenistan, underscored by Karimov's failure to
attend the funeral of Turkmen president Saparmurat Niyazov in December.
"Uzbekistan has little choice but to stay close to Russia," Dosym
Satpayev, director of the Assessment Risks Group, a non-profit research
organization based in Almaty, Kazakhstan, told TOL.
And even if Karimov turns to the West again, there is no guarantee
that Western investors will return to Uzbekistan. Karimov needs the
West so that he will not be considered a dictator and Uzbekistan will
be taken as a civilized state, the analyst said, similar to successful
Kazakhstan. In addition, he said, Karimov feels "regional jealousy"
when he looks at his more prosperous neighbor, Kazakhstan.
On top of that, Russia recently reminded Uzbekistan of its debt of
some $700 million, which Tashkent has not serviced since 1998.
Cutting ties with Russia may yet prove harder than the Uzbek government
may hope.
Marina Kozlova is a journalist based in Tashkent.