Tweet
The Jerusalem Report
October 15, 2007
TREASURING TURKEY?
by Alon Liel
Diplomacy sometimes resembles physics. Even the hardest materials can
only stand a given amount of pressure and the same is true of
bilateral relations. The Israeli-Turkish bond, so meaningful and
stable during the 1990s, is now under severe pressure, and if things
are not quickly reversed, we could soon see some serious cracks.
Although the two countries had cooperated secretly on intelligence
issues since the late 1950s, the 1990s were unprecedented in
Israeli-Turkish relations, due mainly to the progress in Israel's
acceptance in the Middle East. The 1991 Madrid peace conference led
to the upgrading of ties to ambassadorial level.
The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles completely
broke the ice between Ankara and Jerusalem, generating high-level
visits and a series of military and economic agreements. In early
1996, the two countries signed a free trade agreement that was
followed by a decision to grant Israel a contract to upgrade 170
Turkish army tanks. The 1990s also witnessed a constant growth in the
volume of Israeli tourism to Turkey, and a meaningful increase in
bilateral trade. After the horrific earthquake in the Istanbul region
in August 1999, Israel was quick to provide massive and effective
help. By the end of the 1990s, Turkish public sympathy towards Israel
was at an all-time high. That this should be the case in a powerful
Muslim state was a major regional coup.
The first decade of the 21st century, however, has been very
different. The deterioration of ties with Israel started with
then-education minister Yossi Sarid promising in April 2000 to teach
Israeli children about the genocide allegedly committed by the Turks
against the Armenians during the First World War, a highly
inflammatory and sensitive issue in Turkey. Soon afterwards, the
second Palestinian intifada broke out, and the high Palestinian death
toll roused anti-Israeli feelings throughout the Muslim world.
At the height of the intifada, in November 2002 an Islamist leader,
Recep Tayip Erdogan, won an overwhelming victory in Turkish
elections. Eighteen months later, outraged at the Israeli
assassination of two senior Hamas leaders, Ahmad Yassin and Abdel
Aziz Rantisi in March and April 2004, Prime Minister Erdogan started
describing Israeli policy towards the Palestinians as "state
terrorism." Things continued to go wrong. During 2004, Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon rejected an offer from Erdogan to mediate between Israel
and Syria. A Turkish proposal to sell water to Israel was scuttled by
the Treasury, and large water projects granted to Israeli companies
in southeast Turkey collapsed. The years 2005-6 saw repeated media
stories about Israeli companies granting military assistance to the
Kurds in northern Iraq, much to the annoyance of the authorities in
Ankara, troubled by the demands of their own Kurdish minority.
During July and August this year, things went from bad to worse. This
period was dominated by tension between Ankara and major Jewish
organizations in the United States, which decided to change their
attitude towards the Armenian tragedy, defining it, for the first
time, as "genocide," and thereby triggering Turkish protests to
Jerusalem, misguidedly seen as somehow responsible for the Jewish
organizations' conduct.
All these new tensions came to a head on the night between September
5th and 6th, when Israeli warplanes allegedly attacked Syria,
Turkey's friendly neighbor, in unexplained circumstances. On their
way back, according to the Turks, the Israeli aircraft violated
Turkish airspace without notification or explanation. The new Turkish
Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan, described the Israeli attack as
"unacceptable" and one of his senior diplomats euphemistically
labeled Israel's subsequent conduct as "unprofessional." It seemed as
if Israel had forgotten that its ties with Turkey are based on a
close military bond, and that compromising that special link could be
extremely counterproductive.
If the attack on Syria had a convincing explanation - media reports
have said it was against a plant making nuclear devices with North
Korean input - why did Israel's best friend in the Middle East not
receive a good, real-time briefing on it? Israel needs to change its
mindset on Turkey. It must come to terms with the fact that since
July 2007, with the election of Abdullah Gul as president, the
Islamist "Justice and Development" party is in total control of the
Turkish political scene. Turkey's ties with the Islamic world are
constantly improving and all Israel needs to do to lose its special
status in Ankara is to supply the pretext.
Will the reported attack on Syria provide the excuse? In order to
prevent this from happening, Israel must make a special effort to
regain Ankara's confidence. Losing Turkey's friendship could have
devastating regional implications for Israel and possibly even for
the U.S., which seems likely to further insult the Turks by not
inviting them to the planned Middle East peace conference in the
fall. American and Israeli statesmen need to focus not only on how to
punish Iran and Syria for their misdeeds, but also on how to avoid
losing Turkey, which has been one of the West's staunchest allies
since World War II.
Dr. Alon Liel, a former Foreign Ministry director general, served as
Israel's charge d'affaires in Turkey during the 1980s.
