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iPolitics, Canada
Sept 26 2014
Putin is getting the kind of Eastern Europe he wants
By Jonathan Manthorpe
Vladimir Putin ordered the withdrawal of some Russian troops from the
separatist regions of eastern Ukraine this week, but it wasn't a
retreat. In fact, the Russian president now has what he wants: another
Moscow-dominated buffer state protecting his flanks from NATO
expansion.
In theory, the September 5 cease-fire agreement prepared the ground
for a political solution in Ukraine by allowing greater autonomy for
the pro-Russian regions of Lugansk and Donetsk. But if Putin's past
actions in ethnically riven states on the borders of the old Soviet
Union are any guide, the cease-fire line and its 30-kilometre security
zone will become the boundary of a new, pro-Moscow, quasi-independent
state in eastern Ukraine.
The existence of the partitioned Lugansk/Donetsk enclave and, as the
months and years go by, the shrinking hope of any resolution of the
separation will hobble any efforts by the pro-western administration
in Kyiv to join the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
That's what Putin wants -- and he's worked this trick before with great
success. When leaders of the former Soviet state of Georgia made
overtures to NATO and the EU in 2008, Putin recognized the
independence of the country's two pro-Russian breakaway regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Georgian government in Tblisi attempted to regain control of the
regions, but Russia intervened on their behalf. The Moscow forces
mounted a blitzkrieg across the country, routing the Georgian forces.
Before retiring and agreeing to a cease-fire, the Russians made it
clear that they could have occupied Tblisi if they'd wanted to.
Six years later, Russian troops remain in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Their presence, and the partition of the country, have effectively
deferred Georgia's desire for western alliances. Georgia still says it
would like to join NATO, but the idea remains in limbo. Georgian Prime
Minister Irakli Garibashvili said at a press conference in Brussels in
June that his country could be a full EU member within 5 to 10 years.
However, he stressed that Georgia did not have fixed a date for
bidding for EU membership.
Putin went out on a legal limb by giving Moscow's official recognition
to the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He played his cards
differently when constructing another buffer enclave -- Transdniestria
in south-eastern Moldova, a landlocked ex-Soviet state wedged between
Romania and Ukraine.
It looks very much as though Ukraine's Lugansk and Donetsk are joining
what have been called 'frozen conflicts' -- Moscow-controlled buffer
states, in reality.
The Moldovan region between the eastern bank of Dniestria River and
Ukraine has been occupied by Russian troops since a civil war in 1992
after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The European Court of Human
Rights describes Transdniestria as "under the effective authority, or
at least decisive influence of Russia."
Moldova is in the very early stages of applying for EU membership. It
also has made some tentative and inconclusive overtures to NATO. But
in both these cases the presence of Russian troops in Transdniestria,
while technically illegal, is a reality that colours the whole
picture.
It looks very much as though Ukraine's Lugansk and Donetsk are joining
what have been called "frozen conflicts" -- Moscow-controlled buffer
states, in reality. There's another one of these Moscow-aligned
partitioned states on Russia's border with NATO member Turkey in the
South Caucasus. Ngorno-Karabakh was sliced out of Azerbaijan during a
three-year war, aided by its ethnic siblings in neighbouring Armenia,
which ended with a cease-fire in 1994.
Armenia has resisted incorporating Ngorno-Karabakh, but its influence
in the region is great. In its foreign and military policies, Armenia
dances an intricate and sure-footed quickstep, leaning sometimes on
the arm of western Europe, but more often and with greater affection
on the arm of Moscow.
Ngorno-Karabakh is recognized as an independent nation by only three
other administrations. And those three tell us all we need to know
about Ngorno-Karabakh's relations with Moscow and its position in the
firmament of Russian buffer states. The three are South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and Transdniestria. There are no prizes for betting that
sometime soon the "frozen conflict" zone of Lugansk and Donetsk will
also recognize the independence of Ngorno-Karabakh.
This all pre-supposes, of course, that Ukraine is not going to regain
suzerainty over its dissident eastern territories in the foreseeable
future. There is little reason to believe that Kyiv has either the
military muscle or the diplomatic clout to retake Lugansk and Donetsk.
The Ukrainian military was no match initially for the rebels, with
their unmarked Russian allies. Years of under-funding, bad or no
training and an officer corps still set in Cold War ways took their
toll on Kyiv's forces.
However, a rapid reformation of the military by Kyiv in July and
August showed immediate results, and for a while it seemed the
national forces might defeat the separatists. But then the Russians
strode in with more fighters, more sophisticated weaponry and even
shelled Ukrainian forces from Russian territory.
The Russians and separatists then made the first moves in opening a
new front along the Sea of Azov coast around Novoazovzk and Mariupol,
raising the prospect of a link-up with Crimea -- whose loss to the
Ukraine earlier in the year is probably irreversible. This lunge by
the Russian forces may have been a feint to scare Kyiv into agreeing
to a cease-fire before the war got out of hand and engulfed the whole
of eastern Ukraine.
If so, it worked -- and there can be little doubt that if Russia's
Donetsk and Lugansk "frozen conflict" enclave is threatened, Moscow
will do the same again.
Jonathan Manthorpe has been a foreign correspondent and international
affairs columnist for nearly 40 years. He was European bureau chief
for the Toronto Star and then Southam News in the late 1970s and the
1980s. In 1989 he was appointed Africa correspondent by Southam News
and in 1993 was posted to Hong Kong to cover Asia. For the last few
years he has been based in Vancouver, writing international affairs
columns for what is now the Postmedia Group. He left the group last
year and now writes for a range of newspapers and websites.
[email protected]
The views, opinions and positions expressed by all iPolitics
columnists and contributors are the author's alone. They do not
inherently or expressly reflect the views, opinions and/or positions
of iPolitics.
http://www.ipolitics.ca/2014/09/26/putin-is-getting-the-kind-of-eastern-europe-he-wants/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Sept 26 2014
Putin is getting the kind of Eastern Europe he wants
By Jonathan Manthorpe
Vladimir Putin ordered the withdrawal of some Russian troops from the
separatist regions of eastern Ukraine this week, but it wasn't a
retreat. In fact, the Russian president now has what he wants: another
Moscow-dominated buffer state protecting his flanks from NATO
expansion.
In theory, the September 5 cease-fire agreement prepared the ground
for a political solution in Ukraine by allowing greater autonomy for
the pro-Russian regions of Lugansk and Donetsk. But if Putin's past
actions in ethnically riven states on the borders of the old Soviet
Union are any guide, the cease-fire line and its 30-kilometre security
zone will become the boundary of a new, pro-Moscow, quasi-independent
state in eastern Ukraine.
The existence of the partitioned Lugansk/Donetsk enclave and, as the
months and years go by, the shrinking hope of any resolution of the
separation will hobble any efforts by the pro-western administration
in Kyiv to join the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
That's what Putin wants -- and he's worked this trick before with great
success. When leaders of the former Soviet state of Georgia made
overtures to NATO and the EU in 2008, Putin recognized the
independence of the country's two pro-Russian breakaway regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Georgian government in Tblisi attempted to regain control of the
regions, but Russia intervened on their behalf. The Moscow forces
mounted a blitzkrieg across the country, routing the Georgian forces.
Before retiring and agreeing to a cease-fire, the Russians made it
clear that they could have occupied Tblisi if they'd wanted to.
Six years later, Russian troops remain in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Their presence, and the partition of the country, have effectively
deferred Georgia's desire for western alliances. Georgia still says it
would like to join NATO, but the idea remains in limbo. Georgian Prime
Minister Irakli Garibashvili said at a press conference in Brussels in
June that his country could be a full EU member within 5 to 10 years.
However, he stressed that Georgia did not have fixed a date for
bidding for EU membership.
Putin went out on a legal limb by giving Moscow's official recognition
to the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He played his cards
differently when constructing another buffer enclave -- Transdniestria
in south-eastern Moldova, a landlocked ex-Soviet state wedged between
Romania and Ukraine.
It looks very much as though Ukraine's Lugansk and Donetsk are joining
what have been called 'frozen conflicts' -- Moscow-controlled buffer
states, in reality.
The Moldovan region between the eastern bank of Dniestria River and
Ukraine has been occupied by Russian troops since a civil war in 1992
after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The European Court of Human
Rights describes Transdniestria as "under the effective authority, or
at least decisive influence of Russia."
Moldova is in the very early stages of applying for EU membership. It
also has made some tentative and inconclusive overtures to NATO. But
in both these cases the presence of Russian troops in Transdniestria,
while technically illegal, is a reality that colours the whole
picture.
It looks very much as though Ukraine's Lugansk and Donetsk are joining
what have been called "frozen conflicts" -- Moscow-controlled buffer
states, in reality. There's another one of these Moscow-aligned
partitioned states on Russia's border with NATO member Turkey in the
South Caucasus. Ngorno-Karabakh was sliced out of Azerbaijan during a
three-year war, aided by its ethnic siblings in neighbouring Armenia,
which ended with a cease-fire in 1994.
Armenia has resisted incorporating Ngorno-Karabakh, but its influence
in the region is great. In its foreign and military policies, Armenia
dances an intricate and sure-footed quickstep, leaning sometimes on
the arm of western Europe, but more often and with greater affection
on the arm of Moscow.
Ngorno-Karabakh is recognized as an independent nation by only three
other administrations. And those three tell us all we need to know
about Ngorno-Karabakh's relations with Moscow and its position in the
firmament of Russian buffer states. The three are South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and Transdniestria. There are no prizes for betting that
sometime soon the "frozen conflict" zone of Lugansk and Donetsk will
also recognize the independence of Ngorno-Karabakh.
This all pre-supposes, of course, that Ukraine is not going to regain
suzerainty over its dissident eastern territories in the foreseeable
future. There is little reason to believe that Kyiv has either the
military muscle or the diplomatic clout to retake Lugansk and Donetsk.
The Ukrainian military was no match initially for the rebels, with
their unmarked Russian allies. Years of under-funding, bad or no
training and an officer corps still set in Cold War ways took their
toll on Kyiv's forces.
However, a rapid reformation of the military by Kyiv in July and
August showed immediate results, and for a while it seemed the
national forces might defeat the separatists. But then the Russians
strode in with more fighters, more sophisticated weaponry and even
shelled Ukrainian forces from Russian territory.
The Russians and separatists then made the first moves in opening a
new front along the Sea of Azov coast around Novoazovzk and Mariupol,
raising the prospect of a link-up with Crimea -- whose loss to the
Ukraine earlier in the year is probably irreversible. This lunge by
the Russian forces may have been a feint to scare Kyiv into agreeing
to a cease-fire before the war got out of hand and engulfed the whole
of eastern Ukraine.
If so, it worked -- and there can be little doubt that if Russia's
Donetsk and Lugansk "frozen conflict" enclave is threatened, Moscow
will do the same again.
Jonathan Manthorpe has been a foreign correspondent and international
affairs columnist for nearly 40 years. He was European bureau chief
for the Toronto Star and then Southam News in the late 1970s and the
1980s. In 1989 he was appointed Africa correspondent by Southam News
and in 1993 was posted to Hong Kong to cover Asia. For the last few
years he has been based in Vancouver, writing international affairs
columns for what is now the Postmedia Group. He left the group last
year and now writes for a range of newspapers and websites.
[email protected]
The views, opinions and positions expressed by all iPolitics
columnists and contributors are the author's alone. They do not
inherently or expressly reflect the views, opinions and/or positions
of iPolitics.
http://www.ipolitics.ca/2014/09/26/putin-is-getting-the-kind-of-eastern-europe-he-wants/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress