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ARE THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY ON A COLLISION COURSE?
By Gallia Lindenstrauss, special for the Jerusalem Post
Jerusalem Post
Oct 16 2007
Turkish-American relations face two significant challenges. One has to
do with the Turkish inclination to enter northern Iraq in order to deal
with Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) fighters operating there. The other
is connected with an upcoming US House of Representatives vote on a
resolution to recognize as genocide the mass killings of Armenians
by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Both challenges touch on
very sensitive issues for the Turks, who are convinced that the US
is insufficiently attentive to their needs and demands.
The Turks have threatened to intervene in northern Iraq on several
occasions since the fall of Saddam Hussein, but they now appear more
determined than ever to do so. In addition to the massive buildup near
the border, the government has now decided to ask for parliamentary
approval to send forces into Iraq. This decision follows the killing
of 30 soldiers and civilians by the PKK in the last two weeks, in
what are considered unusually severe actions by the PKK. According to
the Turks, the US has consistently failed to act against PKK fighters
hiding in the Kandil area of northern Iraq and does nothing to prevent
attacks on Turkey from that region.
The approval of the resolution by the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on October 10 prompted severe condemnation by Turkish leaders
and led Turkey to summon its ambassador in the US to Ankara for
consultations. President Abdullah Gul accused American politicians
of sacrificing big issues for petty games of domestic politics.
Given the Democrat majority in the House, it was expected that the
resolution would be approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee despite
strong opposition by the administration. Nevertheless, its passage
has added to Turkish frustration at the state of relations with the
US, and the expected majority for the resolution in the full House in
November has strengthened the perception of the Turks that they have
less to lose in terms of Turkish-US relations if they do act in Iraq.
Given that Turkey is more determined to do so and less likely to heed
American warnings not to intervene, it is possible that the US will
decide to minimize the negative consequences of Turkish intervention
by providing at least partial cooperation.
The publication of reports about secret plans for such cooperation
suggests that the possibility has already been extensively discussed
by the two sides, notwithstanding American concerns about stability in
the Kurdish-controlled autonomous area in the north of Iraq and about
a hostile reaction on the part of the Kurds, who have been the most
loyal American allies in Iraq. Indeed, these concerns suggest that
if the Turks do intervene, the Americans may also have to undertake
more aggressive actions. Given American failures in Iraq up until now,
it is doubtful whether the administration can permit another failure
in the form of unilateral Turkish intervention seemingly in defiance
of the US.
Such intervention would have negative consequences that could by
neutralized, at least with respect to Turkish-US relations, if the
Americans actually cooperated. By contrast, Turkey is unwilling to
compromise on the Armenian genocide issue and the administration
cannot impose its will on Congress. It is therefore difficult to
see how the damage to bilateral relations of the likely forthcoming
Congressional resolution can be limited.
Turkish policy indicates that while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and Gul are acting to promote domestic reforms that run counter to
the Kemalist legacy, in foreign affairs they act in conformity with
the hard-line Turkish tradition.
It is true that close ties with the United States are also a
traditionally important component of Turkish foreign policy,
but it is increasingly difficult today for Turks to reconcile the
contradiction between their interests and those of the US. Since the
American invasion of Iraq, Turkish public opinion has also become
more anti-American, and that influences decision makers to adopt
uncompromising positions regarding the Kurdish issue and ignore
American attitudes.
Although Turkish-American relations appear to be headed toward a
crisis, both sides remain aware of the importance of those ties and
therefore try to deal with the challenges they face.
But despite the common desire not to harm bilateral strategic
relations, there is a clash between Turkish and American interests that
may very well further convulse the already complicated reality in Iraq.
By Gallia Lindenstrauss, special for the Jerusalem Post
Jerusalem Post
Oct 16 2007
Turkish-American relations face two significant challenges. One has to
do with the Turkish inclination to enter northern Iraq in order to deal
with Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) fighters operating there. The other
is connected with an upcoming US House of Representatives vote on a
resolution to recognize as genocide the mass killings of Armenians
by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Both challenges touch on
very sensitive issues for the Turks, who are convinced that the US
is insufficiently attentive to their needs and demands.
The Turks have threatened to intervene in northern Iraq on several
occasions since the fall of Saddam Hussein, but they now appear more
determined than ever to do so. In addition to the massive buildup near
the border, the government has now decided to ask for parliamentary
approval to send forces into Iraq. This decision follows the killing
of 30 soldiers and civilians by the PKK in the last two weeks, in
what are considered unusually severe actions by the PKK. According to
the Turks, the US has consistently failed to act against PKK fighters
hiding in the Kandil area of northern Iraq and does nothing to prevent
attacks on Turkey from that region.
The approval of the resolution by the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on October 10 prompted severe condemnation by Turkish leaders
and led Turkey to summon its ambassador in the US to Ankara for
consultations. President Abdullah Gul accused American politicians
of sacrificing big issues for petty games of domestic politics.
Given the Democrat majority in the House, it was expected that the
resolution would be approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee despite
strong opposition by the administration. Nevertheless, its passage
has added to Turkish frustration at the state of relations with the
US, and the expected majority for the resolution in the full House in
November has strengthened the perception of the Turks that they have
less to lose in terms of Turkish-US relations if they do act in Iraq.
Given that Turkey is more determined to do so and less likely to heed
American warnings not to intervene, it is possible that the US will
decide to minimize the negative consequences of Turkish intervention
by providing at least partial cooperation.
The publication of reports about secret plans for such cooperation
suggests that the possibility has already been extensively discussed
by the two sides, notwithstanding American concerns about stability in
the Kurdish-controlled autonomous area in the north of Iraq and about
a hostile reaction on the part of the Kurds, who have been the most
loyal American allies in Iraq. Indeed, these concerns suggest that
if the Turks do intervene, the Americans may also have to undertake
more aggressive actions. Given American failures in Iraq up until now,
it is doubtful whether the administration can permit another failure
in the form of unilateral Turkish intervention seemingly in defiance
of the US.
Such intervention would have negative consequences that could by
neutralized, at least with respect to Turkish-US relations, if the
Americans actually cooperated. By contrast, Turkey is unwilling to
compromise on the Armenian genocide issue and the administration
cannot impose its will on Congress. It is therefore difficult to
see how the damage to bilateral relations of the likely forthcoming
Congressional resolution can be limited.
Turkish policy indicates that while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and Gul are acting to promote domestic reforms that run counter to
the Kemalist legacy, in foreign affairs they act in conformity with
the hard-line Turkish tradition.
It is true that close ties with the United States are also a
traditionally important component of Turkish foreign policy,
but it is increasingly difficult today for Turks to reconcile the
contradiction between their interests and those of the US. Since the
American invasion of Iraq, Turkish public opinion has also become
more anti-American, and that influences decision makers to adopt
uncompromising positions regarding the Kurdish issue and ignore
American attitudes.
Although Turkish-American relations appear to be headed toward a
crisis, both sides remain aware of the importance of those ties and
therefore try to deal with the challenges they face.
But despite the common desire not to harm bilateral strategic
relations, there is a clash between Turkish and American interests that
may very well further convulse the already complicated reality in Iraq.