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US Department of State (press release), DC
May 24 2007
Russia: In Transition or Intransigent?
Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Testimony Before the Helsinki Commission
Washington, DC
May 24, 2007
Chairman Hastings and members of the Commission, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you. Today's subject, "Russia Today," is
critical to the United States and our partners, particularly in
Europe. Whether Russia is "in transition or intransigent" - the other
part of your question for this hearing - is a useful if provocative
way to frame the challenge of working with Russia, which remains in
our interest.
Russia certainly remains "in transition" from its communist past. Its
growing assertiveness in tone and perhaps in action, spurred in part
by high energy revenues, may have stimulated your use of the word
"intransigent." In no case, however, can Russia be presented in such
stark terms: while Russia does sometimes seem a difficult partner to
work with, we also have many important areas of cooperation through
which we pursue common interests. Although ours may not be a
strategic partnership, it includes partnership on many strategic
issues. U.S.-Russia relations are complicated. Given the legacy of
U.S.-Soviet relations, this is no surprise. In Moscow on May 15,
Secretary Rice pointed out that we need to differentiate between
discrete disagreements and our overall intention to work together
whenever possible. "There are going to be times when we disagree, but
it is true that sometimes the rhetoric makes it sound as if the
relationship itself is in question, rather than . . . the specific
differences that we have."
The Administration's analysis of Russia is realistic, and our
objectives with Russia reflect this. We want Russia to be a partner
in the world, and we want Russia to be strong, but strong in 21st
century terms: with strong, democratic and independent institutions
in and out of government; with a strong civil society, free press and
active opposition; with strong and independent middle and
entrepreneurial classes. We do not exempt Russia from our belief in
the universal potential of freedom, and we also have Russia in mind
when we say that we seek an open world characterized by partnerships
with like-minded countries.
Our preferred tactical approach is cooperation-we work together
wherever we can, always seeking to expand the scope of that
collaboration where our interests overlap - but we push back when we
must, privately when possible but publicly when necessary, in defense
of our values, interests and friends. At all points, we also seek to
work with our European allies and friends to coordinate our
approaches and articulate the common values underlying our policies.
Given the media preoccupation (in both countries) with the problems,
I wish to first mention the areas of cooperation in relations. The
United States and Russia continue to cooperate in critical areas,
including counterterrorism and nonproliferation. The U.S.-Russia
Counterterrorism Working Group last met in September 2006, and will
meet again in a few months, to continue and deepen cooperation on
intelligence, law enforcement, WMD, terrorist financing,
counternarcotics, Afghanistan, UN issues, MANPADS, and transportation
security.
Our strategic cooperation is intensifying. Last year, together with
Moscow, we renewed until 2013 the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program, which was launched in 1992 to facilitate dismantlement of
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. As this
program marks 15 years, we and Russia have agreed to accelerate some
elements under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative; nuclear
security upgrades are on track for completion by the end of 2008. At
the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Presidents Bush and Putin
announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which
seeks to prevent nuclear materials falling into terrorists' hands. We
and Russia are both working toward enhancing nuclear fuel cycle
security, through the Global Nuclear Energy Policy and the fuel
center initiative, respectively, and we are negotiating with Russia
an agreement on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement (Section
"123" of the Atomic Energy Act) as well as one on Defense Technology
Cooperation. The United States has presented a proposal for
substantive cooperation on missile defense, and, with the expiration
of the START Treaty in 2009, we have begun positive discussions about
a post-START arrangement. There have been several high-level visits
in recent months, including those of Secretary Rice and Defense
Secretary Gates. We share with Russia many common global
nonproliferation goals. We work closely with Russia and others to
address the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, although
Moscow has sometimes voiced disagreement with our approach to
sanctions and other measures. Russia voted for UN Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (North Korea), 1737, and 1747 (Iran), calling
respectively for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and
imposing Chapter VII sanctions on North Korea, as well as imposing
sanctions against Iran until Tehran suspends its nuclear enrichment
program and comes into compliance with its NPT obligations. We look
forward to the full implementation of those resolutions. The United
States and Russia, along with China, Japan, South Korea, and North
Korea participate in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, and Russia
chairs the Six-Party Talks Working Group on a Northeast Asia Peace
and Security Mechanism.
We continue to pursue cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council
[NRC], which this year marks its fifth anniversary. We have a broad
menu of cooperative NATO-Russia initiatives involving diverse experts
on both sides: these range from Russian participation in Operation
Active Endeavor to counternarcotics program in Afghanistan. We look
forward to greater opportunities for cooperation once Russia ratifies
a Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) with NATO: we welcome the Duma's
ratification on May 23, and look forward to the Federation Council
following suit. That said, the April 26 meeting of NRC Foreign
Ministers in Oslo, Norway, showcased some important differences
between Russia on the one hand and most NATO Allies on the other in
light of President Putin's "State of the Nation" Address
("poslaniye") earlier that day. In that speech, President Putin
suggested he would consider suspending Russia's implementation of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) if no
progress was made on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by NATO
Allies. At the NRC, NATO Ministers universally responded that we
continue to regard the current CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of the
European security, and that we are ready to seek ratification of the
Adapted CFE Treaty after Russia fulfills its 1999 Istanbul
commitments on withdrawal of forces for Moldova and Georgia. The
Administration and NATO Allies are very serious about our support for
Adapted CFE: the Adapted Treaty, signed in 1999, replaces the
bloc-to-bloc structure of the original Treaty with a more flexible
system of national and territorial equipment limits. It allows
accession by new members, and provides for enhanced information on
military forces and more inspection opportunities than the original
Treaty. Adapted CFE also contains specific provisions relating to
host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces that are very
important to our GUAM partners. There should be no question about
NATO Allies' support for CFE and Adapted CFE-neither of which
represent efforts by NATO to take advantage of Russia-and no question
about NATO Allies' insistence on fulfillment of the Istanbul
commitments as the basis for ratification of the Adapted Treaty.
