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KATHIMERINI English Edition
The 'new' Turkey and Greece
By Nikos Konstandaras
It is a fact of life that whatever happens in Turkey has a direct
impact in Greece. So tight is the two countries' entanglement that
Ankara's relations with other capitals influence Athens's relations
with third countries and organizations, as we have seen repeatedly in
the case of the United States, NATO and the EU. Sometimes, Turkey's
direct impact on Greece is minimal, usually because our neighbor is
preoccupied with some of the other major issues that concern it. But
the dynamics of conflict within Turkey sooner or later translate into
spectacular foreign policy. This is sometimes a consequence of
Turkey's sense of insecurity; sometimes it stems from a sense of its
being the dominant power in the region; often it is an extension of
the power game being played in Turkey's domestic politics.
Today Turkey is in the middle of a great transformation. For us in
Greece, it is difficult to understand that our neighbor has been at
war for the last 20 years. The Kurdish separatist war may have been on
the backburner for the past few years but in recent months it has
flared up dramatically, driving Turkey to declare itself ready to
invade northern Iraq where it claims the rebels have bases. This
threat may be dictated by the balance that has to be struck between
Turkey's government and its restive military leaders but is most
likely no bluff. Turkey is prepared to throw its conscripts - and its
reputation as a military power - into a war with a tough and greatly
experienced adversary, such as the Kurdish fighters have proved to be,
in unpredictable, mountainous terrain. Not only do the Turks have to
worry about their adversaries, but they also have to push ahead over
the very strong objections of their principal ally, the United States.
Washington fears that Turkey's invasion of northern Iraq could
jeopardize security in the only part of Iraq that is relatively
stable.
On another major front, Turkey has warned the US against Congress
declaring that it recognizes the eradication of the Armenians in
Turkey as genocide. Ankara has made it quite clear that if the
resolution goes through, the US may lose at least some of the
assistance that it gets by way of material and warplanes transiting
Turkey on the way to Iraq and Afghanistan.
When Turkey does not shrink from a direct confrontation with the US on
issues that constitute the superpower's greatest military and foreign
policy challenges of a generation, can anyone doubt that Ankara will
hesitate in carrying out whichever policy it chooses with regard to
Greece and Cyprus? And what mediation could we then expect from the
US?
Turkey will always wield its two greatest weapons: its strategic
importance and the size of its armed forces. It shows them off and
hides them at will. Proclaiming at once that it is under threat and
that it is invincible, it provides services to others and launches
threats. The result is the tolerance of allies and the withdrawal of
rivals. Greece has often paid the cost of forgetting this.
Domestically, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government has
shown repeatedly that it is a player to be reckoned with in its clash
with the Turkish establishment. Within this context, Turks yesterday
voted in a referendum on Erdogan's proposal that the country's
president be elected by popular vote (and no longer by parliament).
This is yet another step toward politicians' emancipation from a state
that is still controlled by a tight network of military officials,
judges and other state functionaries who serve the ideology of a
secular state at the expense of popular will and freedom of
expression. This clash of the titans has become entangled in Turkey's
efforts to make the political, economic and social changes that will
allow it to accede to the European Union.
With Turkey in the middle of great changes whose results are still
unpredictable, Greece seems to be stuck in a one-dimensional policy
that goes no further than supporting Turkey's accession to the EU as
long as Ankara meets all the criteria, as if this were the automatic
solution to all problems in Greek-Turkish relations.
But what will happen if Turkey - either by its own choice or other
factors - does not join the European Union? Do we have any estimate as
to what this country will look like? Do we know what kind of
relationship we might have with it? Do we have any idea regarding how
we will deal with Turkey without the good offices of any mediators?
Whatever happens, Greece and Turkey will remain neighbors. A
relatively painless coexistence will demand great skill, seriousness
and planning - all factors which cannot be left to chance or
intermediaries.
Source: http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_colu mns_100033_22/10/2007_89205
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
The 'new' Turkey and Greece
By Nikos Konstandaras
It is a fact of life that whatever happens in Turkey has a direct
impact in Greece. So tight is the two countries' entanglement that
Ankara's relations with other capitals influence Athens's relations
with third countries and organizations, as we have seen repeatedly in
the case of the United States, NATO and the EU. Sometimes, Turkey's
direct impact on Greece is minimal, usually because our neighbor is
preoccupied with some of the other major issues that concern it. But
the dynamics of conflict within Turkey sooner or later translate into
spectacular foreign policy. This is sometimes a consequence of
Turkey's sense of insecurity; sometimes it stems from a sense of its
being the dominant power in the region; often it is an extension of
the power game being played in Turkey's domestic politics.
Today Turkey is in the middle of a great transformation. For us in
Greece, it is difficult to understand that our neighbor has been at
war for the last 20 years. The Kurdish separatist war may have been on
the backburner for the past few years but in recent months it has
flared up dramatically, driving Turkey to declare itself ready to
invade northern Iraq where it claims the rebels have bases. This
threat may be dictated by the balance that has to be struck between
Turkey's government and its restive military leaders but is most
likely no bluff. Turkey is prepared to throw its conscripts - and its
reputation as a military power - into a war with a tough and greatly
experienced adversary, such as the Kurdish fighters have proved to be,
in unpredictable, mountainous terrain. Not only do the Turks have to
worry about their adversaries, but they also have to push ahead over
the very strong objections of their principal ally, the United States.
Washington fears that Turkey's invasion of northern Iraq could
jeopardize security in the only part of Iraq that is relatively
stable.
On another major front, Turkey has warned the US against Congress
declaring that it recognizes the eradication of the Armenians in
Turkey as genocide. Ankara has made it quite clear that if the
resolution goes through, the US may lose at least some of the
assistance that it gets by way of material and warplanes transiting
Turkey on the way to Iraq and Afghanistan.
When Turkey does not shrink from a direct confrontation with the US on
issues that constitute the superpower's greatest military and foreign
policy challenges of a generation, can anyone doubt that Ankara will
hesitate in carrying out whichever policy it chooses with regard to
Greece and Cyprus? And what mediation could we then expect from the
US?
Turkey will always wield its two greatest weapons: its strategic
importance and the size of its armed forces. It shows them off and
hides them at will. Proclaiming at once that it is under threat and
that it is invincible, it provides services to others and launches
threats. The result is the tolerance of allies and the withdrawal of
rivals. Greece has often paid the cost of forgetting this.
Domestically, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government has
shown repeatedly that it is a player to be reckoned with in its clash
with the Turkish establishment. Within this context, Turks yesterday
voted in a referendum on Erdogan's proposal that the country's
president be elected by popular vote (and no longer by parliament).
This is yet another step toward politicians' emancipation from a state
that is still controlled by a tight network of military officials,
judges and other state functionaries who serve the ideology of a
secular state at the expense of popular will and freedom of
expression. This clash of the titans has become entangled in Turkey's
efforts to make the political, economic and social changes that will
allow it to accede to the European Union.
With Turkey in the middle of great changes whose results are still
unpredictable, Greece seems to be stuck in a one-dimensional policy
that goes no further than supporting Turkey's accession to the EU as
long as Ankara meets all the criteria, as if this were the automatic
solution to all problems in Greek-Turkish relations.
But what will happen if Turkey - either by its own choice or other
factors - does not join the European Union? Do we have any estimate as
to what this country will look like? Do we know what kind of
relationship we might have with it? Do we have any idea regarding how
we will deal with Turkey without the good offices of any mediators?
Whatever happens, Greece and Turkey will remain neighbors. A
relatively painless coexistence will demand great skill, seriousness
and planning - all factors which cannot be left to chance or
intermediaries.
Source: http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_colu mns_100033_22/10/2007_89205
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress