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The Possible Perils Of Recognizing Kosovo's Independence

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  • The Possible Perils Of Recognizing Kosovo's Independence

    THE POSSIBLE PERILS OF RECOGNIZING KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE
    By Charles Tannock

    The Daily Star, Lebanon
    Sept 25 2007

    Look before you leap is as sound a principle in foreign policy as it
    is in life. Yet, once again, the Bush administration is preparing to
    leap into the unknown. Even though lack of foresight is universally
    viewed as a leading cause of its Iraq debacle, the United States (with
    British backing probable) is now preparing to recognize Kosovo's
    independence unilaterally - irrespective of the consequences for
    Europe and the world.

    Kosovo has been administered since 1999 by a United Nations mission
    guarded by NATO troops, although it remains formally a part of
    Serbia. But, with Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority demanding its
    own state and with Russia refusing to recognize UN mediator Martti
    Ahtisaari's plan for conditional independence, the US is preparing
    to go it alone. Instead of thinking through what Ahtisaari deemed
    unthinkable - a partition of Kosovo with a small part of the north
    going to Serbia and the rest linked to the Kosovars' ethnic brethren
    in Albania or a separate state - the US plans to act without the
    UN's blessing, arguing that only an independent Kosovo will bring
    stability to the Western Balkans.

    That argument is debatable - and the record of the Kosovar government
    suggests that it is wrong. But the US position is unambiguously
    misguided in not foreseeing that the "Kosovo precedent" will incite
    instability and potentially even violence elsewhere.

    Why the rush to give Kosovo independence? Many serious disputes
    have gone unresolved for decades. The Kashmir question has lingered
    since 1947, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus since 1974,
    and Israel's occupation of the West Bank from 1967. Yet no one is
    suggesting that unilateral solutions be imposed in these potential
    flashpoints.

    Nevertheless, the US - like most European Union members - argue that
    Kosovo's situation is sui generis and will set no legally binding
    international precedent. But Russia sees things very differently.

    Indeed, it may seek to use this precedent to reestablish its authority
    over the nations and territories that were once part of the Soviet
    Union.

    Spain and Cyprus, with their worries over secessionist-minded
    regions, are worried by any possible precedent. Romania fears the
    fallout on neighboring Moldova from Kosovo's unilaterally gaining
    independence. The worry is that Russia will unilaterally recognize
    the breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdnistria, which Russian
    troops and criminal gangs have been propping up for 16 years.

    Ukraine - the great prize in Russia's bid to recapture its former
    sphere of influence - is also deeply anxious. It fears that Russia
    will encourage separatist tendencies in Crimea, where the ethnic
    Russian population forms a majority. (Crimea was ceded to Ukraine
    by Nikita Khrushchev only in 1954). Russia may decide to abuse the
    Kosovo precedent further to divide Ukraine's population between
    Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers.

    But the biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo's
    independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the
    tinderbox of today's Middle East. Here, there is a real danger that
    Russia may recognize breakaway regions in the South Caucasus - and
    back them more strongly than it does now.

    http://www.dailystar.com.lb

    Even before Vladimir Putin became Russia's president, the Kremlin was
    making mischief in Georgia, issuing Russian passports to citizens
    of Abkhazia (the largest breakaway region) and pouring money into
    its economy. Russia's supposed "peacekeeping troops" in Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia, Georgia's other secession-minded region, have in fact
    protected their rebel governments. Russia has also been enforcing
    a complete trade embargo on Georgia in the hope of weakening the
    resolve of its pro-Western president, Mikhail Saakashvili.

    Should Russia recognize Abkhazia's independence, Saakashvili might be
    tempted to respond militarily to prevent his country from unraveling.

    Renewed conflict in Abkhazia would not only bring the risk of open
    warfare with Russia, but strain relations with Armenia, as there
    are near to 50,000 Armenians in Abkhazia who support the breakaway
    government.

    Another risk in the South Caucasus is that Russia (with Armenian
    support) will recognize Nagorno-Karabakh's self-proclaimed independence
    from Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, historically Armenian, endured
    a bloody secessionist war between 1988 and 1994, with 30,000 killed
    and 14 percent of Azerbaijan's territory occupied by Russian-backed
    Armenian forces.

    Since then, oil has fuelled an Azeri military buildup. So the
    government in Baku is far more prepared to respond to renewed warfare
    than it was in the 1990s. Moreover, it has neighboring Turkey on
    its side. Turkey is already enforcing a punitive economic embargo on
    Armenia, including closure of its border.

    Military projections by the US have repeatedly suggested that
    Azerbaijan would lose such a battle, even with newly purchased
    equipment and Turkish military support. Armenian forces are well dug in
    and have received a significant boost from Russia's diversion of heavy
    weaponry to Armenia from some recently closed Georgian military bases.

    Iran also must be factored into this equation, as it is becoming a
    strategic investor by building an oil refinery just across its border
    in Armenia - partly as a security measure in case of a US attack
    and partly to relieve its petrol shortages. Moreover, Iran remains
    eager to contain Azerbaijani revanchist claims over the large Azeri
    minority in northern Iran.

    The conflicts in Transdnistria and the South Caucasus are usually
    called "frozen conflicts," because not much has happened since they
    began in the early 1990s. Any unilateral move to give Kosovo its
    independence is likely to unfreeze them - fast and bloodily. And such
    potential bloodshed on Russia's border may give Vladimir Putin the
    pretext he may desire to extend his rule beyond its constitutionally
    mandated end next March.

    Charles Tannock is a member of the European Parliament, where he is
    spokesman on foreign affairs for the British Conservative Party. THE
    DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with Project
    Syndicate (c) (www.project-syndicate.org)
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