Tweet
GEORGIANS DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION ABOUT ABKHAZIA
by M. Gagua and L. Tughushi
Democracy & Freedom Watch
http://dfwatch.net/georgians-do-not-have-enough-information-about-abkhazia-98898
June 22 2012
There is a deficit of knowledge about what is going on in Abkhazia,
says Alexander Cooley, professor of political science at Barnard
College, Columbia University in New York.
Cooley sat down with DF Watch and told us about a researcher doing
public opinion surveys in Abkhazia who was frowned upon by the
Georgian government..
How do you see the dynamic of the situation in Georgia politically
generally?
The general view of Georgia is that we've now reached the second term
of this government that presented itself as a revolutionary government
and now the question of how it either transitions or how it gives up
power becomes the central question. We can no longer talk that this
is a young government. It's not. Like in 2003, 2004. We of course
have the presidential term limits. And I think there is couple of
distinct trends. One is that the government has been very good at
the modernization project of Georgia. And what do I mean by this?
Presenting Georgia as a modern dynamic society, changing its image
abroad, aligning it with the west, incorporating this language
of values of the west and so on, very good at that; improving its
investment image abroad and so forth.
It's also been extremely effective, and is viewed as a role model on
the petty corruption issue and reforming the police and so forth.
Having said all that I think we've now reached, in parts, the limits
of the modernization program, and you've seen the tension between
modernization and democratization that the steps on the democratization
side have stopped, and that you see clearly now a government that's
convinced it has the best interest of the Georgian people on mind,
the state, but is increasingly resorting to undemocratic tactics
and procedures to try and extend its time in power and to paint its
political opponents in an unfavorable light. So I think it's very
important that we disentangle the issues of this government as a
modernizer, versus the government as democratizer. I think this
government has modernizing credentials, but it has stalled on the
democracy front. And even though I think it wants to conflate the two,
we need to keep these separate.
You mentioned that democratization process was stopped. When exactly
did you notice this turning point, which year, which event indicated
this?
I think most people would point to the events of 2007 and the crackdown
as crystallizing the stall. Now I think when you look constitutionally,
there were moments before, like the failure to enact the constitutional
reforms, that were meant to come into force shortly after the rose
revolution. I think there were also some strategic mistakes made
by the US in response. For instance after this new government came
to power we stopped viewing Georgia as a country in transition, and
viewed it as a fully-fledged democracy. So for instance we withdrew
media founding for promoting the media, and then in 2005-2006 you saw
this government assert its control over the media. So I think that
was a mistake on our part. So I think there were some sides from
2005 to 2006, but I think 2007 is when in terms of Georgian image
more broadly you saw real chinks in this democracy image.
We have had two interviews with Lincoln Mitchell, and he mentioned
that for several years, the USA was somewhat suspicious towards the
democratic opposition, but what is the situation now?
I think it has evolved, I think it has improved. The thing we have
to realize about the US, especially when it looks at this part of
the world, it's not very much the Cold War mentality. Even so-called
experts, analysts, foreign policy people, senators or representatives,
who are engaged with the region, still view the US policy as being one
where they should strengthen the sovereignty and independence of the
former soviet states. That's a code word for saying we should lessen
their dependency on Russia. We put it always in those term. That's
been the strategy in this part of the world for long time. So I think,
A) the government here has been very good at labeling all political
opponents, all political concerns as playing into the Russians, whether
they were or not, this is a different issue, and that in turn found a
real audience in the US, this kind of binary choice. You know, you're
either with us or with Russia. It clarifies things, it clarifies the
policy. You know, we wanna be with the good guys. Now, I think you're
seeing more nuance. I think you're seeing some reflections about what
happened in 2008. You see that question of the war, its origins is
not is as not as clear cut as it was first portrayed to be. I think
actually Vladimir Putin has been incredibly important in this and I'll
say why. As negative example, because doing what he did, this idea that
not only did he make the transition to Prime Minister, but he had it
all planned out beforehand. And then to come back as president, this
strikes us as being just wrong, from a democratic process. So that now
I think any such plans here, to sort of engineer a primeministership
or changing duties is going to be looked up in the states in the more
negative manner, because of what happened in Russia. Perhaps that's
an unexpected Russian example, but I think that's an issue too. Then
a third factor is I think you see more openness now in terms of the
media environment and lobbying environment in the US, because Georgian
Dream now is making its positions felt in certain parts of Washington,
whereas before, the Georgian opposition really had no representation
in this part. So I think this convergence of factors puts us in a
different position then we were, I would say, three or four years ago.
Very interesting point about Putin precedent, him becoming Prime
Minister...
Yes, it's harder to criticize this in Russia, than accept the reasons
for it somewhere else.
Many people here expect the same scenario in Georgia too - Saakashvili
becomes Prime Minister, because the new constitution gives all
powers to the Prime Minister from 2013. What will be the response
from Washington?
I'm not sure that Washington can do to respond, to tell you the truth.
I think there are messages that have been made in private and delivered
that we expect an orderly and constitutional transition of authority,
I think there have been private messages delivered trying to persuade
president Saakashvili to think about your legacy and your image here,
your place in history, if you were to voluntarily cede power. But the
reality is that Georgia is going to continue to remain - for many
a friend, for many an ally - regardless of whether this happens or
not. One thing that I would like to see is much more public call about
this issue like going on the record, talking about expectations about
what we consider to be democratic progress and democratic development
in Georgia. But in reality I don't think that if this is engineered
and this happens after-the-fact, what can the US do? I don't think
it can do too much, to tell you the truth.
Let's turn to the Chicago Summit. It was seen as very important here.
The government had been outlining the progress, while others considered
no steps were taken forward. What are your views?
I had the opposite reaction in terms of the message in Georgia. I
saw this as a very strained indicator of Georgia's NATO aspirations
and importance. I think the Georgian government tried to play up that
somehow there was a meaningful progress on the NATO issue, because it
feels like it has to demonstrate progress, because it all the time has
to prove that its strategy is working. In reality Georgian membership
in NATO is a very low priority at the moment for the member countries.
They are very much concern about one issue only - that's Afghanistan
getting out of Afghanistan. Everything else is of secondary importance.
This fall we have a parliamentary election which is seen as very
important for many people here. What do you think, does there exist
any red line, the crossing of which would cost Saakashvili and Georgian
authorities their image as pro-western and democratic?
It's hard to think in hypotheticals, so I'd rather not come up with
imaginary scenarios. There is an international expectation that
the elections should be reasonibly fair, that the process should be
transparent, that all candidates who want to run, should be allowed to
run, that there shouldn't be obviously the problem of administrative
resources, but that this use of the media power and media control,
that sort of block certain oppositional channels from cable packages,
and so forth, this should also be denounced as unfair. I think former
ambassador Bass commented on this issue. So I don't think there is
any one red line. I think there should be an expectation that this
is a mature government now, they certainly know about rules and
institutions, that the run up to the election should be as open and
as transparent, conforming to international norms as the conduct of
the election itself.
But what if it doesn't, what if elections are still unfair, despite
all those criticism and recommendations?
I think you'll see a lot of international criticism. To what ends,
I don't know. I would be speculating, so I don't want to speculate
scenarios, but I think, one thing, and I know Lincoln agrees with me
on this, elections always seem to be tests of Georgia's democratic
status. And it keeps receding for the tests. It's a sort of exam that
you keep taking and taking and taking until eventually you get it
right at some point. But the image of this government if it somehow
interferes will be deminished. So I think this is why things now are
in a different place than they were four or five years ago. Now we
are at the end of a second cycle, and that's a quite pivotal point
in terms of the perception of governments.
You published an opinion piece together with Lincoln Mitchell in the
New York Times last year about the Abkhazian elections. You touched
several important points, including the Georgian authority and how
they treat these breakaway regions. How do you view Georgian policy
towards those regions?
I think that the policy is one of isolation, and one of wanting to
speak on their behalf, and I think it's been very counterproductive. I
fear that Abkhazia is already lost now to Russia, because of the
policy, that there was an opening perhaps right after the war. This is
one of things we wanted to do:if there is obvious distrust between
the Abkhaz government and this government, and if there is genuine
concern in Abkhazia about being observed by Russia, which there is, you
must offer a third way. You must offer some other set of processes,
institutions, areas, where you can facilitate some dialogues and
contacts, and this is sort of the regional third way, this is what we
advocate, engagement. No recognition, but international engagement,
and also it's becoming the basis of EU policy, although in the
implementation phase it hasn't gone that way. Because given just
a stark binary choice between Georgia and Russia, you see the turn
to Russia. And not everyone's necessarily happy about it, there are
concerns. Again, some of the Abkhaz say, what for? We are autonomous or
de facto independent, but not formally recognized. Now we're formally
recognized but we're not independent. Now we're formally recognized,
but we're not independent. So there is a tension between the legal
recognition and the material consequences.
I think the other thing here is that the central government here is
not given a set of matrix or indicators or standards through which we
would be able to judge as external academics or analysts, the success
of their strategy. So, how do we know, when we hear statements from
senior officials that the strategy is working? Working to do what?
What should we look at? Should we look at the number of grey passports
that were adopted? Should we look at the number of hospital visits
by Abkhaz here in Georgia? What should we look at, just tell us,
otherwise this just your word. The final part that I have found very
troubling is that it is clear that there is a deficit of knowledge
about what is going on in Abkhazia. So this is why we have researchers
committed to make public opinion surveys in Abkhazia trying to get a
sense of what are the issues, what are the political attitudes. And
this type of work is very frowned upon by central authorities here.
One permanent researcher who entered via the north has now subsequently
been banned here, but his work is very important work about political
attitudes in Abkhazia. So I think the point is we can't keep talking
about what the Abkhaz really think as if it's just some hypathotical
thing. We have the tools to find out what the Abkhaz do think,
and I think the sooner that Tbilisi starts dealing with realities
and political attitudes there and acknowledging them, that signals
itself to the Abkhaz that you are taking these issues seriously. Now
the question I said was, the Russians would never allow. How do you
know? You need to start putting this process in place of real dialogue,
of taking opinions seriously that if the Russians intervene, it changes
Abkhaz perceptions of the political equation and the tolerance issue
and so forth. So I actually think forcing Russia's hand would be good
outcome of this. Not a bad one.
Can you maybe predict about current situation in Karabakh [a disputed
region claimed by both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and currently controlled
by Armenia], because the situation is quite difficult there.
Very difficult. I can't predict and I'm not sure I want to. All I
would say is that of course these recent skirmishes are part of a
broader tension that you've seen over the last two three years. I
think the question is, is there a destabilizing window at the moment,
is every government that is now flushed with new wealth, that seems
self-confident, whether it sees a window of a possible military
operation in a way that it won't be able to in five or ten year's
time. From a strategic point of view, that's the question I would ask.
But in terms of what will happenn I don't know.
Is there a possibility of involvement by some regional big powers,
like Russia or Turkey, Iran?
There's a lot of talk about involvement of big powers, there's lot
talks about also the ramifications of the campaign against Iran, on
the Karabakh issue. These are some second order consequences that need
to be talked about in relation to the discussion of what a military
operation on Iran will do. Not only for the Middle East but in the
Caucasus itself. Would it set in emotion a set of other dynamics? I
just can't predict with any certainty, what would or wouldn't happen.
But yes, is there a relation there? Absolutely. Are relations between
Iranians and Israelis very tense? Yes, very much so. I can't say
anything more without just speculating.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by M. Gagua and L. Tughushi
Democracy & Freedom Watch
http://dfwatch.net/georgians-do-not-have-enough-information-about-abkhazia-98898
June 22 2012
There is a deficit of knowledge about what is going on in Abkhazia,
says Alexander Cooley, professor of political science at Barnard
College, Columbia University in New York.
Cooley sat down with DF Watch and told us about a researcher doing
public opinion surveys in Abkhazia who was frowned upon by the
Georgian government..
How do you see the dynamic of the situation in Georgia politically
generally?
The general view of Georgia is that we've now reached the second term
of this government that presented itself as a revolutionary government
and now the question of how it either transitions or how it gives up
power becomes the central question. We can no longer talk that this
is a young government. It's not. Like in 2003, 2004. We of course
have the presidential term limits. And I think there is couple of
distinct trends. One is that the government has been very good at
the modernization project of Georgia. And what do I mean by this?
Presenting Georgia as a modern dynamic society, changing its image
abroad, aligning it with the west, incorporating this language
of values of the west and so on, very good at that; improving its
investment image abroad and so forth.
It's also been extremely effective, and is viewed as a role model on
the petty corruption issue and reforming the police and so forth.
Having said all that I think we've now reached, in parts, the limits
of the modernization program, and you've seen the tension between
modernization and democratization that the steps on the democratization
side have stopped, and that you see clearly now a government that's
convinced it has the best interest of the Georgian people on mind,
the state, but is increasingly resorting to undemocratic tactics
and procedures to try and extend its time in power and to paint its
political opponents in an unfavorable light. So I think it's very
important that we disentangle the issues of this government as a
modernizer, versus the government as democratizer. I think this
government has modernizing credentials, but it has stalled on the
democracy front. And even though I think it wants to conflate the two,
we need to keep these separate.
You mentioned that democratization process was stopped. When exactly
did you notice this turning point, which year, which event indicated
this?
I think most people would point to the events of 2007 and the crackdown
as crystallizing the stall. Now I think when you look constitutionally,
there were moments before, like the failure to enact the constitutional
reforms, that were meant to come into force shortly after the rose
revolution. I think there were also some strategic mistakes made
by the US in response. For instance after this new government came
to power we stopped viewing Georgia as a country in transition, and
viewed it as a fully-fledged democracy. So for instance we withdrew
media founding for promoting the media, and then in 2005-2006 you saw
this government assert its control over the media. So I think that
was a mistake on our part. So I think there were some sides from
2005 to 2006, but I think 2007 is when in terms of Georgian image
more broadly you saw real chinks in this democracy image.
We have had two interviews with Lincoln Mitchell, and he mentioned
that for several years, the USA was somewhat suspicious towards the
democratic opposition, but what is the situation now?
I think it has evolved, I think it has improved. The thing we have
to realize about the US, especially when it looks at this part of
the world, it's not very much the Cold War mentality. Even so-called
experts, analysts, foreign policy people, senators or representatives,
who are engaged with the region, still view the US policy as being one
where they should strengthen the sovereignty and independence of the
former soviet states. That's a code word for saying we should lessen
their dependency on Russia. We put it always in those term. That's
been the strategy in this part of the world for long time. So I think,
A) the government here has been very good at labeling all political
opponents, all political concerns as playing into the Russians, whether
they were or not, this is a different issue, and that in turn found a
real audience in the US, this kind of binary choice. You know, you're
either with us or with Russia. It clarifies things, it clarifies the
policy. You know, we wanna be with the good guys. Now, I think you're
seeing more nuance. I think you're seeing some reflections about what
happened in 2008. You see that question of the war, its origins is
not is as not as clear cut as it was first portrayed to be. I think
actually Vladimir Putin has been incredibly important in this and I'll
say why. As negative example, because doing what he did, this idea that
not only did he make the transition to Prime Minister, but he had it
all planned out beforehand. And then to come back as president, this
strikes us as being just wrong, from a democratic process. So that now
I think any such plans here, to sort of engineer a primeministership
or changing duties is going to be looked up in the states in the more
negative manner, because of what happened in Russia. Perhaps that's
an unexpected Russian example, but I think that's an issue too. Then
a third factor is I think you see more openness now in terms of the
media environment and lobbying environment in the US, because Georgian
Dream now is making its positions felt in certain parts of Washington,
whereas before, the Georgian opposition really had no representation
in this part. So I think this convergence of factors puts us in a
different position then we were, I would say, three or four years ago.
Very interesting point about Putin precedent, him becoming Prime
Minister...
Yes, it's harder to criticize this in Russia, than accept the reasons
for it somewhere else.
Many people here expect the same scenario in Georgia too - Saakashvili
becomes Prime Minister, because the new constitution gives all
powers to the Prime Minister from 2013. What will be the response
from Washington?
I'm not sure that Washington can do to respond, to tell you the truth.
I think there are messages that have been made in private and delivered
that we expect an orderly and constitutional transition of authority,
I think there have been private messages delivered trying to persuade
president Saakashvili to think about your legacy and your image here,
your place in history, if you were to voluntarily cede power. But the
reality is that Georgia is going to continue to remain - for many
a friend, for many an ally - regardless of whether this happens or
not. One thing that I would like to see is much more public call about
this issue like going on the record, talking about expectations about
what we consider to be democratic progress and democratic development
in Georgia. But in reality I don't think that if this is engineered
and this happens after-the-fact, what can the US do? I don't think
it can do too much, to tell you the truth.
Let's turn to the Chicago Summit. It was seen as very important here.
The government had been outlining the progress, while others considered
no steps were taken forward. What are your views?
I had the opposite reaction in terms of the message in Georgia. I
saw this as a very strained indicator of Georgia's NATO aspirations
and importance. I think the Georgian government tried to play up that
somehow there was a meaningful progress on the NATO issue, because it
feels like it has to demonstrate progress, because it all the time has
to prove that its strategy is working. In reality Georgian membership
in NATO is a very low priority at the moment for the member countries.
They are very much concern about one issue only - that's Afghanistan
getting out of Afghanistan. Everything else is of secondary importance.
This fall we have a parliamentary election which is seen as very
important for many people here. What do you think, does there exist
any red line, the crossing of which would cost Saakashvili and Georgian
authorities their image as pro-western and democratic?
It's hard to think in hypotheticals, so I'd rather not come up with
imaginary scenarios. There is an international expectation that
the elections should be reasonibly fair, that the process should be
transparent, that all candidates who want to run, should be allowed to
run, that there shouldn't be obviously the problem of administrative
resources, but that this use of the media power and media control,
that sort of block certain oppositional channels from cable packages,
and so forth, this should also be denounced as unfair. I think former
ambassador Bass commented on this issue. So I don't think there is
any one red line. I think there should be an expectation that this
is a mature government now, they certainly know about rules and
institutions, that the run up to the election should be as open and
as transparent, conforming to international norms as the conduct of
the election itself.
But what if it doesn't, what if elections are still unfair, despite
all those criticism and recommendations?
I think you'll see a lot of international criticism. To what ends,
I don't know. I would be speculating, so I don't want to speculate
scenarios, but I think, one thing, and I know Lincoln agrees with me
on this, elections always seem to be tests of Georgia's democratic
status. And it keeps receding for the tests. It's a sort of exam that
you keep taking and taking and taking until eventually you get it
right at some point. But the image of this government if it somehow
interferes will be deminished. So I think this is why things now are
in a different place than they were four or five years ago. Now we
are at the end of a second cycle, and that's a quite pivotal point
in terms of the perception of governments.
You published an opinion piece together with Lincoln Mitchell in the
New York Times last year about the Abkhazian elections. You touched
several important points, including the Georgian authority and how
they treat these breakaway regions. How do you view Georgian policy
towards those regions?
I think that the policy is one of isolation, and one of wanting to
speak on their behalf, and I think it's been very counterproductive. I
fear that Abkhazia is already lost now to Russia, because of the
policy, that there was an opening perhaps right after the war. This is
one of things we wanted to do:if there is obvious distrust between
the Abkhaz government and this government, and if there is genuine
concern in Abkhazia about being observed by Russia, which there is, you
must offer a third way. You must offer some other set of processes,
institutions, areas, where you can facilitate some dialogues and
contacts, and this is sort of the regional third way, this is what we
advocate, engagement. No recognition, but international engagement,
and also it's becoming the basis of EU policy, although in the
implementation phase it hasn't gone that way. Because given just
a stark binary choice between Georgia and Russia, you see the turn
to Russia. And not everyone's necessarily happy about it, there are
concerns. Again, some of the Abkhaz say, what for? We are autonomous or
de facto independent, but not formally recognized. Now we're formally
recognized but we're not independent. Now we're formally recognized,
but we're not independent. So there is a tension between the legal
recognition and the material consequences.
I think the other thing here is that the central government here is
not given a set of matrix or indicators or standards through which we
would be able to judge as external academics or analysts, the success
of their strategy. So, how do we know, when we hear statements from
senior officials that the strategy is working? Working to do what?
What should we look at? Should we look at the number of grey passports
that were adopted? Should we look at the number of hospital visits
by Abkhaz here in Georgia? What should we look at, just tell us,
otherwise this just your word. The final part that I have found very
troubling is that it is clear that there is a deficit of knowledge
about what is going on in Abkhazia. So this is why we have researchers
committed to make public opinion surveys in Abkhazia trying to get a
sense of what are the issues, what are the political attitudes. And
this type of work is very frowned upon by central authorities here.
One permanent researcher who entered via the north has now subsequently
been banned here, but his work is very important work about political
attitudes in Abkhazia. So I think the point is we can't keep talking
about what the Abkhaz really think as if it's just some hypathotical
thing. We have the tools to find out what the Abkhaz do think,
and I think the sooner that Tbilisi starts dealing with realities
and political attitudes there and acknowledging them, that signals
itself to the Abkhaz that you are taking these issues seriously. Now
the question I said was, the Russians would never allow. How do you
know? You need to start putting this process in place of real dialogue,
of taking opinions seriously that if the Russians intervene, it changes
Abkhaz perceptions of the political equation and the tolerance issue
and so forth. So I actually think forcing Russia's hand would be good
outcome of this. Not a bad one.
Can you maybe predict about current situation in Karabakh [a disputed
region claimed by both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and currently controlled
by Armenia], because the situation is quite difficult there.
Very difficult. I can't predict and I'm not sure I want to. All I
would say is that of course these recent skirmishes are part of a
broader tension that you've seen over the last two three years. I
think the question is, is there a destabilizing window at the moment,
is every government that is now flushed with new wealth, that seems
self-confident, whether it sees a window of a possible military
operation in a way that it won't be able to in five or ten year's
time. From a strategic point of view, that's the question I would ask.
But in terms of what will happenn I don't know.
Is there a possibility of involvement by some regional big powers,
like Russia or Turkey, Iran?
There's a lot of talk about involvement of big powers, there's lot
talks about also the ramifications of the campaign against Iran, on
the Karabakh issue. These are some second order consequences that need
to be talked about in relation to the discussion of what a military
operation on Iran will do. Not only for the Middle East but in the
Caucasus itself. Would it set in emotion a set of other dynamics? I
just can't predict with any certainty, what would or wouldn't happen.
But yes, is there a relation there? Absolutely. Are relations between
Iranians and Israelis very tense? Yes, very much so. I can't say
anything more without just speculating.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress