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AZERI-VISION: THE EU'S MISGUIDED PRAGMATISM IS ENCOURAGING AUTHORITARIANISM IN AZERBAIJAN.
By Jacqueline Hale
European Voice
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2012/may/azeri-vision/74439.aspx
May 25 2012
As Azerbaijan welcomes Eurovision to its Caspian shores this weekend,
viewers and visitors should not be taken in by the government's latest
glitzy display. More importantly, Azerbaijan, a hydrocarbon-rich
state, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) partner, current member
of the UN Security Council, and aspirant host of the 2020 Olympics,
needs the EU more than officials in Baku - and Brussels - realise.
Insistence on energy dependence - at the cost of European values
- has straitjacketed EU foreign policy in the Caspian. The EU has
subordinated its broader ENP agenda to the goals of energy security and
diversification. Five years on from Azerbaijan's inclusion in the ENP,
despite advances in energy co-operation, significant backsliding has
occurred around the jointly agreed ENP values agenda, which includes
democracy and respect for human rights.
International indexes characterise Azerbaijan as highly corrupt,
authoritarian, and generally 'not free'. While the EU spells out
human-rights obligations on paper through its ENP, a parallel agenda
is revealed by trips to Baku by Jose Manuel Barroso, the European
Commission's president, and by Gunther Oettinger, the European energy
commissioner, and a separate memorandum of understanding on energy
policy. Amid quiet diplomacy and presidential handholding, the Caspian
state's crackdown on independent journalists, human-rights activists,
and opposition forces have not been met with any EU censure - in
stark contrast to the EU's approach to energy-poor Belarus.
Much of the inconsistency between the EU's 'values' rhetoric and its
actions is driven by official insistence that the EU has 'no leverage'
to push for change. This is both an excuse and a strategic blunder.
With 500 million people in its borders, the EU has considerable clout
as an energy consumer. Azerbaijan remains a largely undiversified
economy, depending on the EU market for its oil (now passing its
peak) and for its gas. In 2010, the EU accounted for over 50% of
exports from Azerbaijan. Add to this Azerbaijan's geopolitical woes
- a still unresolved dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh,
increasingly poor relations with Iran, and a perceived imbalance
(in Armenia's favour) of Russia's relations in the region - and it
becomes clear why Brussels and other European capitals have been the
targets of aggressive PR and lobbying by the Azeri government.
The Arab Spring brought into sharp relief how the pursuit of energy
and commercial deals at the expense of human rights can cause enormous
reputational and political damage to the EU. Although the government
of Azerbaijan must take primary responsibility for its 'nul points' in
the field of human rights and democracy, the EU is not without blame.
Azerbaijan has had little incentive to create a more open society
in the face of an EU foreign energy policy premised on engagement
without red lines or negative policy consequences. By contrast, it is
the EU that is set to lose out - as a norms-based, soft-power actor -
if it fails to live up to, and demand, governance and transparency
in dealings between Europe, its companies, and the Azeri government.
Doing business now and dealing with human rights and governance
standards later has an impact on more than EU values. It also makes
poor financial sense. Companies opting to leave rentier states -
as Azerbaijan's is - due to corruption attest to this.
Principled negotiations by the EU rather than misguided pragmatism
could help reverse this trend of casual authoritarianism in Azerbaijan.
The ENP review - with its emphasis on partnering societies and the
'more for more' approach - sets a much better tone. By awarding
greater and broader EU support to committed reformers in the EU's
southern and eastern neighbourhood it addresses those groups from
Tunisia to Azerbaijan that are looking to the EU to set standards.
Newly empowered EU delegations and embassies are best placed to
deliver this, through intensifying their networks and outreach.
Crucial oil and mining transparency legislation due to be adopted in
Brussels this summer will also offer a chance for Azerbaijan's citizens
to hold their government to account for the use of oil revenues.
As criticism of Azerbaijan increases ahead of Eurovision, it is
clear that the government there is not impervious to censure. The
EU retains the power to confer, and withdraw, what Azerbaijan craves
most - international legitimacy. Now let this legitimacy be earned,
not bought.
Jacqueline Hale is a senior policy analyst on EU external relations
for the Open Society Institute in Brussels.
By Jacqueline Hale
European Voice
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2012/may/azeri-vision/74439.aspx
May 25 2012
As Azerbaijan welcomes Eurovision to its Caspian shores this weekend,
viewers and visitors should not be taken in by the government's latest
glitzy display. More importantly, Azerbaijan, a hydrocarbon-rich
state, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) partner, current member
of the UN Security Council, and aspirant host of the 2020 Olympics,
needs the EU more than officials in Baku - and Brussels - realise.
Insistence on energy dependence - at the cost of European values
- has straitjacketed EU foreign policy in the Caspian. The EU has
subordinated its broader ENP agenda to the goals of energy security and
diversification. Five years on from Azerbaijan's inclusion in the ENP,
despite advances in energy co-operation, significant backsliding has
occurred around the jointly agreed ENP values agenda, which includes
democracy and respect for human rights.
International indexes characterise Azerbaijan as highly corrupt,
authoritarian, and generally 'not free'. While the EU spells out
human-rights obligations on paper through its ENP, a parallel agenda
is revealed by trips to Baku by Jose Manuel Barroso, the European
Commission's president, and by Gunther Oettinger, the European energy
commissioner, and a separate memorandum of understanding on energy
policy. Amid quiet diplomacy and presidential handholding, the Caspian
state's crackdown on independent journalists, human-rights activists,
and opposition forces have not been met with any EU censure - in
stark contrast to the EU's approach to energy-poor Belarus.
Much of the inconsistency between the EU's 'values' rhetoric and its
actions is driven by official insistence that the EU has 'no leverage'
to push for change. This is both an excuse and a strategic blunder.
With 500 million people in its borders, the EU has considerable clout
as an energy consumer. Azerbaijan remains a largely undiversified
economy, depending on the EU market for its oil (now passing its
peak) and for its gas. In 2010, the EU accounted for over 50% of
exports from Azerbaijan. Add to this Azerbaijan's geopolitical woes
- a still unresolved dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh,
increasingly poor relations with Iran, and a perceived imbalance
(in Armenia's favour) of Russia's relations in the region - and it
becomes clear why Brussels and other European capitals have been the
targets of aggressive PR and lobbying by the Azeri government.
The Arab Spring brought into sharp relief how the pursuit of energy
and commercial deals at the expense of human rights can cause enormous
reputational and political damage to the EU. Although the government
of Azerbaijan must take primary responsibility for its 'nul points' in
the field of human rights and democracy, the EU is not without blame.
Azerbaijan has had little incentive to create a more open society
in the face of an EU foreign energy policy premised on engagement
without red lines or negative policy consequences. By contrast, it is
the EU that is set to lose out - as a norms-based, soft-power actor -
if it fails to live up to, and demand, governance and transparency
in dealings between Europe, its companies, and the Azeri government.
Doing business now and dealing with human rights and governance
standards later has an impact on more than EU values. It also makes
poor financial sense. Companies opting to leave rentier states -
as Azerbaijan's is - due to corruption attest to this.
Principled negotiations by the EU rather than misguided pragmatism
could help reverse this trend of casual authoritarianism in Azerbaijan.
The ENP review - with its emphasis on partnering societies and the
'more for more' approach - sets a much better tone. By awarding
greater and broader EU support to committed reformers in the EU's
southern and eastern neighbourhood it addresses those groups from
Tunisia to Azerbaijan that are looking to the EU to set standards.
Newly empowered EU delegations and embassies are best placed to
deliver this, through intensifying their networks and outreach.
Crucial oil and mining transparency legislation due to be adopted in
Brussels this summer will also offer a chance for Azerbaijan's citizens
to hold their government to account for the use of oil revenues.
As criticism of Azerbaijan increases ahead of Eurovision, it is
clear that the government there is not impervious to censure. The
EU retains the power to confer, and withdraw, what Azerbaijan craves
most - international legitimacy. Now let this legitimacy be earned,
not bought.
Jacqueline Hale is a senior policy analyst on EU external relations
for the Open Society Institute in Brussels.