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Al Jazeera, Qatar
Aug 10 2014
Will Armenia and Azerbaijan reach a negotiated solution?
Fighting in Ukraine, and Russia-West rivalries complicate a resolution
to the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict.
Last updated: 10 Aug 2014 09:31
by Vartan Oskanian
Given all that is happening in the Middle East and Ukraine, no one
seems to have the patience for escalation, casualties and bloodshed
any where else.
During the past two weeks, the ceasefire violations at the line of
contact between the Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces went well
beyond the usual and minor skirmishes, causing two dozen casualties on
both sides.
The moment that the long dormant, but simmering, Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus began to
show signs of eruption, the UN, the US, Russia, the EU, Iran and many
other countries rushed to urge restraint, respect of the ceasefire
agreement, and an immediate resumption of interrupted negotiations.
Indeed, on August 9 and 10, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan,
along with Russian President Vladimir Putin, met in the Russian resort
city of Sochi. No doubt, respecting the ceasefire and advancing the
peace process were the main agenda items. Committing to these goals is
one thing, fulfilling them is another. The prevailing circumstances,
however, are hardly conducive for their realisation.
The maintenance of the self-regulated ceasefire - the only one of its
kind in the world - since 1994, succeeded for two reasons: the
military balance between the opposing sides, and hope in the ongoing
negotiations. Over the last three years, both of these deterrents have
been seriously undermined.
Given today's enormous discrepancy in the defence budgets of
Azerbaijan on the one hand, and the Armenian side (Armenia and
Karabakh) on the other, and the Azerbaijanis' disproportionate
purchases of military hardware, there is, in Azerbaijan, a belief that
they have the upper hand in the military equation.
Additionally, the futility of the peace talks in the recent years
during which the differences and disagreements between the parties
have grown deeper and wider, coupled with long interruption of high
level talks, has implanted a sense of despair about the prospects for
a peaceful resolution.
So it is highly likely that the recent escalation intended to test the
military balance and attract the overstretched attention of the major
players back to the conflict and force a resumption of high level
talks.
Right to self-determination?
There are three elements that have always affected the peace talks and
the settlement process, and continue to do so: One is the global and
regional interests of the major powers and their present
interrelationships; second is the dominant trend in international
relations as manifested in the agendas and decisions of international
organisations (such as the UN and Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe); third, is the conflicting sides' own present
political and economic situations and their capacity and will to shape
the peace process.
Over these 20 years, during each successive stage of diplomatic
activity, these three factors have always been consequential, although
never as significantly as today. Worse, never have they all been in
such a state of great and unpredictable flux.
Russia and the US, two of the three mediators in the Nagorno-Karabakh
talks, are at odds and can't see eye to eye over major global issues,
including Ukraine and Syria. Their interests in the Caucasus are not
in harmony either. This situation is interesting and could be a
double-edged sword. One might assume that the ongoing tug of war
between them will spill over into the Karabakh talks, but it is also
possible that both sides use this as an opportunity to mend fences. It
all depends on how it will play out. But the waters are further
muddied considering the conflicting positions Russia and the US have
taken on ethnic conflicts and self-determination movements.
Russia, which opposed what it considered to be the unilateral
legitimisation of sovereignty in Kosovo, did the same by recognising
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Most recently, it
hurriedly recognised Crimea's referendum results by incorporating the
region into Russia.
In other words, while both the West and Russia support
self-determination efforts, they do so selectively - and unilaterally.
Therein lies the danger. This contradictory situation created by
conflicting approaches by the major players will require delicate
diplomatic manoeuvring by the sides and the mediators. During the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh
enclave, 80 percent Armenian, opted for self-determination by
conducting a referendum and declaring secession.
Within international organisations, there are conflicting directions.
Despite the fact that several self-determination movements achieved
independence and statehood in the past decade, such as East Timor,
South Sudan and Kosovo - the first two with membership in the United
Nations - the global organisation remains selective and ambivalent
about the self-determination phenomena and still lacks criteria,
guidelines and legal framework for a more evolved and enlightened
policy.
