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RESOLVING THE KURDISH DILEMMA
By Edward P. Joseph And Michael E. O'Hanlon
Wall Street Journal
Nov 2 2007
As President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prepare for
next week's crucial meetings with Turkey's leaders about the attacks
by Kurdish PKK rebels, they should look beyond crisis management
to deal with the wider Turkish-Kurdish agenda. If they do, it is
possible that the political stalemate within Iraq can begin to be
broken as well. Broadening the agenda could make diplomacy easier.
Iraq's responsible Kurdish establishment is appealing to Washington
for support. Kurdish leaders like Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister
Barham Salih see the U.S. as the indispensable player in resolving
the crisis. Turkey has put aside anger over a recent Congressional
resolution on the Armenian genocide; it also looks to Washington to
advance its legitimate demand that the PKK threat in northern Iraq
be dealt with once and for all.
The problem is that, while Washington is relevant politically, it
will be tough to broker a deal that will meet Turkish expectations.
The momentum in Turkey towards a decisive military confrontation is
strong. So is the resistance in the Kurdish region of Iraq towards a
crackdown on the PKK, which is popular among Kurds along both sides
of the border.
Mr. Bush and Ms. Rice may be tempted to simply soothe tempers and
focus on the PKK problem. But all indications are that won't solve
much. And a Turkish invasion, even if limited to the Qandil Mountain
stronghold of the PKK, could have disastrous consequences. It would
destabilize the most successful part of Iraq and further solidify
Kurdish nationalism -- rendering compromise over the flashpoint,
oil-rich town of Kirkuk even more difficult.
Averting crisis in Kurdistan requires dealing with the three most
neuralgic issues: the PKK, oil and Kirkuk. Turkey sees Kurdish control
of Kirkuk and its oil as the precursor to a Kurdistan independent from
Iraq, which could in turn lead to the violent breakaway of Turkey's
Kurdish region. Iraqi Kurds see Kirkuk as an inalienable piece of
Kurdish patrimony and a source of revenue-producing oil and gas. A
comprehensive deal will take some time to negotiate. But a signal from
Washington to finally deal with all these issues, and make tradeoffs
across all three, could be the key to defusing the current crisis.
Instead of simply delaying resolution of Kirkuk, as Washington has
asked the Kurds to do so far, the U.S. should table creative options
like giving the town a "special status" under the Iraqi constitution.
The constitution's wide federalism provisions permit making Kirkuk
its own region, while at the same time guaranteeing full power-sharing
and property rights for its Turkomen, Arab and other minorities.
While not achieving maximal Kurdish aspirations to reclaim all of
Kirkuk under their control, a special status would advance much of
the Kurdish agenda without crossing Turkish red lines. It would also
stimulate much-needed dialogue with Kirkuk's sizeable non-Kurdish
minority, roughly 40% of the population.
As for oil, the Kurds have been a major obstacle to a comprehensive
package on production and revenue-sharing necessary for a political
settlement in Iraq as a whole. In July, a breakthrough seemed close,
but fell apart largely over Kurdish concerns about their autonomy to
enter into contracts unfettered by Baghdad. Likewise, the question
of whether Kirkuk's oil and gas is from "current fields" (subject to
sharing with others in Iraq) or "new fields" (possibly exempt from
the same kind of sharing) is another nettlesome question that has so
far defied resolution.
Up to now, Kurdish leaders have adroitly played their role as
"kingmaker" in Baghdad -- helping determine which Shiite leader
governs Iraq in exchange for freedom to assert their demands on
oil and Kirkuk. Now, these same Kurdish leaders, facing their most
serious crisis since the U.S. invasion in 2003, might be more willing
to listen to creative, carefully crafted proposals from Washington.
An oil deal addressing Kurdish concerns about interference from
Baghdad, while providing firm guarantees about production and revenue
sharing, is certainly possible. And a breakthrough on oil could
advance discussions on the other political questions. Progress on
Kirkuk might make possible a badly needed conversation in Baghdad on
political arrangements to accommodate the concerns of the capital's
mixed populations (such as helping people to relocate safely if they
feel the need), while acknowledging the reality, as seen in Kirkuk,
that the country's demographics have been altered by war.
Mr. Joseph is visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies. Mr. O'Hanlon directs the "Opportunity 08
Project" at the Brookings Institution.
By Edward P. Joseph And Michael E. O'Hanlon
Wall Street Journal
Nov 2 2007
As President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prepare for
next week's crucial meetings with Turkey's leaders about the attacks
by Kurdish PKK rebels, they should look beyond crisis management
to deal with the wider Turkish-Kurdish agenda. If they do, it is
possible that the political stalemate within Iraq can begin to be
broken as well. Broadening the agenda could make diplomacy easier.
Iraq's responsible Kurdish establishment is appealing to Washington
for support. Kurdish leaders like Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister
Barham Salih see the U.S. as the indispensable player in resolving
the crisis. Turkey has put aside anger over a recent Congressional
resolution on the Armenian genocide; it also looks to Washington to
advance its legitimate demand that the PKK threat in northern Iraq
be dealt with once and for all.
The problem is that, while Washington is relevant politically, it
will be tough to broker a deal that will meet Turkish expectations.
The momentum in Turkey towards a decisive military confrontation is
strong. So is the resistance in the Kurdish region of Iraq towards a
crackdown on the PKK, which is popular among Kurds along both sides
of the border.
Mr. Bush and Ms. Rice may be tempted to simply soothe tempers and
focus on the PKK problem. But all indications are that won't solve
much. And a Turkish invasion, even if limited to the Qandil Mountain
stronghold of the PKK, could have disastrous consequences. It would
destabilize the most successful part of Iraq and further solidify
Kurdish nationalism -- rendering compromise over the flashpoint,
oil-rich town of Kirkuk even more difficult.
Averting crisis in Kurdistan requires dealing with the three most
neuralgic issues: the PKK, oil and Kirkuk. Turkey sees Kurdish control
of Kirkuk and its oil as the precursor to a Kurdistan independent from
Iraq, which could in turn lead to the violent breakaway of Turkey's
Kurdish region. Iraqi Kurds see Kirkuk as an inalienable piece of
Kurdish patrimony and a source of revenue-producing oil and gas. A
comprehensive deal will take some time to negotiate. But a signal from
Washington to finally deal with all these issues, and make tradeoffs
across all three, could be the key to defusing the current crisis.
Instead of simply delaying resolution of Kirkuk, as Washington has
asked the Kurds to do so far, the U.S. should table creative options
like giving the town a "special status" under the Iraqi constitution.
The constitution's wide federalism provisions permit making Kirkuk
its own region, while at the same time guaranteeing full power-sharing
and property rights for its Turkomen, Arab and other minorities.
While not achieving maximal Kurdish aspirations to reclaim all of
Kirkuk under their control, a special status would advance much of
the Kurdish agenda without crossing Turkish red lines. It would also
stimulate much-needed dialogue with Kirkuk's sizeable non-Kurdish
minority, roughly 40% of the population.
As for oil, the Kurds have been a major obstacle to a comprehensive
package on production and revenue-sharing necessary for a political
settlement in Iraq as a whole. In July, a breakthrough seemed close,
but fell apart largely over Kurdish concerns about their autonomy to
enter into contracts unfettered by Baghdad. Likewise, the question
of whether Kirkuk's oil and gas is from "current fields" (subject to
sharing with others in Iraq) or "new fields" (possibly exempt from
the same kind of sharing) is another nettlesome question that has so
far defied resolution.
Up to now, Kurdish leaders have adroitly played their role as
"kingmaker" in Baghdad -- helping determine which Shiite leader
governs Iraq in exchange for freedom to assert their demands on
oil and Kirkuk. Now, these same Kurdish leaders, facing their most
serious crisis since the U.S. invasion in 2003, might be more willing
to listen to creative, carefully crafted proposals from Washington.
An oil deal addressing Kurdish concerns about interference from
Baghdad, while providing firm guarantees about production and revenue
sharing, is certainly possible. And a breakthrough on oil could
advance discussions on the other political questions. Progress on
Kirkuk might make possible a badly needed conversation in Baghdad on
political arrangements to accommodate the concerns of the capital's
mixed populations (such as helping people to relocate safely if they
feel the need), while acknowledging the reality, as seen in Kirkuk,
that the country's demographics have been altered by war.
Mr. Joseph is visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies. Mr. O'Hanlon directs the "Opportunity 08
Project" at the Brookings Institution.