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OSCE/ODIHR POST-ELECTION INTERIM REPORT No. 1
A1+
[08:08 pm] 25 May, 2007
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following the 12 May elections to the National Assembly and the
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions by the International
Election Observation Mission (IEOM) on 13 May, the OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission (EOM) continued to observe the vote tabulation,
the announcement of results and the handling of complaints and appeals.
During these last stages of the election process, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM
observed certain inconsistencies with established regulations and
departures from best electoral practice which do not contribute to
strengthening public confidence in the election process.
The vote count and tabulation were protracted but completed generally
within legal deadlines. However, delay by the Central Election
Commission (CEC) in posting tabulated results from the Yerevan
constituencies on its website compromised transparency measures put
in place for these elections.
Several Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) were observed
ordering corrections to Precinct Election Commission (PEC) protocols,
including adjustments to "initial data" (for example, number of
voters according to the voter lists, number of ballots received),
contrary to the Election Code.
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed discrepancies, some of them significant,
between certified polling station protocol copies and preliminary
disaggregated results tabulated by TECs and submitted electronically
mainly via a networked computer system. While such mistakes may not
have been deliberate, they included numbers swapped between lines,
incorrect calculations and discrepancies in initial data.
Three of the nine CEC members refused to sign the protocol of the
nationwide preliminary proportional contest results, citing reports of
violations that called into question the accuracy of the results. They
refused also to sign the final results protocol.
Recounts of results were initially requested in twelve constituencies,
and took place to completion in five.
These were conducted in accordance with the law and revealed no major
results discrepancies with the preliminary results.
At least 20 complaints and appeals relating to election day were
received and adjudicated by the CEC and TECs.
The president and the prime minister have stated that criminal
responsibility for electoral violations is to be pursued. Some criminal
cases have been initiated related to falsification of results, bribery
and fraud involving the voter list. The OSCE/ODIHR welcomes these
steps and emphasizes the importance of the thorough and impartial
investigation of all alleged irregularities.
II. INTRODUCTION
For the 12 May election day observation, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM
joined efforts with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European
Parliament (EP) to form the International Election Observation Mission
(IEOM). On the day after the elections to the National Assembly, the
IEOM issued a joint Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.
The statement reflected developments in the pre-election period,
election day and the vote counting overnight. As noted in the
Statement, a final assessment of the election also depends on the
conduct of the remaining stages of the election process, including
the vote tabulation, announcement of final results and the handling of
post-election complaints and appeals. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM will continue
to follow developments; this interim report covers developments for
the period from 13 to 22 May. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive
final report including recommendations approximately two months after
completion of the election process.
III. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
A. VOTE TABULATION AT TECS
The IEOM observed the vote counting and completion of results
protocols at 108 PECs, and tabulation of results at 39 out of the 41
TECs. Vote counting observed at PEC level was protracted, although in
only four observed instances did it extend beyond the legal deadline
for completion (10 hours after the close of voting). In PEC 17/38
the proportional counting and results protocol was completed at
around 05:30 hours, and consequently the PEC did not conduct a proper
majoritarian results count before filling out the majoritarian protocol
in time for the 06:00 hours deadline.
In 35 per cent of the polling stations where counting was observed,
the PEC members had difficulties completing the results protocols,
and in 11 cases the PEC was observed taking the prohibited action
of changing protocol "initial data" (number of voters according to
the voter lists, number of ballots and envelopes received, number of
cancelled and unused ballot papers, number of ballot paper coupons).
The implications of the observed difficulties with completion of
results protocols at PECs became more evident at the point of transfer
of results for tabulation at the TECs: many results protocols had
been filled out incompletely or incorrectly by the PECs.
Consequently, the completion or correction of protocols at TECs
was widely observed - 17 percent of TECs ordered corrections - and
completely new PEC protocols were observed being compiled at TECs 13,
16 and 37. This appeared to contribute to disorganisation at TECs,
with IEOM observers reporting procedural errors in 31 per cent of
TECs. These included lapses in a number of procedures relating to
the security of electoral materials and transparency.4 Overall, IEOM
observers assessed the conduct of the tabulation as bad or very bad
in 35 per cent of TECs.
Actions prohibited in the Election Code were also observed: 14
TECs were observed changing or ordering changes to "initial data"
on PEC protocols; and in seven TECs bags containing ballot papers
were delivered from PECs unsealed, or had clearly been sealed and
reopened.5 At TEC 19 IEOM observers saw unsealed bags of ballot papers
being taken downstairs to a campaign office of the Republican Party
and then brought back up to the TEC premises sealed. TECs 4, 36 and
40 were observed to have continued tabulation of results beyond the
deadline of 14:00 hours on 13 May.
The CEC had made considerable efforts to establish a transparent
reporting system of results, with results disaggregated by PEC
displayed on its website. Results were slow to appear on the website
on 12-13 May. Most results from the 13 Yerevan TECs were not posted
until after midday on 13 May, which cannot be explained by the slow
rate of the counting and tabulation. Although results appeared
within the deadline for the CEC to announce preliminary results
(i.e. by 20:00 hours on 13 May), a significant lapse in the promised
transparency of recording election results appears to have occurred,
as the vote counting and completion of results protocols in Yerevan
was reported by IEOM observers to have been completed by almost all
Yerevan PECs before 06:00 hours on 13 May.
The networked computer system linking the CEC to the TECs was not used
for the delivery of results in Yerevan. By a decision of the CEC from
February,6 the tabulated results data from the Yerevan TECs were to
be delivered to the CEC premises and entered into the computer there,
by CEC staff. The formal decision on this was apparently not widely
understood, and appeared to be contradicted by information given closer
to the election day, including in the CEC chairman's presentation of
the system to the mass media on 12 April (see OSCE/ODIHR EOM Interim
Report No.2).
B. ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS
The CEC announced preliminary results for the proportional contest
at 16:10 hours on 13 May.
However, three of the nine CEC members - representing the former
Justice Alliance, Orinats Yerkir and the National Unity Party -
refused to sign the results protocol, on the grounds that the extent
of electoral violations reported to them called into question the
accuracy of the announced election outcome.
Since 13 May the OSCE/ODIHR EOM has been able to compare 94
certified PEC "protocol extracts" obtained by IEOM observers (from
35 constituencies) with the disaggregated preliminary results of the
proportional contest posted on the CEC website. Discrepancies in 187
individual items of data entry were found. While such mistakes may not
have been deliberate, they included numbers swapped between lines and
incorrect calculations. However, significant discrepancies were also
found in the socalled initial data. According to the Election Code,
this data should not have been altered after initially being recorded.
On 16 May OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers at the CEC premises in Yerevan
witnessed CEC staff, in the presence of TEC representatives,
re-entering PEC protocol data for the proportional contest into the
computerized tabulation system. It was explained to the OSCE/ODIHR
EOM that original protocols brought to Yerevan by the TECs were being
used for the data re-entry, and that final election results would be
established on this basis.
On 19 May the CEC held its session on establishing and announcing
final results of the proportional election and approving the results
of the majoritarian contest.
The final results as announced included minor changes in tabulated
figures as compared to the preliminary results; however these did
not appear to affect the election outcome as calculated in the
preliminary results. The same three CEC members who had refused
to sign the preliminary results protocol refused to sign the final
results protocol.
While the TEC protocols disaggregated by PEC for the proportional
contest are required by law to be publicly posted, the posting
of the majoritarian contest results as disaggregated by PEC is not
stipulated in the Election Code. Consequently, proxies, observers and
other interested parties had no possibility to check the correctness
of certified PEC protocol copies against a TEC protocol for the
majoritarian contest.
Moreover, the period for which result protocols (proportional and
majoritarian) should be on display at PEC and TEC premises is not
stipulated. In many places the OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed that protocols
were taken down shortly after election day. On 18 May, the OSCE/ODIHR
EOM noted that all TEC protocol data on majoritarian contest results
had been removed from the CEC website.
