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PROVISION TO TURKEY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ON PKK HIGHLIGHTS POLICY SHIFT
By Frank Hyland
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/articl e.php?articleid=2373766
November 6, 2007
The 2007 edition of the annual offensive of the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK) against Turkey has displayed the group's adaptability and
its tenacity. It has included a multi-front strategy, with both urban
terrorist-style attacks in cities such as Istanbul (Terrorism Focus,
October 10) and the more traditional small-unit guerrilla operations
in southeast Turkey. The guerrilla tactics this year, however,
encompassed an increase in the use of improvised explosive devices
that resulted in an upsurge in Turkish casualties (Terrorism Focus,
June 26). In just one battle on October 21, more than a dozen Turkish
troops were killed, 17 wounded and eight more captured and taken back
to the PKK's Iraqi mountain redoubt (Hurriyet, October 22). After
initially limiting its response to cautioning Turkey not to invade
northern Iraq / Kurdistan, U.S. policy shifted and the United States
is now providing Turkey with intelligence data on the PKK presence.
Stung by the continuing stream of casualties in higher numbers,
Turkey engaged in a very intense public campaign on a worldwide basis,
including threats to invade Iraqi territory. Turkey also expressed
its outrage at the consideration of a U.S. Congressional Resolution
recognizing an alleged genocide campaign against Armenians by Ottoman
Turks in the early 20th Century. The combination of these factors,
according to Turkey, would severely damage U.S.-Turkish relations.
The damage, primarily to the U.S. military effort in neighboring Iraq,
could include decreased access to airfields and roads, according to
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (AP, October 10). A Pentagon press
briefing on October 26 by the senior U.S. military official in Northern
Iraq, Major General Benjamin Mixon, did little to assuage Turkish
fears. In response to a question about his plans vis-a-vis the PKK,
General Mixon said that he was planning to do "absolutely nothing" to
counter PKK activities in Northern Iraq because he had "not been given
any requirements" to do so by higher authorities (www.defenselink.mil,
October 26). Simultaneously, though, Washington stated publicly
that it was willing to provide "actionable intelligence" to Turkey
in countering the PKK (Turkishpress.com, October 23). Subsequently,
in a November 2 news conference in Ankara, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stated that Washington was already providing
actionable intelligence to Turkey on PKK facilities. Working with
the Northern Iraqi provincial government, Secretary Rice said that
the number of Turkish-Iraqi border passes has been reduced in an
effort to provide more control over the movement of PKK commandos
(Asia Times, November 6).
The exchange of intelligence information with other nations, especially
in the field of counter-terrorism and with long-time NATO allies, comes
as no surprise. In the case of the PKK, for example, its founder and
long-time leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in Nairobi, Kenya,
in 1999 as a result of intelligence provided to Turkey by a number of
other nations (www.kurdistan.org, quoting CovertAction Quarterly, Fall
2002). The very public announcement of the provision of intelligence
information, however, coming as it does in the midst of an accelerated
diplomatic campaign including even the U.S. Secretary of State,
signals a shift in U.S. policy.
The signal is intended, of course, to allay the concerns of Turkey;
it also is intended to deliver a message to the PKK that it can no
longer enjoy the sanctuary of the Qandil Mountains and that its bases
are under near-constant watch. Intelligence-producing assets in the
Iraq Theater of Operations include unmanned aerial vehicles with the
capability to linger over any target, undetected, for extended periods
of time. A concentration of PKK guerrillas, for example, would then
be an easy target for Turkish aircraft and even artillery fire.
The PKK's hit-and-run attacks have obviously been troublesome for
the Turkish army to combat this year, as shown in the higher numbers
of Turkish casualties. Turkey has responded by sending additional
troops and paramilitary units to the border area and by enhancing the
training of those deployed. The addition of more detailed intelligence
on PKK presence and movements--and its provision to Turkey in
near-real-time--will enhance Turkey's operations. The effects may
not be noticeable until the spring of 2008 because the PKK ingress
and egress routes, as usual, will be virtually impassable until then.
By Frank Hyland
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/articl e.php?articleid=2373766
November 6, 2007
The 2007 edition of the annual offensive of the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK) against Turkey has displayed the group's adaptability and
its tenacity. It has included a multi-front strategy, with both urban
terrorist-style attacks in cities such as Istanbul (Terrorism Focus,
October 10) and the more traditional small-unit guerrilla operations
in southeast Turkey. The guerrilla tactics this year, however,
encompassed an increase in the use of improvised explosive devices
that resulted in an upsurge in Turkish casualties (Terrorism Focus,
June 26). In just one battle on October 21, more than a dozen Turkish
troops were killed, 17 wounded and eight more captured and taken back
to the PKK's Iraqi mountain redoubt (Hurriyet, October 22). After
initially limiting its response to cautioning Turkey not to invade
northern Iraq / Kurdistan, U.S. policy shifted and the United States
is now providing Turkey with intelligence data on the PKK presence.
Stung by the continuing stream of casualties in higher numbers,
Turkey engaged in a very intense public campaign on a worldwide basis,
including threats to invade Iraqi territory. Turkey also expressed
its outrage at the consideration of a U.S. Congressional Resolution
recognizing an alleged genocide campaign against Armenians by Ottoman
Turks in the early 20th Century. The combination of these factors,
according to Turkey, would severely damage U.S.-Turkish relations.
The damage, primarily to the U.S. military effort in neighboring Iraq,
could include decreased access to airfields and roads, according to
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (AP, October 10). A Pentagon press
briefing on October 26 by the senior U.S. military official in Northern
Iraq, Major General Benjamin Mixon, did little to assuage Turkish
fears. In response to a question about his plans vis-a-vis the PKK,
General Mixon said that he was planning to do "absolutely nothing" to
counter PKK activities in Northern Iraq because he had "not been given
any requirements" to do so by higher authorities (www.defenselink.mil,
October 26). Simultaneously, though, Washington stated publicly
that it was willing to provide "actionable intelligence" to Turkey
in countering the PKK (Turkishpress.com, October 23). Subsequently,
in a November 2 news conference in Ankara, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stated that Washington was already providing
actionable intelligence to Turkey on PKK facilities. Working with
the Northern Iraqi provincial government, Secretary Rice said that
the number of Turkish-Iraqi border passes has been reduced in an
effort to provide more control over the movement of PKK commandos
(Asia Times, November 6).
The exchange of intelligence information with other nations, especially
in the field of counter-terrorism and with long-time NATO allies, comes
as no surprise. In the case of the PKK, for example, its founder and
long-time leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in Nairobi, Kenya,
in 1999 as a result of intelligence provided to Turkey by a number of
other nations (www.kurdistan.org, quoting CovertAction Quarterly, Fall
2002). The very public announcement of the provision of intelligence
information, however, coming as it does in the midst of an accelerated
diplomatic campaign including even the U.S. Secretary of State,
signals a shift in U.S. policy.
The signal is intended, of course, to allay the concerns of Turkey;
it also is intended to deliver a message to the PKK that it can no
longer enjoy the sanctuary of the Qandil Mountains and that its bases
are under near-constant watch. Intelligence-producing assets in the
Iraq Theater of Operations include unmanned aerial vehicles with the
capability to linger over any target, undetected, for extended periods
of time. A concentration of PKK guerrillas, for example, would then
be an easy target for Turkish aircraft and even artillery fire.
The PKK's hit-and-run attacks have obviously been troublesome for
the Turkish army to combat this year, as shown in the higher numbers
of Turkish casualties. Turkey has responded by sending additional
troops and paramilitary units to the border area and by enhancing the
training of those deployed. The addition of more detailed intelligence
on PKK presence and movements--and its provision to Turkey in
near-real-time--will enhance Turkey's operations. The effects may
not be noticeable until the spring of 2008 because the PKK ingress
and egress routes, as usual, will be virtually impassable until then.