Tweet
THE GEOPOLITICAL WHIRLPOOL OF THE CAUCASUS
by Oleg Gorupai, translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Krasnaya Zvezda
October 8, 2007 Monday
Russia
HIGHLIGHT: Russia and the South Caucasus: resisting the West's
encroachment; Ensuring security in the Russian Caucasus is
inconceivable without, and inseparable from, stability in Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This is precisely why Russia has taken on
the burden of geopolitical leadership in the South Caucasus ever
since the break-up of the USSR.
The South Caucasus never ceases to surprise the international
community, keeping it on its toes with intermittent bursts of
adrenaline. The latest events in Georgia; regular declarations
from Azeri politicians about possibly using force to sort out
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem; Armenia's emphasis on enhancing its
defence capacities - all this certainly indicates that the region's
military-political situation is complicated and deteriorating. The
militarization of the Caucasus has reached a critical peak. The
combined military budget of these three Trans-Caucasus countries now
amounts to over $1.5 billion a year!
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) and the London Institue for War and Peace, the military budgets
of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are growing steadily: faster than
defense spending in most other countries, and much faster than their
GDP growth rates (up to 40 times faster). As at mid-2007, Georgia's
military budget for this year was $303 million, Armenia's was $264
million, and Azerbaijan's was over $900 million. There are 75 tanks
and 85 artillery pieces per million residents of the South Caucasus:
higher than the equivalent figures for Turkey or Iran. The present-day
Caucasus has become one of the world's most militarized regions. The
independent states of the South Caucasus possess military arsenals
comparable to those of the average European country. The Armed Forces
of Azerbaijan have 70,000 personnel, the Armenian Armed Forces have
45,000, and Georgia's troop strength in 2006 peaked at 31,878.
Aside from the military arsenals of these three
internationally-recognized states, there are also the military
machines of three unrecognized formations - entirely comparable to
those of the recognized states. The Armed Forces of Abkhazia have
5,000 personnel, and South Ossetia has 3,000. In terms of firepower,
the armed forces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are practically equal to
Georgia. Georgia has 80-100 tanks; Abkhazia has 100 and South Ossetia
has 87. Heavy artillery numbers (over 122 millimeters) are 117, 237,
and 95 respectively.
The Georgian government has almost doubled defense spending for 2007
recently: from 513 million lari ($303 million) to 957 million lari
($566 million); in late September, the Georgian parliament approved
the government's proposal for a substantial increase (over 25%)
in the military budget for 2008. Tbilisi's military spending will
rise to $723 million next year. The Georgian government has noted
that among the reasons for the additional spending is the aim of
accelerating military reforms required for Georgia to join NATO.
Azerbaijan's military budget has grown from $146 million in 2004 to
almost $1 billion this year. Armenia's defense spending has increased
by 350% as compared to 2000 (Armenia allocated almost $150 million
for defense in 2006 and almost $264 million this year); Azerbaijan's
defense spending has risen eight-fold; Georgia's defense spending has
risen ten-fold (at the start of 2006, it was only $77 million). It's
worth noting that the Trans-Caucasus countries have seen a surge in
military spending in the course of 2006 and 2007.
These facts are inevitably a source of concern for Russia and
its partners in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), especially given the obvious imbalance of forces among the
Trans-Caucasus states (Armenia looks very modest compared to its
neighbors). The situation developing within the CSTO's activity zone
was considered at a meeting of the CSTO secretaries in mid-September.
After the meeting, CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha noted
that the meeting also considered "the militant statements made by
representatives of certain states, indicating a wish to resolve some
frozen conflicts by military means, along with escalating military
activity and the growing military budgets and troop strength in
Georgia and Azerbaijan." As Bordyuzha pointed out, all this could
become a factor of "instability and threats for CSTO member states."
Clearly, the region is witnessing a dangerous increase of activity.
Governments, defense ministries, and analysts all over the world are
paying closer attention to this region. The main reason for that is
Washington's persistent policy course of destabilizing the situation
in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. With the Iran crisis highly
likely to escalate into an armed conflict, the Trans-Caucasus would
be in dangerous proximity to the theater of war. Most importantly,
the architects of global politics regard the Iran problem as leverage
for far-reaching long-term transformations in the so-called Greater
Middle East: in effect, the Americanization of this region. In their
view, the South Caucasus should not be an obstacle to these plans
(at least); it might even facilitate them (at most).
Washington will not abandon its plans to restructure the Caucasus.
The chief objectives of the United States and its NATO allies remain
unchanged: integrating the three Trans-Caucasus states into the
Euro-Atlantic community, and expelling Russia from the region.
However, European Union membership for the South Caucasus countries
isn't even a hypothetical possibility; the chief instrument for their
Euro-Atlantic integration is supposed to be the NATO military bloc.
In Washington's view, the Caucasus should be the next stage in NATO
expansion - and the best possible option is believed to be simultaneous
accession to NATO for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
At NATO's Istanbul summit in 204, the South Caucasus region was
included among NATO's priority zones. NATO's cooperation with
countries in this region is based on Individual Partnership Action
Plans (IPAPs). In 2004, the Armenian prime minister established an
inter-departmental commission for coordinating the implementation
of Armenia's IPAP with NATO. Georgia's IPAP was adopted in 2003;
Azerbaijan's IPAP was adopted in May 2005. The United States is
using political and financial support for countries in this region to
restrict Russia's role and gradually push Russia out of the Caucasus.
Over the past 12 years, the Americans have provided around $1.3
billion worth of aid to Georgia - including military aid. According
to Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment for Russia and the CIS,
the Americans spent $64 million on the Train and Equip program in
2002-04. Georgia received a total of $98 million in US military
aid during that time. That sum raised Georgia to 20th place in the
ranking of Washington's foreign partners. In the previous three
years, Georgia had received only $18 million from the United States,
ranking 41st among US aid recipients. These figures are taken from the
"Collateral Damage" report released by the Center for Public Integrity,
based on a year of investigative journalism. Another American program,
Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations (under way since 2005),
has cost $60 million. Moreover, the United States is also providing
aid under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International
Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. In 2005, the FMF and
IMET programs provided Georgia with $11.9 million and $1.4 million
respectively (funding is supposed to be maintained at 2005 levels in
2006 and 2007). Washington provided Georgia with a total of around
$74 million in military aid in 2005: more than double the American
funding Georgia received in 2004 ($30 million).
The Pentagon is also intensively arming Azerbaijan. This is indicated
in a report from the Center for Defense Information: Baku has received
$14 million worth of arms from the United States in recent years. "The
United States uses arms sales as a reward for its allies in the war on
terror," says the report. It also notes that Azerbaijan has received
over $27 million in military aid from Washington in the past five
years. The US budget for 2007 and 2008 includes further military aid
and arms sales to Azerbaijan. The draft budget presented to Congress
by the White House proposes to allocate $5.3 million worth of military
aid to Azerbaijan.
Washington isn't neglecting Armenia either. On August 1, the United
States presented the Armenian Defense Ministry's peacekeeping battalion
with $3 million worth of arms and equipment. This was provided as
part of the FMF program. The program intends to provide $8 million
by 2009 for the purpose of establishing an Armenian peacekeeping
battalion that will cooperate with NATO. The draft budget presented
to Congress by the White House proposes to allocate $3.3 million
worth of military aid to Armenia.
As we can see, US policy in this region is facilitating its
militarization. Washington has developed and is implementing projects
intended to weaken Russia's influence in the Caucasus as much as
possible - in economic, political, and military terms. And the GUAM
alliance (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) is being strengthened
as an alternative to Russian influence. There have also been reports
of an Azerbaijan-Turkey-Georgia military bloc being formed.
The fundamental changes in the regional balance of power could become
irreversible if the South Caucasus countries are integrated into NATO,
as a "more effective" security system. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer visited Tbilisi recently, meeting with Georgian leaders
to discuss the prospects for Georgia's accession to NATO (Georgia
hopes to initiate a NATO membership program in spring of 2008).
What's more, if US plans to install missile defense elements in the
Caucasus go ahead, the Trans-Caucasus will end up on the front line -
and thus in a high risk zone.
>From the very outset of its existence as an independent state, Russia
has designated the South Caucasus as a strategic interests priority
zone. Whoever controls the Trans-Caucasus also controls the Caspian Sea
and access to Central Asia and the Middle East. From this standpoint,
the region is important for Russia's strategic interests.
One of Moscow's most important objectives is to restrain negative
developments in the South Caucasus, no matter how hard the
"international community" may try to push Russia out of this region.
Russian dominance in the South Caucasus is not a question of Russia
"reviving imperialism." Ensuring stability in the Trans-Caucasus
countries is a fundamental precondition for peaceful development
within Russia itself: maintaining Russia's territorial integrity.
Russia is a Caucasus state. This assertion is not just a pretty
metaphor. Seven regions of the Russian Federation (Adygea, Ingushetia,
Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkesia, North Ossetia,
Chechnya) are located in the North Caucasus, and four more regions
are on the steppes adjacent to the Caucasus (Krasnodar and Stavropol
territories, the Rostov region, Kalmykia). The Black Sea coast of
the Krasnodar territory and the area around Mineralnye Vody in the
Stavropol territory are part of the Caucasus. Ensuring security in
the Russian Caucasus is inconceivable without, and inseparable from,
stability in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This is precisely
why Russia has taken on the burden of geopolitical leadership in the
South Caucasus ever since the break-up of the USSR.
Hence Russia's intense interest in events around Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Stabilizing the situation in these territories is in line
with Russia's national interests.
Our immediate neighbors in the region have repeatedly expressed
the opinion that Moscow has no strictly-defined and coordinated
policy on the Trans-Caucasus; they are still saying this. Indeed,
Russia itself wasn't in the best situation back in the 1990s; it
was incapable of pursuing a coherent policy in relation to Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
The results of this have been perceptible: Georgia is looking to
Brussels and Washington these days, while Azerbaijan is looking to
Brussels, Washington, and Ankara. Armenia, on the other hand, is
far more inclined to take Russia's regional interests into account,
and values its relations with Russia. Thus, Moscow's policy in the
Trans-Caucasus should by no means be regarded as a complete failure.
While Georgia considers that it has unarguable reasons for joining
NATO, Armenia has every reason to waver. Armenia doesn't see any
particular advantage for itself in the prospect of NATO gaining
control of the region; in fact, it has justifiable apprehensions
that this could have a harmful impact on Armenian interests. Armenia
remains Russia's real strategic partner in the South Caucasus. It is
basing its foreign policy on the principle of maintaining equilibrium
between the various military-political blocs whose interests directly
concern the Caucasus region. This policy is what best suits the state
interests of Armenia at the present stage.
Russia's relations with Azerbaijan have also improved. On a visit
to Baku in spring of 2007, Federation Council Speaker Sergei
Mironov said that although some analysts have reported a recent
"chill" in Russian-Azeri relations, such opinions "should remain
on the conscience of the analysts themselves." In Mironov's view,
Russian-Azeri strategic partnership is growing: in economic affairs,
humanitarian issues, and many other areas of bilateral cooperation.
Mironov said: "This has been confirmed for all to see by the
successful Year of Russia in Azerbaijan and the Year of Azerbaijan
in Russia, which became a convincing demonstration of Russian-Azeri
friendship. There is also striking evidence in the fact that bilateral
trade grew by 50% between 2005 and 2006, and now stands at over
$1.6 billion."
Of course, skeptics might object that wishful thinking should not
be portrayed as reality. But the growing influence of Russia in the
Caucasus and worldwide is being acknowledged in the West as well. A
group of American analysts involved in the Global Power Barometer
project concluded recently that "US influence is in steep decline...
other players such as Russia... are stepping into the vacuum. The US
is... already sharing the global influence stage with emerging powers
who can move global events as well or better."
If Russia's policy in the South Caucasus continues to take a pragmatic
tone, then (given the factors of geographical proximity and cultural,
technological, and human links) Moscow's presence and influence in
the South Caucasus will make it possible to prevent the region's
militarization and solve all the most urgent regional problems,
including territorial problems.
by Oleg Gorupai, translated by Elena Leonova
Source: Krasnaya Zvezda
October 8, 2007 Monday
Russia
HIGHLIGHT: Russia and the South Caucasus: resisting the West's
encroachment; Ensuring security in the Russian Caucasus is
inconceivable without, and inseparable from, stability in Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This is precisely why Russia has taken on
the burden of geopolitical leadership in the South Caucasus ever
since the break-up of the USSR.
The South Caucasus never ceases to surprise the international
community, keeping it on its toes with intermittent bursts of
adrenaline. The latest events in Georgia; regular declarations
from Azeri politicians about possibly using force to sort out
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem; Armenia's emphasis on enhancing its
defence capacities - all this certainly indicates that the region's
military-political situation is complicated and deteriorating. The
militarization of the Caucasus has reached a critical peak. The
combined military budget of these three Trans-Caucasus countries now
amounts to over $1.5 billion a year!
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) and the London Institue for War and Peace, the military budgets
of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are growing steadily: faster than
defense spending in most other countries, and much faster than their
GDP growth rates (up to 40 times faster). As at mid-2007, Georgia's
military budget for this year was $303 million, Armenia's was $264
million, and Azerbaijan's was over $900 million. There are 75 tanks
and 85 artillery pieces per million residents of the South Caucasus:
higher than the equivalent figures for Turkey or Iran. The present-day
Caucasus has become one of the world's most militarized regions. The
independent states of the South Caucasus possess military arsenals
comparable to those of the average European country. The Armed Forces
of Azerbaijan have 70,000 personnel, the Armenian Armed Forces have
45,000, and Georgia's troop strength in 2006 peaked at 31,878.
Aside from the military arsenals of these three
internationally-recognized states, there are also the military
machines of three unrecognized formations - entirely comparable to
those of the recognized states. The Armed Forces of Abkhazia have
5,000 personnel, and South Ossetia has 3,000. In terms of firepower,
the armed forces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are practically equal to
Georgia. Georgia has 80-100 tanks; Abkhazia has 100 and South Ossetia
has 87. Heavy artillery numbers (over 122 millimeters) are 117, 237,
and 95 respectively.
The Georgian government has almost doubled defense spending for 2007
recently: from 513 million lari ($303 million) to 957 million lari
($566 million); in late September, the Georgian parliament approved
the government's proposal for a substantial increase (over 25%)
in the military budget for 2008. Tbilisi's military spending will
rise to $723 million next year. The Georgian government has noted
that among the reasons for the additional spending is the aim of
accelerating military reforms required for Georgia to join NATO.
Azerbaijan's military budget has grown from $146 million in 2004 to
almost $1 billion this year. Armenia's defense spending has increased
by 350% as compared to 2000 (Armenia allocated almost $150 million
for defense in 2006 and almost $264 million this year); Azerbaijan's
defense spending has risen eight-fold; Georgia's defense spending has
risen ten-fold (at the start of 2006, it was only $77 million). It's
worth noting that the Trans-Caucasus countries have seen a surge in
military spending in the course of 2006 and 2007.
These facts are inevitably a source of concern for Russia and
its partners in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), especially given the obvious imbalance of forces among the
Trans-Caucasus states (Armenia looks very modest compared to its
neighbors). The situation developing within the CSTO's activity zone
was considered at a meeting of the CSTO secretaries in mid-September.
After the meeting, CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha noted
that the meeting also considered "the militant statements made by
representatives of certain states, indicating a wish to resolve some
frozen conflicts by military means, along with escalating military
activity and the growing military budgets and troop strength in
Georgia and Azerbaijan." As Bordyuzha pointed out, all this could
become a factor of "instability and threats for CSTO member states."
Clearly, the region is witnessing a dangerous increase of activity.
Governments, defense ministries, and analysts all over the world are
paying closer attention to this region. The main reason for that is
Washington's persistent policy course of destabilizing the situation
in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. With the Iran crisis highly
likely to escalate into an armed conflict, the Trans-Caucasus would
be in dangerous proximity to the theater of war. Most importantly,
the architects of global politics regard the Iran problem as leverage
for far-reaching long-term transformations in the so-called Greater
Middle East: in effect, the Americanization of this region. In their
view, the South Caucasus should not be an obstacle to these plans
(at least); it might even facilitate them (at most).
Washington will not abandon its plans to restructure the Caucasus.
The chief objectives of the United States and its NATO allies remain
unchanged: integrating the three Trans-Caucasus states into the
Euro-Atlantic community, and expelling Russia from the region.
However, European Union membership for the South Caucasus countries
isn't even a hypothetical possibility; the chief instrument for their
Euro-Atlantic integration is supposed to be the NATO military bloc.
In Washington's view, the Caucasus should be the next stage in NATO
expansion - and the best possible option is believed to be simultaneous
accession to NATO for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
At NATO's Istanbul summit in 204, the South Caucasus region was
included among NATO's priority zones. NATO's cooperation with
countries in this region is based on Individual Partnership Action
Plans (IPAPs). In 2004, the Armenian prime minister established an
inter-departmental commission for coordinating the implementation
of Armenia's IPAP with NATO. Georgia's IPAP was adopted in 2003;
Azerbaijan's IPAP was adopted in May 2005. The United States is
using political and financial support for countries in this region to
restrict Russia's role and gradually push Russia out of the Caucasus.
Over the past 12 years, the Americans have provided around $1.3
billion worth of aid to Georgia - including military aid. According
to Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment for Russia and the CIS,
the Americans spent $64 million on the Train and Equip program in
2002-04. Georgia received a total of $98 million in US military
aid during that time. That sum raised Georgia to 20th place in the
ranking of Washington's foreign partners. In the previous three
years, Georgia had received only $18 million from the United States,
ranking 41st among US aid recipients. These figures are taken from the
"Collateral Damage" report released by the Center for Public Integrity,
based on a year of investigative journalism. Another American program,
Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations (under way since 2005),
has cost $60 million. Moreover, the United States is also providing
aid under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International
Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. In 2005, the FMF and
IMET programs provided Georgia with $11.9 million and $1.4 million
respectively (funding is supposed to be maintained at 2005 levels in
2006 and 2007). Washington provided Georgia with a total of around
$74 million in military aid in 2005: more than double the American
funding Georgia received in 2004 ($30 million).
The Pentagon is also intensively arming Azerbaijan. This is indicated
in a report from the Center for Defense Information: Baku has received
$14 million worth of arms from the United States in recent years. "The
United States uses arms sales as a reward for its allies in the war on
terror," says the report. It also notes that Azerbaijan has received
over $27 million in military aid from Washington in the past five
years. The US budget for 2007 and 2008 includes further military aid
and arms sales to Azerbaijan. The draft budget presented to Congress
by the White House proposes to allocate $5.3 million worth of military
aid to Azerbaijan.
Washington isn't neglecting Armenia either. On August 1, the United
States presented the Armenian Defense Ministry's peacekeeping battalion
with $3 million worth of arms and equipment. This was provided as
part of the FMF program. The program intends to provide $8 million
by 2009 for the purpose of establishing an Armenian peacekeeping
battalion that will cooperate with NATO. The draft budget presented
to Congress by the White House proposes to allocate $3.3 million
worth of military aid to Armenia.
As we can see, US policy in this region is facilitating its
militarization. Washington has developed and is implementing projects
intended to weaken Russia's influence in the Caucasus as much as
possible - in economic, political, and military terms. And the GUAM
alliance (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) is being strengthened
as an alternative to Russian influence. There have also been reports
of an Azerbaijan-Turkey-Georgia military bloc being formed.
The fundamental changes in the regional balance of power could become
irreversible if the South Caucasus countries are integrated into NATO,
as a "more effective" security system. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer visited Tbilisi recently, meeting with Georgian leaders
to discuss the prospects for Georgia's accession to NATO (Georgia
hopes to initiate a NATO membership program in spring of 2008).
What's more, if US plans to install missile defense elements in the
Caucasus go ahead, the Trans-Caucasus will end up on the front line -
and thus in a high risk zone.
>From the very outset of its existence as an independent state, Russia
has designated the South Caucasus as a strategic interests priority
zone. Whoever controls the Trans-Caucasus also controls the Caspian Sea
and access to Central Asia and the Middle East. From this standpoint,
the region is important for Russia's strategic interests.
One of Moscow's most important objectives is to restrain negative
developments in the South Caucasus, no matter how hard the
"international community" may try to push Russia out of this region.
Russian dominance in the South Caucasus is not a question of Russia
"reviving imperialism." Ensuring stability in the Trans-Caucasus
countries is a fundamental precondition for peaceful development
within Russia itself: maintaining Russia's territorial integrity.
Russia is a Caucasus state. This assertion is not just a pretty
metaphor. Seven regions of the Russian Federation (Adygea, Ingushetia,
Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkesia, North Ossetia,
Chechnya) are located in the North Caucasus, and four more regions
are on the steppes adjacent to the Caucasus (Krasnodar and Stavropol
territories, the Rostov region, Kalmykia). The Black Sea coast of
the Krasnodar territory and the area around Mineralnye Vody in the
Stavropol territory are part of the Caucasus. Ensuring security in
the Russian Caucasus is inconceivable without, and inseparable from,
stability in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This is precisely
why Russia has taken on the burden of geopolitical leadership in the
South Caucasus ever since the break-up of the USSR.
Hence Russia's intense interest in events around Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Stabilizing the situation in these territories is in line
with Russia's national interests.
Our immediate neighbors in the region have repeatedly expressed
the opinion that Moscow has no strictly-defined and coordinated
policy on the Trans-Caucasus; they are still saying this. Indeed,
Russia itself wasn't in the best situation back in the 1990s; it
was incapable of pursuing a coherent policy in relation to Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
The results of this have been perceptible: Georgia is looking to
Brussels and Washington these days, while Azerbaijan is looking to
Brussels, Washington, and Ankara. Armenia, on the other hand, is
far more inclined to take Russia's regional interests into account,
and values its relations with Russia. Thus, Moscow's policy in the
Trans-Caucasus should by no means be regarded as a complete failure.
While Georgia considers that it has unarguable reasons for joining
NATO, Armenia has every reason to waver. Armenia doesn't see any
particular advantage for itself in the prospect of NATO gaining
control of the region; in fact, it has justifiable apprehensions
that this could have a harmful impact on Armenian interests. Armenia
remains Russia's real strategic partner in the South Caucasus. It is
basing its foreign policy on the principle of maintaining equilibrium
between the various military-political blocs whose interests directly
concern the Caucasus region. This policy is what best suits the state
interests of Armenia at the present stage.
Russia's relations with Azerbaijan have also improved. On a visit
to Baku in spring of 2007, Federation Council Speaker Sergei
Mironov said that although some analysts have reported a recent
"chill" in Russian-Azeri relations, such opinions "should remain
on the conscience of the analysts themselves." In Mironov's view,
Russian-Azeri strategic partnership is growing: in economic affairs,
humanitarian issues, and many other areas of bilateral cooperation.
Mironov said: "This has been confirmed for all to see by the
successful Year of Russia in Azerbaijan and the Year of Azerbaijan
in Russia, which became a convincing demonstration of Russian-Azeri
friendship. There is also striking evidence in the fact that bilateral
trade grew by 50% between 2005 and 2006, and now stands at over
$1.6 billion."
Of course, skeptics might object that wishful thinking should not
be portrayed as reality. But the growing influence of Russia in the
Caucasus and worldwide is being acknowledged in the West as well. A
group of American analysts involved in the Global Power Barometer
project concluded recently that "US influence is in steep decline...
other players such as Russia... are stepping into the vacuum. The US
is... already sharing the global influence stage with emerging powers
who can move global events as well or better."
If Russia's policy in the South Caucasus continues to take a pragmatic
tone, then (given the factors of geographical proximity and cultural,
technological, and human links) Moscow's presence and influence in
the South Caucasus will make it possible to prevent the region's
militarization and solve all the most urgent regional problems,
including territorial problems.