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THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: IN THE FIRST CIRCLE
by Oleg Gorupai
Translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Krasnaya Zvezda, April 27, 2007, p. 3
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
May 4, 2007 Friday
RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS; The Caucasus has become
an intensified activity zone for the leading Western powers, whose
interests also extend to the Middle East and Central Asia. The United
States is taking the most vigorous steps to penetrate the Caucasus
and extend its political, economic, and military influence there.
The Caucasus has become an intensified activity zone for the leading
Western powers, whose interests also extend to the Middle East and
Central Asia.
The United States is taking the most vigorous steps to penetrate the
Caucasus and extend its political, economic, and military influence
there. This is primarily linked to America's energy policy, aimed at
reducing dependence on oil from the Middle East: diverting Central
Asia's energy resources from Russia and China via a southern route
through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, and Caspian Sea
energy resources via a major export pipeline running from Baku through
Georgia and Turkey. In March 1999, the US Congress passed the Silk
Road Strategy Act. It mentions supporting the "economic and political
independence" of countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia"
whose oil and gas could "reduce the energy dependence of the United
States on the unreliable Persian Gulf." Moscow State University
analyst Alexei Urazov points out that this means Washington has
regarded the Caspian region (and the South Caucasus, as part of it)
all along as a potential global reserve, to be drawn upon if other
US-controlled hydrocarbon reserves run low or if the global pricing
situation changes.
What's more, the United States regards the South Caucasus as one of the
most important regions in resolving the Iran problem. If Washington
attempts to solve the problem by military force, the US military
would use the South Caucasus as a convenient base on Iran's northern
border. Thus, the prospects of the South Caucasus - and the Caucasus
factor's future significance in global politics and the world economy -
are directly dependent on how American-Iranian relations develop.
Another priority objective for American policy in the South Caucasus
is to neutralize the influence of Russia and China in that region and
Central Asia. Those adjacent regions are inextricably interconnected:
in addition to possessing natural resources, the Caucasus is also a
unique transport corridor connecting Europe and Asia. Both regions
are exceptionally important for the purpose of further entrenching
the US presence on the Asian continent: in terms of maintaining
global leadership and in the context of American policy on China and
Russia. The United States aims to form pro-Western political regimes in
the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, with independent
(or relatively unaffected by external influence from Russia and China)
access to Western markets: for the United States, this opens up real
prospects for establishing a beach-head for increasing pressure on
Beijing and Moscow alike. Moreover, creating a cordon sanitaire between
Russia and China - with the United States maintaining a political and
economic presence within it - would substantially reduce the global
influence of Russia and China.
However, unless the United States can reinforce its positions in the
South Caucasus, particularly in Azerbaijan and Georgia, further US
expansion into Central Asia could be rather vulnerable.
The Bush Administration recently released a strategic plan for US
foreign policy in 2007-12. It states that the Russian Federation is
exerting economic and political pressure on Georgia, seeking to gain
control of Georgia's infrastructure and strategic plans. According
to the "Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012," the US priority in
the next five years will be "consolidating democratic reforms" and
securing a place in the Euro-Atlantic community for South Caucasus
countries. The Stragetic Plan says: "We seek to consolidate new
democracies in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova by fighting corruption and
assisting economic reforms. As these countries break with their Soviet
past and move closer to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions,
we need to continue to provide our support, encouragement, and
technical advice."
The decision to back Georgia is not a random choice. Let's leave aside
the talk of democracy, corruption, and economic reforms; everything
indicates that all this is only a distraction. As far back as 2005,
then SACEUR General James Jones spoke out very frankly about the goals
of US military-political strategy in the Trans-Caucasus: the concept
of "forward bases" for American armed forces. The Georgian government
already has an agreement with the Americans, signed in 2002, that
permits the United States to deploy anything it pleases on Georgian
territory and bring in any kind of military contingent. In return,
Washington has provided Georgia with $1.3 billion worth of aid in
recent years, including military hardware.
According to analyst Vano Tumanishvili, US Navy commanders are aiming
to create a logistics system for the US Navy on the Black Sea coast
of Georgia. This objective was set in 2005, but actual work has been
postponed or encountered serious technical problems. Representatives
of US forces in Europe and the US Navy visited Georgia again in March
2007, investigating the possibility of establishing a port base for
servicing military patrol vessels. Along with hosting vessels of this
class, the port would presumably be visited by transport vessels and
medium-class vessels. According to Tumanishvili, the US and Britain
intend to propose joint patrols with the Georgian Navy in the Black
Sea basin, with the aim of ensuring overall navigation safety and
creating a filter for the transport of drugs and other banned cargo.