October 15, 2007
TREASURING TURKEY?
by Alon Liel
Diplomacy sometimes resembles physics. Even the hardest materials can
only stand a given amount of pressure and the same is true of
bilateral relations. The Israeli-Turkish bond, so meaningful and
stable during the 1990s, is now under severe pressure, and if things
are not quickly reversed, we could soon see some serious cracks.
Although the two countries had cooperated secretly on intelligence
issues since the late 1950s, the 1990s were unprecedented in
Israeli-Turkish relations, due mainly to the progress in Israel's
acceptance in the Middle East. The 1991 Madrid peace conference led
to the upgrading of ties to ambassadorial level.
The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles completely
broke the ice between Ankara and Jerusalem, generating high-level
visits and a series of military and economic agreements. In early
1996, the two countries signed a free trade agreement that was
followed by a decision to grant Israel a contract to upgrade 170
Turkish army tanks. The 1990s also witnessed a constant growth in the
volume of Israeli tourism to Turkey, and a meaningful increase in
bilateral trade. After the horrific earthquake in the Istanbul region
in August 1999, Israel was quick to provide massive and effective
help. By the end of the 1990s, Turkish public sympathy towards Israel
was at an all-time high. That this should be the case in a powerful
Muslim state was a major regional coup.
The first decade of the 21st century, however, has been very
different. The deterioration of ties with Israel started with
then-education minister Yossi Sarid promising in April 2000 to teach
Israeli children about the genocide allegedly committed by the Turks
against the Armenians during the First World War, a highly
inflammatory and sensitive issue in Turkey. Soon afterwards, the
second Palestinian intifada broke out, and the high Palestinian death
toll roused anti-Israeli feelings throughout the Muslim world.
At the height of the intifada, in November 2002 an Islamist leader,
Recep Tayip Erdogan, won an overwhelming victory in Turkish
elections. Eighteen months later, outraged at the Israeli
assassination of two senior Hamas leaders, Ahmad Yassin and Abdel
Aziz Rantisi in March and April 2004, Prime Minister Erdogan started
describing Israeli policy towards the Palestinians as "state
terrorism." Things continued to go wrong. During 2004, Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon rejected an offer from Erdogan to mediate between Israel
and Syria. A Turkish proposal to sell water to Israel was scuttled by
the Treasury, and large water projects granted to Israeli companies
in southeast Turkey collapsed. The years 2005-6 saw repeated media
stories about Israeli companies granting military assistance to the
Kurds in northern Iraq, much to the annoyance of the authorities in
Ankara, troubled by the demands of their own Kurdish minority.
During July and August this year, things went from bad to worse. This
period was dominated by tension between Ankara and major Jewish
organizations in the United States, which decided to change their
attitude towards the Armenian tragedy, defining it, for the first
time, as "genocide," and thereby triggering Turkish protests to
Jerusalem, misguidedly seen as somehow responsible for the Jewish
organizations' conduct.
All these new tensions came to a head on the night between September
5th and 6th, when Israeli warplanes allegedly attacked Syria,
Turkey's friendly neighbor, in unexplained circumstances. On their
way back, according to the Turks, the Israeli aircraft violated
Turkish airspace without notification or explanation. The new Turkish
Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan, described the Israeli attack as
"unacceptable" and one of his senior diplomats euphemistically
labeled Israel's subsequent conduct as "unprofessional." It seemed as
if Israel had forgotten that its ties with Turkey are based on a
close military bond, and that compromising that special link could be
extremely counterproductive.
If the attack on Syria had a convincing explanation - media reports
have said it was against a plant making nuclear devices with North
Korean input - why did Israel's best friend in the Middle East not
receive a good, real-time briefing on it? Israel needs to change its
mindset on Turkey. It must come to terms with the fact that since
July 2007, with the election of Abdullah Gul as president, the
Islamist "Justice and Development" party is in total control of the
Turkish political scene. Turkey's ties with the Islamic world are
constantly improving and all Israel needs to do to lose its special
status in Ankara is to supply the pretext.
Will the reported attack on Syria provide the excuse? In order to
prevent this from happening, Israel must make a special effort to
regain Ankara's confidence. Losing Turkey's friendship could have
devastating regional implications for Israel and possibly even for
the U.S., which seems likely to further insult the Turks by not
inviting them to the planned Middle East peace conference in the
fall. American and Israeli statesmen need to focus not only on how to
punish Iran and Syria for their misdeeds, but also on how to avoid
losing Turkey, which has been one of the West's staunchest allies
since World War II.
Dr. Alon Liel, a former Foreign Ministry director general, served as
Israel's charge d'affaires in Turkey during the 1980s.