The extent of problems and irregularities arising during the
counting, tabulation and publication of results, and deficiencies in
transparency, are not conducive to strengthening public confidence
in the administration of crucial election procedures.
The authorities have begun to take corrective steps, including
launching a criminal investigation of all nine members of PEC 15/16
for falsification of election results, and initiating criminal cases
also for bribery and for fraud involving the voter list.
President Robert Kocharyan and Prime Minister Serge Sargsyan have
stated that criminal responsibility for electoral violations is being
pursued (see also below).
C. RECOUNTS
The Election Code provides that candidates, proxies or PEC members have
the right to appeal the results of the voting in a particular precinct
by submitting a recount request to the respective TEC. Although
in the event of a high number of such requests the TEC's capacity
to complete its work within proscribed deadlines can be challenged,
the Election Code allows flexibility for TECs to extend their working
hours to accommodate such an eventuality,8 and there are no provisions
in the law stipulating any reasons why a TEC may refuse to conduct a
recount if correctly requested. In cases where TECs rejected requests
for recounts, the decision to do so was made on procedural grounds
and in accordance with the law.
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM was made aware of more than 30 requests for
recounts affecting more than 200 polling stations in 12 constituencies;
mainly these related to majoritarian contests. A number of these were
subsequently withdrawn by the complainant. In two cases known to the
OSCE/ODIHR EOM (in TECs 15 and 25) the complainants withdrew their
requests for a recount after it had commenced, because they allegedly
did not trust the TEC recount process.
The recount at TEC 15 was affected by a demonstration outside the
premises on 16-17 May and delays in reaching a quorum. In the five
places where recounts took place to completion, they were reported
to have been carried out in a calm atmosphere and in accordance with
procedures. TEC 33 did not meet the deadline for summarization of
the recounts, but reportedly was given a deadline extension by the CEC.
Recounts observed by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM did not produce significantly
different results from those recorded in the original protocols.
D. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE RESULTS
Election results can only be challenged in the Constitutional
Court. Court officials informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, that, guided by the
Law on the Constitutional Court, it will receive complaints for both
the proportional and majoritarian contest on the seventh day after
the announcement of final results, i.e. 26 May for the proportional
contest, and generally on 24 May for the majoritarian contests10
(the Election Code says within seven days, but the Constitutional
Court officials said that the different wording in the Law on the
Constitutional Court takes precedence). The Constitutional Court has
fifteen days to render a final decision on the proportional results
after their announcement,11 while one month is granted for deciding on
majoritarian disputes. Moreover, the Constitutional Court may decide
to prolong the deadline for a decision in the majoritarian contest for
up to 50 days. At this writing one complaint has been received by the
Constitutional Court, from majoritarian candidate Heghine Bisharyan
(Orinats Yerkir), disputing the majoritarian election results in
TEC 11.
IV. OTHER POST-ELECTION COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM was informed of seven complaints (on behalf of
various political parties and the CEC member from Orinats Yerkir)
filed with the CEC, and around twice that number filed with TECs
alleging irregularities on election day, mainly about procedural
violations, vote buying, ballot stuffing, military voting, the
presence of unauthorized persons and election day campaigning. The
CEC demonstrated genuine efforts to handle disputes by responding to
all of the complaints in a timely manner. Most of the complaints it
received were rejected on jurisdictional grounds or as being without
substance (in one case of the latter, concerning alleged vote buying
and ballot stuffing, the CEC consulted with the relevant TEC before
making its determination).
TECs have been handling complaints in a transparent manner, but some
issues raised concern. In particular, on election day, TEC 17 refused
to review four complaints submitted by a candidate. The complaints
were erroneously addressed to individual PECs and not the TEC, and the
TEC refused the complaints while it could instead have encouraged the
applicant to correct the formal error.12 The OSCE/ODIHR EOM was also
informed of ten applications received by the Office of the Prosecutor
General concerning election day irregularities possibly constituting
criminal offences. As noted above, some criminal cases have already
been initiated.
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM will continue to follow the complaints and appeals
process. It appreciates the continued co-operation with the authorities
of the Republic of Armenia.
A1+
[08:08 pm] 25 May, 2007
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following the 12 May elections to the National Assembly and the
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions by the International
Election Observation Mission (IEOM) on 13 May, the OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission (EOM) continued to observe the vote tabulation,
the announcement of results and the handling of complaints and appeals.
During these last stages of the election process, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM
observed certain inconsistencies with established regulations and
departures from best electoral practice which do not contribute to
strengthening public confidence in the election process.
The vote count and tabulation were protracted but completed generally
within legal deadlines. However, delay by the Central Election
Commission (CEC) in posting tabulated results from the Yerevan
constituencies on its website compromised transparency measures put
in place for these elections.
Several Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) were observed
ordering corrections to Precinct Election Commission (PEC) protocols,
including adjustments to "initial data" (for example, number of
voters according to the voter lists, number of ballots received),
contrary to the Election Code.
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed discrepancies, some of them significant,
between certified polling station protocol copies and preliminary
disaggregated results tabulated by TECs and submitted electronically
mainly via a networked computer system. While such mistakes may not
have been deliberate, they included numbers swapped between lines,
incorrect calculations and discrepancies in initial data.
Three of the nine CEC members refused to sign the protocol of the
nationwide preliminary proportional contest results, citing reports of
violations that called into question the accuracy of the results. They
refused also to sign the final results protocol.
Recounts of results were initially requested in twelve constituencies,
and took place to completion in five.
These were conducted in accordance with the law and revealed no major
results discrepancies with the preliminary results.
At least 20 complaints and appeals relating to election day were
received and adjudicated by the CEC and TECs.
The president and the prime minister have stated that criminal
responsibility for electoral violations is to be pursued. Some criminal
cases have been initiated related to falsification of results, bribery
and fraud involving the voter list. The OSCE/ODIHR welcomes these
steps and emphasizes the importance of the thorough and impartial
investigation of all alleged irregularities.
II. INTRODUCTION
For the 12 May election day observation, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM
joined efforts with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European
Parliament (EP) to form the International Election Observation Mission
(IEOM). On the day after the elections to the National Assembly, the
IEOM issued a joint Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.
The statement reflected developments in the pre-election period,
election day and the vote counting overnight. As noted in the
Statement, a final assessment of the election also depends on the
conduct of the remaining stages of the election process, including
the vote tabulation, announcement of final results and the handling of
post-election complaints and appeals. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM will continue
to follow developments; this interim report covers developments for
the period from 13 to 22 May. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive
final report including recommendations approximately two months after
completion of the election process.
III. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
A. VOTE TABULATION AT TECS
The IEOM observed the vote counting and completion of results
protocols at 108 PECs, and tabulation of results at 39 out of the 41
TECs. Vote counting observed at PEC level was protracted, although in
only four observed instances did it extend beyond the legal deadline
for completion (10 hours after the close of voting). In PEC 17/38
the proportional counting and results protocol was completed at
around 05:30 hours, and consequently the PEC did not conduct a proper
majoritarian results count before filling out the majoritarian protocol
in time for the 06:00 hours deadline.
In 35 per cent of the polling stations where counting was observed,
the PEC members had difficulties completing the results protocols,
and in 11 cases the PEC was observed taking the prohibited action
of changing protocol "initial data" (number of voters according to
the voter lists, number of ballots and envelopes received, number of
cancelled and unused ballot papers, number of ballot paper coupons).
The implications of the observed difficulties with completion of
results protocols at PECs became more evident at the point of transfer
of results for tabulation at the TECs: many results protocols had
been filled out incompletely or incorrectly by the PECs.
Consequently, the completion or correction of protocols at TECs
was widely observed - 17 percent of TECs ordered corrections - and
completely new PEC protocols were observed being compiled at TECs 13,
16 and 37. This appeared to contribute to disorganisation at TECs,
with IEOM observers reporting procedural errors in 31 per cent of
TECs. These included lapses in a number of procedures relating to
the security of electoral materials and transparency.4 Overall, IEOM
observers assessed the conduct of the tabulation as bad or very bad
in 35 per cent of TECs.
Actions prohibited in the Election Code were also observed: 14
TECs were observed changing or ordering changes to "initial data"
on PEC protocols; and in seven TECs bags containing ballot papers
were delivered from PECs unsealed, or had clearly been sealed and
reopened.5 At TEC 19 IEOM observers saw unsealed bags of ballot papers
being taken downstairs to a campaign office of the Republican Party
and then brought back up to the TEC premises sealed. TECs 4, 36 and
40 were observed to have continued tabulation of results beyond the
deadline of 14:00 hours on 13 May.
The CEC had made considerable efforts to establish a transparent
reporting system of results, with results disaggregated by PEC
displayed on its website. Results were slow to appear on the website
on 12-13 May. Most results from the 13 Yerevan TECs were not posted
until after midday on 13 May, which cannot be explained by the slow
rate of the counting and tabulation. Although results appeared
within the deadline for the CEC to announce preliminary results
(i.e. by 20:00 hours on 13 May), a significant lapse in the promised
transparency of recording election results appears to have occurred,
as the vote counting and completion of results protocols in Yerevan
was reported by IEOM observers to have been completed by almost all
Yerevan PECs before 06:00 hours on 13 May.
The networked computer system linking the CEC to the TECs was not used
for the delivery of results in Yerevan. By a decision of the CEC from
February,6 the tabulated results data from the Yerevan TECs were to
be delivered to the CEC premises and entered into the computer there,
by CEC staff. The formal decision on this was apparently not widely
understood, and appeared to be contradicted by information given closer
to the election day, including in the CEC chairman's presentation of
the system to the mass media on 12 April (see OSCE/ODIHR EOM Interim
Report No.2).
B. ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS
The CEC announced preliminary results for the proportional contest
at 16:10 hours on 13 May.
However, three of the nine CEC members - representing the former
Justice Alliance, Orinats Yerkir and the National Unity Party -
refused to sign the results protocol, on the grounds that the extent
of electoral violations reported to them called into question the
accuracy of the announced election outcome.
Since 13 May the OSCE/ODIHR EOM has been able to compare 94
certified PEC "protocol extracts" obtained by IEOM observers (from
35 constituencies) with the disaggregated preliminary results of the
proportional contest posted on the CEC website. Discrepancies in 187
individual items of data entry were found. While such mistakes may not
have been deliberate, they included numbers swapped between lines and
incorrect calculations. However, significant discrepancies were also
found in the socalled initial data. According to the Election Code,
this data should not have been altered after initially being recorded.
On 16 May OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers at the CEC premises in Yerevan
witnessed CEC staff, in the presence of TEC representatives,
re-entering PEC protocol data for the proportional contest into the
computerized tabulation system. It was explained to the OSCE/ODIHR
EOM that original protocols brought to Yerevan by the TECs were being
used for the data re-entry, and that final election results would be
established on this basis.
On 19 May the CEC held its session on establishing and announcing
final results of the proportional election and approving the results
of the majoritarian contest.
The final results as announced included minor changes in tabulated
figures as compared to the preliminary results; however these did
not appear to affect the election outcome as calculated in the
preliminary results. The same three CEC members who had refused
to sign the preliminary results protocol refused to sign the final
results protocol.
While the TEC protocols disaggregated by PEC for the proportional
contest are required by law to be publicly posted, the posting
of the majoritarian contest results as disaggregated by PEC is not
stipulated in the Election Code. Consequently, proxies, observers and
other interested parties had no possibility to check the correctness
of certified PEC protocol copies against a TEC protocol for the
majoritarian contest.
Moreover, the period for which result protocols (proportional and
majoritarian) should be on display at PEC and TEC premises is not
stipulated. In many places the OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed that protocols
were taken down shortly after election day. On 18 May, the OSCE/ODIHR
EOM noted that all TEC protocol data on majoritarian contest results
had been removed from the CEC website.
