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PROTOCOLS TO HAVE 'PROFOUND EFFECT' ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS, SAYS ENVOY
asbarez
August 10th, 2011
Former US Ambassador to Turkey, James Jeffrey
The fate of the Turkey-Armenia protocols will have the most "profound
effect" on the Turkey-US relations, said former US Ambassador to
Turkey, James Jeffrey, in a 2010 State Department cable released
by WikiLeaks.
In discussing US expectations vis-a-vis Turkey's follow through on the
UN or US-imposed sanctions on Iran, Jeffrey, in a January 2010 cable
said: "This [the Iran issue] will have a profound effect on [US-Turkey]
relations second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the
next year."
After Turkey refused to sign the dangerous Turkey-Armenia Protocols,
the US was quick to say that the proverbial ball was now in Turkey's
court. That statement first received much attention, when Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton visited Armenia and made the statement at
a press conference there.
State Department circles and officials have publicly, and privately,
reiterated that point, firmly believing that the ill-conceived
protocols were-and are-the only way to address the centuries-old
Turkish-Armenian question, including the Armenian Genocide.
Jeffrey also says that "Major challenges with us [the US] in the coming
months include the direction of Turkish-Israeli relations, the fate
of the Protocols with Armenia, and the Turkish posture vis-a-vis Iran."
In a very frank tone, Jeffrey delineates the obstacles and challenges
facing US-Turkey relations as the AKP party fortifies its positions
and lever within the Turkish government and society.
Jeffrey acknowledges that Turkey is pursuing "Neo-Ottoman" policy and
cites a speech delivered by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
in Sarajevo at the end of 2009, in which Davutoglu claimed that
the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East were better off under
Ottoman rule.
"We will re-establish this (Ottoman) Balkan," Jeffrey quotes Davutoglu
from his Sarajevo speech.
Read the entire WikiLeaks cable.
Viewing cable 10ANKARA87, WHAT LIES BENEATH ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN
POLICY If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction
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Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ~UThe
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#10ANKARA87.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 10ANKARA87
2010-01-20 05:25 2010-11-28 18:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO2532 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
RUEHSR DE RUEHAK #0087/01 0200525 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 200525Z JAN
10 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1747
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU
DHABI 0003 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0994 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
1550 RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0581 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0511
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1792 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0250
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1082 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0170
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0691 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0252
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 6792 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0352
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT
STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE RUEUITH/ODC
ANKARA TUC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 000087
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020 TAGS: PREL TU SUBJECT: WHAT LIES BENEATH
ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY
REF: A. 09 ANKARA 1717 ¶B. 09 ISTANBUL 466 ¶C. 09 ANKARA 1561 (EXDIS)
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
INTRODUCTION/COMMENT --------------------
¶1. (C) There is much talk in chanceries and in the international
media these days about Turkey's new, highly activist foreign policy,
which unquestionably represents a transition not only from prior
governments, but also from the AKP regime before the Gaza/Davos
events, and before the ascent of Ahmet Davutoglu as Foreign Minister
in April. Some commentaries are upbeat, but others, including many
experts and editorial writers in the US, have expressed concern. The
ruling AKP foreign policy is driven by both a desire to be more
independently activist, and by a more Islamic orientation. Frankly,
rational national interest, particularly trade opportunities and
stability considerations, also drives Turkey's new slant. Major
challenges with us in the coming months include the direction of
Turkish-Israeli relations, the fate of the Protocols with Armenia,
and the Turkish posture vis--vis Iran.
¶2. (C) Does all this mean that the country is becoming more focused
on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign
policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is "abandoning" or wants
to abandon its traditional Western orientation and willingness to
cooperate with us? Absolutely not. At the end of the day we will have
to live with a Turkey whose population is propelling much of what we
see. This calls for a more issue-by-issue approach, and recognition
that Turkey will often go its own way. In any case, sooner or later we
will no longer have to deal with the current cast of political leaders,
with their special yen for destructive drama and - rhetoric. But we see
no one better on the horizon, and Turkey will remain a complicated
blend of world class "Western" institutions, competencies, and
orientation, and Middle Eastern culture and religion. END INTRODUCTION.
COMPONENTS OF POLICY --------------------
"The Traditional Western"
¶3. (C) Turkish policy today is a mix of "traditional Western"
orientation, attitudes and interests, and two new elements,
linked with new operational philosophies: "zero conflicts" and
"neo-Ottomanism." The traditional still represents the core of Turkish
foreign policy, and is centered on cooperation and integration with
the West. Its core is NATO, the customs union with the EU, and
most significantly, the EU accession effort. This all began with
the Ottoman effort to emulate the European great powers, and was
propelled powerfully forward by Ataturk. Nevertheless the country was
on the sidelines in World War II. It was only the threat of the USSR,
and the dominance (and outstretched hand) of the US, that led to the
"Turkey we know": tough combat partner in Korea, major NATO ally,
US anchor in the Middle East.
Much of this continues.
¶4. (C) Europe is by far Turkey's most important economic partner
in terms of investment and trade. The EU accounts for 42 percent
of Turkey,s total trade, while the US accounts for a bit less than
5 percent. While the US is much less important in terms of trade
statistics, it remains important in various sectors (e.g.energy,
aviation, military), and in various ways. NATO is essential to and
much respected by
ANKARA 00000087 002 OF 006
Turkey. (Note: The fact that "only" about one-third of the Turkish
population in one poll see NATO as important to Turkey's security
is actually a plus; on any poll Turks usually are overwhelmingly
negative about any foreign engagement or relationship. But we should
not be too sanguine here since support for NATO has been halved over
the past decade. End Note) The military is armed by the US, and Turkey
recognizes that many fires in its back yard -- from Iraq to Afghanistan
and Pakistan -- can only be solved by close cooperation with and
acceptance of US and NATO leadership. Finally, even AKP leaders know
that much of their allure or "wasta" in the Middle East and elsewhere
stems from their privileged position in key Western clubs.
This traditional orientation may be shaken, or reduced, but as it
has both significant buy-in by elites of all philosophies, and many
concrete advantages, Turkey will not abandon it.
"Zero Problems with Turkey's Neighbors"
¶5. (C) But this Turkey is trying to "post-modernize" itself.
One major area of AKP effort has been to resolve problems with Turkey's
immediate "near abroad." This effort stands in contrast with the
"traditional" Turkish policy of letting these frozen conflicts fester,
and is much more compatible with US and European interests. The list of
Turkish initiatives under the AKP is impressive: accepting the Annan
Plan in 2004 to resolve Cyprus, continuing the 1999 rapprochement
with Greece, the opening to Armenia culminating in the signing of
recognition protocols, warming and productive relations with both
Baghdad and Erbil (the latter complemented by significant reforms in
Turkey's relations with its own Kurdish population). The signature
accomplishment of this policy is the wooing of Syria. While this road
to Damascus in fact was paved by Syria's accommodation of prior Turkish
governments' demands (relinquishing claims on Turkey's Hatay province,
expelling Ocalan), it is touted by the Turks as a game-changer. As
noted below, they have leveraged it to tackle a number of regional
problems, from Lebanon to Iran.
¶6. (C) While this new approach is to be applauded, there is a fly
in its ointment. Little of true practical and final accomplishment
has been achieved. Cyprus is still split (albeit the fault, at least
in terms of the Annan plan, lies more with the Greek Cypriots and
the EU); tensions with Greece in the Aegean continue; the Protocols
with Armenia have not been ratified due to Turkish concerns about
Nagorno-Karabakh; Iraq's instability and the KRG's unwillingness
to do more against the PKK raise questions about the sustainability
of Turkey's constructive Iraq policy; the rapprochement with Syria
has not really produced any Syrian "flip" away from Iran. Granted,
Turkey is dealing with some of the world's most difficult actors,
and facing stiff opposition at home to making more concessions,
but the proof of this pudding is yet to be seen.
"Neo Ottomanism"
¶7. (C) The idea of Turkey using its cultural and religious links
to the Middle East to the advantage of both Turkish interests and
regional stability is not new with the AKP, but has been given much
more priority by it, in part because of the Islamic orientation of much
of the party, including leaders Erdogan, Gul, and Davutoglu. Moreover,
the AKP's constant harping on its unique understanding of the region,
and outreach to populations over the heads of conservative, pro-US
governments, have led to accusations of "neo-Ottomanism." Rather than
deny, Davutoglu has embraced this accusation. Himself the grandson
of an Ottoman soldier
ANKARA 00000087 003 OF 006
who fought in Gaza, Davutoglu summed up the Davutoglu/AKP philosophy in
an extraordinary speech in Sarajevo in late 2009 (REF A). His thesis:
the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East were all better off when under
Ottoman control or influence; peace and progress prevailed. Alas the
region has been ravaged by division and war ever since. (He was too
clever to explicitly blame all that on the imperialist western powers,
but came close). However, now Turkey is back, ready to lead -- or
even unite. (Davutoglu: "We will re-establish this (Ottoman) Balkan").
¶8. (C) While this speech was given in the Balkans, most of its
impact is in the Middle East. Davutoglu's theory is that most of
the regimes there are both undemocratic and illegitimate. Turkey,
building on the alleged admiration among Middle Eastern populations
for its economic success and power, and willing to stand up for the
interests of the people, reaches over the regimes to the "Arab street."
Turkey's excoriating the Israelis over Gaza, culminating in the
insulting treatment of President Peres by Erdogan at Davos in 2009,
illustrates this trend. To capitalize on its rapport with the people,
and supposed diplomatic expertise and Ottoman experience, Turkey has
thrown itself into a half-dozen conflicts as a mediator. This has
worked well, as noted above, with Iraq, and was quite successful in
the Syrian-Israeli talks before Gaza. Turkey has also achieved some
limited success on Lebanon and in bringing Saudi Arabia and Syria
together. As noted below, however, this policy brings with it great
frictions, not just with us and the Europeans but with many supposed
beneficiaries of a return to Ottoman suzerainty. Furthermore, it has
not achieved any single success of note.
WHY THE CHANGE?
---------------
¶9. (C) Various factors explain the shifts we see in Turkish foreign
policy beyond the personal views of the AKP leadership:
-- Islamization: As reported REF B, religiosity has been increasing
in Turkey in past years, just as has been seen in many other Muslim
societies. The AKP is both a beneficiary of, and a stimulus for, this
phenomenon. However, bitter opposition within Turkey against domestic
"pro-Islamic" reforms (e.g., head scarves) has frustrated the AKP,
and a more "Islamic" or "Middle Eastern" foreign policy offers an
alternative sop for the AKP's devout base.
-- Success: Despite its problems, Turkey over the past 50 years
has been a success story, rising to the 16th largest economy and
membership in the G-20. This, along with its extraordinary security
situation compared to all other regional states, and democratic system,
encourage a more active -- and more independent -- leadership role
in regional and even global affairs.
-- Economics: one secret of Turkish success has been its trade and
technology-led economic growth. This growth is in good part thanks to
its customs union with the EU, by far its biggest export market, and
resulting investment from the EU, as well as decades of technology
transfer and educational assistance from the U.S. Nevertheless,
with exports to the EU down due to the 2008-2009 crisis, Turkey is
looking for new markets, particularly in the hydrocarbon rich Arab
world, Iran, Russia, and Caucasus/Central Asia. They have money,
and strong import demand, and Turkey is dependent on them for its oil
and gas. These countries, however, (along with China-another Turkish
export target) tend much more than the EU and North America to mix
politics and trade. To some
ANKARA 00000087 004 OF 006
degree the West thus is taken for granted and economic priority is
directed towards relations with the Middle East and "Eurasia."
-- Civilians ascendant: Erdogan's political success - together with
a number of messy scandals resulting in public investigation - has
meant that the Turkish General Staff now plays a much smaller role in
defining Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey's support to NATO is still
strong, but it now lacks the suspicion of Russia which the cold-war
instinct of General Staff brought to the mix.
-- EU disillusionment: Both popular and elite Turkish opinion has
recently grown much more pessimistic about eventual EU membership --
or even its value. The reasons for this are complex, but include the
shifting mood in Europe towards Islam, the replacement of "pro-Turkey"
leaders in France and Germany by Sarkozy and Merkel, both decidedly
cool towards Turkey's EU membership, and a sense in Turkey of distance
from and lack of sympathy for Europe.
-- Relativization of the Western anchor. An op-ed in the Financial
Times by Gideon Rechman on January 4 noted correctly the tendency of
the "young giants" -- South Africa, Brazil, India, and Turkey -- to
pursue Third Worldish policies and rhetoric even while benefitting
enormously from the globalized trade and international security
created and maintained by the "West." That certainly characterizes
Turkey. With the end of the cold war, relative success in the struggle
with the PKK, and the "taming" of Syria, Iraq, and (at least from
Turkey's point of view) Iran, Turkey's need for NATO and U.S. security
is reduced. Its dependence on Western trade, investment, technology
transfer and educational exchange remains critical, but is regarded as
a "free good" that Turkey deserves and does not have to expend effort
for. Relations with its various new friends in the North-East-South
or on the other hand require effort which is facilitated by some
downplaying of Turkey's Western anchor.
DAVUTOGLU DISCONTENTS ---------------------
¶10. (C) The AKP's new approach to international affairs receives mixed
reviews inside and outside Turkey. It is not a major factor in the
AKP's relative popularity, but several elements of it (unfortunately,
those we are least happy with) do appeal to voters. Criticism of Israel
post-Gaza is overwhelmingly popular, and the relatively soft Turkish
position on Iran -- a country about which many Turks are skeptical --
is presumably helpful with a narrow, but for Erdogan's electoral fate
important, group of Islamic voters associated with former PM Erbakan.
¶11. (C) Nevertheless, many in Turkey's large westernized elite see the
Islamic Outreach as a complement to the alleged AKP plan to Islamize
Turkish society, and complain bitterly about their country's losing
its western moorings. The Nationalist segment in Turkey, mobilized
most by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), sees the AKP's compromises
on Armenia, the KRG in northern Iraq, Cyprus, etc, as a betrayal of
diaspora "Turks" (the Iraqi Turkomen, Azeris, Turkish Cypriots, etc)
and charges that the AKP is trying to replace the Republic's organizing
principle of "Turkism" with the broader Islamic "Umma." The Republican
People's Party (CHP), the lead opposition party, attacks AKP foreign
policy relatively ineffectively with a mix of MHP-like nationalist
rhetoric and "abandoning the west" criticism.
¶12. (C) But it is in the EU that the Erdogan foreign policy of late
has run into the heaviest of sailing. To some degree
ANKARA 00000087 005 OF 006
European angst at Turkey's "new direction" is viewed as an excuse
to pummel Turkey to score domestic points among anti-foreigner
elements. But there is real concern in Europe, made manifest by the
Rasmussen NATO SecGen issue last April. Europeans were furious with
Turkey's presentng itself as the "Islamic" voice or conscience in
NATO, having consulted with Middle Eastern States before talking
to its NATO allies. Extrapolating that behavior into the even
more diversity-intolerant EU is a nightmare. Erdogan's foreign
(and domestic) policy orientation conjures up not just a clash
of Christianity and Islam, but the spectre of a "meld" of Europe
and the Middle East, and of Europe's secularlism with oriental
religiosity. Davutoglu and others argue that Turkey's "success"
as a coming Middle East power makes it more attractive to the EU --
giving Europe a new foreign policy "market" through Turkey. While
some in Europe appear interested in this idea, ironically including
Turkey EU membership skeptic France, this does not seem to carry much
weight in most European capitals, let alone populations.
¶13. (C) Finally, not all of the ex-Ottomans look with fondness on
their past under the Pashas, or yearn for Turkey's return. Reaction
among many in the Balkans to Davutoglu's Sarejevo speech (REF A)
was quite strong. In the Middle East itself, the Arab street might
applaud Turkey's populistic and essentially cost-free support for
more radical elements, but it's not particularly appreciated by rulers
(although Turkey seems to have made some progress with Syria, brokered
a rapprochement between President Bashir and Saudi King Abdullah, and
has had some role in resolving the Lebanon cabinet stalemate). Sooner
or later, though, Turkey will have to produce results, take risks,
commit real resources, and take hard decisions to augment a policy now
consisting mainly of popular slogans, ceaseless trips, and innumerable
signatures on MOUs of little importance. The experience with Iran,
which despite significant Turkish verbal support and wooing, appears
uninterested in granting Turkey any concessions, or agreeing to a
Turkish lead in mediation efforts, is telling.
THE PROBLEM FOR THE US ----------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey's new foreign policy is a mixed bag for us.
Having regional heavyweights take on burdens, thereby relieving us,
has long been a desired goal of US policy, but it comes with a certain
loss of control. Nevertheless, on a whole host of key issues of
supreme importance to us -- Afghanistan and Pakistan, cooperation in
and on Iraq, NATO efforts (although a leading Turkish role in Missile
Defense will not be easy) -- Turkey is a crucial ally, and our use of
Incirlik, Habur gate, and Turkish airspace for our Iraq and Afghanistan
operations is indispensible. Its "zero conflicts" initiatives, which
have moved Turkey forward on more of the key bilateral spats --
Cyprus, Greece, Kurds, Northern Iraq, Armenia -- than we have seen
with any other Turkish government, also support U.S. interests.
¶15. (C) Nevertheless, these latter issues illustrate two problems. At
least in Turkish eyes, on this complex of issues the US , especially
the media, interest groups, and Congress, default to a "blame Turkey"
posture regardless of whatever it does. Second, Turkey has repeatedly
run into trouble actually consummating these various openings -- the
Armenian protocols being the best example, but continued overflights of
Greek islands and domestic opposition to the Kurdish opening are also
relevant. What we fear is that this inability to bring to conclusion
foreign policy initiatives will affect not just the above, but most
Turkish policy, given the over-extension of Davutoglu and his team,
and a
ANKARA 00000087 006 OF 006
tendency to substitute rhetoric for long term investment of diplomatic,
military, and assistance capital. (Fortunately, Afghanistan/Pakistan
and Iraq are the two major exceptions to this tendency.)
¶16. (C) The greatest potential strategic problem for the US, however,
and the one that has some of the commentators howling, is the Turks
neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle East and Balkans. This
"back to the past" attitude so clear in Davutoglu's Sarajevo speech,
combined with the Turks' tendency to execute it through alliances
with more Islamic or more worrisome local actors, constantly creates
new problems.
Part of this is structural. Despite their success and relative power,
the Turks really can't compete on equal terms with either the US or
regional "leaders" (EU in the Balkans, Russia in the Caucasus/Black
Sea, Saudis, Egyptians and even Iranians in the ME). With Rolls Royce
ambitions but Rover resources, to cut themselves in on the action
the Turks have to "cheat" by finding an underdog (this also plays
to Erdogan's own worldview), a Siladjcic, Mish'al, or Ahmadinejad,
who will be happy to have the Turks take up his cause. The Turks then
attempt to ram through revisions to at least the reigning "Western"
position to the favor of their guy. Given, again, the questioning of
Western policy and motives by much of the Turkish public and the AKP,
such an approach provides a relatively low cost and popular tool to
demonstrate influence, power, and the "we're back" slogan.
¶17. (C) This has been, so far, manageable, if at times high
maintenance, in the Balkans and Mideast, although the damage to
Israeli-Turkish relations remains serious. If the Turks are genuine in
their desire to draw Syria away from Iran, and if they begin achieving
real success rather than telephone books worth of questionable
protocols, then that will be of benefit to us all. But with Iran
itself it is a different story. REF C describes the background to the
Turkish relationship with Iran, one more complicated than with their
ex-Ottoman Arab and other subjects. Trade/hydrocarbon interests,
Turkish aversion to sanctions stemming from the first Gulf War,
Erdogan's vocal "third worldism" and certain domestic political
considerations all push Turkey in the wrong direction. Unlike with many
of the other issues, however, Turkey will have to stand and be counted
on Iran, in the Security Council, with MD, and in implementation of
UN or US sanctions. This will have a profound effect on relations
second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the next year.
Jeffrey
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
asbarez
August 10th, 2011
Former US Ambassador to Turkey, James Jeffrey
The fate of the Turkey-Armenia protocols will have the most "profound
effect" on the Turkey-US relations, said former US Ambassador to
Turkey, James Jeffrey, in a 2010 State Department cable released
by WikiLeaks.
In discussing US expectations vis-a-vis Turkey's follow through on the
UN or US-imposed sanctions on Iran, Jeffrey, in a January 2010 cable
said: "This [the Iran issue] will have a profound effect on [US-Turkey]
relations second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the
next year."
After Turkey refused to sign the dangerous Turkey-Armenia Protocols,
the US was quick to say that the proverbial ball was now in Turkey's
court. That statement first received much attention, when Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton visited Armenia and made the statement at
a press conference there.
State Department circles and officials have publicly, and privately,
reiterated that point, firmly believing that the ill-conceived
protocols were-and are-the only way to address the centuries-old
Turkish-Armenian question, including the Armenian Genocide.
Jeffrey also says that "Major challenges with us [the US] in the coming
months include the direction of Turkish-Israeli relations, the fate
of the Protocols with Armenia, and the Turkish posture vis-a-vis Iran."
In a very frank tone, Jeffrey delineates the obstacles and challenges
facing US-Turkey relations as the AKP party fortifies its positions
and lever within the Turkish government and society.
Jeffrey acknowledges that Turkey is pursuing "Neo-Ottoman" policy and
cites a speech delivered by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
in Sarajevo at the end of 2009, in which Davutoglu claimed that
the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East were better off under
Ottoman rule.
"We will re-establish this (Ottoman) Balkan," Jeffrey quotes Davutoglu
from his Sarajevo speech.
Read the entire WikiLeaks cable.
Viewing cable 10ANKARA87, WHAT LIES BENEATH ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN
POLICY If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction
on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with
others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ~UThe
top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom
it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.~UThe
middle box contains the header information that is associated with
the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a
general subject.~UThe bottom box presents the body of the cable. The
opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables
(browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed
by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific
topics and a comment section.To understand the justification used for
the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article
as reference.
Discussing cables If you find meaningful or important information in a
cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to
a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying
the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please
mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the
hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g.
#10ANKARA87.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 10ANKARA87
2010-01-20 05:25 2010-11-28 18:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO2532 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
RUEHSR DE RUEHAK #0087/01 0200525 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 200525Z JAN
10 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1747
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU
DHABI 0003 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0994 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
1550 RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0581 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0511
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1792 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0250
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1082 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0170
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0691 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0252
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 6792 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0352
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT
STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE RUEUITH/ODC
ANKARA TUC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 000087
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020 TAGS: PREL TU SUBJECT: WHAT LIES BENEATH
ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY
REF: A. 09 ANKARA 1717 ¶B. 09 ISTANBUL 466 ¶C. 09 ANKARA 1561 (EXDIS)
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
INTRODUCTION/COMMENT --------------------
¶1. (C) There is much talk in chanceries and in the international
media these days about Turkey's new, highly activist foreign policy,
which unquestionably represents a transition not only from prior
governments, but also from the AKP regime before the Gaza/Davos
events, and before the ascent of Ahmet Davutoglu as Foreign Minister
in April. Some commentaries are upbeat, but others, including many
experts and editorial writers in the US, have expressed concern. The
ruling AKP foreign policy is driven by both a desire to be more
independently activist, and by a more Islamic orientation. Frankly,
rational national interest, particularly trade opportunities and
stability considerations, also drives Turkey's new slant. Major
challenges with us in the coming months include the direction of
Turkish-Israeli relations, the fate of the Protocols with Armenia,
and the Turkish posture vis--vis Iran.
¶2. (C) Does all this mean that the country is becoming more focused
on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign
policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is "abandoning" or wants
to abandon its traditional Western orientation and willingness to
cooperate with us? Absolutely not. At the end of the day we will have
to live with a Turkey whose population is propelling much of what we
see. This calls for a more issue-by-issue approach, and recognition
that Turkey will often go its own way. In any case, sooner or later we
will no longer have to deal with the current cast of political leaders,
with their special yen for destructive drama and - rhetoric. But we see
no one better on the horizon, and Turkey will remain a complicated
blend of world class "Western" institutions, competencies, and
orientation, and Middle Eastern culture and religion. END INTRODUCTION.
COMPONENTS OF POLICY --------------------
"The Traditional Western"
¶3. (C) Turkish policy today is a mix of "traditional Western"
orientation, attitudes and interests, and two new elements,
linked with new operational philosophies: "zero conflicts" and
"neo-Ottomanism." The traditional still represents the core of Turkish
foreign policy, and is centered on cooperation and integration with
the West. Its core is NATO, the customs union with the EU, and
most significantly, the EU accession effort. This all began with
the Ottoman effort to emulate the European great powers, and was
propelled powerfully forward by Ataturk. Nevertheless the country was
on the sidelines in World War II. It was only the threat of the USSR,
and the dominance (and outstretched hand) of the US, that led to the
"Turkey we know": tough combat partner in Korea, major NATO ally,
US anchor in the Middle East.
Much of this continues.
¶4. (C) Europe is by far Turkey's most important economic partner
in terms of investment and trade. The EU accounts for 42 percent
of Turkey,s total trade, while the US accounts for a bit less than
5 percent. While the US is much less important in terms of trade
statistics, it remains important in various sectors (e.g.energy,
aviation, military), and in various ways. NATO is essential to and
much respected by
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Turkey. (Note: The fact that "only" about one-third of the Turkish
population in one poll see NATO as important to Turkey's security
is actually a plus; on any poll Turks usually are overwhelmingly
negative about any foreign engagement or relationship. But we should
not be too sanguine here since support for NATO has been halved over
the past decade. End Note) The military is armed by the US, and Turkey
recognizes that many fires in its back yard -- from Iraq to Afghanistan
and Pakistan -- can only be solved by close cooperation with and
acceptance of US and NATO leadership. Finally, even AKP leaders know
that much of their allure or "wasta" in the Middle East and elsewhere
stems from their privileged position in key Western clubs.
This traditional orientation may be shaken, or reduced, but as it
has both significant buy-in by elites of all philosophies, and many
concrete advantages, Turkey will not abandon it.
"Zero Problems with Turkey's Neighbors"
¶5. (C) But this Turkey is trying to "post-modernize" itself.
One major area of AKP effort has been to resolve problems with Turkey's
immediate "near abroad." This effort stands in contrast with the
"traditional" Turkish policy of letting these frozen conflicts fester,
and is much more compatible with US and European interests. The list of
Turkish initiatives under the AKP is impressive: accepting the Annan
Plan in 2004 to resolve Cyprus, continuing the 1999 rapprochement
with Greece, the opening to Armenia culminating in the signing of
recognition protocols, warming and productive relations with both
Baghdad and Erbil (the latter complemented by significant reforms in
Turkey's relations with its own Kurdish population). The signature
accomplishment of this policy is the wooing of Syria. While this road
to Damascus in fact was paved by Syria's accommodation of prior Turkish
governments' demands (relinquishing claims on Turkey's Hatay province,
expelling Ocalan), it is touted by the Turks as a game-changer. As
noted below, they have leveraged it to tackle a number of regional
problems, from Lebanon to Iran.
¶6. (C) While this new approach is to be applauded, there is a fly
in its ointment. Little of true practical and final accomplishment
has been achieved. Cyprus is still split (albeit the fault, at least
in terms of the Annan plan, lies more with the Greek Cypriots and
the EU); tensions with Greece in the Aegean continue; the Protocols
with Armenia have not been ratified due to Turkish concerns about
Nagorno-Karabakh; Iraq's instability and the KRG's unwillingness
to do more against the PKK raise questions about the sustainability
of Turkey's constructive Iraq policy; the rapprochement with Syria
has not really produced any Syrian "flip" away from Iran. Granted,
Turkey is dealing with some of the world's most difficult actors,
and facing stiff opposition at home to making more concessions,
but the proof of this pudding is yet to be seen.
"Neo Ottomanism"
¶7. (C) The idea of Turkey using its cultural and religious links
to the Middle East to the advantage of both Turkish interests and
regional stability is not new with the AKP, but has been given much
more priority by it, in part because of the Islamic orientation of much
of the party, including leaders Erdogan, Gul, and Davutoglu. Moreover,
the AKP's constant harping on its unique understanding of the region,
and outreach to populations over the heads of conservative, pro-US
governments, have led to accusations of "neo-Ottomanism." Rather than
deny, Davutoglu has embraced this accusation. Himself the grandson
of an Ottoman soldier
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who fought in Gaza, Davutoglu summed up the Davutoglu/AKP philosophy in
an extraordinary speech in Sarajevo in late 2009 (REF A). His thesis:
the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East were all better off when under
Ottoman control or influence; peace and progress prevailed. Alas the
region has been ravaged by division and war ever since. (He was too
clever to explicitly blame all that on the imperialist western powers,
but came close). However, now Turkey is back, ready to lead -- or
even unite. (Davutoglu: "We will re-establish this (Ottoman) Balkan").
¶8. (C) While this speech was given in the Balkans, most of its
impact is in the Middle East. Davutoglu's theory is that most of
the regimes there are both undemocratic and illegitimate. Turkey,
building on the alleged admiration among Middle Eastern populations
for its economic success and power, and willing to stand up for the
interests of the people, reaches over the regimes to the "Arab street."
Turkey's excoriating the Israelis over Gaza, culminating in the
insulting treatment of President Peres by Erdogan at Davos in 2009,
illustrates this trend. To capitalize on its rapport with the people,
and supposed diplomatic expertise and Ottoman experience, Turkey has
thrown itself into a half-dozen conflicts as a mediator. This has
worked well, as noted above, with Iraq, and was quite successful in
the Syrian-Israeli talks before Gaza. Turkey has also achieved some
limited success on Lebanon and in bringing Saudi Arabia and Syria
together. As noted below, however, this policy brings with it great
frictions, not just with us and the Europeans but with many supposed
beneficiaries of a return to Ottoman suzerainty. Furthermore, it has
not achieved any single success of note.
WHY THE CHANGE?
---------------
¶9. (C) Various factors explain the shifts we see in Turkish foreign
policy beyond the personal views of the AKP leadership:
-- Islamization: As reported REF B, religiosity has been increasing
in Turkey in past years, just as has been seen in many other Muslim
societies. The AKP is both a beneficiary of, and a stimulus for, this
phenomenon. However, bitter opposition within Turkey against domestic
"pro-Islamic" reforms (e.g., head scarves) has frustrated the AKP,
and a more "Islamic" or "Middle Eastern" foreign policy offers an
alternative sop for the AKP's devout base.
-- Success: Despite its problems, Turkey over the past 50 years
has been a success story, rising to the 16th largest economy and
membership in the G-20. This, along with its extraordinary security
situation compared to all other regional states, and democratic system,
encourage a more active -- and more independent -- leadership role
in regional and even global affairs.
-- Economics: one secret of Turkish success has been its trade and
technology-led economic growth. This growth is in good part thanks to
its customs union with the EU, by far its biggest export market, and
resulting investment from the EU, as well as decades of technology
transfer and educational assistance from the U.S. Nevertheless,
with exports to the EU down due to the 2008-2009 crisis, Turkey is
looking for new markets, particularly in the hydrocarbon rich Arab
world, Iran, Russia, and Caucasus/Central Asia. They have money,
and strong import demand, and Turkey is dependent on them for its oil
and gas. These countries, however, (along with China-another Turkish
export target) tend much more than the EU and North America to mix
politics and trade. To some
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degree the West thus is taken for granted and economic priority is
directed towards relations with the Middle East and "Eurasia."
-- Civilians ascendant: Erdogan's political success - together with
a number of messy scandals resulting in public investigation - has
meant that the Turkish General Staff now plays a much smaller role in
defining Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey's support to NATO is still
strong, but it now lacks the suspicion of Russia which the cold-war
instinct of General Staff brought to the mix.
-- EU disillusionment: Both popular and elite Turkish opinion has
recently grown much more pessimistic about eventual EU membership --
or even its value. The reasons for this are complex, but include the
shifting mood in Europe towards Islam, the replacement of "pro-Turkey"
leaders in France and Germany by Sarkozy and Merkel, both decidedly
cool towards Turkey's EU membership, and a sense in Turkey of distance
from and lack of sympathy for Europe.
-- Relativization of the Western anchor. An op-ed in the Financial
Times by Gideon Rechman on January 4 noted correctly the tendency of
the "young giants" -- South Africa, Brazil, India, and Turkey -- to
pursue Third Worldish policies and rhetoric even while benefitting
enormously from the globalized trade and international security
created and maintained by the "West." That certainly characterizes
Turkey. With the end of the cold war, relative success in the struggle
with the PKK, and the "taming" of Syria, Iraq, and (at least from
Turkey's point of view) Iran, Turkey's need for NATO and U.S. security
is reduced. Its dependence on Western trade, investment, technology
transfer and educational exchange remains critical, but is regarded as
a "free good" that Turkey deserves and does not have to expend effort
for. Relations with its various new friends in the North-East-South
or on the other hand require effort which is facilitated by some
downplaying of Turkey's Western anchor.
DAVUTOGLU DISCONTENTS ---------------------
¶10. (C) The AKP's new approach to international affairs receives mixed
reviews inside and outside Turkey. It is not a major factor in the
AKP's relative popularity, but several elements of it (unfortunately,
those we are least happy with) do appeal to voters. Criticism of Israel
post-Gaza is overwhelmingly popular, and the relatively soft Turkish
position on Iran -- a country about which many Turks are skeptical --
is presumably helpful with a narrow, but for Erdogan's electoral fate
important, group of Islamic voters associated with former PM Erbakan.
¶11. (C) Nevertheless, many in Turkey's large westernized elite see the
Islamic Outreach as a complement to the alleged AKP plan to Islamize
Turkish society, and complain bitterly about their country's losing
its western moorings. The Nationalist segment in Turkey, mobilized
most by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), sees the AKP's compromises
on Armenia, the KRG in northern Iraq, Cyprus, etc, as a betrayal of
diaspora "Turks" (the Iraqi Turkomen, Azeris, Turkish Cypriots, etc)
and charges that the AKP is trying to replace the Republic's organizing
principle of "Turkism" with the broader Islamic "Umma." The Republican
People's Party (CHP), the lead opposition party, attacks AKP foreign
policy relatively ineffectively with a mix of MHP-like nationalist
rhetoric and "abandoning the west" criticism.
¶12. (C) But it is in the EU that the Erdogan foreign policy of late
has run into the heaviest of sailing. To some degree
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European angst at Turkey's "new direction" is viewed as an excuse
to pummel Turkey to score domestic points among anti-foreigner
elements. But there is real concern in Europe, made manifest by the
Rasmussen NATO SecGen issue last April. Europeans were furious with
Turkey's presentng itself as the "Islamic" voice or conscience in
NATO, having consulted with Middle Eastern States before talking
to its NATO allies. Extrapolating that behavior into the even
more diversity-intolerant EU is a nightmare. Erdogan's foreign
(and domestic) policy orientation conjures up not just a clash
of Christianity and Islam, but the spectre of a "meld" of Europe
and the Middle East, and of Europe's secularlism with oriental
religiosity. Davutoglu and others argue that Turkey's "success"
as a coming Middle East power makes it more attractive to the EU --
giving Europe a new foreign policy "market" through Turkey. While
some in Europe appear interested in this idea, ironically including
Turkey EU membership skeptic France, this does not seem to carry much
weight in most European capitals, let alone populations.
¶13. (C) Finally, not all of the ex-Ottomans look with fondness on
their past under the Pashas, or yearn for Turkey's return. Reaction
among many in the Balkans to Davutoglu's Sarejevo speech (REF A)
was quite strong. In the Middle East itself, the Arab street might
applaud Turkey's populistic and essentially cost-free support for
more radical elements, but it's not particularly appreciated by rulers
(although Turkey seems to have made some progress with Syria, brokered
a rapprochement between President Bashir and Saudi King Abdullah, and
has had some role in resolving the Lebanon cabinet stalemate). Sooner
or later, though, Turkey will have to produce results, take risks,
commit real resources, and take hard decisions to augment a policy now
consisting mainly of popular slogans, ceaseless trips, and innumerable
signatures on MOUs of little importance. The experience with Iran,
which despite significant Turkish verbal support and wooing, appears
uninterested in granting Turkey any concessions, or agreeing to a
Turkish lead in mediation efforts, is telling.
THE PROBLEM FOR THE US ----------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey's new foreign policy is a mixed bag for us.
Having regional heavyweights take on burdens, thereby relieving us,
has long been a desired goal of US policy, but it comes with a certain
loss of control. Nevertheless, on a whole host of key issues of
supreme importance to us -- Afghanistan and Pakistan, cooperation in
and on Iraq, NATO efforts (although a leading Turkish role in Missile
Defense will not be easy) -- Turkey is a crucial ally, and our use of
Incirlik, Habur gate, and Turkish airspace for our Iraq and Afghanistan
operations is indispensible. Its "zero conflicts" initiatives, which
have moved Turkey forward on more of the key bilateral spats --
Cyprus, Greece, Kurds, Northern Iraq, Armenia -- than we have seen
with any other Turkish government, also support U.S. interests.
¶15. (C) Nevertheless, these latter issues illustrate two problems. At
least in Turkish eyes, on this complex of issues the US , especially
the media, interest groups, and Congress, default to a "blame Turkey"
posture regardless of whatever it does. Second, Turkey has repeatedly
run into trouble actually consummating these various openings -- the
Armenian protocols being the best example, but continued overflights of
Greek islands and domestic opposition to the Kurdish opening are also
relevant. What we fear is that this inability to bring to conclusion
foreign policy initiatives will affect not just the above, but most
Turkish policy, given the over-extension of Davutoglu and his team,
and a
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tendency to substitute rhetoric for long term investment of diplomatic,
military, and assistance capital. (Fortunately, Afghanistan/Pakistan
and Iraq are the two major exceptions to this tendency.)
¶16. (C) The greatest potential strategic problem for the US, however,
and the one that has some of the commentators howling, is the Turks
neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle East and Balkans. This
"back to the past" attitude so clear in Davutoglu's Sarajevo speech,
combined with the Turks' tendency to execute it through alliances
with more Islamic or more worrisome local actors, constantly creates
new problems.
Part of this is structural. Despite their success and relative power,
the Turks really can't compete on equal terms with either the US or
regional "leaders" (EU in the Balkans, Russia in the Caucasus/Black
Sea, Saudis, Egyptians and even Iranians in the ME). With Rolls Royce
ambitions but Rover resources, to cut themselves in on the action
the Turks have to "cheat" by finding an underdog (this also plays
to Erdogan's own worldview), a Siladjcic, Mish'al, or Ahmadinejad,
who will be happy to have the Turks take up his cause. The Turks then
attempt to ram through revisions to at least the reigning "Western"
position to the favor of their guy. Given, again, the questioning of
Western policy and motives by much of the Turkish public and the AKP,
such an approach provides a relatively low cost and popular tool to
demonstrate influence, power, and the "we're back" slogan.
¶17. (C) This has been, so far, manageable, if at times high
maintenance, in the Balkans and Mideast, although the damage to
Israeli-Turkish relations remains serious. If the Turks are genuine in
their desire to draw Syria away from Iran, and if they begin achieving
real success rather than telephone books worth of questionable
protocols, then that will be of benefit to us all. But with Iran
itself it is a different story. REF C describes the background to the
Turkish relationship with Iran, one more complicated than with their
ex-Ottoman Arab and other subjects. Trade/hydrocarbon interests,
Turkish aversion to sanctions stemming from the first Gulf War,
Erdogan's vocal "third worldism" and certain domestic political
considerations all push Turkey in the wrong direction. Unlike with many
of the other issues, however, Turkey will have to stand and be counted
on Iran, in the Security Council, with MD, and in implementation of
UN or US sanctions. This will have a profound effect on relations
second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the next year.
Jeffrey
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"