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The Times of Central Asia
August 15, 2008 Friday
`Territorial integrity' and Cold War thinking
By Charles van der Leeuw
TCA contributor
ALMATY, August 15 (TCA Editions) -- If the makers of Australia's Mad
Max soap movies are thinking of a new episode, the Caucasus will be
their obvious location. Mikhail Saakashvili's reckless adventure into
Georgia's breakaway territory of South Ossetia, carrying the risk of a
second offensive against the other escapist province of Abkhazia,
ended up in disaster as could have been predicted - even though
Russia's open and fierce response to it may have surprised friend and
foe.
Moscow's overall goal must have been to set an example and send a
clear message once and for all - less in the face of Georgian than in
that of the United States. The message is: Stop meddling as though the
Cold War were still in full swing - or else collaborators are bound to
regret it.
When the same thing happened back in 1991, the main perpetrator was
Tengiz Kitovani, the first lieutenant of the turbulent and ultra-right
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The irony is that the latter had
unilaterally split Georgia off from the USSR two years earlier, in
spite of protests from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, until then two
autonomous regions within the Soviet republic of Georgia. Kitovani's
troops were literally shot out of South Ossetia, and a later attempt
under Edward Shevardnadze to retake Abkhazia ended in a similar
disaster. In both cases, the Georgian party had hoped for support from
the Western powers, who, however, wisely kept themselves aloof from
the battles. Russia as well kept its discretion and, though providing
some logistic support, not one Russian soldier intervened until the
sky had been cleared of gun smoke.
This time, the situation looks different. Ever since Bush Junior came
to power, Washington has dreamed of one more powerful enemy to keep
America's arms industry in business and the US army in its full force
at hand. The US government has abused its "war on terror" on the other
side of the globe to create a spearhead into Central Asia and
undermine Russia's hegemony in the volatile region. It would probably
not hesitate to encourage Uzbekistan to do the same thing in
Kyrgyzstan's Osh that Saakashvili has tried to undertake in
Tskhinvali. Borders in Central Asia have only vaguely been agreed on,
and ethnic minorities occupying potential separatist zones are
everywhere. The recent discover of weapons in American officers' home
in Bishkek, enough to organize a palace revolution with, amply
illustrates that America has other plans with Central Asia than just
fighting off Taliban hordes.
Just like American peddle diplomat April Glaspy in the late 1980s
virtually told Saddam Hussein to occupy Kuwait (and was later
surprised to see that he responded by doing just that) her successor
Condoleezza Rice hardly more than a fortnight previous to
Saakashvili's crackdown on Tskhinvali must have at least given him the
impression that he could go ahead with the fulfillment of his election
promise to "restore the fatherland's territorial unity" by force if he
could. This silent nod and what followed was all based on a formidable
miscalculation. Will it all lead to the end of the flag-carrier of the
Pink Revolution's political life, as it did in the case of
Gamsakhurdia in late 1992? Some think that this is what the Russian
leadership has in mind - hence the big guns they put in. But it is far
from sure how the Georgian community will react.
If it is true that breakaway self-styled maverick states on one's
territory are painful and humiliating, ways to deal with them are not
amply available and giving in to provocations by third parties is the
least wise thing to do. Looking back in time, it has become clear that
Azerbaijan's attempt to take back its Armenian-backed enclave of
Nagorno Karabakh by force between 1992 and 1994 only resulted in a
crushing defeat and more of its territory occupied, with about a
million survivors chased from their homes. Moldova cherishes little
hope of getting its left bank, on which separatists have proclaimed
the so-called Trans-Dnyestr Republic, back within its borders.
The trouble is that once a community has entrenched itself on the
territory it occupies, it is hard to reintegrate it with the former
state structure. The only compromise within reach is the formation of
what would be a federation at best, and probably more of a
confederation. For all it matters, split-offs have taken place
throughout world history. Thus, France was the result of a split-off
from Charlemagne's Franco-German realm. The Netherlands used to be
part of France from the 6th to the 10th Century AD, only to fall in
the hands of the Germans subsequently, and after a brief incorporation
into the Spanish kingdom in the 16th Century, it fought itself out of
it and gained full independence. Both France and Germany have tried to
retake it by force - somewhat less than successfully.
Today, it would be hard to imagine Spain claiming Holland back. The
slogan "territorial integrity", as agreed upon in the UN charter, may
look nice but it simply denies the course of history. And even the UN
has made a number of exceptions, the most important of which are
Alaska, Hawaii and Greenland, whose right to establish fully
independent states is being recognized by the international community
including Denmark and America. A referendum by Copenhagen in the 1990s
among the Eskimo-and-a-half living in Greenland resulted in an
overwhelming majority rejecting independence.
