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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND KURDS
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5853
16.06.2011
Artashes Ter-Harutyunyan
The Arab revolutions and developments conditioned by them sidelined a
number of factors which have played an important role in the Middle
East politics. However, the wave of revolutions in the Arab world
seems to be on the decrease and the aforementioned factors make
themselves felt.
The Kurdish issue is one of such issues and though in the
international expert observations concerning the Middle East the topic
of the Arab revolutions still prevails but there are already signs
that that in the time to come the Kurdish issue will acquire a
considerable place in the political developments in the Middle East.
At the same time this issue acquires new meaning in a consequence of
recent regional developments, in particular against the background of
situation in Syria, Turkey and Iraq and the events expected there.
Instability in Syria
Though the Syrian authorities do everything to prevent the leakage of
information about the events in the country, but the picture we have
is enough to form an opinion about the situation there. E.g. Bashar
al-Assad's decision to draw in troops to suppress the disorders all
over the country proves that police failed to handle the situation. In
other words in the cities enveloped by the disturbances police has
either been dismissed or it is close to that. On the other hand the
decision of the government to involve heavy armoured units in
suppression of disorders proves the seriousness of the situation. If
all this is supplemented by information received over the last two
months that the number of the deceased reaches several dozens every
week, the picture seems to be clear.
But the significance of the developments in Syria gradually goes
beyond the borders of the country and acquires the status of the
factor of the Middle East politics. And here two circumstances are
distinguished.
The first refers to the Syrian state, correspondingly to the viability
of the borders of Syria. This issue has become especially topical
after overthrowing of Saddam Hussein's regime in neghbouring Iraq,
when it turned out that the Iraqi state established in the 20th
century has serious viability problems, and by its weakness and the
lack of integrity it provides fertile ground for new redrawing of the
borders in the Middle East. The same can be said about Syria. Only if
in case with Iraq the collapse of the state formation was initiated in
2003 by the intrusion of the American troops, in case with Syria the
current disturbances may become the beginning of such a process.
Developments in Syria, of course, are in the context of the
revolutionary wave in the Arab world. And in this aspect the most
probable scenario seems to be the weakening of the al-Assads' regime
and its overthrowing in the future. But the regime is not the point.
The weakness of the system of the Syrian state which was established
in 1946 within the borders of the former French colony (within the
artificially drawn borders after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire),
is proved by both many coups which took place there in 1946-1970 and
authoritarian system which has been established there since 1970s. The
fact is that today's Syria has spent the 2/3 of its existence under
the authoritarian regime of the al-Assads. Thus, the weakening and
overthrowing of the regime will affect the state and in this aspect
parallels can be drawn with neigbouring Iraq.
The second factor is the regions populated by the Kurds (about 2
million)1. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain (where the
disturbances brought either to overthrowing of the regimes which had
ruled for decades or seriously shook the ruling system) public
disturbances in Syria may urge seriously the independence movement
among Kurds (which is the main conclusion drawn by the American,
British and Turkish experts dealing with the Syrian issue).
Though, there is scares information about exclusively Kurdish protest
actions (and according to the available information the number of
people who participated in those action is very restricted, i.e. about
several hundred) against the background of the disturbances which has
been continuing since the February, the executive order of the
president for April 7th, according to which he granted a citizenship
to about 300 thousand Kurds who were born and lived in Syria2 draws
attention.
This step by al-Assad has been the most serious concession made by the
official Damascus to the Kurds for recent decades3, which comes to
prove that in Damascus they are concerned with the possible
independence of the Kurds.
Ankara is also concerned by the situation in Syria and it should be
supposed that this concern is also caused by the Kurdish issue or it
is at least one of the main reasons.
Turkey and Kurds
On June 12 the parliamentary elections will be held in Turkey: the
ruling Justice and Development party (JDP) intends not only to win the
majority of places in the parliament but also to win constitutional
majority.
Today it is the accepted opinion that the JDP has no serious political
competitors on its way to this goal4, and the consequences of the
global financial and economic crisis are overcome in Turkish economy.
The only problem for the JPD is the Kurdish issue and the rivals of
the party try to take advantage of that.
Taking into consideration this circumstance, the Erdogan government
has changed its approach to the Kurds and even initiated a dialogue
with the leader of the KWP Abdullah Ocalan. In consequence an
armistice was concluded between Ankara and KWP. The armistice played
into the hands of the JDP as it provide opportunity to this political
power headed by Erdogan to win votes in both regions populated by
Kurds5 (as they promised that the issues worrying Kurds would be
solved), and Turkish nationalists (as it was presented to the Turkish
electorate that the Erdogan government managed to suppress
`separatist' claims of the Kurds).
Meanwhile, the confrontation with the Kurds deprives the JDP of those
two big segments of electorate (the Kurds will vote for the Kurdish
candidate and the kemalists and nationalists will win even more votes
thus speculating on the failed Kurdish policy of Erdogan).
The developments went on in accordance with the later variant, i.e.
they were unfavourable for the JDP and on February 28 KWP stated about
the unilateral termination of the armistice (as it has already been
mentioned the JDP did not redeem the promises given to the Kurds).
At present there are no grounds for speaking about any kind of accord
between the JDP and the Kurds. Even more, the responsibility for the
attack on the column of the prime-minister Recep Tayip Erdogan was
assumed by the KWP. If this is a truth, it proves that on the eve of
the elections the Kurds try to expert pressure on the Erdogan
government in order to force him to make concessions. Only time will
show to what it will bring, but if till the elections the sides do not
compromise the action, this may mean only one thing - after the
elections the Kurdish issue will again come forward on the agenda of
the domestic political life in Turkey, and in this context the
developments in the neighbourng Syria and Iraq will be an additional
headache for the Turks6.
Iraq after the withdrawal of the US troops
According to the preliminary agreement the American troops must leave
Iraq till the end of this year. If Americans really withdraw from Iraq
or reduce their military presence to the degree when they cannot
seriously influence the domestic developments there, this new
situation cannot but affect the Iraqi Kurdistan.
Today there are no military encounters between the central government
in Baghdad and the authorities of the Iraqi Kurdistan (connected with
the territorial disputes (over Kirkuk and other disputable areas),
issues concerning the energy carriers (oil and gas fields in the Iraqi
Kurdistan) and the authority in the sphere of security) only because
of the presence of the American troops. And as for the prospects both
parties have apprehensions and they are preparing for the worst
scenario. This is clearly proved by the recent measures taken by the
government of the Iraqi Kurdistan when in November 2010 and in
February 2011 Kurdish military units, without the consent of the
central government in Baghdad, located in Kirkuk and neigbouring
areas.
Under such circumstances the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq
most probably will bring to the furthers separation of the Iraqi
Kurdistan from Baghdad as the absence of mechanisms of settling acute
problems with the central government of Iraq (and the recent movements
of the Kurdish units are the evidence of that) allows assuming that
the Iraqi Kurdistan will lay stress rather on strengthening its own
authority than coming to terms with Baghdad.
1 According to different international estimations there are about 2
million Kurds living in Syria, i.e. almost 10% of the whole
population.
2 The issue of the rights of the Kurdish minority in Syria, which
constitutes almost 2 million, has been on the political agenda for 2
decades. According to some estimates up to half a million Kurds have
no citizenship in Syria.
3 This step was, of course, welcomed by the Kurdish leaders in Syria,
but immediately statements were made that the Kurds will stop
struggling for their rights. E.g. on the next day after the decision
of Bashar al-Assad one of the Kurdish leaders - Habib Ibrahim, stated
that his `people will continue its non-violent struggle for civil
rights and democracy' and one of the leader of the Kurdish Workers
Party Murad Garilan called al-Assad to take real measures to protect
the rights of the Kurds in Syria, `otherwise the Kurdish rebel will be
even stronger than the Arab one'.
4 Since 2003 as a result of a successive policy implemented by the JDP
its two main rivals - the army and People's Republican Party, have
been weakened.
5 According to the recent data, 1 of four citizens of Turkey is an
ethnic Kurd. I.e. In Turkey which population is 74 million, there are
more than 18 million Kurds.
6 It is not a mere chance that against the background of the
disturbances in Syria, the head the national intelligence of Turkey
(MIT) Hakan Fidan visited Syria twice in April. After his second visit
on April 28, the National Security Council of Turkey after the session
which had lasted for 6 hours made a statement calling Syrian
authorities to carry out reforms in the country and thus offered the
assistance of Ankara in this issue.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
-CRISIS IN LIBYA AND REGIONAL DIPLOMACY OF TURKEY[28.04.2011]
-FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM POPULATION ON THE PLANET [24.02.2011]
-SOUTHERN SUDAN: NEW STATE IN THE WORLD[25.01.2011]
-ON THE CYBER-SECURITY[17.01.2011]
-TURKEY-CHINA INTERRELATIONS[29.11.2010]
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5853
16.06.2011
Artashes Ter-Harutyunyan
The Arab revolutions and developments conditioned by them sidelined a
number of factors which have played an important role in the Middle
East politics. However, the wave of revolutions in the Arab world
seems to be on the decrease and the aforementioned factors make
themselves felt.
The Kurdish issue is one of such issues and though in the
international expert observations concerning the Middle East the topic
of the Arab revolutions still prevails but there are already signs
that that in the time to come the Kurdish issue will acquire a
considerable place in the political developments in the Middle East.
At the same time this issue acquires new meaning in a consequence of
recent regional developments, in particular against the background of
situation in Syria, Turkey and Iraq and the events expected there.
Instability in Syria
Though the Syrian authorities do everything to prevent the leakage of
information about the events in the country, but the picture we have
is enough to form an opinion about the situation there. E.g. Bashar
al-Assad's decision to draw in troops to suppress the disorders all
over the country proves that police failed to handle the situation. In
other words in the cities enveloped by the disturbances police has
either been dismissed or it is close to that. On the other hand the
decision of the government to involve heavy armoured units in
suppression of disorders proves the seriousness of the situation. If
all this is supplemented by information received over the last two
months that the number of the deceased reaches several dozens every
week, the picture seems to be clear.
But the significance of the developments in Syria gradually goes
beyond the borders of the country and acquires the status of the
factor of the Middle East politics. And here two circumstances are
distinguished.
The first refers to the Syrian state, correspondingly to the viability
of the borders of Syria. This issue has become especially topical
after overthrowing of Saddam Hussein's regime in neghbouring Iraq,
when it turned out that the Iraqi state established in the 20th
century has serious viability problems, and by its weakness and the
lack of integrity it provides fertile ground for new redrawing of the
borders in the Middle East. The same can be said about Syria. Only if
in case with Iraq the collapse of the state formation was initiated in
2003 by the intrusion of the American troops, in case with Syria the
current disturbances may become the beginning of such a process.
Developments in Syria, of course, are in the context of the
revolutionary wave in the Arab world. And in this aspect the most
probable scenario seems to be the weakening of the al-Assads' regime
and its overthrowing in the future. But the regime is not the point.
The weakness of the system of the Syrian state which was established
in 1946 within the borders of the former French colony (within the
artificially drawn borders after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire),
is proved by both many coups which took place there in 1946-1970 and
authoritarian system which has been established there since 1970s. The
fact is that today's Syria has spent the 2/3 of its existence under
the authoritarian regime of the al-Assads. Thus, the weakening and
overthrowing of the regime will affect the state and in this aspect
parallels can be drawn with neigbouring Iraq.
The second factor is the regions populated by the Kurds (about 2
million)1. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain (where the
disturbances brought either to overthrowing of the regimes which had
ruled for decades or seriously shook the ruling system) public
disturbances in Syria may urge seriously the independence movement
among Kurds (which is the main conclusion drawn by the American,
British and Turkish experts dealing with the Syrian issue).
Though, there is scares information about exclusively Kurdish protest
actions (and according to the available information the number of
people who participated in those action is very restricted, i.e. about
several hundred) against the background of the disturbances which has
been continuing since the February, the executive order of the
president for April 7th, according to which he granted a citizenship
to about 300 thousand Kurds who were born and lived in Syria2 draws
attention.
This step by al-Assad has been the most serious concession made by the
official Damascus to the Kurds for recent decades3, which comes to
prove that in Damascus they are concerned with the possible
independence of the Kurds.
Ankara is also concerned by the situation in Syria and it should be
supposed that this concern is also caused by the Kurdish issue or it
is at least one of the main reasons.
Turkey and Kurds
On June 12 the parliamentary elections will be held in Turkey: the
ruling Justice and Development party (JDP) intends not only to win the
majority of places in the parliament but also to win constitutional
majority.
Today it is the accepted opinion that the JDP has no serious political
competitors on its way to this goal4, and the consequences of the
global financial and economic crisis are overcome in Turkish economy.
The only problem for the JPD is the Kurdish issue and the rivals of
the party try to take advantage of that.
Taking into consideration this circumstance, the Erdogan government
has changed its approach to the Kurds and even initiated a dialogue
with the leader of the KWP Abdullah Ocalan. In consequence an
armistice was concluded between Ankara and KWP. The armistice played
into the hands of the JDP as it provide opportunity to this political
power headed by Erdogan to win votes in both regions populated by
Kurds5 (as they promised that the issues worrying Kurds would be
solved), and Turkish nationalists (as it was presented to the Turkish
electorate that the Erdogan government managed to suppress
`separatist' claims of the Kurds).
Meanwhile, the confrontation with the Kurds deprives the JDP of those
two big segments of electorate (the Kurds will vote for the Kurdish
candidate and the kemalists and nationalists will win even more votes
thus speculating on the failed Kurdish policy of Erdogan).
The developments went on in accordance with the later variant, i.e.
they were unfavourable for the JDP and on February 28 KWP stated about
the unilateral termination of the armistice (as it has already been
mentioned the JDP did not redeem the promises given to the Kurds).
At present there are no grounds for speaking about any kind of accord
between the JDP and the Kurds. Even more, the responsibility for the
attack on the column of the prime-minister Recep Tayip Erdogan was
assumed by the KWP. If this is a truth, it proves that on the eve of
the elections the Kurds try to expert pressure on the Erdogan
government in order to force him to make concessions. Only time will
show to what it will bring, but if till the elections the sides do not
compromise the action, this may mean only one thing - after the
elections the Kurdish issue will again come forward on the agenda of
the domestic political life in Turkey, and in this context the
developments in the neighbourng Syria and Iraq will be an additional
headache for the Turks6.
Iraq after the withdrawal of the US troops
According to the preliminary agreement the American troops must leave
Iraq till the end of this year. If Americans really withdraw from Iraq
or reduce their military presence to the degree when they cannot
seriously influence the domestic developments there, this new
situation cannot but affect the Iraqi Kurdistan.
Today there are no military encounters between the central government
in Baghdad and the authorities of the Iraqi Kurdistan (connected with
the territorial disputes (over Kirkuk and other disputable areas),
issues concerning the energy carriers (oil and gas fields in the Iraqi
Kurdistan) and the authority in the sphere of security) only because
of the presence of the American troops. And as for the prospects both
parties have apprehensions and they are preparing for the worst
scenario. This is clearly proved by the recent measures taken by the
government of the Iraqi Kurdistan when in November 2010 and in
February 2011 Kurdish military units, without the consent of the
central government in Baghdad, located in Kirkuk and neigbouring
areas.
Under such circumstances the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq
most probably will bring to the furthers separation of the Iraqi
Kurdistan from Baghdad as the absence of mechanisms of settling acute
problems with the central government of Iraq (and the recent movements
of the Kurdish units are the evidence of that) allows assuming that
the Iraqi Kurdistan will lay stress rather on strengthening its own
authority than coming to terms with Baghdad.
1 According to different international estimations there are about 2
million Kurds living in Syria, i.e. almost 10% of the whole
population.
2 The issue of the rights of the Kurdish minority in Syria, which
constitutes almost 2 million, has been on the political agenda for 2
decades. According to some estimates up to half a million Kurds have
no citizenship in Syria.
3 This step was, of course, welcomed by the Kurdish leaders in Syria,
but immediately statements were made that the Kurds will stop
struggling for their rights. E.g. on the next day after the decision
of Bashar al-Assad one of the Kurdish leaders - Habib Ibrahim, stated
that his `people will continue its non-violent struggle for civil
rights and democracy' and one of the leader of the Kurdish Workers
Party Murad Garilan called al-Assad to take real measures to protect
the rights of the Kurds in Syria, `otherwise the Kurdish rebel will be
even stronger than the Arab one'.
4 Since 2003 as a result of a successive policy implemented by the JDP
its two main rivals - the army and People's Republican Party, have
been weakened.
5 According to the recent data, 1 of four citizens of Turkey is an
ethnic Kurd. I.e. In Turkey which population is 74 million, there are
more than 18 million Kurds.
6 It is not a mere chance that against the background of the
disturbances in Syria, the head the national intelligence of Turkey
(MIT) Hakan Fidan visited Syria twice in April. After his second visit
on April 28, the National Security Council of Turkey after the session
which had lasted for 6 hours made a statement calling Syrian
authorities to carry out reforms in the country and thus offered the
assistance of Ankara in this issue.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
-CRISIS IN LIBYA AND REGIONAL DIPLOMACY OF TURKEY[28.04.2011]
-FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM POPULATION ON THE PLANET [24.02.2011]
-SOUTHERN SUDAN: NEW STATE IN THE WORLD[25.01.2011]
-ON THE CYBER-SECURITY[17.01.2011]
-TURKEY-CHINA INTERRELATIONS[29.11.2010]