Yet Washington's determination to increase its influence in this
region is primarily based on the aim of ensuring security for the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline transport corridor and the wish
to have bases in the rear in the event of a military solution to
the Iran problem. Consequently, it is natural to conclude that the
USA intends to turn Tbilisi into its "unsinkable aircraft-carrier,"
warehouse, and hospital in the South Caucasus.
Washington intends to involve NATO in achieving this objective. As
everyone knows, Congress recently vote in favor of supporting NATO
membership for Georgia and Ukraine, allocating financial aid for
preparations. President Bush has signed this act into law. It is
believed that talk of granting NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia
is already underway. This prospect is fervently supported by the
Georgian government.
Azerbaijan and Armenia have also been feeling intense pressure
from the USA and NATO for some time. The White House is focusing
attention on Azerbaijan, as a transit link for transporting Caspian
energy resources to the West via the geopolitical "crack" (Georgia)
between Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan has been allocated a significant
place in NATO's EUCOM Transformation program (hosting American troops),
the Caspian Guard Inititative, the US Air Force's Lily Pad program for
establishing small military bases worldwide, and the US plan to build
Caucasus Net, a combined missile defense and air defense system in
the region (stationary and mobile radar stations). The US government
has contracted Washington Group International to build two radars.
Moreover, the Azeri Navy and Border Guard Service will be equipped
with modern technology as part of the individual partnership plan
with NATO. Reno Harnish, former US ambassador to Azerbaijan, told
AFP that Washington has already allocated $30 million for improving
Azerbaijan's coast guard service, and now intends to spend $135
million within the Caspian Guard Initiative to improve the navies of
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
As we see, Washington has been "courting" Baku quite intensely;
yet the Azeri government isn't rushing into Washington's harsh embrace.
Baku has refused to allow other countries to use its military
airfields. A statement from the Azeri Defense Ministry reads:
"Azerbaijan will never create opportunities and conditions for any
foreign country to use our territory against neighboring countries."
Azerbaijan has also refused to hose US missile defense elements. At
this stage Azerbaijan isn't taking any substantial steps to integrate
itself into NATO as fast as possible. Moreover, Azeri Deputy Foreign
Minister Halaf Halafov said in early April that Russia and Azerbaijan
should not be rivals in the energy market. He stressed that Baku
regards Russia as an additional energy market opportunity and there
are grounds for expanding cooperation in that area.
Meanwhile, Armenia bases its foreign policy on the principle of
maintaining equilibrium between the various military-political blocs
whose interests directly concern the Caspian region. Yerevan has
a pro-Russian policy, since this is most in keeping with Armenia's
state interests at this stage. Washington is demonstrating increasing
displeasure with the close cooperation between Armenia and Russia,
Armenia's military technology cooperation with Belarus, and the
intensive development of Armenian-Iranian relations. The Bush
Administration is making it increasingly clear to Armenia that the
outlook for US-Armenian relations depends on how much support Armenia
is prepared to give to American policy in the region. According to
the US Embassy in Yerevan, the USA has provided Armenia with around
$1.5 billion in aid since independence: giving Armenia the second
highest per capita aid figure after Israel.
American and NATO representatives have spoken repeatedly of the need to
withdraw Russian troops from Armenia. For example, NATO special envoy
Robert Simmons said that their presence allegedly exceeds Armenia's
quotas under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. But
Russia's military presence in Armenia not only guarantees this small
state's security, but is also a factor which Western politicians must
take into account in their geostrategic game on the great chessboard
of Eurasia.
And this is what really annoys the United States. This explains
America's increasingly insistent calls for Yerevan to demand withdrawal
of the Russian troops. In return, Yerevan is being promised benefits
like an open border with Turkey and economic prosperity in the
future. Armenia has an election coming up in May.
Political analyst Vsevolod Yaguzhinsky predicts that if the Armenian
government gives in to the West's intense pressure after the election
and agrees to expel the Russian military group, this could only
have one outcome: the blockade from Turkey would remain unchanged,
while Yerevan's room for maneuver in foreign policy would contract
substantially. Armenia, like neighboring Georgia, would become a
hostage to US policy.
Does Russia have interests of its own in the South Caucasus?
Certainly - and they cover a variety of aspects. Russia's interest in
the region is now largely determined by security considerations. The
Trans-Caucasus is linked to Russia's North Caucasus by unbreakable
bonds. Any outbreak of instability on the other side of the Caucasus
Range is sure to have an impact on the situation in Russia's southern
regions. Thus, the pursuit of Moscow's geopolitical and geostrategic
goals in the South Caucasus should primarily entail the ability to
manage the national interest systems of states in that region in such
a way that they are as consistent as possible with Russia's interests,
not moving outside that framework. At the very least, Russia should
define and develop a system of priorities in the Trans-Caucasus states,
as part of its national policy, taking account of the full diversity
and specifics of the real situation in the Caucasus.
by Oleg Gorupai
Translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Krasnaya Zvezda, April 27, 2007, p. 3
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
May 4, 2007 Friday
RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS; The Caucasus has become
an intensified activity zone for the leading Western powers, whose
interests also extend to the Middle East and Central Asia. The United
States is taking the most vigorous steps to penetrate the Caucasus
and extend its political, economic, and military influence there.