One thing is clear however: The very early assumptions about the root
causes of self-determination claims (ethnic and religious hatred,
extreme nationalism, irrelevant historical claims, outside
manipulation) and their resolution framework (one-size-fits-all, fear
of the domino effect, quick democratisation, ethnic groups lowering
their goals with the promise of democracy, human rights and
prosperity) have all been questioned, challenged and undermined. The
evidence is the independence of some of the movements and the
persistence of the many others, among them Nagorno-Karabakh.
The scenarios
The ultimate question is what is to happen to this no-peace, no-war
situation. What is the end game? Is there a viable political solution?
There are three possible - and not very novel - scenarios. One is the
continuation of a sustainable status quo. The second is the eruption
of war and a new situation on the ground. The third is a negotiated
solution.
Although most of the international community, including the mediators,
will automatically reject the first scenario as unacceptable and
unsustainable, this is not necessarily the case. There are many
historical examples when yesterday's unrealistic alternative became
today's preferred and realistic solution.
The second scenario - war - is difficult to imagine. Armenians have no
reason to start a war. If the Azerbaijanis start a war, this will be
the third time they will have tried, and they will only succeed if
they aim for a "final solution". That would be a huge risk for
Azerbaijan, greater than for the Armenian side, given their total
reliance on their role as an energy producing and transit country.
And finally, there is the third scenario - a negotiated solution. This
is obviously the most desirable, but would require substantive
compromises. These negotiations have already gone on for 20 long,
intense years, during which five serious proposals were presented.
Four were rejected; one is still on the table.
Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully requires two
parallel steps: A guarantee of non-resumption of military hostilities,
and a clear, mutually binding blueprint for reaching a final
settlement.
This is the challenge facing Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. A lasting
peace will come when each side acknowledges the other's minimum
requirements, not their belligerent and maximalist demands. Before
this can happen, each side must achieve sufficient internal consensus
on its bargaining position. This hasn't happened yet.
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former
foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/08/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-kara-201489124936667673.html
From: A. Papazian
Aug 10 2014
Will Armenia and Azerbaijan reach a negotiated solution?
Fighting in Ukraine, and Russia-West rivalries complicate a resolution
to the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict.
Last updated: 10 Aug 2014 09:31
by Vartan Oskanian
Given all that is happening in the Middle East and Ukraine, no one
seems to have the patience for escalation, casualties and bloodshed
any where else.
During the past two weeks, the ceasefire violations at the line of
contact between the Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces went well
beyond the usual and minor skirmishes, causing two dozen casualties on
both sides.
The moment that the long dormant, but simmering, Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus began to
show signs of eruption, the UN, the US, Russia, the EU, Iran and many
other countries rushed to urge restraint, respect of the ceasefire
agreement, and an immediate resumption of interrupted negotiations.
Indeed, on August 9 and 10, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan,
along with Russian President Vladimir Putin, met in the Russian resort
city of Sochi. No doubt, respecting the ceasefire and advancing the
peace process were the main agenda items. Committing to these goals is
one thing, fulfilling them is another. The prevailing circumstances,
however, are hardly conducive for their realisation.
The maintenance of the self-regulated ceasefire - the only one of its
kind in the world - since 1994, succeeded for two reasons: the
military balance between the opposing sides, and hope in the ongoing
negotiations. Over the last three years, both of these deterrents have
been seriously undermined.
Given today's enormous discrepancy in the defence budgets of
Azerbaijan on the one hand, and the Armenian side (Armenia and
Karabakh) on the other, and the Azerbaijanis' disproportionate
purchases of military hardware, there is, in Azerbaijan, a belief that
they have the upper hand in the military equation.
Additionally, the futility of the peace talks in the recent years
during which the differences and disagreements between the parties
have grown deeper and wider, coupled with long interruption of high
level talks, has implanted a sense of despair about the prospects for
a peaceful resolution.
So it is highly likely that the recent escalation intended to test the
military balance and attract the overstretched attention of the major
players back to the conflict and force a resumption of high level
talks.
