Tweet
THE GAME OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH IS GOING ON AND THE PLAYER WITH STRONGER NERVES WILL WIN
David Stepanyan
Ar
2010-08-20 15:39:00
Interview with Aleksey Vlasov, Director of the Russian Center for
Post-Soviet Area, editor-in-chief of Vestnik Kavkaza portal, Deputy
Dean of the Moscow State University History Department
Mr.Vlasov, do you see any link between the signing of a new strategic
treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the prolongation of the
period of deployment of the 102nd Russian military unit in Armenia?
They are certainly inter-related. Some Azerbaijani political experts
are mistaken thinking hat Russia definitely staked on Armenia as
the outpost of the Kremlin in the South Caucasus in response to
rapprochement of Baku and Ankara. Everything is much more complicated,
I think. Russia leaves no hopes for a more complicated game. One
should not make any hasty conclusions before the visit of Medvedev to
Baku in autumn. As of S-300 air defense system, the expert said that
it meets the diversified policy of Russia. It is clear, however, that
Azerbaijan needs more tangible arguments to retain the former dynamics
of rapprochement with Moscow. The Karabakh issue is probably no longer
in this list. Energy cooperation and trade-economic cooperation are
possible topics for the dialogue.
But one can make conclusions on how much these actions may compensate
for Baku the negative reaction in the society, connected with the
Russian-Armenian treaty about the base, only after the Russian
leader's visit to Azerbaijan in autumn of the current year. As for
the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, enhancing of the new
strategic alliance is really connected with the Karabakh conflict
as well, in which the negotiating pause has appeared. This step had
to push Yerevan to compromises, but its effectiveness was reduced
because of the Russian decision on the base. The game goes on, and
the player with strong nerves will win.
Does this agreement imply that Russian border guards will have wider
powers in protecting the borders with Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan in
case of new Azeri aggression?
I think that the Russian leadership will not pit stress on the content
of the treaty but its spirit. That is to say, the fact of its signing
is a guarantee for Yerevan but not evidence of Russia's readiness to
fight for Karabakh. Moscow will not draw much attention on the topic,
as it will prevent the conflict via the diplomatic ways but not follow
its military stage. It will not be the status-quo in the Kremlin way.
Can we be 100% sure that there will be no new war in Nagorno-Karabakh
considering Moscow's growing involvement in the peace process?
Moscow really tries to create a new balance of relations in the
Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan triangle and all the latest steps by the
Kremlin were aimed to keep this balance in case of military actions
around Karabakh. The developments around S-300 and the military base on
Armenia constitute links in one and the same chain when transferring
"the keys to crisis" to Moscow. It is another matter how the Kremlin
will use this situation. The strategic lines of Russia's behavior
are not observed yet. Tactical landscape is more visible and our
diplomacy takes to it like a duck to water.
Are the rumors that Russia has supplied Azerbaijan with S-300 air
defense systems true and do they have any connection with the visit
of President Medvedev to Armenia?
The supposed sale by Russia to Azerbaijan of the two air defence
systems C-300 'Favorit' is understood in Baku as a finished deal.
Local experts think that this complex will allow Azerbaijan to protect
its strategical facilities from possible missile strikes. It is very
much possible. But the point is who is watched as a potential source
of threat. It may be either Armenia or Iran. But the real meaning
of this step should be compared with general nature of relations
between Russian Federation and Azerbaijan. Against the background
of displeasure of the Azerbaijani elite regarding the new format of
the treaty with Armenia on the base, this bargain is watched like
a balancing step but not like a new stage of inter-actions between
Moscow and Baku in the military sphere.
Recently Russia has substantially strengthened its positions in both
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Are they doing it exclusively at the expense
of the United States or are there other countries too?
Russia has really enhanced its positions in the South Caucasus. But
the main resource of this progress is the systemized weakening of
the positions of Washington.
Barack Obama has not yet gained a strict position regarding this
region and the situation about the ambassador to Baku is another
evidence of it. The rest players have still preserved their positions.
Ankara could really improve them but the domestic political problems
of this country affect Turkey's position much. In general, Russia's
success is more a result of other players' failure. Just this
circumstance does not make it possible to assess the Russian policy
in the South Caucasus like good or bad. New opportunities for the
energy game, for further isolation of Georgia and for bargaining on
the Iranian topic have been opened. But these opportunities have been
just opened a little, and they should be still used.
From: A. Papazian
David Stepanyan
Ar
2010-08-20 15:39:00
Interview with Aleksey Vlasov, Director of the Russian Center for
Post-Soviet Area, editor-in-chief of Vestnik Kavkaza portal, Deputy
Dean of the Moscow State University History Department
Mr.Vlasov, do you see any link between the signing of a new strategic
treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the prolongation of the
period of deployment of the 102nd Russian military unit in Armenia?
They are certainly inter-related. Some Azerbaijani political experts
are mistaken thinking hat Russia definitely staked on Armenia as
the outpost of the Kremlin in the South Caucasus in response to
rapprochement of Baku and Ankara. Everything is much more complicated,
I think. Russia leaves no hopes for a more complicated game. One
should not make any hasty conclusions before the visit of Medvedev to
Baku in autumn. As of S-300 air defense system, the expert said that
it meets the diversified policy of Russia. It is clear, however, that
Azerbaijan needs more tangible arguments to retain the former dynamics
of rapprochement with Moscow. The Karabakh issue is probably no longer
in this list. Energy cooperation and trade-economic cooperation are
possible topics for the dialogue.
But one can make conclusions on how much these actions may compensate
for Baku the negative reaction in the society, connected with the
Russian-Armenian treaty about the base, only after the Russian
leader's visit to Azerbaijan in autumn of the current year. As for
the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, enhancing of the new
strategic alliance is really connected with the Karabakh conflict
as well, in which the negotiating pause has appeared. This step had
to push Yerevan to compromises, but its effectiveness was reduced
because of the Russian decision on the base. The game goes on, and
the player with strong nerves will win.
Does this agreement imply that Russian border guards will have wider
powers in protecting the borders with Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan in
case of new Azeri aggression?
I think that the Russian leadership will not pit stress on the content
of the treaty but its spirit. That is to say, the fact of its signing
is a guarantee for Yerevan but not evidence of Russia's readiness to
fight for Karabakh. Moscow will not draw much attention on the topic,
as it will prevent the conflict via the diplomatic ways but not follow
its military stage. It will not be the status-quo in the Kremlin way.
Can we be 100% sure that there will be no new war in Nagorno-Karabakh
considering Moscow's growing involvement in the peace process?
Moscow really tries to create a new balance of relations in the
Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan triangle and all the latest steps by the
Kremlin were aimed to keep this balance in case of military actions
around Karabakh. The developments around S-300 and the military base on
Armenia constitute links in one and the same chain when transferring
"the keys to crisis" to Moscow. It is another matter how the Kremlin
will use this situation. The strategic lines of Russia's behavior
are not observed yet. Tactical landscape is more visible and our
diplomacy takes to it like a duck to water.
Are the rumors that Russia has supplied Azerbaijan with S-300 air
defense systems true and do they have any connection with the visit
of President Medvedev to Armenia?
The supposed sale by Russia to Azerbaijan of the two air defence
systems C-300 'Favorit' is understood in Baku as a finished deal.
Local experts think that this complex will allow Azerbaijan to protect
its strategical facilities from possible missile strikes. It is very
much possible. But the point is who is watched as a potential source
of threat. It may be either Armenia or Iran. But the real meaning
of this step should be compared with general nature of relations
between Russian Federation and Azerbaijan. Against the background
of displeasure of the Azerbaijani elite regarding the new format of
the treaty with Armenia on the base, this bargain is watched like
a balancing step but not like a new stage of inter-actions between
Moscow and Baku in the military sphere.
Recently Russia has substantially strengthened its positions in both
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Are they doing it exclusively at the expense
of the United States or are there other countries too?
Russia has really enhanced its positions in the South Caucasus. But
the main resource of this progress is the systemized weakening of
the positions of Washington.
Barack Obama has not yet gained a strict position regarding this
region and the situation about the ambassador to Baku is another
evidence of it. The rest players have still preserved their positions.
Ankara could really improve them but the domestic political problems
of this country affect Turkey's position much. In general, Russia's
success is more a result of other players' failure. Just this
circumstance does not make it possible to assess the Russian policy
in the South Caucasus like good or bad. New opportunities for the
energy game, for further isolation of Georgia and for bargaining on
the Iranian topic have been opened. But these opportunities have been
just opened a little, and they should be still used.
From: A. Papazian