We also seek to advance cooperation with Russia through the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an
organization, obviously, of deep interest to this Commission.
Russia's critical attitude toward the OSCE remains a cause for
concern. Speaking on February 10, 2007, to the Munich Security
Conference, President Putin branded the OSCE a "vulgar instrument
designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of
countries." Under the guise of demanding reforms, Russia has proposed
changes to the OSCE, the effect of which would be to cripple its
democracy promotion efforts. The United States disagrees strongly
with this Russian approach and has defended the OSCE's mandate to
advance democratic reforms, including election monitoring. Indeed,
these efforts embody commitments that Washington and Moscow undertook
when we signed the Helsinki Final Act. The United States continues
strongly to support the work of the OSCE's Office of Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); its elections monitoring
mechanisms represent the international "gold standard" in this area.
We applaud the long and distinguished track record ODIHR has
accumulated in electoral monitoring throughout the OSCE region, and
look forward to its involvement in Russia's upcoming Duma elections
in December 2007 and Presidential elections in March 2008. We also
value highly the contributions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to
the OSCE's election monitoring work, and the PA's joint efforts with
ODIHR. I should add that the United States accepts and welcomes ODIHR
monitoring of U.S. elections.
While every organization can be improved, we believe there is wisdom
in the aphorism "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." The OSCE is
working well and doing important work, and we will continue to
support it against "reform" efforts calculated to circumscribe its
activities or debilitate its democracy promotion work.
Differences with Russia over the OSCE reflect broader, negative
trends on human rights and democracy in Russia itself. We hope that
the situation will not deteriorate further over the coming year, in
conjunction with upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections
cycles and issues connected to succession.
Let us be clear: Russia is even today a vastly freer country than at
any time in Soviet history and arguably freer than at any period in
Russia's history. It is also true that post-communist transitions
take time. But it would be an insult to Russia to hold that great
country to low standards. Suppression of genuine opposition,
abridgement of the right to protest, constriction of the space of
civil society, and the decline of media freedom all represent serious
setbacks that are inconsistent with Russia's professed commitment to
building and preserving the foundations of a democratic state. The
unsolved murders of journalists and critics are equally disturbing.
The State Department has publicly protested, including at the OSCE
Permanent Council, the recent police brutality employed to break up
opposition marches in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhny Novgorod.
The EU also protested those actions. Authorities sought to prevent
the marches from taking place at all: they denied permission to stage
the events or tried to marginalize them by changing their venues;
they harassed and detained Russians traveling to participate in these
peaceful rallies; on the day of the events, disproportionate police
presence wielded undue force against the protestors as well as
journalists reporting on the events. Some of the same efforts were
directed against members of the Russian opposition seeking to express
their opinions ahead of the EU-Russia Summit in Samara May 18. The
fact that the authorities allowed pro-Kremlin youth groups to engage
in activity from which opposition activists were prohibited
demonstrated selective use of the law. Nonetheless, it is encouraging
that independent groups, despite harassment, were able to gather,
garner supporters, and attract public attention.
Interestingly, Presidential Administration deputy press spokesman
Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that the police response to last month's
protests merits review, and St. Petersburg Governor Matviyenko and
the Russian Federation's Human Rights Ombudsman, Vladimir Lukin, have
both called for investigations. In his annual report on human rights
in Russia, presented April 24 to the Duma and May 4 to the Federation
Council, Ombudsman Lukin reiterated that his office had received and
would investigate increased numbers of citizens' complaints about
government obstacles to holding rallies.
President Putin's own chairperson of the Civil Society Institution
and Human Rights Council, Ella Pamfilova, has said that Interior
Minister Nurgaliyev should resign in connection with the police
break-up of those demonstrations. Such calls indicate that, even
within official Russia, views differ on human rights.
We are likewise concerned about the increasingly narrow and
controlled space within which Russian NGOs are forced to operate, and
continue to monitor the implementation of the new NGO law enacted in
April 2006. The record is mixed thus far. While the process for
re-registration of foreign NGOs was cumbersome, and require paperwork
and reporting requirements that many Russian and foreign NGOs find
onerous, the fact remains that the vast majority of foreign NGOs did
succeed in re-registering, although some suffered disruptions in the
continuity of their program operations. We are also heartened by the
ability of some NGOs to effect change in the law, as when religious
groups, concerned that the reporting requirements could be construed
to require listing congregants or accounting for collections among
the faithful, successfully lobbied the Kremlin to exempt
ecclesiastical organizations from those rules.
The increasing pressure on Russian journalists is likewise troubling.
Vigorous and investigatory media independent of officialdom are
essential to dynamic, healthy processes in all democracies. In Russia
today, unfortunately, most national television networks media-the
primary source of news for most Russians --are in government hands or
the hands of individuals and entities allied with the Kremlin. The
growing agglomeration of print media in the hands of government
officials or those allied with them likewise undercuts press freedom.
Attacks on journalists, including the brutal and still unsolved
murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya, among others, chill
and deter the fourth estate. Self-censorship remains a growing
problem. Some space for free discussion remains, particularly on the
Internet, as the vigorous and sometimes sympathetic coverage in the
print media of recent opposition marches indicates, but it still
appears to be shrinking.
Ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections, the Kremlin is
bringing its full weight to bear in shaping the legal and social
environment to preclude a level playing field. There have been many
instances in which the authorities have used electoral laws
selectively to the advantage of pro-Kremlin forces or to hamstring
opposition forces. The refusal to re-register Yabloko in St.
Petersburg and difficulties encountered by other parties, appear to
have been based on political instructions, rather than an objective
judgment of whether these parties met registration requirements.
Last year, the Duma enacted amendments to the criminal and
administrative codes redefining "extremism" so broadly and vaguely as
to provide a potent weapon to wield against and intimidate opponents;
greater self-censorship appears to be a major goal in this effort. We
note, for example, that Dissenters' March leader Garry Kasparov has
already been questioned by the FSB in its investigation into
"extremist" activity. Even the most cursory analysis of Russian
national broadcast media shows news reporting skewed decisively in
favor of Kremlin-approved parties and groups.
Against this background, the U.S. and its European Allies and friends
continue to support Russian democracy and civil society. These issues
are regular parts of our bilateral and multilateral consultations.
President Bush, when he was in St. Petersburg last summer, hosted an
event with NGO and civil society leaders, sending a powerful message
of American support and solidarity. Just last week, the Secretary
took part in Moscow in a roundtable discussion with leaders of civil
society and other figures. She also has regularly and candidly
articulated our concerns with Russia's leadership, as she did last
week. The Secretary, my colleague Assistant Secretary Lowenkron of
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and I have
participated in NGO events in Russia to showcase our support for
independent media and civil society. The OSCE also remains an
important forum for the United States and others to remind Russia
that its commitments to democracy and human rights are not just
"internal matters," but commitments that all State Parties to the
Helsinki Final Act have undertaken to observe and protect.
Russia's relations with its neighbors and with Europe remain an issue
of considerable concern. Moscow often still approaches its neighbors
with a zero-sum mentality, particularly when it comes to those
countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, which choose to pursue closer
Euro-Atlantic ties. We and European countries have spoken out against
Russia's use of energy to apply political and/or economic pressure on
neighbors, such as in the case of Ukraine in 2006. We are concerned
by apparently political interference with infrastructures, as in the
case of claimed structural deficiencies that restricted traffic on a
bridge to Estonia this month, prolonged "repairs" to an oil pipeline
to Lithuania, or the closing of Russia's only legal border crossing
with Georgia last year.
Russian-Georgian relations, after a period of extreme tension, have
shown tentative signs of limited improvement, but Moscow could do
much more to normalize relations. Russia maintains the economic and
transportation sanctions it imposed against Georgia last fall.
Likewise, it continues to take actions that call into question its
professed support for Georgia's territorial integrity by supporting
separatist regimes in Georgia's South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions;
it provides the same support to the separatist regime in Moldova's
Transnistria region. The United States continues to call on Russia to
end these policies and work with our European partners to implement
confidence-building measures designed to bring the sides in each
conflict closer together. At the same time, we encourage Russia to
play a more constructive role and to use its influence with the
separatists to advance a peaceful resolution of each conflict in
Georgia. The United States has had productive high-level discussions
with Russia on these issues. Russia recently sent officials to
Tbilisi to discuss reducing tensions in South Ossetia, and publicly
scolded South Ossetian de facto authorities for violations of
existing agreements. We have also encouraged both sides to ameliorate
their relationship and understand that Russian and Georgian officials
are scheduled to meet soon for this purpose.
The United States is also working to advance a resolution in the
separatist conflict in Moldova's Transnistria region. The United
States and EU are official observers at the 5 + 2 Talks, negotiations
that have been at an impasse for more than a year because of the
Transnistrian side's unwillingness to engage. The Russian and
Moldovan governments have recently called for a resumption of the 5 +
2 process, although Russia has to date failed to use its heft to
bring the Transnistrians back to the negotiating table, and we hope
that all parties will engage seriously. Russia's recent statements
calling for resumption of the 5 + 2 process have also made mention of
the principle of Moldova's territorial integrity. Finally, despite
promises by President Putin himself last fall that the ban against
Moldovan wine and agricultural goods would be lifted, the ban is
still in place.
On one separatist conflict, in Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States
and Russia work well together in trying to facilitate a resolution.
Together with OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair country counterparts from
Russia and France, I traveled to the region last spring to push the
peace process forward by presenting to the Presidents of Azerbaijan
and Armenia a set of proposed basic principles for the peaceful
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These principles remain
the centerpiece of negotiations between the two sides even today.
While recognizing that the burden for resolving the conflict lies
with Armenia and Azerbaijan, we nevertheless continue to show that
the United States and Russia can work together to facilitate a peace
process that could bring greater stability and security to the South
Caucasus, which is in our mutual best interest.
We regret Russia's so far hostile attitude toward U.S. plans for
placing elements of a limited missile defense system in Poland and
the Czech Republic (intended to shield the United States and its
European allies against missile threats from the Middle East) and
President Putin's announcement on April 26 that Russia would consider
a moratorium on implementation of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe.
We have held numerous briefings and consultations with Russia on our
missile defense plans for more than a year (both bilaterally and in
the NATO-Russia Council), and geography and geometry both demonstrate
that the very modest system proposed in Poland and the Czech Republic
poses no threat whatsoever to Russia. Speaking at the NATO
Ministerial in Oslo April 26, Secretary Rice described as "purely
ludicrous" the idea that somehow 10 interceptors and a few radars in
Eastern Europe are going to threaten Russia. We and the Russians
simply do not agree here, but we will continue to work to reach a
better understanding between our two countries on this important
issue. Both the State and Defense Departments, including Secretaries
Rice and Gates, have briefed Russia on our missile defense plans for
more than eighteen months. We have kept-and will continue to
keep-Russia fully informed about those plans. We are committed, as we
have been in the past, to consulting with Russia and being
transparent with it about missile defense. We have offered to
cooperate with Russia across the full spectrum of missile defense
activities, an offer that the Russians themselves have described as
"serious," and that offer remains on the table. But Russia does not
have a veto over our missile defense plans.
Regarding the Adapted CFE Treaty, it isn't clear to us exactly what
Russia's concerns are. The Russians have made it clear that they want
NATO Allies to ratify the Adapted Treaty, among other reasons because
they would like some of our new NATO members, particularly the Baltic
states, to be able to join. The United States and its NATO Allies are
prepared to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty after Russia fulfills its
outstanding Istanbul Commitments, dating from 1999, in Moldova and
Georgia. Under the provisions of the adapted CFE treaty signed in
Istanbul in 1999, Russia made three sets of commitments. First, it
pledged to reduce its forces in the CFE flank area to the level
specified by the Adapted Treaty, and has done so. Second, there's
been important progress in Georgia, where the commitments are almost
fulfilled, except for the need for Russia to reach agreement with
Georgia on the status or withdrawal of the Russian presence at the
Gudauta base. On the third set of commitments, concerning Moldova,
Russian forces were supposed to have been withdrawn by the end of
2002; that deadline was extended by agreement of the OSCE to the end
of 2003. In fact, there has been a stalemate on Russian withdrawal
since early 2004. Russian forces, some designated as peacekeepers,
remain in the separatist area of Transnistria, along with some 20,000
tons of stored munitions. Moldova wants all Russian munitions and
forces, including the peacekeeping force (PKF), to be withdrawn.
However, Moldovan authorities have said that they would be willing to
accept Russian participation in a genuinely multinational PKF, under
an OSCE umbrella. We are urging Russia and others to negotiate
seriously on a transformed PKF. A decision to field such a force
would be a major step toward solving this conflict and toward
fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments.
Russia has made dramatic economic gains over the past few years. We
welcome Russia's economic revival, particularly after difficult
economic transitions in the 1990s. Prosperity and peace is in
everyone's interests. We welcome Russia's economic revitalization,
but are concerned that this revival is built upon certain
vulnerabilities: Russia's wealth remains more value-extracted than
value-added. Russia's economic gains have fueled a certain bravado in
Russia's external agenda. But those gains are also fostering the
growth of a nascent middle class whose emergence, over time, we hope
will bring with it modern political reforms, including greater
accountability and governmental responsiveness. The United States
supports Russia's integration into rules-based international
organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, consonant with
Russia's commitment to those organizations' principles. An important
step towards Russia's integration into the norms of the global
economy was reached last fall with the closure of the U.S.-Russia
bilateral WTO agreement -- arguably the biggest single step forward
in our economic relationship in the past decade. While not a miracle
cure for either of us, it very much serves the interest of both our
countries.
The range of both U.S. and Russian interests are clearly global.
Given that reach, it is imperative that both our countries seek to
work together wherever possible, even when such cooperation may prove
challenging. At the same time, we are committed to defending our
principles, pushing back wherever we must. U.S.-Russia relations
require ongoing dialogue. As I mentioned, Secretary Rice just
completed a good visit to Moscow last week, and the President will
meet with President Putin during the G8 Summit in Germany in June.
This and other opportunities in the coming months will provide
important moments to try to narrow our differences on issues that
matter to us while pressing forward on elements of our constructive
engagement with Russia as well.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I am grateful for the
opportunity to speak before you today, and look forward to your
questions.
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/85479.htm
May 24 2007
Russia: In Transition or Intransigent?
Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Testimony Before the Helsinki Commission
Washington, DC
May 24, 2007
Chairman Hastings and members of the Commission, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you. Today's subject, "Russia Today," is
critical to the United States and our partners, particularly in
Europe. Whether Russia is "in transition or intransigent" - the other
part of your question for this hearing - is a useful if provocative
way to frame the challenge of working with Russia, which remains in
our interest.
Russia certainly remains "in transition" from its communist past. Its
growing assertiveness in tone and perhaps in action, spurred in part
by high energy revenues, may have stimulated your use of the word
"intransigent." In no case, however, can Russia be presented in such
stark terms: while Russia does sometimes seem a difficult partner to
work with, we also have many important areas of cooperation through
which we pursue common interests. Although ours may not be a
strategic partnership, it includes partnership on many strategic
issues. U.S.-Russia relations are complicated. Given the legacy of
U.S.-Soviet relations, this is no surprise. In Moscow on May 15,
Secretary Rice pointed out that we need to differentiate between
discrete disagreements and our overall intention to work together
whenever possible. "There are going to be times when we disagree, but
it is true that sometimes the rhetoric makes it sound as if the
relationship itself is in question, rather than . . . the specific
differences that we have."
The Administration's analysis of Russia is realistic, and our
objectives with Russia reflect this. We want Russia to be a partner
in the world, and we want Russia to be strong, but strong in 21st
century terms: with strong, democratic and independent institutions
in and out of government; with a strong civil society, free press and
active opposition; with strong and independent middle and
entrepreneurial classes. We do not exempt Russia from our belief in
the universal potential of freedom, and we also have Russia in mind
when we say that we seek an open world characterized by partnerships
with like-minded countries.
Our preferred tactical approach is cooperation-we work together
wherever we can, always seeking to expand the scope of that
collaboration where our interests overlap - but we push back when we
must, privately when possible but publicly when necessary, in defense
of our values, interests and friends. At all points, we also seek to
work with our European allies and friends to coordinate our
approaches and articulate the common values underlying our policies.
Given the media preoccupation (in both countries) with the problems,
I wish to first mention the areas of cooperation in relations. The
United States and Russia continue to cooperate in critical areas,
including counterterrorism and nonproliferation. The U.S.-Russia
Counterterrorism Working Group last met in September 2006, and will
meet again in a few months, to continue and deepen cooperation on
intelligence, law enforcement, WMD, terrorist financing,
counternarcotics, Afghanistan, UN issues, MANPADS, and transportation
security.
Our strategic cooperation is intensifying. Last year, together with
Moscow, we renewed until 2013 the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program, which was launched in 1992 to facilitate dismantlement of
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. As this
program marks 15 years, we and Russia have agreed to accelerate some
elements under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative; nuclear
security upgrades are on track for completion by the end of 2008. At
the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Presidents Bush and Putin
announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which
seeks to prevent nuclear materials falling into terrorists' hands. We
and Russia are both working toward enhancing nuclear fuel cycle
security, through the Global Nuclear Energy Policy and the fuel
center initiative, respectively, and we are negotiating with Russia
an agreement on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement (Section
"123" of the Atomic Energy Act) as well as one on Defense Technology
Cooperation. The United States has presented a proposal for
substantive cooperation on missile defense, and, with the expiration
of the START Treaty in 2009, we have begun positive discussions about
a post-START arrangement. There have been several high-level visits
in recent months, including those of Secretary Rice and Defense
Secretary Gates. We share with Russia many common global
nonproliferation goals. We work closely with Russia and others to
address the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, although
Moscow has sometimes voiced disagreement with our approach to
sanctions and other measures. Russia voted for UN Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (North Korea), 1737, and 1747 (Iran), calling
respectively for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and
imposing Chapter VII sanctions on North Korea, as well as imposing
sanctions against Iran until Tehran suspends its nuclear enrichment
program and comes into compliance with its NPT obligations. We look
forward to the full implementation of those resolutions. The United
States and Russia, along with China, Japan, South Korea, and North
Korea participate in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, and Russia
chairs the Six-Party Talks Working Group on a Northeast Asia Peace
and Security Mechanism.
We continue to pursue cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council
[NRC], which this year marks its fifth anniversary. We have a broad
menu of cooperative NATO-Russia initiatives involving diverse experts
on both sides: these range from Russian participation in Operation
Active Endeavor to counternarcotics program in Afghanistan. We look
forward to greater opportunities for cooperation once Russia ratifies
a Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) with NATO: we welcome the Duma's
ratification on May 23, and look forward to the Federation Council
following suit. That said, the April 26 meeting of NRC Foreign
Ministers in Oslo, Norway, showcased some important differences
between Russia on the one hand and most NATO Allies on the other in
light of President Putin's "State of the Nation" Address
("poslaniye") earlier that day. In that speech, President Putin
suggested he would consider suspending Russia's implementation of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) if no
progress was made on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by NATO
Allies. At the NRC, NATO Ministers universally responded that we
continue to regard the current CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of the
European security, and that we are ready to seek ratification of the
Adapted CFE Treaty after Russia fulfills its 1999 Istanbul
commitments on withdrawal of forces for Moldova and Georgia. The
Administration and NATO Allies are very serious about our support for
Adapted CFE: the Adapted Treaty, signed in 1999, replaces the
bloc-to-bloc structure of the original Treaty with a more flexible
system of national and territorial equipment limits. It allows
accession by new members, and provides for enhanced information on
military forces and more inspection opportunities than the original
Treaty. Adapted CFE also contains specific provisions relating to
host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces that are very
important to our GUAM partners. There should be no question about
NATO Allies' support for CFE and Adapted CFE-neither of which
represent efforts by NATO to take advantage of Russia-and no question
about NATO Allies' insistence on fulfillment of the Istanbul
commitments as the basis for ratification of the Adapted Treaty.
We also seek to advance cooperation with Russia through the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an
organization, obviously, of deep interest to this Commission.
Russia's critical attitude toward the OSCE remains a cause for
concern. Speaking on February 10, 2007, to the Munich Security
Conference, President Putin branded the OSCE a "vulgar instrument
designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of
countries." Under the guise of demanding reforms, Russia has proposed
changes to the OSCE, the effect of which would be to cripple its
democracy promotion efforts. The United States disagrees strongly
with this Russian approach and has defended the OSCE's mandate to
advance democratic reforms, including election monitoring. Indeed,
these efforts embody commitments that Washington and Moscow undertook
when we signed the Helsinki Final Act. The United States continues
strongly to support the work of the OSCE's Office of Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); its elections monitoring
mechanisms represent the international "gold standard" in this area.
We applaud the long and distinguished track record ODIHR has
accumulated in electoral monitoring throughout the OSCE region, and
look forward to its involvement in Russia's upcoming Duma elections
in December 2007 and Presidential elections in March 2008. We also
value highly the contributions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to
the OSCE's election monitoring work, and the PA's joint efforts with
ODIHR. I should add that the United States accepts and welcomes ODIHR
monitoring of U.S. elections.
While every organization can be improved, we believe there is wisdom
in the aphorism "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." The OSCE is
working well and doing important work, and we will continue to
support it against "reform" efforts calculated to circumscribe its
activities or debilitate its democracy promotion work.
Differences with Russia over the OSCE reflect broader, negative
trends on human rights and democracy in Russia itself. We hope that
the situation will not deteriorate further over the coming year, in
conjunction with upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections
cycles and issues connected to succession.
Let us be clear: Russia is even today a vastly freer country than at
any time in Soviet history and arguably freer than at any period in
Russia's history. It is also true that post-communist transitions
take time. But it would be an insult to Russia to hold that great
country to low standards. Suppression of genuine opposition,
abridgement of the right to protest, constriction of the space of
civil society, and the decline of media freedom all represent serious
setbacks that are inconsistent with Russia's professed commitment to
building and preserving the foundations of a democratic state. The
unsolved murders of journalists and critics are equally disturbing.
The State Department has publicly protested, including at the OSCE
Permanent Council, the recent police brutality employed to break up
opposition marches in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhny Novgorod.
The EU also protested those actions. Authorities sought to prevent
the marches from taking place at all: they denied permission to stage
the events or tried to marginalize them by changing their venues;
they harassed and detained Russians traveling to participate in these
peaceful rallies; on the day of the events, disproportionate police
presence wielded undue force against the protestors as well as
journalists reporting on the events. Some of the same efforts were
directed against members of the Russian opposition seeking to express
their opinions ahead of the EU-Russia Summit in Samara May 18. The
fact that the authorities allowed pro-Kremlin youth groups to engage
in activity from which opposition activists were prohibited
demonstrated selective use of the law. Nonetheless, it is encouraging
that independent groups, despite harassment, were able to gather,
garner supporters, and attract public attention.
Interestingly, Presidential Administration deputy press spokesman
Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that the police response to last month's
protests merits review, and St. Petersburg Governor Matviyenko and
the Russian Federation's Human Rights Ombudsman, Vladimir Lukin, have
both called for investigations. In his annual report on human rights
in Russia, presented April 24 to the Duma and May 4 to the Federation
Council, Ombudsman Lukin reiterated that his office had received and
would investigate increased numbers of citizens' complaints about
government obstacles to holding rallies.
President Putin's own chairperson of the Civil Society Institution
and Human Rights Council, Ella Pamfilova, has said that Interior
Minister Nurgaliyev should resign in connection with the police
break-up of those demonstrations. Such calls indicate that, even
within official Russia, views differ on human rights.
We are likewise concerned about the increasingly narrow and
controlled space within which Russian NGOs are forced to operate, and
continue to monitor the implementation of the new NGO law enacted in
April 2006. The record is mixed thus far. While the process for
re-registration of foreign NGOs was cumbersome, and require paperwork
and reporting requirements that many Russian and foreign NGOs find
onerous, the fact remains that the vast majority of foreign NGOs did
succeed in re-registering, although some suffered disruptions in the
continuity of their program operations. We are also heartened by the
ability of some NGOs to effect change in the law, as when religious
groups, concerned that the reporting requirements could be construed
to require listing congregants or accounting for collections among
the faithful, successfully lobbied the Kremlin to exempt
ecclesiastical organizations from those rules.
The increasing pressure on Russian journalists is likewise troubling.
Vigorous and investigatory media independent of officialdom are
essential to dynamic, healthy processes in all democracies. In Russia
today, unfortunately, most national television networks media-the
primary source of news for most Russians --are in government hands or
the hands of individuals and entities allied with the Kremlin. The
growing agglomeration of print media in the hands of government
officials or those allied with them likewise undercuts press freedom.
Attacks on journalists, including the brutal and still unsolved
murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya, among others, chill
and deter the fourth estate. Self-censorship remains a growing
problem. Some space for free discussion remains, particularly on the
Internet, as the vigorous and sometimes sympathetic coverage in the
print media of recent opposition marches indicates, but it still
appears to be shrinking.
Ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections, the Kremlin is
bringing its full weight to bear in shaping the legal and social
environment to preclude a level playing field. There have been many
instances in which the authorities have used electoral laws
selectively to the advantage of pro-Kremlin forces or to hamstring
opposition forces. The refusal to re-register Yabloko in St.
Petersburg and difficulties encountered by other parties, appear to
have been based on political instructions, rather than an objective
judgment of whether these parties met registration requirements.
Last year, the Duma enacted amendments to the criminal and
administrative codes redefining "extremism" so broadly and vaguely as
to provide a potent weapon to wield against and intimidate opponents;
greater self-censorship appears to be a major goal in this effort. We
note, for example, that Dissenters' March leader Garry Kasparov has
already been questioned by the FSB in its investigation into
"extremist" activity. Even the most cursory analysis of Russian
national broadcast media shows news reporting skewed decisively in
favor of Kremlin-approved parties and groups.
Against this background, the U.S. and its European Allies and friends
continue to support Russian democracy and civil society. These issues
are regular parts of our bilateral and multilateral consultations.
President Bush, when he was in St. Petersburg last summer, hosted an
event with NGO and civil society leaders, sending a powerful message
of American support and solidarity. Just last week, the Secretary
took part in Moscow in a roundtable discussion with leaders of civil
society and other figures. She also has regularly and candidly
articulated our concerns with Russia's leadership, as she did last
week. The Secretary, my colleague Assistant Secretary Lowenkron of
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and I have
participated in NGO events in Russia to showcase our support for
independent media and civil society. The OSCE also remains an
important forum for the United States and others to remind Russia
that its commitments to democracy and human rights are not just
"internal matters," but commitments that all State Parties to the
Helsinki Final Act have undertaken to observe and protect.
Russia's relations with its neighbors and with Europe remain an issue
of considerable concern. Moscow often still approaches its neighbors
with a zero-sum mentality, particularly when it comes to those
countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, which choose to pursue closer
Euro-Atlantic ties. We and European countries have spoken out against
Russia's use of energy to apply political and/or economic pressure on
neighbors, such as in the case of Ukraine in 2006. We are concerned
by apparently political interference with infrastructures, as in the
case of claimed structural deficiencies that restricted traffic on a
bridge to Estonia this month, prolonged "repairs" to an oil pipeline
to Lithuania, or the closing of Russia's only legal border crossing
with Georgia last year.
Russian-Georgian relations, after a period of extreme tension, have
shown tentative signs of limited improvement, but Moscow could do
much more to normalize relations. Russia maintains the economic and
transportation sanctions it imposed against Georgia last fall.
Likewise, it continues to take actions that call into question its
professed support for Georgia's territorial integrity by supporting
separatist regimes in Georgia's South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions;
it provides the same support to the separatist regime in Moldova's
Transnistria region. The United States continues to call on Russia to
end these policies and work with our European partners to implement
confidence-building measures designed to bring the sides in each
conflict closer together. At the same time, we encourage Russia to
play a more constructive role and to use its influence with the
separatists to advance a peaceful resolution of each conflict in
Georgia. The United States has had productive high-level discussions
with Russia on these issues. Russia recently sent officials to
Tbilisi to discuss reducing tensions in South Ossetia, and publicly
scolded South Ossetian de facto authorities for violations of
existing agreements. We have also encouraged both sides to ameliorate
their relationship and understand that Russian and Georgian officials
are scheduled to meet soon for this purpose.
The United States is also working to advance a resolution in the
separatist conflict in Moldova's Transnistria region. The United
States and EU are official observers at the 5 + 2 Talks, negotiations
that have been at an impasse for more than a year because of the
Transnistrian side's unwillingness to engage. The Russian and
Moldovan governments have recently called for a resumption of the 5 +
2 process, although Russia has to date failed to use its heft to
bring the Transnistrians back to the negotiating table, and we hope
that all parties will engage seriously. Russia's recent statements
calling for resumption of the 5 + 2 process have also made mention of
the principle of Moldova's territorial integrity. Finally, despite
promises by President Putin himself last fall that the ban against
Moldovan wine and agricultural goods would be lifted, the ban is
still in place.
On one separatist conflict, in Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States
and Russia work well together in trying to facilitate a resolution.
Together with OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair country counterparts from
Russia and France, I traveled to the region last spring to push the
peace process forward by presenting to the Presidents of Azerbaijan
and Armenia a set of proposed basic principles for the peaceful
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These principles remain
the centerpiece of negotiations between the two sides even today.
While recognizing that the burden for resolving the conflict lies
with Armenia and Azerbaijan, we nevertheless continue to show that
the United States and Russia can work together to facilitate a peace
process that could bring greater stability and security to the South
Caucasus, which is in our mutual best interest.
We regret Russia's so far hostile attitude toward U.S. plans for
placing elements of a limited missile defense system in Poland and
the Czech Republic (intended to shield the United States and its
European allies against missile threats from the Middle East) and
President Putin's announcement on April 26 that Russia would consider
a moratorium on implementation of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe.
We have held numerous briefings and consultations with Russia on our
missile defense plans for more than a year (both bilaterally and in
the NATO-Russia Council), and geography and geometry both demonstrate
that the very modest system proposed in Poland and the Czech Republic
poses no threat whatsoever to Russia. Speaking at the NATO
Ministerial in Oslo April 26, Secretary Rice described as "purely
ludicrous" the idea that somehow 10 interceptors and a few radars in
Eastern Europe are going to threaten Russia. We and the Russians
simply do not agree here, but we will continue to work to reach a
better understanding between our two countries on this important
issue. Both the State and Defense Departments, including Secretaries
Rice and Gates, have briefed Russia on our missile defense plans for
more than eighteen months. We have kept-and will continue to
keep-Russia fully informed about those plans. We are committed, as we
have been in the past, to consulting with Russia and being
transparent with it about missile defense. We have offered to
cooperate with Russia across the full spectrum of missile defense
activities, an offer that the Russians themselves have described as
"serious," and that offer remains on the table. But Russia does not
have a veto over our missile defense plans.
Regarding the Adapted CFE Treaty, it isn't clear to us exactly what
Russia's concerns are. The Russians have made it clear that they want
NATO Allies to ratify the Adapted Treaty, among other reasons because
they would like some of our new NATO members, particularly the Baltic
states, to be able to join. The United States and its NATO Allies are
prepared to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty after Russia fulfills its
outstanding Istanbul Commitments, dating from 1999, in Moldova and
Georgia. Under the provisions of the adapted CFE treaty signed in
Istanbul in 1999, Russia made three sets of commitments. First, it
pledged to reduce its forces in the CFE flank area to the level
specified by the Adapted Treaty, and has done so. Second, there's
been important progress in Georgia, where the commitments are almost
fulfilled, except for the need for Russia to reach agreement with
Georgia on the status or withdrawal of the Russian presence at the
Gudauta base. On the third set of commitments, concerning Moldova,
Russian forces were supposed to have been withdrawn by the end of
2002; that deadline was extended by agreement of the OSCE to the end
of 2003. In fact, there has been a stalemate on Russian withdrawal
since early 2004. Russian forces, some designated as peacekeepers,
remain in the separatist area of Transnistria, along with some 20,000
tons of stored munitions. Moldova wants all Russian munitions and
forces, including the peacekeeping force (PKF), to be withdrawn.
However, Moldovan authorities have said that they would be willing to
accept Russian participation in a genuinely multinational PKF, under
an OSCE umbrella. We are urging Russia and others to negotiate
seriously on a transformed PKF. A decision to field such a force
would be a major step toward solving this conflict and toward
fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments.
Russia has made dramatic economic gains over the past few years. We
welcome Russia's economic revival, particularly after difficult
economic transitions in the 1990s. Prosperity and peace is in
everyone's interests. We welcome Russia's economic revitalization,
but are concerned that this revival is built upon certain
vulnerabilities: Russia's wealth remains more value-extracted than
value-added. Russia's economic gains have fueled a certain bravado in
Russia's external agenda. But those gains are also fostering the
growth of a nascent middle class whose emergence, over time, we hope
will bring with it modern political reforms, including greater
accountability and governmental responsiveness. The United States
supports Russia's integration into rules-based international
organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, consonant with
Russia's commitment to those organizations' principles. An important
step towards Russia's integration into the norms of the global
economy was reached last fall with the closure of the U.S.-Russia
bilateral WTO agreement -- arguably the biggest single step forward
in our economic relationship in the past decade. While not a miracle
cure for either of us, it very much serves the interest of both our
countries.
The range of both U.S. and Russian interests are clearly global.
Given that reach, it is imperative that both our countries seek to
work together wherever possible, even when such cooperation may prove
challenging. At the same time, we are committed to defending our
principles, pushing back wherever we must. U.S.-Russia relations
require ongoing dialogue. As I mentioned, Secretary Rice just
completed a good visit to Moscow last week, and the President will
meet with President Putin during the G8 Summit in Germany in June.
This and other opportunities in the coming months will provide
important moments to try to narrow our differences on issues that
matter to us while pressing forward on elements of our constructive
engagement with Russia as well.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I am grateful for the
opportunity to speak before you today, and look forward to your
questions.
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/85479.htm