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LATEST PROGRESS REPORT ARRIVES AS EU-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP WANING
Mandy Kirby
Global Insight
November 7, 2007
The annual European Union assessment of Turkey repeats its calls for
reform, but is Turkey losing interest?
A difficult situation over the 2007 dual presidential and parliamentary
elections processes was dealt with well by the Turkish government of
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, although the European Union (EU)
has criticised military intervention into its democratic processes,
in its latest annual progress report. Since being elected for the
first time in 2002, Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) have been
associated with a reformist, EU-focused agenda, pushed off track
by election concerns. Now the time has come to move back to the
reform agenda, or Turkey risks being usurped by southern European
contenders. Already Croatia has overtaken Turkey and should achieve
membership around 2010, but Turkey risks seeing others slide in ahead,
with reports on other western Balkan countries also released yesterday
as well as the confirmation of Serbia's Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA).
Global Insight Perspective Significance The European Union (EU) has
called for reform progress to be stepped up in its tenth annual report
on Turkey, calling for a hiatus on almost two years of foot-dragging
and lack of progress in the official Accession Partnership.
Implications Despite calls for a wider debate by member-state France,
the report assumes that Turkey will pursue full membership rather
than any lesser alternative currently touted by some nervous at the
prospects of Turkish entry. The emphasis in any timetable though,
is on the medium-to-long term.
Outlook The report was clear that there is much to do for Turkey
to get back on track, after reform was wiped out by elections to
the parliament and presidency in 2007, and even IMF-mandated reforms
have stalled in parliament, such as the long-promised social security
reform. The damage in political relations between bloc members and
Turkey may leave bigger obstacles to surmount.
The EU carrot being dangled is the promise of two more negotiating
chapters being opened; consumer health and protection and Trans
European Networks (TENs). These relatively uncontroversial areas
sidestep the suspension of several chapters until some movement
on the Cyprus dispute. Turkey is no closer to moving towards the
opening of ports and airports and levelling trading relations with
the official government to a par with other member states. This
intransigence--argued on the basis that the island should reach a
settlement over its divide before such a deal is struck--has resulted
in eight key trade-related chapters being frozen until Turkey
conforms. Recently, Cyprus was angered by a co-operation document
between Turkey and the United Kingdom, which referred to the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by name, even though Turkey is the
only country recognising it as such. Cypriot relations with the United
Kingdom have worsened considerably, and Cyprus remains obstructive
to EU efforts to "end the isolation" of the North. It appears time
will only entrench the divide between the two halves of the island.
No Escaping Penal Code Reform
Even though by being accepted as a candidate state, Turkey is deemed to
have met all the political objectives required, the EU has criticised
human rights and minority treatment, as well as the implementation
of the controversial penal code and Article 301, which has been used
to target journalists, writers and other artists perceived to have
insulted "Turkishness". Without this being addressed, progress will
stall and yesterday Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn noted that no
chapters in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs would be opened until
action had been taken. The Turkish government has promised that it
will do so, but the timetable has slipped already to push the reform
into the major constitutional overhaul that will take up much of the
reform efforts in the coming year. Article 301 is the mere tip of
Turkish minority-rights issues, such as the treatment of religious
and ethnic minorities, though progress in human rights and women's
rights has been seen. The lack of independence in the judiciary is
also a concern, which the EU feels was highlighted by the behaviour
of the Constitutional Court during the presidential election crisis
earlier in 2007, resolved on a technicality.
New Hope for Progress?
The Foreign Ministry, now headed by chief EU negotiator Ali Babacan,
has pledged commitment to reform. Previously, while political relations
turned somewhat frosty with respective political institutions, on
a technical level, progress was good, smooth even, with Babacan at
the helm. Then he was simultaneously Economy Minister but managed
to juggle the roles with ease, and arguably now there is more logic
to his two roles, perhaps made easier by the scale of the landslide
re-election of Erdogan's AK party in July.
However, this may be a moot point. Turkey has visibly turned its
attention away from the EU, disillusioned by the obvious lack of
enthusiasm for its accession process; at the most optimistic of
estimates, the country will become a member in the middle of the next
decade, after the next EU financial perspectives have been agreed. In
essence, all discussions of Turkish membership outside of the EU
council of ministers are pointless until the next budget is debated.
Only then will it become clear whether Turkey is to be priced into
the 2013-2020 budget.
Instead, Turkey has looked to shape up relationships with its
regional peers. Disappointed also by a lack of co-operation with
the United States on combating terrorism, Turkey has looked at the
state of relations with countries such as Israel, generally speaking
a traditional ally, but with some wobbles of late, including over the
issue of a proposed U.S. bill to recognise as genocide the slaughter of
Armenians in 1915-1918 by Ottoman troops. Syria and Iran have become
much closer friends, promising further co-operation on fighting
terrorism. Always an issue of national import, it has become most
prominent on the agenda at present, and other concerns have largely
been swept aside until Turkey gains assurances from allies or takes
matters into its own hands. This has clouded its U.S. relations and
the Iraqi government has not proved itself strong enough to build
up relations. On the economic front, Turkey has had to address the
threat of cheaper labour from China, and has diversified its economy,
developing areas such as financial services and Islamic finance. The
large, youthful Turkish population and its economic potential should
be enormously attractive to the EU, but there is a very real risk
that Turkey will decide its future lies elsewhere. In the meantime,
it continues to pay lip-service to the quest of full EU membership,
much in the same way that the bloc does.
Outlook and Implications
The positive aspects emanating from the regular report are a renewed
commitment to full membership; the promise of new chapters being
opened; praise for Turkey's democratic performance during a trying
year; and the strong reform mandate which is available to the newly
re-elected Justice and Development government. The EU repeated
criticism of the high 10% parliamentary threshold which afforded AK
such a strong parliamentary majority, but which should be able to
address reform lag. Currently, only one negotiating chapter has been
nominally closed--science and research--and three of the 34 others
are in progress.
However, the tone of the report remains critical and the prospect of
membership so distant as to be blurry. Despite Babacan's assurances
of reform and the good technical relations, the politics of the
situation are pulling Turkey and the EU apart. Economically, both
sides can afford to maintain the status quo indefinitely, prolonging
the customs arrangement first agreed in 1995. The EU also knows it
can continue to find more areas for compliance, though dragging out
accession processes risks undermining the process, and may clash
with new debates on reform and enlargement in the bloc. It will make
economic sense to allow business to be as simple as possible with
a major trading partner. The chances are, though, that chances for
full membership are receding.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Mandy Kirby
Global Insight
November 7, 2007
The annual European Union assessment of Turkey repeats its calls for
reform, but is Turkey losing interest?
A difficult situation over the 2007 dual presidential and parliamentary
elections processes was dealt with well by the Turkish government of
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, although the European Union (EU)
has criticised military intervention into its democratic processes,
in its latest annual progress report. Since being elected for the
first time in 2002, Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) have been
associated with a reformist, EU-focused agenda, pushed off track
by election concerns. Now the time has come to move back to the
reform agenda, or Turkey risks being usurped by southern European
contenders. Already Croatia has overtaken Turkey and should achieve
membership around 2010, but Turkey risks seeing others slide in ahead,
with reports on other western Balkan countries also released yesterday
as well as the confirmation of Serbia's Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA).
Global Insight Perspective Significance The European Union (EU) has
called for reform progress to be stepped up in its tenth annual report
on Turkey, calling for a hiatus on almost two years of foot-dragging
and lack of progress in the official Accession Partnership.
Implications Despite calls for a wider debate by member-state France,
the report assumes that Turkey will pursue full membership rather
than any lesser alternative currently touted by some nervous at the
prospects of Turkish entry. The emphasis in any timetable though,
is on the medium-to-long term.
Outlook The report was clear that there is much to do for Turkey
to get back on track, after reform was wiped out by elections to
the parliament and presidency in 2007, and even IMF-mandated reforms
have stalled in parliament, such as the long-promised social security
reform. The damage in political relations between bloc members and
Turkey may leave bigger obstacles to surmount.
The EU carrot being dangled is the promise of two more negotiating
chapters being opened; consumer health and protection and Trans
European Networks (TENs). These relatively uncontroversial areas
sidestep the suspension of several chapters until some movement
on the Cyprus dispute. Turkey is no closer to moving towards the
opening of ports and airports and levelling trading relations with
the official government to a par with other member states. This
intransigence--argued on the basis that the island should reach a
settlement over its divide before such a deal is struck--has resulted
in eight key trade-related chapters being frozen until Turkey
conforms. Recently, Cyprus was angered by a co-operation document
between Turkey and the United Kingdom, which referred to the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by name, even though Turkey is the
only country recognising it as such. Cypriot relations with the United
Kingdom have worsened considerably, and Cyprus remains obstructive
to EU efforts to "end the isolation" of the North. It appears time
will only entrench the divide between the two halves of the island.
No Escaping Penal Code Reform
Even though by being accepted as a candidate state, Turkey is deemed to
have met all the political objectives required, the EU has criticised
human rights and minority treatment, as well as the implementation
of the controversial penal code and Article 301, which has been used
to target journalists, writers and other artists perceived to have
insulted "Turkishness". Without this being addressed, progress will
stall and yesterday Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn noted that no
chapters in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs would be opened until
action had been taken. The Turkish government has promised that it
will do so, but the timetable has slipped already to push the reform
into the major constitutional overhaul that will take up much of the
reform efforts in the coming year. Article 301 is the mere tip of
Turkish minority-rights issues, such as the treatment of religious
and ethnic minorities, though progress in human rights and women's
rights has been seen. The lack of independence in the judiciary is
also a concern, which the EU feels was highlighted by the behaviour
of the Constitutional Court during the presidential election crisis
earlier in 2007, resolved on a technicality.
New Hope for Progress?
The Foreign Ministry, now headed by chief EU negotiator Ali Babacan,
has pledged commitment to reform. Previously, while political relations
turned somewhat frosty with respective political institutions, on
a technical level, progress was good, smooth even, with Babacan at
the helm. Then he was simultaneously Economy Minister but managed
to juggle the roles with ease, and arguably now there is more logic
to his two roles, perhaps made easier by the scale of the landslide
re-election of Erdogan's AK party in July.
However, this may be a moot point. Turkey has visibly turned its
attention away from the EU, disillusioned by the obvious lack of
enthusiasm for its accession process; at the most optimistic of
estimates, the country will become a member in the middle of the next
decade, after the next EU financial perspectives have been agreed. In
essence, all discussions of Turkish membership outside of the EU
council of ministers are pointless until the next budget is debated.
Only then will it become clear whether Turkey is to be priced into
the 2013-2020 budget.
Instead, Turkey has looked to shape up relationships with its
regional peers. Disappointed also by a lack of co-operation with
the United States on combating terrorism, Turkey has looked at the
state of relations with countries such as Israel, generally speaking
a traditional ally, but with some wobbles of late, including over the
issue of a proposed U.S. bill to recognise as genocide the slaughter of
Armenians in 1915-1918 by Ottoman troops. Syria and Iran have become
much closer friends, promising further co-operation on fighting
terrorism. Always an issue of national import, it has become most
prominent on the agenda at present, and other concerns have largely
been swept aside until Turkey gains assurances from allies or takes
matters into its own hands. This has clouded its U.S. relations and
the Iraqi government has not proved itself strong enough to build
up relations. On the economic front, Turkey has had to address the
threat of cheaper labour from China, and has diversified its economy,
developing areas such as financial services and Islamic finance. The
large, youthful Turkish population and its economic potential should
be enormously attractive to the EU, but there is a very real risk
that Turkey will decide its future lies elsewhere. In the meantime,
it continues to pay lip-service to the quest of full EU membership,
much in the same way that the bloc does.
Outlook and Implications
The positive aspects emanating from the regular report are a renewed
commitment to full membership; the promise of new chapters being
opened; praise for Turkey's democratic performance during a trying
year; and the strong reform mandate which is available to the newly
re-elected Justice and Development government. The EU repeated
criticism of the high 10% parliamentary threshold which afforded AK
such a strong parliamentary majority, but which should be able to
address reform lag. Currently, only one negotiating chapter has been
nominally closed--science and research--and three of the 34 others
are in progress.
However, the tone of the report remains critical and the prospect of
membership so distant as to be blurry. Despite Babacan's assurances
of reform and the good technical relations, the politics of the
situation are pulling Turkey and the EU apart. Economically, both
sides can afford to maintain the status quo indefinitely, prolonging
the customs arrangement first agreed in 1995. The EU also knows it
can continue to find more areas for compliance, though dragging out
accession processes risks undermining the process, and may clash
with new debates on reform and enlargement in the bloc. It will make
economic sense to allow business to be as simple as possible with
a major trading partner. The chances are, though, that chances for
full membership are receding.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress