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WILL A CROSS-BORDER OPERATION END TERRORISM?
By Dr. Davut ÞahÝner
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Oct 24 2007
In the event the operation lasts longer than planned, trade with
northern Iraq will be negatively affected.
In this case Turkey would be alienated in the region, which might
fall into the control of non-regional forces, leaving Turkey with a
chronic problem.
Possible mistakes during the operation may cause permanent scars in
bilateral relations between the Turks and the Kurds. Thus the targets
within the operation should be specific and well defined. The targets
should be determined and identified through prior intelligence.
Further political and military goals should be built around this
intelligence. It should include extensive information on the social
fabric, economic situation and other aspects.
The long presence of Turkey in northern Iraq may be perceived
as occupation and divert it from the path to the EU. The latest
developments within EU countries may also contribute to this process.
Considering that there are influential lobbies inside the EU working
hard to prevent Turkey's full membership, the developments in northern
Iraq may be exploited by these opponents.
The role of the military in the administration of the country in
Turkey could be exaggerated and Turkey could be labeled a military
dictatorship. It should be noted that the Armenian, Greek and Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) lobbies are waiting for the proper moment to use
this sort of propaganda to erode Turkey's prestige and image in the
world. Such propaganda would seriously undermine Turkey's political
and economic interests. For example, export and tourism revenues
would substantially decline.
Turkey may lose ground in the battles on the Armenian and Cyprus
questions, currently the most important national causes. In an
environment where Turkey's image has been tarnished, the Armenian and
Greek lobbies may take serious steps that would inflict the greatest
harm on Turkey in regards to these issues.
It should be noted that the current essay reviews the risks involved
in the invasion of northern Iraq without proper preparations rather
than a limited cross-border operation. A real cross-border operation
could be fruitful under the following conditions:
Turkey should prescribe precise targets beforehand. The goal should
be the elimination of the most influential terrorists and the
higher members of the organizations rather than killing hundreds of
terrorists. To do this the targets should be determined very carefully
and the terrorist shelters should be effectively rooted out. Expert
teams rather than thousands of ordinary soldiers are required for
this sort of operation. The raids should be held under cover of night.
A number of small operations rather than a few comprehensive ones
should be considered. A couple of small, limited operations in a
week is a good target. That way the world and the region can become
accustomed to Turkey's interventions.
The commercial and technical activities of the terrorists rather than
the terrorists themselves should be targeted. It may be difficult to
bomb their shelters on Kandil Mountains. However, equipment supply to
the terrorist organization could be halted. Moreover, the supporters
of the terrorist organization in Iraq could be punished.
The heavy weaponry, electric generators and equipment of the terrorist
organization could be targeted. Regular attacks on these sorts of
targets would diminish the power of the organization and lower morale
among its members.
Privates and reserve officers should not be employed in the
cross-border operations. Instead, professional and expert military
staff should be utilized. Special teams should be created for the
operations in the region; classic warfare based on regular units
should be avoided.
Increasing the number of warring troops against a low number of
terrorists is not a plausible solution. Quality rather than quantity
matters in the fight against this sort of organization. Increase in
the number of troops who are not trained for guerilla warfare will
lead to further losses in the battle.
The PKK terrorists should be made ineffective, dead or alive, in the
Iraqi cities. It is pretty surprising that the PKK militants have
sustained not a single wound in Iraq, where almost every day a number
of people are dying. For this reason, the relevant security units
should be legally authorized to render the terrorists ineffective.
In addition to the military measures, diplomatic and political attempts
should be made for an effective outcome. Particularly, policies should
be developed to ensure that Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani withdraw
their support from the PKK. Both carrot and stick policies should be
employed simultaneously. Turkey cannot obtain satisfactory results
by threatening the countries from which it expects support.
Other countries and groups should not be threatened if the threats
and the promises associated with the threats cannot be carried out.
Acting otherwise places Turkey's credibility in question and makes
its resolve appear weak on the matter.
It is particularly essential to rely on the information and
intelligence supplied by the National Intelligence Organization
(MÝT) and the police. A separate unit that will deal with terrorism
may also be considered. However, it should be recalled that regular
armies often fail to address terrorist threats. Therefore, small,
flexible and professional units should be seriously considered.
Subtle border violations should be tolerated. Turkish troops have
already crossed the border at some points. The troops should advance
a little further through these already violated points. All these
activities should be carried out discretely. There is no requirement
to make a statement or explanation to the world in relation to such
discreet operations, or even overt ones. The Israeli case should be
examined thoroughly.
Communication and contact with other countries through the media
should be specifically avoided and third parties should not be
forced to make statements. The claims indicating that terror could
be eliminated and resolved in Iraq should be avoided. Unnecessary
promises should not be made to the public. Allies should be sought
inside Iraq and direct contacts should be established with the
people. To this end, TV broadcasts in Arabic and Kurdish should be
considered as an effective avenue. At no stage should dialogue and
discussion stop. Turkey is not at a point where there are no other
options outside of an operation. If politics is unable to generate
new alternatives, the security units cannot proceed further.
