Tweet
POLITICIANS, STAY OUT OF OUR HISTORY
Washington Post
Oct 17 2007
The U.S. Congress has no moral authority to pass judgment on any
other country's history, particularly with its Iraqi invasion record
in public view - nor does any other parliament or political body,
for that matter. History cannot be legislated and politicians ought
to stay away from trying to do so. It is not their duty.
This does not mean that historians can determine the outcome of what
is essentially a political problem, either. To give something a label
is a political act, which is precisely what complicates the matter.
But the task of coming to terms with one's history is the work and
duty of that nation's citizens. This was the position taken by the
late Hrant Dink, the slain editor of an independent Armenian weekly,
AGOS, who, on numerous occasions was treated by diaspora Armenians
as a traitor or an "Uncle Tom," or worse, because he wanted them to
leave Turkey alone. Not because he did not believe what had happened
in 1915 was genocide, but because he thought letting Turks come to
terms with their history as their country's democratization deepened
was more valuable than scoring political points and cooling your
heart with sweet revenge. (More on Dink later.)
(Eminent French historians have said as much in warning their
politicians to leave history out of their legislation. In a country
that happens to want to criminalize the denial of an Armenian genocide,
the leadership wants its historians to judge the record of the war
in Algeria.)
Foreign journalists and others these days often why the Turks care so
much about a non-binding resolution about crimes committed 90 years
ago by an Empire whose legacy they rejected when they founded their
republic. In fact, most non-Armenian Turks had no idea Turkey had an
"Armenian issue" until a terrorist organization called ASALA (Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) started to kill Turkish
diplomats in the 1970s. ASALA was protected by the French government
until they made the fatal mistake of killing French citizens when
they bombed France's Orly Airport in 1983.
Because Turkey's rulers had never bothered to include the Armenian
issue in school textbooks, it was only under these traumatic
circumstances that most Turkish citizens realized that they had to
come to terms with a dark page of their history. This did not prove
easy. There was no material in Turkish; ASALA's bombing had raised
emotions on all sides; and the official story was dominant. At best,
that story claimed the incident was a case of mutual massacres. (The
Turkish government has since proposed to form a commission of
historians in conjunction with the Republic of Armenia, including
independent historians, but the call was not answered - a fact that
added to the suspicions of the Turkish public about the political
nature of the matter.)
Lately, with the pioneering work of Taner Akcam and others, Turkish
historians have come up with different versions of the story, providing
context and studying the Armenian nationalist/revolutionary movements
and their history as well. Interested members of the public now had
access to material written by Armenian authors and translated to
Turkish. It was discovered that some among the Ottoman elite held
the Union and Progress Party that was responsible for the deportation
and the massacres in total contempt and called its leaders criminals,
thereby alluding to atrocities. It was known that the Party and its
secret "Special Organization" had at times instigated massacres,
opposed by state officials. The Ottoman Parliament, which counted
some Armenians among its members, debated the matter and condemned
those responsible. But it was also clear that some leaders of the
independence movement were implicated in what had happened. In the
process of nation-building for the new republican Turkey, there was no
question of either return or restitution for the Armenians. After all,
a court had tried and sentenced the culprits in 1919 while Istanbul
was under allied occupation.
Some Turkish historians decided that what happened in 1915 was indeed
genocide, while others accepted the catastrophe but did not define it
as such. Two years ago, after bitter judicial battles, a conference
was finally held in Istanbul that brought together those who had an
alternative view of the fate of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire.
The issue was being normalized and a process of digging deep into
history and into the nation's soul began. Some of those who did not
accept the Armenian case wanted to go to the International Court of
Justice and have a proper judicial verdict - a course of action the
Armenian side did not favor. Yet there were, and are, restrictions on
having a truly open debate. Article 301 of the Turkish penal code,
which punishes those who insult Turkishness, is a Sword of Damocles
to those who dare challenge the official version of things.
The Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was tried and sentenced under 301.
His murder was a symbol of the intense fight within the country,
and it catalyzed a movement. He was targeted and threatened by
ultranationalists and, though he was under considerable danger, he
was not given protection. His was a murder foretold. Officials in
security services connived. The judicial process is a travesty so far.
Yet, close to 200,000 people marched silently at his funeral, holding
banners that read, "We are all Hrant," and "We are all Armenians." As
expected, this infuriated the nationalists and they struck back. The
pressure on Turkey by foreign politicians only exacerbated the
tension, polarized the country and poisoned the atmosphere. In such
a politicized environment even those who may be inclined to look at
history differently will refrain from doing so. They see their country
and themselves as a nation being subjected to a vicious attack. The
Diaspora and their allies are seen to want the Turks to accept the
label of genocide and then begin a debate.
Understandably, most Turks believe this is akin to hanging first
and asking questions later. The politicization of the issue is now
closing the space for debate and freedom of expression. It intensifies
a xenophobic nationalism, undermining liberal political openings and
further democratization. The current government will not move against
301, even though it is at best profound embarrassment and at worst
a sign of obstructionism.
So if the aim was to get to the bottom of the historical truth, to
understand what had happened and how it had happened, to set the
historical record straight despite all sorts of obfuscation and
denial on the part of official historians - if that was the aim,
then that aim is now far removed. That is a shame.
Under these circumstances the Congressional resolution is an
unnecessary, counterproductive and wrongheaded initiative. It is
written with a revanchist intent and gives every indication that the
resolution will be used to further political goals. Even those who
voted against it did so not because they don't believe a genocide
was committed, but because Turkey is strategically too important for
the United States. That certainly does not do Turkey much honor. It's
what I would call cynicism.
I happen to think that such degree of politicization does not truly
honor the memory of the victims, either. It certainly does not serve
the interests of the Armenians who live in Armenia proper. As for
American interests in Iraq and the harm a strong Turkish reaction
may cause to these: no Turkish government can stand idly by if the
resolution passed. It would have to respond in a way that calms down
a furious public, and that means the use of Incirlik Airbase would
be at least restricted.
But the fallout would go further than this. Turkish-American relations
can barely withstand yet another traumatic incident. A severe crisis
in relations would probably ensue. And the convulsions that stem from
Turkey's identity crises would intensify.
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/pos tglobal/soli_ozel/2007/10/politicians_stay_out_of_ our_hi.html
Washington Post
Oct 17 2007
The U.S. Congress has no moral authority to pass judgment on any
other country's history, particularly with its Iraqi invasion record
in public view - nor does any other parliament or political body,
for that matter. History cannot be legislated and politicians ought
to stay away from trying to do so. It is not their duty.
This does not mean that historians can determine the outcome of what
is essentially a political problem, either. To give something a label
is a political act, which is precisely what complicates the matter.
But the task of coming to terms with one's history is the work and
duty of that nation's citizens. This was the position taken by the
late Hrant Dink, the slain editor of an independent Armenian weekly,
AGOS, who, on numerous occasions was treated by diaspora Armenians
as a traitor or an "Uncle Tom," or worse, because he wanted them to
leave Turkey alone. Not because he did not believe what had happened
in 1915 was genocide, but because he thought letting Turks come to
terms with their history as their country's democratization deepened
was more valuable than scoring political points and cooling your
heart with sweet revenge. (More on Dink later.)
(Eminent French historians have said as much in warning their
politicians to leave history out of their legislation. In a country
that happens to want to criminalize the denial of an Armenian genocide,
the leadership wants its historians to judge the record of the war
in Algeria.)
Foreign journalists and others these days often why the Turks care so
much about a non-binding resolution about crimes committed 90 years
ago by an Empire whose legacy they rejected when they founded their
republic. In fact, most non-Armenian Turks had no idea Turkey had an
"Armenian issue" until a terrorist organization called ASALA (Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) started to kill Turkish
diplomats in the 1970s. ASALA was protected by the French government
until they made the fatal mistake of killing French citizens when
they bombed France's Orly Airport in 1983.
Because Turkey's rulers had never bothered to include the Armenian
issue in school textbooks, it was only under these traumatic
circumstances that most Turkish citizens realized that they had to
come to terms with a dark page of their history. This did not prove
easy. There was no material in Turkish; ASALA's bombing had raised
emotions on all sides; and the official story was dominant. At best,
that story claimed the incident was a case of mutual massacres. (The
Turkish government has since proposed to form a commission of
historians in conjunction with the Republic of Armenia, including
independent historians, but the call was not answered - a fact that
added to the suspicions of the Turkish public about the political
nature of the matter.)
Lately, with the pioneering work of Taner Akcam and others, Turkish
historians have come up with different versions of the story, providing
context and studying the Armenian nationalist/revolutionary movements
and their history as well. Interested members of the public now had
access to material written by Armenian authors and translated to
Turkish. It was discovered that some among the Ottoman elite held
the Union and Progress Party that was responsible for the deportation
and the massacres in total contempt and called its leaders criminals,
thereby alluding to atrocities. It was known that the Party and its
secret "Special Organization" had at times instigated massacres,
opposed by state officials. The Ottoman Parliament, which counted
some Armenians among its members, debated the matter and condemned
those responsible. But it was also clear that some leaders of the
independence movement were implicated in what had happened. In the
process of nation-building for the new republican Turkey, there was no
question of either return or restitution for the Armenians. After all,
a court had tried and sentenced the culprits in 1919 while Istanbul
was under allied occupation.
Some Turkish historians decided that what happened in 1915 was indeed
genocide, while others accepted the catastrophe but did not define it
as such. Two years ago, after bitter judicial battles, a conference
was finally held in Istanbul that brought together those who had an
alternative view of the fate of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire.
The issue was being normalized and a process of digging deep into
history and into the nation's soul began. Some of those who did not
accept the Armenian case wanted to go to the International Court of
Justice and have a proper judicial verdict - a course of action the
Armenian side did not favor. Yet there were, and are, restrictions on
having a truly open debate. Article 301 of the Turkish penal code,
which punishes those who insult Turkishness, is a Sword of Damocles
to those who dare challenge the official version of things.
The Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was tried and sentenced under 301.
His murder was a symbol of the intense fight within the country,
and it catalyzed a movement. He was targeted and threatened by
ultranationalists and, though he was under considerable danger, he
was not given protection. His was a murder foretold. Officials in
security services connived. The judicial process is a travesty so far.
Yet, close to 200,000 people marched silently at his funeral, holding
banners that read, "We are all Hrant," and "We are all Armenians." As
expected, this infuriated the nationalists and they struck back. The
pressure on Turkey by foreign politicians only exacerbated the
tension, polarized the country and poisoned the atmosphere. In such
a politicized environment even those who may be inclined to look at
history differently will refrain from doing so. They see their country
and themselves as a nation being subjected to a vicious attack. The
Diaspora and their allies are seen to want the Turks to accept the
label of genocide and then begin a debate.
Understandably, most Turks believe this is akin to hanging first
and asking questions later. The politicization of the issue is now
closing the space for debate and freedom of expression. It intensifies
a xenophobic nationalism, undermining liberal political openings and
further democratization. The current government will not move against
301, even though it is at best profound embarrassment and at worst
a sign of obstructionism.
So if the aim was to get to the bottom of the historical truth, to
understand what had happened and how it had happened, to set the
historical record straight despite all sorts of obfuscation and
denial on the part of official historians - if that was the aim,
then that aim is now far removed. That is a shame.
Under these circumstances the Congressional resolution is an
unnecessary, counterproductive and wrongheaded initiative. It is
written with a revanchist intent and gives every indication that the
resolution will be used to further political goals. Even those who
voted against it did so not because they don't believe a genocide
was committed, but because Turkey is strategically too important for
the United States. That certainly does not do Turkey much honor. It's
what I would call cynicism.
I happen to think that such degree of politicization does not truly
honor the memory of the victims, either. It certainly does not serve
the interests of the Armenians who live in Armenia proper. As for
American interests in Iraq and the harm a strong Turkish reaction
may cause to these: no Turkish government can stand idly by if the
resolution passed. It would have to respond in a way that calms down
a furious public, and that means the use of Incirlik Airbase would
be at least restricted.
But the fallout would go further than this. Turkish-American relations
can barely withstand yet another traumatic incident. A severe crisis
in relations would probably ensue. And the convulsions that stem from
Turkey's identity crises would intensify.
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/pos tglobal/soli_ozel/2007/10/politicians_stay_out_of_ our_hi.html