The Caucasus has become an intensified activity zone for the leading
Western powers, whose interests also extend to the Middle East and
Central Asia.
The United States is taking the most vigorous steps to penetrate the
Caucasus and extend its political, economic, and military influence
there. This is primarily linked to America's energy policy, aimed at
reducing dependence on oil from the Middle East: diverting Central
Asia's energy resources from Russia and China via a southern route
through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, and Caspian Sea
energy resources via a major export pipeline running from Baku through
Georgia and Turkey. In March 1999, the US Congress passed the Silk
Road Strategy Act. It mentions supporting the "economic and political
independence" of countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia"
whose oil and gas could "reduce the energy dependence of the United
States on the unreliable Persian Gulf." Moscow State University
analyst Alexei Urazov points out that this means Washington has
regarded the Caspian region (and the South Caucasus, as part of it)
all along as a potential global reserve, to be drawn upon if other
US-controlled hydrocarbon reserves run low or if the global pricing
situation changes.
What's more, the United States regards the South Caucasus as one of the
most important regions in resolving the Iran problem. If Washington
attempts to solve the problem by military force, the US military
would use the South Caucasus as a convenient base on Iran's northern
border. Thus, the prospects of the South Caucasus - and the Caucasus
factor's future significance in global politics and the world economy -
are directly dependent on how American-Iranian relations develop.
Another priority objective for American policy in the South Caucasus
is to neutralize the influence of Russia and China in that region and
Central Asia. Those adjacent regions are inextricably interconnected:
in addition to possessing natural resources, the Caucasus is also a
unique transport corridor connecting Europe and Asia. Both regions
are exceptionally important for the purpose of further entrenching
the US presence on the Asian continent: in terms of maintaining
global leadership and in the context of American policy on China and
Russia. The United States aims to form pro-Western political regimes in
the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, with independent
(or relatively unaffected by external influence from Russia and China)
access to Western markets: for the United States, this opens up real
prospects for establishing a beach-head for increasing pressure on
Beijing and Moscow alike. Moreover, creating a cordon sanitaire between
Russia and China - with the United States maintaining a political and
economic presence within it - would substantially reduce the global
influence of Russia and China.
However, unless the United States can reinforce its positions in the
South Caucasus, particularly in Azerbaijan and Georgia, further US
expansion into Central Asia could be rather vulnerable.
The Bush Administration recently released a strategic plan for US
foreign policy in 2007-12. It states that the Russian Federation is
exerting economic and political pressure on Georgia, seeking to gain
control of Georgia's infrastructure and strategic plans. According
to the "Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012," the US priority in
the next five years will be "consolidating democratic reforms" and
securing a place in the Euro-Atlantic community for South Caucasus
countries. The Stragetic Plan says: "We seek to consolidate new
democracies in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova by fighting corruption and
assisting economic reforms. As these countries break with their Soviet
past and move closer to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions,
we need to continue to provide our support, encouragement, and
technical advice."
The decision to back Georgia is not a random choice. Let's leave aside
the talk of democracy, corruption, and economic reforms; everything
indicates that all this is only a distraction. As far back as 2005,
then SACEUR General James Jones spoke out very frankly about the goals
of US military-political strategy in the Trans-Caucasus: the concept
of "forward bases" for American armed forces. The Georgian government
already has an agreement with the Americans, signed in 2002, that
permits the United States to deploy anything it pleases on Georgian
territory and bring in any kind of military contingent. In return,
Washington has provided Georgia with $1.3 billion worth of aid in
recent years, including military hardware.
According to analyst Vano Tumanishvili, US Navy commanders are aiming
to create a logistics system for the US Navy on the Black Sea coast
of Georgia. This objective was set in 2005, but actual work has been
postponed or encountered serious technical problems. Representatives
of US forces in Europe and the US Navy visited Georgia again in March
2007, investigating the possibility of establishing a port base for
servicing military patrol vessels. Along with hosting vessels of this
class, the port would presumably be visited by transport vessels and
medium-class vessels. According to Tumanishvili, the US and Britain
intend to propose joint patrols with the Georgian Navy in the Black
Sea basin, with the aim of ensuring overall navigation safety and
creating a filter for the transport of drugs and other banned cargo.
