Tweet
EVEN FOUR OR FIVE ROUNDS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH FOR SERGE SARGSYAN TO BECOME PRESIDENT IN A FAIR ELECTION
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Aug 30 2007
It seems to be beyond doubt that everything the opposition is doing now
is almost a guarantee of the victory of Prime Minister Serge Sargsyan
in the presidential election of 2008. The opposition imparted their
meetings with such mystery that now they have to support this mystery
with adequate contents, meanwhile it is clear that it is impossible
because 90 percent of the politicians attending these meetings will
perhaps stay till they make sure they are not the common candidate of
the opposition. Afterwards each will make a statement, expect that the
consultations of the opposition did not give what had been expected
and will justify their nomination. Or in order to avoid appearing
ambitious or unfaithful, these candidates will explain their nomination
by tactical moves, saying that it is the best way of emergence of the
common candidate. Everyone imagines this mechanism: several opposition
candidates are nominated, they launch an election campaign, then the
plan requires a second round, and logically Serge Sargsyan and one
of the oppositionists run in the second round, and the opposition
running in the second round deserves becoming the common candidate.
Two counterarguments, however, show that this tactics is illogical.
First, nobody can guarantee that several oppositionists will not
consider the oppositionist running in the second round as a protege of
the government whom Serge Sargsyan helped to get to the second round,
ensuring his smooth victory. After all, there have been a few similar
cases in the glorious history of the Armenian opposition. Why should
any of the opposition leaders who will be running in the election
out of their ambitions justifying it by the intention to reveal the
natural common candidate in the second round accept the presence of
this candidate in the second round? If anyone is likely to give up
ambitions, they will do it in the first round.
Now the second counterargument. Who said or who did Serge Sargsyan
tell that he is likely to be elected president in the run-off
election? First, it is obvious that Serge Sargsyan took the track
for outdoing Robert Kocharyan's political deeds, like Hitler tried
to beat Napoleon's military records because the prime minister has
raised the lath of economic indices, meanwhile Robert Kocharyan has
mainly relied on these indices in the years of his office. And since
the prime minister seeks to outdo the president, and Robert Kocharyan
seems unlikely to stop him, it is highly probable that Serge Sargsyan
will try to become president in the first round and more confidently
than Robert Kocharyan became president in 2003 in a run-off election.
Serge Sargsyan's desire is logical, in fact. It is clear that perhaps
even four or five rounds would not be enough for Serge Sargsyan to
become president in a fair election. In other words, it will be
necessary to use both administrative and financial intervention,
like the absolute victory was ensured on May 12, although in a way
that allowed the international community to recognize the results. If
Serge Sargsyan can have this mechanism work, he will do it in a single
round and will not prolong the tense climate. And if he fails in the
first round, he will lose the second round in two weeks.
Consequently, there is no alternative to solving the problem at once,
and Serge Sargsyan's efforts to get all the levers of government
before becoming president show he has already made the political
decision to win in the first round, even though Galust Sahakyan has
not stated officially.
What will the opposition be doing then? How about the common candidate
operation which stops halfway? In fact, nothing prevents the opposition
from resuming it, since the next election is in 2013, and most probably
the opponent of the opposition will again be Serge Sargsyan.
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Aug 30 2007
It seems to be beyond doubt that everything the opposition is doing now
is almost a guarantee of the victory of Prime Minister Serge Sargsyan
in the presidential election of 2008. The opposition imparted their
meetings with such mystery that now they have to support this mystery
with adequate contents, meanwhile it is clear that it is impossible
because 90 percent of the politicians attending these meetings will
perhaps stay till they make sure they are not the common candidate of
the opposition. Afterwards each will make a statement, expect that the
consultations of the opposition did not give what had been expected
and will justify their nomination. Or in order to avoid appearing
ambitious or unfaithful, these candidates will explain their nomination
by tactical moves, saying that it is the best way of emergence of the
common candidate. Everyone imagines this mechanism: several opposition
candidates are nominated, they launch an election campaign, then the
plan requires a second round, and logically Serge Sargsyan and one
of the oppositionists run in the second round, and the opposition
running in the second round deserves becoming the common candidate.
Two counterarguments, however, show that this tactics is illogical.
First, nobody can guarantee that several oppositionists will not
consider the oppositionist running in the second round as a protege of
the government whom Serge Sargsyan helped to get to the second round,
ensuring his smooth victory. After all, there have been a few similar
cases in the glorious history of the Armenian opposition. Why should
any of the opposition leaders who will be running in the election
out of their ambitions justifying it by the intention to reveal the
natural common candidate in the second round accept the presence of
this candidate in the second round? If anyone is likely to give up
ambitions, they will do it in the first round.
Now the second counterargument. Who said or who did Serge Sargsyan
tell that he is likely to be elected president in the run-off
election? First, it is obvious that Serge Sargsyan took the track
for outdoing Robert Kocharyan's political deeds, like Hitler tried
to beat Napoleon's military records because the prime minister has
raised the lath of economic indices, meanwhile Robert Kocharyan has
mainly relied on these indices in the years of his office. And since
the prime minister seeks to outdo the president, and Robert Kocharyan
seems unlikely to stop him, it is highly probable that Serge Sargsyan
will try to become president in the first round and more confidently
than Robert Kocharyan became president in 2003 in a run-off election.
Serge Sargsyan's desire is logical, in fact. It is clear that perhaps
even four or five rounds would not be enough for Serge Sargsyan to
become president in a fair election. In other words, it will be
necessary to use both administrative and financial intervention,
like the absolute victory was ensured on May 12, although in a way
that allowed the international community to recognize the results. If
Serge Sargsyan can have this mechanism work, he will do it in a single
round and will not prolong the tense climate. And if he fails in the
first round, he will lose the second round in two weeks.
Consequently, there is no alternative to solving the problem at once,
and Serge Sargsyan's efforts to get all the levers of government
before becoming president show he has already made the political
decision to win in the first round, even though Galust Sahakyan has
not stated officially.
What will the opposition be doing then? How about the common candidate
operation which stops halfway? In fact, nothing prevents the opposition
from resuming it, since the next election is in 2013, and most probably
the opponent of the opposition will again be Serge Sargsyan.