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KURDISTAN IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR TURKEY IN NORTHERN IRAQ
By Mehmet Kalyoncu
Balkanalysis.com, AZ
May 1 2007
Nowadays, amid the current presidential and nearing parliamentary
elections, Ankara is preoccupied with the question of a cross-border
operation against Kurdish PKK militants who have found refuge in
northern Iraq. A provocative comment came from one of the Kurdish
leaders in Iraq, Massoud Barzani: "if Turkey interferes with Kirkuk,
then we will interfere with Diyarbakir."1 Baghdad's apparent tacit
approval of his comments have strained nerves in Ankara more than
ever as the Turkish military keeps a wary eye on developments in
Northern Iraq.2
The provocative attitude of Barzani's Kurdish Regional Government, and
Baghdad's failure to confront it, are also coinciding with heightened
terrorist activities from the PKK in Turkey's southeastern border area
with Iraq. This has had the effect of blurring the distinction between
the PKK threat to Turkey and Kurdish state formation in Northern Iraq,
creating the impression that the two are naturally conducive to each
other. In fact, they are not. The two are indeed interrelated, but
will reinforce one another only if Ankara gets involved in northern
Iraq militarily and isolates itself from the region economically
and diplomatically.
The PKK threat is likely to be used by the Kurdish leaders as leverage
against Ankara so long as it does not recognize the legitimacy
of Kurdish state formation in northern Iraq. The PKK would seek
to garner Kurdish popular support for the idea of the so called
"Greater Kurdistan" in the southeastern Turkey as well as within
the Kurdish Diaspora in the European capitals through alliances,
with other diasporas traditionally not so friendly with Turkey.
The PKK threat is, however, destined to die out, provided that
Ankara fully engages in diplomatic and economic relations with the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, tries to make sure
that the KRG is not dominated by a particular clan or family but is
controlled by alternating governments through democratic elections,
and carries out multilateral but not unilateral military operations
against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq. At the end of the day, the
formation of a Kurdish political entity in Northern Iraq may even
serve Turkey's deliberate diffusion into the Middle East, if handled
properly by Ankara.
A Hostile and Unpredictable Kurdish Government is a Threat- Not
Kurdistan
A democratic Kurdistan on good terms with Turkey can be a reliable
ally in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, for Turkey, which
is now all for more involvement in the Middle East, Kurdistan with
a democratic government could be even vital to Turkish interests,
provided that its leadership is available and accountable to the
average Kurd, and hence subject to alteration through a democratic
election process. The real challenge seems to be securing the Kurdish
Regional Government's future against the absolute domination of
a particular clan, which is the Barzani clan at the moment. This
clan has traditionally proven unpredictable and exhibited a mostly
confrontational behavioral pattern.
Ankara can never have a stable and predictable relationship with the
Barzani leadership, at least so far as past experience would seem
to indicate. The relations between the two have frequently swayed
between cooperation and confrontation. Turkey provided a safe haven
for some half a million Iraqi Kurds during the First Gulf War, in
addition to 1.5 million Kurds escaping Saddam Hussein's campaigns
in the 1980s- most notably, the 1988 chemical attack in Halabja. In
the early 1990s, Ankara granted the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader
Massoud Barzani the right to seek refuge in Turkey, which it did not
give to his rival, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the Ankara-Barzani alliance did not last.
According to Iraqi Kurdish writer Kamal Said Qadir, "switching
alliances is part of the Barzani family political culture, intertwining
survival and power with Kurdish nationalism. Between 1980 and 1988,
Massoud Barzani allied himself with Iran in its fight against
Saddam, even as the revolutionary authorities in Iran turned their
guns on Iranian Kurds. After long hostility to Turkey, in 1992,
he allied with Ankara in its fight against the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK); in 1996, he allied with
Saddam Hussein against rival Kurdish leader (and current Iraqi
president) Jalal Talabani. In the wake of Iraq's liberation in 2003,
Barzani has portrayed himself as a U.S. ally. For how long, though,
remains unclear."3 Barzani's recently confrontational attitude toward
Ankarawas thus not contrary to his attested behavioral pattern when he
recently threatened to interfere with Diyarbakir, Turkey's southeastern
province, in case Turkey interferes with Kirkuk, which he claims to
be a truly Kurdish city.