Right to self-determination?
There are three elements that have always affected the peace talks and
the settlement process, and continue to do so: One is the global and
regional interests of the major powers and their present
interrelationships; second is the dominant trend in international
relations as manifested in the agendas and decisions of international
organisations (such as the UN and Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe); third, is the conflicting sides' own present
political and economic situations and their capacity and will to shape
the peace process.
Over these 20 years, during each successive stage of diplomatic
activity, these three factors have always been consequential, although
never as significantly as today. Worse, never have they all been in
such a state of great and unpredictable flux.
Russia and the US, two of the three mediators in the Nagorno-Karabakh
talks, are at odds and can't see eye to eye over major global issues,
including Ukraine and Syria. Their interests in the Caucasus are not
in harmony either. This situation is interesting and could be a
double-edged sword. One might assume that the ongoing tug of war
between them will spill over into the Karabakh talks, but it is also
possible that both sides use this as an opportunity to mend fences. It
all depends on how it will play out. But the waters are further
muddied considering the conflicting positions Russia and the US have
taken on ethnic conflicts and self-determination movements.
Russia, which opposed what it considered to be the unilateral
legitimisation of sovereignty in Kosovo, did the same by recognising
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Most recently, it
hurriedly recognised Crimea's referendum results by incorporating the
region into Russia.
In other words, while both the West and Russia support
self-determination efforts, they do so selectively - and unilaterally.
Therein lies the danger. This contradictory situation created by
conflicting approaches by the major players will require delicate
diplomatic manoeuvring by the sides and the mediators. During the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh
enclave, 80 percent Armenian, opted for self-determination by
conducting a referendum and declaring secession.
Within international organisations, there are conflicting directions.
Despite the fact that several self-determination movements achieved
independence and statehood in the past decade, such as East Timor,
South Sudan and Kosovo - the first two with membership in the United
Nations - the global organisation remains selective and ambivalent
about the self-determination phenomena and still lacks criteria,
guidelines and legal framework for a more evolved and enlightened
policy.
One thing is clear however: The very early assumptions about the root
causes of self-determination claims (ethnic and religious hatred,
extreme nationalism, irrelevant historical claims, outside
manipulation) and their resolution framework (one-size-fits-all, fear
of the domino effect, quick democratisation, ethnic groups lowering
their goals with the promise of democracy, human rights and
prosperity) have all been questioned, challenged and undermined. The
evidence is the independence of some of the movements and the
persistence of the many others, among them Nagorno-Karabakh.
The scenarios
The ultimate question is what is to happen to this no-peace, no-war
situation. What is the end game? Is there a viable political solution?
There are three possible - and not very novel - scenarios. One is the
continuation of a sustainable status quo. The second is the eruption
of war and a new situation on the ground. The third is a negotiated
solution.
Although most of the international community, including the mediators,
will automatically reject the first scenario as unacceptable and
unsustainable, this is not necessarily the case. There are many
historical examples when yesterday's unrealistic alternative became
today's preferred and realistic solution.
The second scenario - war - is difficult to imagine. Armenians have no
reason to start a war. If the Azerbaijanis start a war, this will be
the third time they will have tried, and they will only succeed if
they aim for a "final solution". That would be a huge risk for
Azerbaijan, greater than for the Armenian side, given their total
reliance on their role as an energy producing and transit country.
And finally, there is the third scenario - a negotiated solution. This
is obviously the most desirable, but would require substantive
compromises. These negotiations have already gone on for 20 long,
intense years, during which five serious proposals were presented.
Four were rejected; one is still on the table.
Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully requires two
parallel steps: A guarantee of non-resumption of military hostilities,
and a clear, mutually binding blueprint for reaching a final
settlement.
This is the challenge facing Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. A lasting
peace will come when each side acknowledges the other's minimum
requirements, not their belligerent and maximalist demands. Before
this can happen, each side must achieve sufficient internal consensus
on its bargaining position. This hasn't happened yet.
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former
foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/08/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-kara-201489124936667673.html
From: A. Papazian