August 15, 2008 Friday
`Territorial integrity' and Cold War thinking
By Charles van der Leeuw
TCA contributor
ALMATY, August 15 (TCA Editions) -- If the makers of Australia's Mad
Max soap movies are thinking of a new episode, the Caucasus will be
their obvious location. Mikhail Saakashvili's reckless adventure into
Georgia's breakaway territory of South Ossetia, carrying the risk of a
second offensive against the other escapist province of Abkhazia,
ended up in disaster as could have been predicted - even though
Russia's open and fierce response to it may have surprised friend and
foe.
Moscow's overall goal must have been to set an example and send a
clear message once and for all - less in the face of Georgian than in
that of the United States. The message is: Stop meddling as though the
Cold War were still in full swing - or else collaborators are bound to
regret it.
When the same thing happened back in 1991, the main perpetrator was
Tengiz Kitovani, the first lieutenant of the turbulent and ultra-right
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The irony is that the latter had
unilaterally split Georgia off from the USSR two years earlier, in
spite of protests from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, until then two
autonomous regions within the Soviet republic of Georgia. Kitovani's
troops were literally shot out of South Ossetia, and a later attempt
under Edward Shevardnadze to retake Abkhazia ended in a similar
disaster. In both cases, the Georgian party had hoped for support from
the Western powers, who, however, wisely kept themselves aloof from
the battles. Russia as well kept its discretion and, though providing
some logistic support, not one Russian soldier intervened until the
sky had been cleared of gun smoke.
This time, the situation looks different. Ever since Bush Junior came
to power, Washington has dreamed of one more powerful enemy to keep
America's arms industry in business and the US army in its full force
at hand. The US government has abused its "war on terror" on the other
side of the globe to create a spearhead into Central Asia and
undermine Russia's hegemony in the volatile region. It would probably
not hesitate to encourage Uzbekistan to do the same thing in
Kyrgyzstan's Osh that Saakashvili has tried to undertake in
Tskhinvali. Borders in Central Asia have only vaguely been agreed on,
and ethnic minorities occupying potential separatist zones are
everywhere. The recent discover of weapons in American officers' home
in Bishkek, enough to organize a palace revolution with, amply
illustrates that America has other plans with Central Asia than just
fighting off Taliban hordes.
Just like American peddle diplomat April Glaspy in the late 1980s
virtually told Saddam Hussein to occupy Kuwait (and was later
surprised to see that he responded by doing just that) her successor
Condoleezza Rice hardly more than a fortnight previous to
Saakashvili's crackdown on Tskhinvali must have at least given him the
impression that he could go ahead with the fulfillment of his election
promise to "restore the fatherland's territorial unity" by force if he
could. This silent nod and what followed was all based on a formidable
miscalculation. Will it all lead to the end of the flag-carrier of the
Pink Revolution's political life, as it did in the case of
Gamsakhurdia in late 1992? Some think that this is what the Russian
leadership has in mind - hence the big guns they put in. But it is far
from sure how the Georgian community will react.
If it is true that breakaway self-styled maverick states on one's
territory are painful and humiliating, ways to deal with them are not
amply available and giving in to provocations by third parties is the
least wise thing to do. Looking back in time, it has become clear that
Azerbaijan's attempt to take back its Armenian-backed enclave of
Nagorno Karabakh by force between 1992 and 1994 only resulted in a
crushing defeat and more of its territory occupied, with about a
million survivors chased from their homes. Moldova cherishes little
hope of getting its left bank, on which separatists have proclaimed
the so-called Trans-Dnyestr Republic, back within its borders.
The trouble is that once a community has entrenched itself on the
territory it occupies, it is hard to reintegrate it with the former
state structure. The only compromise within reach is the formation of
what would be a federation at best, and probably more of a
confederation. For all it matters, split-offs have taken place
throughout world history. Thus, France was the result of a split-off
from Charlemagne's Franco-German realm. The Netherlands used to be
part of France from the 6th to the 10th Century AD, only to fall in
the hands of the Germans subsequently, and after a brief incorporation
into the Spanish kingdom in the 16th Century, it fought itself out of
it and gained full independence. Both France and Germany have tried to
retake it by force - somewhat less than successfully.
Today, it would be hard to imagine Spain claiming Holland back. The
slogan "territorial integrity", as agreed upon in the UN charter, may
look nice but it simply denies the course of history. And even the UN
has made a number of exceptions, the most important of which are
Alaska, Hawaii and Greenland, whose right to establish fully
independent states is being recognized by the international community
including Denmark and America. A referendum by Copenhagen in the 1990s
among the Eskimo-and-a-half living in Greenland resulted in an
overwhelming majority rejecting independence.