However, Opportunities Still Exist
Despite Ankara's not so friendly experience with Massoud Barzani,
Turkey and the Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq, be it defined as
a state within clearly defined borders or an autonomous regional
government, could develop mutually beneficial relationship in this
chronically unstable region- so long as the Kurdish leadership turns
truly democratic as opposed to being run by a dictatorship led by a
particular family or clan. According to Richard Holbooke, a former US
Ambassador to the UN, "despite their history, Turkeyand Iraqi Kurdistan
need each other. Kurdistan could become a buffer between Turkey and
the chaos to the south, while Turkey could become the protector of a
Kurdistan that, though still technically part of Iraq, is effectively
cut loose from a Baghdad government that may no longer function. In
addition, Turkey has a major economic opportunity in northern Iraq;
already, more than 300 Turkish companies and substantial investment
are a primary engine of Kurdish growth."4
Due to either this approach being favored by the United States, which
has so far acted unilaterally in the region with almost no regard
for Ankara's concerns, or fearing possible nationalist unrest from
the Turkish public, Ankara has so far reflexively disregarded the
possibility of accommodating the process of Kurdish state formation
in Northern Iraq. However, such a process, so long as it is guided
by democratic values and remains somewhat predictable, may not be
detrimental to Turkish national interests in the region after all.
Full engagement with the current Kurdish state-building process in
Iraq from the very beginning would help Turkey gain confidence, not
only in its own Kurds, but also in all Kurds of the region- the very
constituency targeted by the PKK and other separatist entities. In so
doing, Turkey can build leverage against the possibly hostile Kurdish
government(s) now and then in Northern Iraq, and the central government
in Baghdad. In this regard, Turkey should take the lead in the region
by helping the Kurds of Northern Iraq to modernize their community,
establish institutions and help democracy take root in the new Kurdish
state entity.
Turkey's support to the Iraqi Kurds should also aim to create a broad
middle class which would also develop an economic interdependence
between Turkey and the Kurdish Iraqi state. Economic engagement
could start with taxing the already ongoing trade between Turkey's
southeastern cities and the cities in Northern Iraq. Such an engagement
should also aim to carry Kirkuk oil to the global markets through
Turkish pipelines. In addition to pursuing full diplomatic and economic
relations with the new Kurdish state, Ankara should mobilize civil
society organizations in Turkey to be proactive in the making of
the new Kurdistan, so that the ties between the Turkish and Kurdish
publics remain strong, even if disruptions may occur occasionally
between the governments.
Is the Military Option a Viable One?
The option of a military operation against the PKK camps in Northern
Iraq might seem tempting, but is in fact highly risky, not only for
Turkey but also for regional stability. The military might of Ankara
of course cannot be compared to that of the PKK rebels, or even its
possible allies in Baghdad. Based on that comparison and the record
of 16 successful cross-border operations, some may tend to think that
it would take only hours to annihilate the PKK threat. However, it
is no longer 1992, when the PKK was encircled by Barzani's peshmerga
units from the south, thereby helping the Turkish military to succeed
quickly. Today, a military operation with some 40,000 troops against
the PKK is no different from a scenario in which a conventional
military power goes after a non-conventional enemy with high mobility,
which would most probably retreat back and diffuse into the Kurdish
civilian settlements. Once the Turkish military forces are tempted
to chase the retreating fighters, it may be far too late for Ankara
to realize just how far it has had to go into northern Iraq by the
time the world media will have already condemned the operation as a
Turkish invasion of Iraq.
The Last Thing Turkey Needs: A Hostile Kurdish Diaspora
Another risk associated with Ankara's non-accommodating approach to
the Kurdish state being formed in Northern Iraq is the likelihood that
it would create a hostile Kurdish Diaspora in the Western capitals,
and provide a medium for them to be lured by other anti-Turkish
diasporas. Given Turkey's bitter experience with the Armenian and
Greek diasporas, the last thing Turkey needs is a hostile Kurdish
Diaspora. However, the present attitude of Ankara toward the Kurdish
state formation in a restructuring Iraq is likely to only create
another hostile diaspora, this time a Kurdish one, mainly located in
the European capitals.
It is to the best interest of Ankara to recognize that it cannot afford
to ignore the ongoing modernization of Kurds in Western capitals
and the expediting role of transportation and digital communication
to help them organize. Most probably no later than a decade will
proliferate Western educated Kurdish leaders who will be pursuing a
Kurdish "independence" cause. A la Qubad Talabani who represents the
Kurdish Regional Government in Washington, who is up for establishing a
Kurdish Congressional Caucus and a Kurdish-American Business Council,
and who interestingly called for an amnesty for the PKK, 6 which is
listed as terrorist organization by the US State Department.
Similarly is it inevitable that there will grow a second- and
third-generation European Kurdish community which will be attached
to the imagined "Kurdistan." It should not be difficult for Ankara
to understand that such a flourishing diaspora would easily find
financial and intellectual support in Europe, given certain European
states' certified support for the PKK. According to Soner Cagaptay
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in the recent
past Greece, Bulgaria and Russia, in addition to Syria, Iran and
Israel have supported the PKK in one way or another.5 In addition,
the Danish government has long turned a blind eye to the Kurdish
Roj TV broadcasting from Denmark, despite Ankara's concerns over
the TV channel being used as an outlet for the PKK to convey its
captured leader Abdullah Ocalan's messages, and to instigate the
Kurds in Turkey to make uprisings and provocations. Similarly, the
Belgian government has long provided protection to Fehriye Erdal, a
PKK member and the assassin of prominent Turkish businessman Ozdemir
Sabanci, despite Ankara's continuous efforts to bring her to justice.
After all, not only should Ankara avoid making foes of those who
could be friends, but also recognize the opportunities attached to
the challenges unfolding in Northern Iraq.
1 "Barzani haddini asti, bu sozlerin bedeli
agir olur", Zaman, April 10, 2007, available at
http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?habe rno=525763 2 "Barzani'ye
destek Verdi: Karisanin elini keseriz", Zaman, April 14, 2007,
available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno =527509
3 Kamal Said Qadir, "The Barzani Chameleon", Middle East Quarterly,
Spring 2007, available at http://www.meforum.org/article/1681
4 Richard Holbrooke, "Opportunity for Turks and Kurds?" Washington
Post, February 12, 2007, p.17
5 "Dr. Cagaptay: ABD, Turkiye'nin K. Irak'ta kisa sureli operasyon
yapmasina goz yumar", Zaman Amerika, 12 Nisan 2007, p.3
6 "Qubad Talabani calls for amnesty for PKK," Turkish Daily News,
(KurdishMedia.com), June 14, 2006. See speech on "Amnesty for
the PKK"<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p99AT2 B00Bc>at
the Center for Strategic and International
Studies<http://www.sourcewatch.or g/index.php?title=Center_for_Strategic_and_Interna tional_Studies>(CSIS),
June 13, 2006, cited at
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Quba d_al-Talabani
http://www.balkanalysis.com/2007/05 /01/kurdistan-in-the-making-challlenges-and-opport unities-for-turkey-in-northern-iraq/
By Mehmet Kalyoncu
Balkanalysis.com, AZ
May 1 2007
Nowadays, amid the current presidential and nearing parliamentary
elections, Ankara is preoccupied with the question of a cross-border
operation against Kurdish PKK militants who have found refuge in
northern Iraq. A provocative comment came from one of the Kurdish
leaders in Iraq, Massoud Barzani: "if Turkey interferes with Kirkuk,
then we will interfere with Diyarbakir."1 Baghdad's apparent tacit
approval of his comments have strained nerves in Ankara more than
ever as the Turkish military keeps a wary eye on developments in
Northern Iraq.2
The provocative attitude of Barzani's Kurdish Regional Government, and
Baghdad's failure to confront it, are also coinciding with heightened
terrorist activities from the PKK in Turkey's southeastern border area
with Iraq. This has had the effect of blurring the distinction between
the PKK threat to Turkey and Kurdish state formation in Northern Iraq,
creating the impression that the two are naturally conducive to each
other. In fact, they are not. The two are indeed interrelated, but
will reinforce one another only if Ankara gets involved in northern
Iraq militarily and isolates itself from the region economically
and diplomatically.
The PKK threat is likely to be used by the Kurdish leaders as leverage
against Ankara so long as it does not recognize the legitimacy
of Kurdish state formation in northern Iraq. The PKK would seek
to garner Kurdish popular support for the idea of the so called
"Greater Kurdistan" in the southeastern Turkey as well as within
the Kurdish Diaspora in the European capitals through alliances,
with other diasporas traditionally not so friendly with Turkey.
The PKK threat is, however, destined to die out, provided that
Ankara fully engages in diplomatic and economic relations with the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, tries to make sure
that the KRG is not dominated by a particular clan or family but is
controlled by alternating governments through democratic elections,
and carries out multilateral but not unilateral military operations
against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq. At the end of the day, the
formation of a Kurdish political entity in Northern Iraq may even
serve Turkey's deliberate diffusion into the Middle East, if handled
properly by Ankara.
A Hostile and Unpredictable Kurdish Government is a Threat- Not
Kurdistan
A democratic Kurdistan on good terms with Turkey can be a reliable
ally in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, for Turkey, which
is now all for more involvement in the Middle East, Kurdistan with
a democratic government could be even vital to Turkish interests,
provided that its leadership is available and accountable to the
average Kurd, and hence subject to alteration through a democratic
election process. The real challenge seems to be securing the Kurdish
Regional Government's future against the absolute domination of
a particular clan, which is the Barzani clan at the moment. This
clan has traditionally proven unpredictable and exhibited a mostly
confrontational behavioral pattern.
Ankara can never have a stable and predictable relationship with the
Barzani leadership, at least so far as past experience would seem
to indicate. The relations between the two have frequently swayed
between cooperation and confrontation. Turkey provided a safe haven
for some half a million Iraqi Kurds during the First Gulf War, in
addition to 1.5 million Kurds escaping Saddam Hussein's campaigns
in the 1980s- most notably, the 1988 chemical attack in Halabja. In
the early 1990s, Ankara granted the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader
Massoud Barzani the right to seek refuge in Turkey, which it did not
give to his rival, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the Ankara-Barzani alliance did not last.
According to Iraqi Kurdish writer Kamal Said Qadir, "switching
alliances is part of the Barzani family political culture, intertwining
survival and power with Kurdish nationalism. Between 1980 and 1988,
Massoud Barzani allied himself with Iran in its fight against
Saddam, even as the revolutionary authorities in Iran turned their
guns on Iranian Kurds. After long hostility to Turkey, in 1992,
he allied with Ankara in its fight against the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK); in 1996, he allied with
Saddam Hussein against rival Kurdish leader (and current Iraqi
president) Jalal Talabani. In the wake of Iraq's liberation in 2003,
Barzani has portrayed himself as a U.S. ally. For how long, though,
remains unclear."3 Barzani's recently confrontational attitude toward
Ankarawas thus not contrary to his attested behavioral pattern when he
recently threatened to interfere with Diyarbakir, Turkey's southeastern
province, in case Turkey interferes with Kirkuk, which he claims to
be a truly Kurdish city.
However, Opportunities Still Exist
Despite Ankara's not so friendly experience with Massoud Barzani,
Turkey and the Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq, be it defined as
a state within clearly defined borders or an autonomous regional
government, could develop mutually beneficial relationship in this
chronically unstable region- so long as the Kurdish leadership turns
truly democratic as opposed to being run by a dictatorship led by a
particular family or clan. According to Richard Holbooke, a former US
Ambassador to the UN, "despite their history, Turkeyand Iraqi Kurdistan
need each other. Kurdistan could become a buffer between Turkey and
the chaos to the south, while Turkey could become the protector of a
Kurdistan that, though still technically part of Iraq, is effectively
cut loose from a Baghdad government that may no longer function. In
addition, Turkey has a major economic opportunity in northern Iraq;
already, more than 300 Turkish companies and substantial investment
are a primary engine of Kurdish growth."4
Due to either this approach being favored by the United States, which
has so far acted unilaterally in the region with almost no regard
for Ankara's concerns, or fearing possible nationalist unrest from
the Turkish public, Ankara has so far reflexively disregarded the
possibility of accommodating the process of Kurdish state formation
in Northern Iraq. However, such a process, so long as it is guided
by democratic values and remains somewhat predictable, may not be
detrimental to Turkish national interests in the region after all.
Full engagement with the current Kurdish state-building process in
Iraq from the very beginning would help Turkey gain confidence, not
only in its own Kurds, but also in all Kurds of the region- the very
constituency targeted by the PKK and other separatist entities. In so
doing, Turkey can build leverage against the possibly hostile Kurdish
government(s) now and then in Northern Iraq, and the central government
in Baghdad. In this regard, Turkey should take the lead in the region
by helping the Kurds of Northern Iraq to modernize their community,
establish institutions and help democracy take root in the new Kurdish
state entity.
Turkey's support to the Iraqi Kurds should also aim to create a broad
middle class which would also develop an economic interdependence
between Turkey and the Kurdish Iraqi state. Economic engagement
could start with taxing the already ongoing trade between Turkey's
southeastern cities and the cities in Northern Iraq. Such an engagement
should also aim to carry Kirkuk oil to the global markets through
Turkish pipelines. In addition to pursuing full diplomatic and economic
relations with the new Kurdish state, Ankara should mobilize civil
society organizations in Turkey to be proactive in the making of
the new Kurdistan, so that the ties between the Turkish and Kurdish
publics remain strong, even if disruptions may occur occasionally
between the governments.
Is the Military Option a Viable One?
The option of a military operation against the PKK camps in Northern
Iraq might seem tempting, but is in fact highly risky, not only for
Turkey but also for regional stability. The military might of Ankara
of course cannot be compared to that of the PKK rebels, or even its
possible allies in Baghdad. Based on that comparison and the record
of 16 successful cross-border operations, some may tend to think that
it would take only hours to annihilate the PKK threat. However, it
is no longer 1992, when the PKK was encircled by Barzani's peshmerga
units from the south, thereby helping the Turkish military to succeed
quickly. Today, a military operation with some 40,000 troops against
the PKK is no different from a scenario in which a conventional
military power goes after a non-conventional enemy with high mobility,
which would most probably retreat back and diffuse into the Kurdish
civilian settlements. Once the Turkish military forces are tempted
to chase the retreating fighters, it may be far too late for Ankara
to realize just how far it has had to go into northern Iraq by the
time the world media will have already condemned the operation as a
Turkish invasion of Iraq.
The Last Thing Turkey Needs: A Hostile Kurdish Diaspora
Another risk associated with Ankara's non-accommodating approach to
the Kurdish state being formed in Northern Iraq is the likelihood that
it would create a hostile Kurdish Diaspora in the Western capitals,
and provide a medium for them to be lured by other anti-Turkish
diasporas. Given Turkey's bitter experience with the Armenian and
Greek diasporas, the last thing Turkey needs is a hostile Kurdish
Diaspora. However, the present attitude of Ankara toward the Kurdish
state formation in a restructuring Iraq is likely to only create
another hostile diaspora, this time a Kurdish one, mainly located in
the European capitals.
It is to the best interest of Ankara to recognize that it cannot afford
to ignore the ongoing modernization of Kurds in Western capitals
and the expediting role of transportation and digital communication
to help them organize. Most probably no later than a decade will
proliferate Western educated Kurdish leaders who will be pursuing a
Kurdish "independence" cause. A la Qubad Talabani who represents the
Kurdish Regional Government in Washington, who is up for establishing a
Kurdish Congressional Caucus and a Kurdish-American Business Council,
and who interestingly called for an amnesty for the PKK, 6 which is
listed as terrorist organization by the US State Department.
Similarly is it inevitable that there will grow a second- and
third-generation European Kurdish community which will be attached
to the imagined "Kurdistan." It should not be difficult for Ankara
to understand that such a flourishing diaspora would easily find
financial and intellectual support in Europe, given certain European
states' certified support for the PKK. According to Soner Cagaptay
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in the recent
past Greece, Bulgaria and Russia, in addition to Syria, Iran and
Israel have supported the PKK in one way or another.5 In addition,
the Danish government has long turned a blind eye to the Kurdish
Roj TV broadcasting from Denmark, despite Ankara's concerns over
the TV channel being used as an outlet for the PKK to convey its
captured leader Abdullah Ocalan's messages, and to instigate the
Kurds in Turkey to make uprisings and provocations. Similarly, the
Belgian government has long provided protection to Fehriye Erdal, a
PKK member and the assassin of prominent Turkish businessman Ozdemir
Sabanci, despite Ankara's continuous efforts to bring her to justice.
After all, not only should Ankara avoid making foes of those who
could be friends, but also recognize the opportunities attached to
the challenges unfolding in Northern Iraq.
1 "Barzani haddini asti, bu sozlerin bedeli
agir olur", Zaman, April 10, 2007, available at
http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?habe rno=525763 2 "Barzani'ye
destek Verdi: Karisanin elini keseriz", Zaman, April 14, 2007,
available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno =527509
3 Kamal Said Qadir, "The Barzani Chameleon", Middle East Quarterly,
Spring 2007, available at http://www.meforum.org/article/1681
4 Richard Holbrooke, "Opportunity for Turks and Kurds?" Washington
Post, February 12, 2007, p.17
5 "Dr. Cagaptay: ABD, Turkiye'nin K. Irak'ta kisa sureli operasyon
yapmasina goz yumar", Zaman Amerika, 12 Nisan 2007, p.3
6 "Qubad Talabani calls for amnesty for PKK," Turkish Daily News,
(KurdishMedia.com), June 14, 2006. See speech on "Amnesty for
the PKK"<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p99AT2 B00Bc>at
the Center for Strategic and International
Studies<http://www.sourcewatch.or g/index.php?title=Center_for_Strategic_and_Interna tional_Studies>(CSIS),
June 13, 2006, cited at
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Quba d_al-Talabani
http://www.balkanalysis.com/2007/05 /01/kurdistan-in-the-making-challlenges-and-opport unities-for-turkey-in-northern-iraq/