The extent of problems and irregularities arising during the
counting, tabulation and publication of results, and deficiencies in
transparency, are not conducive to strengthening public confidence
in the administration of crucial election procedures.
The authorities have begun to take corrective steps, including
launching a criminal investigation of all nine members of PEC 15/16
for falsification of election results, and initiating criminal cases
also for bribery and for fraud involving the voter list.
President Robert Kocharyan and Prime Minister Serge Sargsyan have
stated that criminal responsibility for electoral violations is being
pursued (see also below).
C. RECOUNTS
The Election Code provides that candidates, proxies or PEC members have
the right to appeal the results of the voting in a particular precinct
by submitting a recount request to the respective TEC. Although
in the event of a high number of such requests the TEC's capacity
to complete its work within proscribed deadlines can be challenged,
the Election Code allows flexibility for TECs to extend their working
hours to accommodate such an eventuality,8 and there are no provisions
in the law stipulating any reasons why a TEC may refuse to conduct a
recount if correctly requested. In cases where TECs rejected requests
for recounts, the decision to do so was made on procedural grounds
and in accordance with the law.
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM was made aware of more than 30 requests for
recounts affecting more than 200 polling stations in 12 constituencies;
mainly these related to majoritarian contests. A number of these were
subsequently withdrawn by the complainant. In two cases known to the
OSCE/ODIHR EOM (in TECs 15 and 25) the complainants withdrew their
requests for a recount after it had commenced, because they allegedly
did not trust the TEC recount process.
The recount at TEC 15 was affected by a demonstration outside the
premises on 16-17 May and delays in reaching a quorum. In the five
places where recounts took place to completion, they were reported
to have been carried out in a calm atmosphere and in accordance with
procedures. TEC 33 did not meet the deadline for summarization of
the recounts, but reportedly was given a deadline extension by the CEC.
Recounts observed by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM did not produce significantly
different results from those recorded in the original protocols.
D. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE RESULTS
Election results can only be challenged in the Constitutional
Court. Court officials informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, that, guided by the
Law on the Constitutional Court, it will receive complaints for both
the proportional and majoritarian contest on the seventh day after
the announcement of final results, i.e. 26 May for the proportional
contest, and generally on 24 May for the majoritarian contests10
(the Election Code says within seven days, but the Constitutional
Court officials said that the different wording in the Law on the
Constitutional Court takes precedence). The Constitutional Court has
fifteen days to render a final decision on the proportional results
after their announcement,11 while one month is granted for deciding on
majoritarian disputes. Moreover, the Constitutional Court may decide
to prolong the deadline for a decision in the majoritarian contest for
up to 50 days. At this writing one complaint has been received by the
Constitutional Court, from majoritarian candidate Heghine Bisharyan
(Orinats Yerkir), disputing the majoritarian election results in
TEC 11.
IV. OTHER POST-ELECTION COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM was informed of seven complaints (on behalf of
various political parties and the CEC member from Orinats Yerkir)
filed with the CEC, and around twice that number filed with TECs
alleging irregularities on election day, mainly about procedural
violations, vote buying, ballot stuffing, military voting, the
presence of unauthorized persons and election day campaigning. The
CEC demonstrated genuine efforts to handle disputes by responding to
all of the complaints in a timely manner. Most of the complaints it
received were rejected on jurisdictional grounds or as being without
substance (in one case of the latter, concerning alleged vote buying
and ballot stuffing, the CEC consulted with the relevant TEC before
making its determination).
TECs have been handling complaints in a transparent manner, but some
issues raised concern. In particular, on election day, TEC 17 refused
to review four complaints submitted by a candidate. The complaints
were erroneously addressed to individual PECs and not the TEC, and the
TEC refused the complaints while it could instead have encouraged the
applicant to correct the formal error.12 The OSCE/ODIHR EOM was also
informed of ten applications received by the Office of the Prosecutor
General concerning election day irregularities possibly constituting
criminal offences. As noted above, some criminal cases have already
been initiated.
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM will continue to follow the complaints and appeals
process. It appreciates the continued co-operation with the authorities
of the Republic of Armenia.