ISOLATION OF ARMENIA AT ANY PRICE IS MORALITY FOR RUSSIANS
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 27 2007
When the U.S. House brought up the issue of recognition of the
Genocide, the Russian politicians and experts reacted right away,
sending their emissaries to Armenia or addressing Armenians from
Moscow with judgments that the United States took that move out
of its own interests and aims rather than morality. In fact, one
needs not be Russian to understand this. Also it is not difficult to
understand why the Russians worry. There was fear that the Armenian
resolution would push Armenia to make its relations with the United
States warmer. Besides, there is danger that this process may bring
about certain tendencies in the Armenian and Turkish relations, namely
establishment of relations. Turkey may at least pretend taking certain
moves to temporize and undermine the U.S. House initiative.
Meanwhile, the improvement of the Armenian and Turkish relations is
not favorable for Russia. That is why the Russians recognized the
Armenian genocide in the early 1990's. And there was no crumb of
morality in it. Which is normal, by the way. It is abnormal that
for the Russians it is moral when they pursue their interests,
and when other states pursue their interests, the Russians think
they are self-interested. What was the interest of Russians to
recognize the Armenian genocide? In fact, the recognition delays the
Turkish-Armenian conciliation because after recognition Turkey has
no motivation for conciliation with Armenians. The vivid evidence to
this is that after the recognition by Russia and France the Armenian
and Turkish relations did not improve, and Turkey's stance toward
the recognition of the genocide did not become milder by at least one
millimeter. It means an increasing degree of independence of Armenia.
When the Armenian and Turkish relations improve, Armenia gains
certain independence in the sense that at least the degree of our
country's security increases. This degree is different in the case
of unsettled relations with Turkey and in the case of improvement of
these relations.
Meanwhile, a change in the security mode of Armenia automatically makes
the Russian military presence in Armenia unnecessary. Not immediately
but in the course of time. Along with the improvement of Armenian and
Turkish relations the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from
Armenia will start, which may take years but will be inevitable. For
its part, it will be the definitive withdrawal of Russia from the
Caucasus even though this country controls almost 90 percent of the
energy sector of Armenia, which is equal to military presence. However,
the economic expansion is also greatly determined by the fact that the
physical security of Armenia is guaranteed by Russia. In other words,
with our present economic capacity the Russian assistance is the only
way to maintain the military balance in the region. Meanwhile, if a
steady tendency of improvement of relations with Turkey appears, the
danger of resumption of the war in Karabakh will vanish. Consequently,
when our dependence on Russia in terms of security weakens, this
enables conducting an economic policy independent from Russia, based
on the interest of Armenia. Naturally, considering this prospect,
Russia cannot welcome any process that contains certain elements
of Armenian and Turkish dialogue deep inside. The vivid evidence to
this is the Russian and Georgian relation. It seems that Georgia is
causing tensions with foolish actions. In reality, those tensions
favor Russia because by cutting communication with Georgia it pushes
this country to look for ways out in cooperation with Turkey and
Azerbaijan, which leads to such projects as Kars-Akhalkalaki. Such
projects increase the isolation of Armenia from the world, in other
words, the dependence of Armenia on Russia.
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 27 2007
When the U.S. House brought up the issue of recognition of the
Genocide, the Russian politicians and experts reacted right away,
sending their emissaries to Armenia or addressing Armenians from
Moscow with judgments that the United States took that move out
of its own interests and aims rather than morality. In fact, one
needs not be Russian to understand this. Also it is not difficult to
understand why the Russians worry. There was fear that the Armenian
resolution would push Armenia to make its relations with the United
States warmer. Besides, there is danger that this process may bring
about certain tendencies in the Armenian and Turkish relations, namely
establishment of relations. Turkey may at least pretend taking certain
moves to temporize and undermine the U.S. House initiative.
Meanwhile, the improvement of the Armenian and Turkish relations is
not favorable for Russia. That is why the Russians recognized the
Armenian genocide in the early 1990's. And there was no crumb of
morality in it. Which is normal, by the way. It is abnormal that
for the Russians it is moral when they pursue their interests,
and when other states pursue their interests, the Russians think
they are self-interested. What was the interest of Russians to
recognize the Armenian genocide? In fact, the recognition delays the
Turkish-Armenian conciliation because after recognition Turkey has
no motivation for conciliation with Armenians. The vivid evidence to
this is that after the recognition by Russia and France the Armenian
and Turkish relations did not improve, and Turkey's stance toward
the recognition of the genocide did not become milder by at least one
millimeter. It means an increasing degree of independence of Armenia.
When the Armenian and Turkish relations improve, Armenia gains
certain independence in the sense that at least the degree of our
country's security increases. This degree is different in the case
of unsettled relations with Turkey and in the case of improvement of
these relations.
Meanwhile, a change in the security mode of Armenia automatically makes
the Russian military presence in Armenia unnecessary. Not immediately
but in the course of time. Along with the improvement of Armenian and
Turkish relations the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from
Armenia will start, which may take years but will be inevitable. For
its part, it will be the definitive withdrawal of Russia from the
Caucasus even though this country controls almost 90 percent of the
energy sector of Armenia, which is equal to military presence. However,
the economic expansion is also greatly determined by the fact that the
physical security of Armenia is guaranteed by Russia. In other words,
with our present economic capacity the Russian assistance is the only
way to maintain the military balance in the region. Meanwhile, if a
steady tendency of improvement of relations with Turkey appears, the
danger of resumption of the war in Karabakh will vanish. Consequently,
when our dependence on Russia in terms of security weakens, this
enables conducting an economic policy independent from Russia, based
on the interest of Armenia. Naturally, considering this prospect,
Russia cannot welcome any process that contains certain elements
of Armenian and Turkish dialogue deep inside. The vivid evidence to
this is the Russian and Georgian relation. It seems that Georgia is
causing tensions with foolish actions. In reality, those tensions
favor Russia because by cutting communication with Georgia it pushes
this country to look for ways out in cooperation with Turkey and
Azerbaijan, which leads to such projects as Kars-Akhalkalaki. Such
projects increase the isolation of Armenia from the world, in other
words, the dependence of Armenia on Russia.