Yet Washington's determination to increase its influence in this
region is primarily based on the aim of ensuring security for the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline transport corridor and the wish
to have bases in the rear in the event of a military solution to
the Iran problem. Consequently, it is natural to conclude that the
USA intends to turn Tbilisi into its "unsinkable aircraft-carrier,"
warehouse, and hospital in the South Caucasus.
Washington intends to involve NATO in achieving this objective. As
everyone knows, Congress recently vote in favor of supporting NATO
membership for Georgia and Ukraine, allocating financial aid for
preparations. President Bush has signed this act into law. It is
believed that talk of granting NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia
is already underway. This prospect is fervently supported by the
Georgian government.
Azerbaijan and Armenia have also been feeling intense pressure
from the USA and NATO for some time. The White House is focusing
attention on Azerbaijan, as a transit link for transporting Caspian
energy resources to the West via the geopolitical "crack" (Georgia)
between Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan has been allocated a significant
place in NATO's EUCOM Transformation program (hosting American troops),
the Caspian Guard Inititative, the US Air Force's Lily Pad program for
establishing small military bases worldwide, and the US plan to build
Caucasus Net, a combined missile defense and air defense system in
the region (stationary and mobile radar stations). The US government
has contracted Washington Group International to build two radars.
Moreover, the Azeri Navy and Border Guard Service will be equipped
with modern technology as part of the individual partnership plan
with NATO. Reno Harnish, former US ambassador to Azerbaijan, told
AFP that Washington has already allocated $30 million for improving
Azerbaijan's coast guard service, and now intends to spend $135
million within the Caspian Guard Initiative to improve the navies of
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
As we see, Washington has been "courting" Baku quite intensely;
yet the Azeri government isn't rushing into Washington's harsh embrace.
Baku has refused to allow other countries to use its military
airfields. A statement from the Azeri Defense Ministry reads:
"Azerbaijan will never create opportunities and conditions for any
foreign country to use our territory against neighboring countries."
Azerbaijan has also refused to hose US missile defense elements. At
this stage Azerbaijan isn't taking any substantial steps to integrate
itself into NATO as fast as possible. Moreover, Azeri Deputy Foreign
Minister Halaf Halafov said in early April that Russia and Azerbaijan
should not be rivals in the energy market. He stressed that Baku
regards Russia as an additional energy market opportunity and there
are grounds for expanding cooperation in that area.
Meanwhile, Armenia bases its foreign policy on the principle of
maintaining equilibrium between the various military-political blocs
whose interests directly concern the Caspian region. Yerevan has
a pro-Russian policy, since this is most in keeping with Armenia's
state interests at this stage. Washington is demonstrating increasing
displeasure with the close cooperation between Armenia and Russia,
Armenia's military technology cooperation with Belarus, and the
intensive development of Armenian-Iranian relations. The Bush
Administration is making it increasingly clear to Armenia that the
outlook for US-Armenian relations depends on how much support Armenia
is prepared to give to American policy in the region. According to
the US Embassy in Yerevan, the USA has provided Armenia with around
$1.5 billion in aid since independence: giving Armenia the second
highest per capita aid figure after Israel.
American and NATO representatives have spoken repeatedly of the need to
withdraw Russian troops from Armenia. For example, NATO special envoy
Robert Simmons said that their presence allegedly exceeds Armenia's
quotas under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. But
Russia's military presence in Armenia not only guarantees this small
state's security, but is also a factor which Western politicians must
take into account in their geostrategic game on the great chessboard
of Eurasia.
And this is what really annoys the United States. This explains
America's increasingly insistent calls for Yerevan to demand withdrawal
of the Russian troops. In return, Yerevan is being promised benefits
like an open border with Turkey and economic prosperity in the
future. Armenia has an election coming up in May.
Political analyst Vsevolod Yaguzhinsky predicts that if the Armenian
government gives in to the West's intense pressure after the election
and agrees to expel the Russian military group, this could only
have one outcome: the blockade from Turkey would remain unchanged,
while Yerevan's room for maneuver in foreign policy would contract
substantially. Armenia, like neighboring Georgia, would become a
hostage to US policy.
Does Russia have interests of its own in the South Caucasus?
Certainly - and they cover a variety of aspects. Russia's interest in
the region is now largely determined by security considerations. The
Trans-Caucasus is linked to Russia's North Caucasus by unbreakable
bonds. Any outbreak of instability on the other side of the Caucasus
Range is sure to have an impact on the situation in Russia's southern
regions. Thus, the pursuit of Moscow's geopolitical and geostrategic
goals in the South Caucasus should primarily entail the ability to
manage the national interest systems of states in that region in such
a way that they are as consistent as possible with Russia's interests,
not moving outside that framework. At the very least, Russia should
define and develop a system of priorities in the Trans-Caucasus states,
as part of its national policy, taking account of the full diversity
and specifics of the real situation in the Caucasus.