*Davut Þahiner is an international security expert working with the
International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO/USAK) 24.10.2007
--Boundary_(ID_dXsyp1QRGj5W/T0l5FbI2w) --
By Dr. Davut ÞahÝner
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Oct 24 2007
In the event the operation lasts longer than planned, trade with
northern Iraq will be negatively affected.
In this case Turkey would be alienated in the region, which might
fall into the control of non-regional forces, leaving Turkey with a
chronic problem.
Possible mistakes during the operation may cause permanent scars in
bilateral relations between the Turks and the Kurds. Thus the targets
within the operation should be specific and well defined. The targets
should be determined and identified through prior intelligence.
Further political and military goals should be built around this
intelligence. It should include extensive information on the social
fabric, economic situation and other aspects.
The long presence of Turkey in northern Iraq may be perceived
as occupation and divert it from the path to the EU. The latest
developments within EU countries may also contribute to this process.
Considering that there are influential lobbies inside the EU working
hard to prevent Turkey's full membership, the developments in northern
Iraq may be exploited by these opponents.
The role of the military in the administration of the country in
Turkey could be exaggerated and Turkey could be labeled a military
dictatorship. It should be noted that the Armenian, Greek and Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) lobbies are waiting for the proper moment to use
this sort of propaganda to erode Turkey's prestige and image in the
world. Such propaganda would seriously undermine Turkey's political
and economic interests. For example, export and tourism revenues
would substantially decline.
Turkey may lose ground in the battles on the Armenian and Cyprus
questions, currently the most important national causes. In an
environment where Turkey's image has been tarnished, the Armenian and
Greek lobbies may take serious steps that would inflict the greatest
harm on Turkey in regards to these issues.
It should be noted that the current essay reviews the risks involved
in the invasion of northern Iraq without proper preparations rather
than a limited cross-border operation. A real cross-border operation
could be fruitful under the following conditions:
Turkey should prescribe precise targets beforehand. The goal should
be the elimination of the most influential terrorists and the
higher members of the organizations rather than killing hundreds of
terrorists. To do this the targets should be determined very carefully
and the terrorist shelters should be effectively rooted out. Expert
teams rather than thousands of ordinary soldiers are required for
this sort of operation. The raids should be held under cover of night.
A number of small operations rather than a few comprehensive ones
should be considered. A couple of small, limited operations in a
week is a good target. That way the world and the region can become
accustomed to Turkey's interventions.
The commercial and technical activities of the terrorists rather than
the terrorists themselves should be targeted. It may be difficult to
bomb their shelters on Kandil Mountains. However, equipment supply to
the terrorist organization could be halted. Moreover, the supporters
of the terrorist organization in Iraq could be punished.
The heavy weaponry, electric generators and equipment of the terrorist
organization could be targeted. Regular attacks on these sorts of
targets would diminish the power of the organization and lower morale
among its members.
Privates and reserve officers should not be employed in the
cross-border operations. Instead, professional and expert military
staff should be utilized. Special teams should be created for the
operations in the region; classic warfare based on regular units
should be avoided.
Increasing the number of warring troops against a low number of
terrorists is not a plausible solution. Quality rather than quantity
matters in the fight against this sort of organization. Increase in
the number of troops who are not trained for guerilla warfare will
lead to further losses in the battle.
The PKK terrorists should be made ineffective, dead or alive, in the
Iraqi cities. It is pretty surprising that the PKK militants have
sustained not a single wound in Iraq, where almost every day a number
of people are dying. For this reason, the relevant security units
should be legally authorized to render the terrorists ineffective.
In addition to the military measures, diplomatic and political attempts
should be made for an effective outcome. Particularly, policies should
be developed to ensure that Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani withdraw
their support from the PKK. Both carrot and stick policies should be
employed simultaneously. Turkey cannot obtain satisfactory results
by threatening the countries from which it expects support.
Other countries and groups should not be threatened if the threats
and the promises associated with the threats cannot be carried out.
Acting otherwise places Turkey's credibility in question and makes
its resolve appear weak on the matter.
It is particularly essential to rely on the information and
intelligence supplied by the National Intelligence Organization
(MÝT) and the police. A separate unit that will deal with terrorism
may also be considered. However, it should be recalled that regular
armies often fail to address terrorist threats. Therefore, small,
flexible and professional units should be seriously considered.
Subtle border violations should be tolerated. Turkish troops have
already crossed the border at some points. The troops should advance
a little further through these already violated points. All these
activities should be carried out discretely. There is no requirement
to make a statement or explanation to the world in relation to such
discreet operations, or even overt ones. The Israeli case should be
examined thoroughly.
Communication and contact with other countries through the media
should be specifically avoided and third parties should not be
forced to make statements. The claims indicating that terror could
be eliminated and resolved in Iraq should be avoided. Unnecessary
promises should not be made to the public. Allies should be sought
inside Iraq and direct contacts should be established with the
people. To this end, TV broadcasts in Arabic and Kurdish should be
considered as an effective avenue. At no stage should dialogue and
discussion stop. Turkey is not at a point where there are no other
options outside of an operation. If politics is unable to generate
new alternatives, the security units cannot proceed further.
*Davut Þahiner is an international security expert working with the
International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO/USAK) 24.10.2007
--Boundary_(ID_dXsyp1QRGj5W/T0l5FbI2w) --