Tweet
CQ Congressional Testimony
February 12, 2015 Thursday
U.S.-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: COMMITTEE: HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
TESTIMONY-BY: DR. SVANTE E. CORNELL, DIRECTOR
AFFILIATION: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Statement of Dr. Svante E. Cornell Director, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins
University
Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats
February 12, 2015 2
Introduction
This hearing occurs at a low point in relations between Azerbaijan and
the United States, a relationship that was once a well-functioning
strategic partnership characterized by a high level of trust. To
understand the reasons behind this state of affairs, and especially to
seek ways to improve the current situation, it is necessary to briefly
delve into Azerbaijan's regional security situation and its politics;
and not least, the policy of the U.S. in Eastern Europe and Eurasia
more broadly.
Azerbaijan's situation has unique characteristics, but the topic today
is part and parcel of several larger trends: first of all, it is an
acute case of the declining influence of the West, and particularly
the United States, in all of post-communist Europe and Eurasia - in
all sectors, including security, energy and human rights. Secondly,
the decline of Azerbaijan's relationship with the U.S. bears
similarities to tensions in America's ties with a number of other
allies, from Israel to South Korea, that have grown wary of U.S.
foreign policy.
Before delving into these matters, it is important to review briefly
why Azerbaijan and its region matters to America's interests.
Why Does Azerbaijan Matter, and What Are U.S. Interests?
The main importance of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus lies in its crucial
geographical location at the intersection of multiple crossroads. It
lies between the Black and Caspian seas, and thus between Europe and
Asia as well as providing the land link between Russia and the Middle
East. Its key strategic value is twofold. On one hand, it lies at the
intersection between Russia, Iran and Turkey, powers playing key roles
in international politics. On the other, it is the bottleneck of the
burgeoning east-west corridor connecting Europe to Central Asia and
beyond. In this Caucasus corridor, Azerbaijan is the only country
bordering both Russia and Iran, and therefore the geopolitically most
pivotal country. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
acknowledged this in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard, in which he
termed Azerbaijan one of the five geopolitical pivots of Eurasia
together with Ukraine, South Korea, Turkey and Iran.
As a result, Azerbaijan and its region is key to western efforts to
shape the future of the intersection of Europe and the Middle East,
and to any reaction to crises occurring in this wider area. It also
plays a central role in western access to the heart of the Eurasian
continent, whether it be for energy, transport, trade, or military
purposes. The strategic importance of Azerbaijan and its region can
also be stated in terms of the current difficult moment in
international politics, where the two most salient challenges to the
transatlantic alliance are Russia's aggressive expansionism, and the
Islamic radicalism emanating from the Middle East.
The states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Azerbaijan in particular,
are unique as they are an important pressure point in both directions.
The task of countering Putin's Russian imperialism goes beyond
Ukraine, and requires a firm strategy to bolster the states on
Russia's periphery, and especially to maintain the crucial east-west
corridor to Central Asia open. But the Caucasus and Central Asia also
include fully one half of secular Muslim-majority states in the world.
These states may have far to go in terms of democratic development,
but their governments and populations are committed to the separation
of state and religion, to secular laws, and to the protection of state
and society from religious extremism. Azerbaijan is unique in being a
majority Shi'a Muslim state, bordering Iran, which is based on a
secular form of statehood.
Thus, the Caucasus (and Central Asia) should be seen as bulwarks
against both Moscow and the Islamic radicalism of the Middle East.
This is amplified by other regional trends. The Iranian theocracy
continues to assertively expand its regional influence, as events from
Syria to Iraq to Yemen indicate. In Turkey, the deterioration of
secular government has given rise to a growing anti-western
authoritarianism with Islamist underpinnings, endangering the
Turkish-American alliance. As a country sharing linguistic bonds with
Turkey and religious ties with Iran, Azerbaijan is once again uniquely
situated.
As mentioned, Azerbaijan is the lynchpin in the land bridge that the
Caucasus constitutes linking Europe with Central Asia. This is
important concretely in terms both of Europe's energy security, and
America's military access to the heart of Eurasia, including
Afghanistan.
The creation of a pipeline system connecting Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea
oil and gas resources via Turkey to Europe, which began a decade ago,
broke the Russian monopoly over the exportation of Caspian energy
resources, and provides Europe with an important source of
diversification. Through Azerbaijan, Europe has the opportunity to
access Central Asia's even larger natural gas resources. Second, after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. faced the
enormous challenge of waging a war in the heart of the Eurasian
continent, thousands of miles from the closest U.S. military base.
America's response was made possible by the introduction of U.S.
military power into Central Asia - which was achieved in turn through
the air corridor across Georgia and Azerbaijan. Later, a Northern
Distribution Network was created which includes access through Russia;
but given the state of Russia-West relations, that corridor cannot be
counted on. Moscow has already on two occasions in the past few months
blocked the German Air Force from using Russian territory to supply
its presence in Afghanistan. Thus, access through Azerbaijan will
remain crucial for any continued presence in Afghanistan or future
contingencies.
In sum, therefore, the Caucasus and particularly Azerbaijan has an
important place in the western strategy to meet imminent threats in
Eastern Europe and the Middle East, as well as in long- term
contingencies for a variety of challenges in the wider region. The
U.S. has a serious and strategic interest in ensuring that the
Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, maintain a positive relationship with the
West, and remain open for western access.
Concrete U.S. Interests
The title of this hearing correctly assumes that the relations between
Azerbaijan and the United States occur in diverse areas, usually
summarized as security, energy and human rights; and that the U.S. has
important interests in each area. In more specific and concrete terms,
American interests in Azerbaijan and the region can be summarized as
follows:
For Azerbaijan and the states of the Caucasus to be stable, sovereign
and self-governing states controlled by none of their neighboring
powers; and cooperating actively with Western governments and
institutions on regional security, counter- terrorism and conflict
resolution.
For the conflicts of the Caucasus, particularly the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict, to be placed on a path toward long-term and
peaceful resolution, within the framework of international law, and
with the degree of manipulation of external powers minimized.
For Azerbaijan to be a state with secular laws in a geographical
environment that includes theocratic Iran, Iraq, the North Caucasus,
and Turkey.
For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to evolve gradually but assuredly
into a zone of self-governing, law-based states that respect human
rights, are free of corruption, and are responsive to citizens' needs.
For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to be a source and transit corridor
for energy, in particular contributing to diversifying the sources of
Europe's energy supplies, and to function as a reliable territory for
Western access by land and air to and from Central and South Asia.
For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to develop into an important land
trade corridor connecting Europe, China, and India not controlled by
any of them but protected by all.
Unfortunately, developments over the past decade have not furthered
these interests. The sovereignty of the regional states is
increasingly under question as blatant interference by Russia has
mounted, complemented by lesser degrees of meddling by Iran and
Turkey. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is on a path of escalation,
not resolution. Azerbaijan remains committed to secular laws, but the
political development of the country and its rights record has come
under increasingly strong criticism. The development of the energy
corridor to the West has been stalled and faced multiple hurdles in
the past decade. Progress toward making the Caucasus a land corridor
is proceeding, but at a slow speed.
Meanwhile, for most of the past decade, America's ability to affect
developments in Azerbaijan and the entire region has been in decline.
In retrospect, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia was a turning
point, after which the situation in the region, and western influence
there, has deteriorated. In fact, it is no exaggeration to state that
at no time since the collapse of the Soviet Union has the U.S. had
less influence over regional matters than today.
Changes in the Region: Impact on the U.S.-Azerbaijan Relationship
The U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship is the most acute exhibit of a trend
of declining American influence. A decade ago, this was a relatively
strong strategic partnership, characterized by mutual respect and a
functioning dialogue between two governments. Today, its main
characteristic is bitter acrimony on both sides.
What are the reasons for this? It is customary to blame Azerbaijan's
domestic evolution for the decline in the relationship. While this is
one factor, the question that should be asked is how the U.S. could
have allowed a relationship with a geostrategically pivotal country
like Azerbaijan to deteriorate so badly, and without taking serious
and visible efforts to engage its leadership until very recently. A
decade ago, the Azerbaijani government was considerably more
responsive to U.S. criticism and advice concerning its domestic
political system, management of elections, and human rights record.
What has changed in the past decade, and why is this no longer the
case?
First, Azerbaijan has benefited from a large inflow of wealth from its
oil and gas industry. It was the fastest-growing economy in the world
for several years - a major change in a country that was in a
dilapidated condition, indeed a failing state, only twenty years ago.
That has brought an ability to provide adequate funding to state
institutions; co-opt large portions of the elite, particularly young
professionals; as well as acquire legitimacy in considerable chunks of
society. Opinion polling from the respected Caucasus Research Resource
Centers shows that the broader population's approval of government
services is growing, not falling. This new-found wealth has led to a
growing reluctance to take advice from abroad; this factor has been
compounded by the intra-elite politics within the government, as
discussed below.
A more important factor is the regional environment, which has
worsened considerably. Aggressive Russian efforts to reassert control
over the former Soviet republics have contributed to a siege
mentality. In the past seven years, Russia has invaded two post-Soviet
states (Georgia and Ukraine) militarily, helped orchestrate a coup
d'etat in a third (Kyrgyzstan), and strong- armed a fourth (Armenia)
to drop all efforts at European integration in favor of the Eurasian
Union. Russian subversion is on the rise across the former Soviet
sphere, as it is in western countries. To this should be added
constant Iranian subversive activities, as well as a growing tendency
by Turkey to interfere in Azerbaijan's internal affairs. This, put
together, has formed a powerful inhibitor against loosening government
control over state and society.
Missteps in American Policies
However, U.S. policies - or the lack thereof - have been an important
contributing factor. It is important to recall that America's
relationship with Azerbaijan, like all former Soviet states, was built
on several components. A constructive dialogue on human rights and
democracy was one of these. Another was American engagement in
supporting the development of the east- west energy corridor, which
enabled Azerbaijan to market is resources independently. A third was
close cooperation on security issues, which included America's efforts
to help resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, as well as
bilateral cooperation on defense, security, intelligence sharing and
counter-terrorism.
These three areas, then, formed a tripod upon which U.S. policy was
based. But in the past decade, that tripod has for all practical
purposes faltered. American engagement in energy issues was strong
down to the completion of initial pipeline infrastructure ten years
ago; it has declined since then. The position of a U.S. Special Envoy
for Eurasian Energy has been abolished; and America's role in the
efforts to bring Caspian natural gas to Europe is minimal. Security
interests gained salience after 9/11, but began a slow decline after
2003 as U.S. attention shifted to Iraq and European governments were
unwilling to pick up the slack. Not least, U.S. leadership in
resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been missing.
As a result, for most practical purposes, the promotion of democracy
and human rights has been the only leg of U.S. policy proceeding at
full speed, leading to an imbalance in the tripod that forms the
underpinning of American strategy. Furthermore, this is certainly the
way the relationship is seen from Baku's perspective. In large parts
of the elite, this is leading to a growing questioning of U.S.
motivations, and a growing inclination to entertain conspiracy
theories (propagated not least by Russian media) on alleged American
plots to overthrow governments.
To be clear, the argument here is not that the U.S. has engaged too
deeply in democracy promotion. The problem is that the U.S. has not
balanced that important commitment with equal attention to security
and energy, and has not adapted its methods to be successful in view
of evolving regional realities.
In this context, the period following the 2008 war in Georgia was a
watershed. That war laid bare the brute force Russia was willing to
deploy to achieve its interests; it also showed that the West did not
function as an effective deterrent against Russia. Not staying at
that, the two American initiatives that most affected Azerbaijan were
profoundly counter-productive for the bilateral relationship.
First, rather than causing Russia to pay a price for its invasion of
an independent state, the Obama administration rewarded Moscow with
the "Reset" initiative. U.S. officials claimed it would not come at
the price of relations with smaller post-Soviet states; but in
practice, it did. America's weak response to the invasion of Georgia,
it should be said in retrospect, led the Kremlin to conclude it could
get away with an even more brazen attack on Ukraine without lasting,
serious consequences. In Baku, it led Azerbaijani leaders to question
the rationale of the country's westward orientation.
Second, the Obama administration did not conclude from the Georgia war
that it should spend additional efforts and energy on resolving the
other unresolved conflict in the Caucasus - that between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Instead, it decided to embark on a project to normalize
Turkish-Armenian relations. The core of that initiative was to open
the Turkish-Armenian border, which Turkey had closed in 1993 because
of Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijan's territory. Since that time, a
link had been maintained between Turkish-Armenian relations and the
Armenia- Azerbaijan conflict. The United States now pushed to cut that
link, something that would heavily damage Azerbaijan's interests,
without offering Baku anything in the process. This initiative
effectively was understood in Baku to mean that Azerbaijan's most
important national security issue was no longer an American concern.
At roughly the same time, America's handling of the Arab upheavals,
and its perceived endorsement of revolutions that brought Islamist
forces to power, further exacerbated perceptions of American
intentions.
Further, the U.S. has failed to draw the implications of Azerbaijan's
complex and opaque internal political scene. Because the formal
opposition is marginalized, American observers have generally assumed
that President Aliyev exercises autocratic power. On this basis they
pay little attention to intra- government politics. Yet Azerbaijan's
internal politics are complex, and take place to a significant extent
within the government rather than between government and opposition.
Notwithstanding the formidable powers that the Constitution accords
the President, his power are in reality far from complete.
In fact, since the 1990s, Azerbaijan's government developed a number
of autonomous fiefdoms, the masters of which have shown an ability to
effectively check the chief executive's powers. Internal rivalries
exist in many countries, and can debilitate effective governance
anywhere. But in Azerbaijan, two factors exacerbate them: first, these
forces are strongest in the chief repressive organs of the state.
Second, they have a thinly disguised (and in some cases overtly
stated) affinity for Russia over the West, and maintain close ties to
counterparts in Moscow that date back to the Soviet period. These
forces have tended to oppose, and even undermine, Azerbaijan's
relations with the West. While President Aliyev and his appointees
have consistently sought to deepen Azerbaijan's relations with the
West, resilient forces whose positions date back to before Aliyev came
to power in 2003 have used their power to repress civil society
organizations and cracked down on dissidents at times often chosen
specifically to undermine the country's relations with the West.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has effectively linked improved bilateral
relations in all areas with the advancement of democratic reforms and
human rights. This is certainly laudable in principle. But in
practice, in the absence of a solid American strategy toward the
region, the implication has been to give the most anti-Western forces
in the government a de facto veto over Azerbaijan's relations with the
United States. This has benefited only the forces in the region
seeking to diminish U.S. influence.
Put otherwise, American actions in response to deplorable acts of
repression have inadvertently reinforced the most retrograde elements
in the government and contributed to isolating the very forces in the
government that advocate for reform, and for integration with the
West. By curtailing engagement in other areas of common interest, e.g.
security and energy, American and European leaders have inadvertently
alienated some of their closest potential partners in the region.
In the final analysis, the problem with U.S. policy has been, at the
basic level, the absence of a concrete strategy that defines America's
interests in the region, appreciates the existence of separate
interests, while at all times taking into account the interactions
between these areas of interest.
The Way Forward
Taking as a starting point that the U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship is
important to the U.S. national interest, what can be done to improve
it?
It is sometimes implied that Azerbaijan is building closer ties with
Russia. In a sense, at least for the caricature of Azerbaijan
prevalent in Western media, turning toward Moscow would seem to be a
natural choice. But in fact, Azerbaijan is one of the former Soviet
states that has been the most determined in resisting Russian efforts
at Eurasian integration. Instead, Azerbaijan fundamentally remains
oriented toward the West, even though that orientation is increasingly
tenuous. Aside from pipeline infrastructure, the country is a member
of the Council of Europe, and joined the European Union's Eastern
Partnership in 2009. European identity remains an important element of
Azerbaijan's self-image, as the country's eagerness to host the first
European Games in 2015 shows.
As Baku's relationship with the West has cooled, it has nevertheless
moved gradually toward a position of non-alignment: while abstaining
from deeper integration with Russia, Azerbaijan also eschews
integration with Europe, attempting instead to "go it alone". In view
of the turbulence of its region, western missteps, and growing Russian
pressure detailed above, Azerbaijan's foreign policy orientation has
in fact been remarkably consistent. In many ways, Azerbaijan's view of
the United States is similar to that which can be found in numerous
other American allies from Israel to South Korea and from Bahrain to
Saudi Arabia: confusion bordering on disbelief over America's policies
and intentions, and a sense of frustration and abandonment. In other
words, it is indicative of a broader problem regarding America's place
in the world.
That said, at this time of considerable turmoil both to Azerbaijan's
north and south, the United States both can, and should, develop a new
approach to Azerbaijan and its region, as the current policy is
clearly not working. To this effect, several observers including
former senior officials, have argued for an approach that is even
tougher on Azerbaijan, including punitive measures. Such an approach
would be sure to fail, because it presupposes a level of American
leverage that is simply not in existence. In the current environment,
a policy that would make U.S. policy even more one-dimensional would
have almost no prospect of bringing positive results. The ruling elite
does not perceive that it benefits from its association with the U.S.
in key matters of national security; therefore, the U.S. simply does
not have the leverage it once had to influence Baku's policies by the
use of the proverbial stick.
Furthermore, singling out Azerbaijan makes little sense in the absence
of similar measures against regional countries with worse human rights
records. Frustration with western indifference to the plight of the
hundreds of thousands of displaced people from the Armenian-occupied
territories in Mountainous Karabakh and western Azerbaijan is already
high in Azerbaijan, and any further targeting of Azerbaijan would
reinforce the sense of western double standards, which officials at
very high levels already denounce.
In fact, given the prevailing frustration with the west and the
character of the country's intra-elite politics, such steps would be
likely to alienate Azerbaijan even further, and could in fact
extinguish whatever influence the U.S. still commands in the country.
The main victims of such an outcome would be not the ruling elite, but
the proponents of human rights and democracy in Azerbaijan itself.
Instead, what is needed is a policy rooted in a regional strategy,
which is based on a broad engagement of the region. A new American
policy must coordinate and find the right balance and sequence among
its priorities. In this context, a much stronger engagement in issues
pertaining to sovereignty and security will do more than anything else
to pave the way for progress in other areas, including human rights.
The history of the past twenty years shows that whenever the U.S. has
been strongly involved in energy and security affairs of the Caucasus,
the Azerbaijani government has been responsive to criticism. When that
has not been the case, as in the past several years, America's
leverage has declined.
In short, going forward, the U.S. cannot expect progress on governance
and human rights without a clear commitment to security issues;
concomitantly, Azerbaijan's leaders must understand that they cannot
expect Western support for their security without a commitment to
reforms in governance and human rights. As already noted, this does
not mean that a new policy should have less of an emphasis on human
rights issues. But it means the U.S. must do more also to address the
issues on which it worked effectively a decade ago: bolstering
sovereignty and independence, addressing security issues, working
seriously to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and
re-engaging on energy politics - all of which happen to be in U.S.
national interest. In sum, for both Azerbaijan's domestic situation
and the bilateral relationship to improve, America's presence must
once again be felt in the region.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
February 12, 2015 Thursday
U.S.-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: COMMITTEE: HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
TESTIMONY-BY: DR. SVANTE E. CORNELL, DIRECTOR
AFFILIATION: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Statement of Dr. Svante E. Cornell Director, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins
University
Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats
February 12, 2015 2
Introduction
This hearing occurs at a low point in relations between Azerbaijan and
the United States, a relationship that was once a well-functioning
strategic partnership characterized by a high level of trust. To
understand the reasons behind this state of affairs, and especially to
seek ways to improve the current situation, it is necessary to briefly
delve into Azerbaijan's regional security situation and its politics;
and not least, the policy of the U.S. in Eastern Europe and Eurasia
more broadly.
Azerbaijan's situation has unique characteristics, but the topic today
is part and parcel of several larger trends: first of all, it is an
acute case of the declining influence of the West, and particularly
the United States, in all of post-communist Europe and Eurasia - in
all sectors, including security, energy and human rights. Secondly,
the decline of Azerbaijan's relationship with the U.S. bears
similarities to tensions in America's ties with a number of other
allies, from Israel to South Korea, that have grown wary of U.S.
foreign policy.
Before delving into these matters, it is important to review briefly
why Azerbaijan and its region matters to America's interests.
Why Does Azerbaijan Matter, and What Are U.S. Interests?
The main importance of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus lies in its crucial
geographical location at the intersection of multiple crossroads. It
lies between the Black and Caspian seas, and thus between Europe and
Asia as well as providing the land link between Russia and the Middle
East. Its key strategic value is twofold. On one hand, it lies at the
intersection between Russia, Iran and Turkey, powers playing key roles
in international politics. On the other, it is the bottleneck of the
burgeoning east-west corridor connecting Europe to Central Asia and
beyond. In this Caucasus corridor, Azerbaijan is the only country
bordering both Russia and Iran, and therefore the geopolitically most
pivotal country. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
acknowledged this in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard, in which he
termed Azerbaijan one of the five geopolitical pivots of Eurasia
together with Ukraine, South Korea, Turkey and Iran.
As a result, Azerbaijan and its region is key to western efforts to
shape the future of the intersection of Europe and the Middle East,
and to any reaction to crises occurring in this wider area. It also
plays a central role in western access to the heart of the Eurasian
continent, whether it be for energy, transport, trade, or military
purposes. The strategic importance of Azerbaijan and its region can
also be stated in terms of the current difficult moment in
international politics, where the two most salient challenges to the
transatlantic alliance are Russia's aggressive expansionism, and the
Islamic radicalism emanating from the Middle East.
The states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Azerbaijan in particular,
are unique as they are an important pressure point in both directions.
The task of countering Putin's Russian imperialism goes beyond
Ukraine, and requires a firm strategy to bolster the states on
Russia's periphery, and especially to maintain the crucial east-west
corridor to Central Asia open. But the Caucasus and Central Asia also
include fully one half of secular Muslim-majority states in the world.
These states may have far to go in terms of democratic development,
but their governments and populations are committed to the separation
of state and religion, to secular laws, and to the protection of state
and society from religious extremism. Azerbaijan is unique in being a
majority Shi'a Muslim state, bordering Iran, which is based on a
secular form of statehood.
Thus, the Caucasus (and Central Asia) should be seen as bulwarks
against both Moscow and the Islamic radicalism of the Middle East.
This is amplified by other regional trends. The Iranian theocracy
continues to assertively expand its regional influence, as events from
Syria to Iraq to Yemen indicate. In Turkey, the deterioration of
secular government has given rise to a growing anti-western
authoritarianism with Islamist underpinnings, endangering the
Turkish-American alliance. As a country sharing linguistic bonds with
Turkey and religious ties with Iran, Azerbaijan is once again uniquely
situated.
As mentioned, Azerbaijan is the lynchpin in the land bridge that the
Caucasus constitutes linking Europe with Central Asia. This is
important concretely in terms both of Europe's energy security, and
America's military access to the heart of Eurasia, including
Afghanistan.
The creation of a pipeline system connecting Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea
oil and gas resources via Turkey to Europe, which began a decade ago,
broke the Russian monopoly over the exportation of Caspian energy
resources, and provides Europe with an important source of
diversification. Through Azerbaijan, Europe has the opportunity to
access Central Asia's even larger natural gas resources. Second, after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. faced the
enormous challenge of waging a war in the heart of the Eurasian
continent, thousands of miles from the closest U.S. military base.
America's response was made possible by the introduction of U.S.
military power into Central Asia - which was achieved in turn through
the air corridor across Georgia and Azerbaijan. Later, a Northern
Distribution Network was created which includes access through Russia;
but given the state of Russia-West relations, that corridor cannot be
counted on. Moscow has already on two occasions in the past few months
blocked the German Air Force from using Russian territory to supply
its presence in Afghanistan. Thus, access through Azerbaijan will
remain crucial for any continued presence in Afghanistan or future
contingencies.
In sum, therefore, the Caucasus and particularly Azerbaijan has an
important place in the western strategy to meet imminent threats in
Eastern Europe and the Middle East, as well as in long- term
contingencies for a variety of challenges in the wider region. The
U.S. has a serious and strategic interest in ensuring that the
Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, maintain a positive relationship with the
West, and remain open for western access.
Concrete U.S. Interests
The title of this hearing correctly assumes that the relations between
Azerbaijan and the United States occur in diverse areas, usually
summarized as security, energy and human rights; and that the U.S. has
important interests in each area. In more specific and concrete terms,
American interests in Azerbaijan and the region can be summarized as
follows:
For Azerbaijan and the states of the Caucasus to be stable, sovereign
and self-governing states controlled by none of their neighboring
powers; and cooperating actively with Western governments and
institutions on regional security, counter- terrorism and conflict
resolution.
For the conflicts of the Caucasus, particularly the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict, to be placed on a path toward long-term and
peaceful resolution, within the framework of international law, and
with the degree of manipulation of external powers minimized.
For Azerbaijan to be a state with secular laws in a geographical
environment that includes theocratic Iran, Iraq, the North Caucasus,
and Turkey.
For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to evolve gradually but assuredly
into a zone of self-governing, law-based states that respect human
rights, are free of corruption, and are responsive to citizens' needs.
For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to be a source and transit corridor
for energy, in particular contributing to diversifying the sources of
Europe's energy supplies, and to function as a reliable territory for
Western access by land and air to and from Central and South Asia.
For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to develop into an important land
trade corridor connecting Europe, China, and India not controlled by
any of them but protected by all.
Unfortunately, developments over the past decade have not furthered
these interests. The sovereignty of the regional states is
increasingly under question as blatant interference by Russia has
mounted, complemented by lesser degrees of meddling by Iran and
Turkey. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is on a path of escalation,
not resolution. Azerbaijan remains committed to secular laws, but the
political development of the country and its rights record has come
under increasingly strong criticism. The development of the energy
corridor to the West has been stalled and faced multiple hurdles in
the past decade. Progress toward making the Caucasus a land corridor
is proceeding, but at a slow speed.
Meanwhile, for most of the past decade, America's ability to affect
developments in Azerbaijan and the entire region has been in decline.
In retrospect, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia was a turning
point, after which the situation in the region, and western influence
there, has deteriorated. In fact, it is no exaggeration to state that
at no time since the collapse of the Soviet Union has the U.S. had
less influence over regional matters than today.
Changes in the Region: Impact on the U.S.-Azerbaijan Relationship
The U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship is the most acute exhibit of a trend
of declining American influence. A decade ago, this was a relatively
strong strategic partnership, characterized by mutual respect and a
functioning dialogue between two governments. Today, its main
characteristic is bitter acrimony on both sides.
What are the reasons for this? It is customary to blame Azerbaijan's
domestic evolution for the decline in the relationship. While this is
one factor, the question that should be asked is how the U.S. could
have allowed a relationship with a geostrategically pivotal country
like Azerbaijan to deteriorate so badly, and without taking serious
and visible efforts to engage its leadership until very recently. A
decade ago, the Azerbaijani government was considerably more
responsive to U.S. criticism and advice concerning its domestic
political system, management of elections, and human rights record.
What has changed in the past decade, and why is this no longer the
case?
First, Azerbaijan has benefited from a large inflow of wealth from its
oil and gas industry. It was the fastest-growing economy in the world
for several years - a major change in a country that was in a
dilapidated condition, indeed a failing state, only twenty years ago.
That has brought an ability to provide adequate funding to state
institutions; co-opt large portions of the elite, particularly young
professionals; as well as acquire legitimacy in considerable chunks of
society. Opinion polling from the respected Caucasus Research Resource
Centers shows that the broader population's approval of government
services is growing, not falling. This new-found wealth has led to a
growing reluctance to take advice from abroad; this factor has been
compounded by the intra-elite politics within the government, as
discussed below.
A more important factor is the regional environment, which has
worsened considerably. Aggressive Russian efforts to reassert control
over the former Soviet republics have contributed to a siege
mentality. In the past seven years, Russia has invaded two post-Soviet
states (Georgia and Ukraine) militarily, helped orchestrate a coup
d'etat in a third (Kyrgyzstan), and strong- armed a fourth (Armenia)
to drop all efforts at European integration in favor of the Eurasian
Union. Russian subversion is on the rise across the former Soviet
sphere, as it is in western countries. To this should be added
constant Iranian subversive activities, as well as a growing tendency
by Turkey to interfere in Azerbaijan's internal affairs. This, put
together, has formed a powerful inhibitor against loosening government
control over state and society.
Missteps in American Policies
However, U.S. policies - or the lack thereof - have been an important
contributing factor. It is important to recall that America's
relationship with Azerbaijan, like all former Soviet states, was built
on several components. A constructive dialogue on human rights and
democracy was one of these. Another was American engagement in
supporting the development of the east- west energy corridor, which
enabled Azerbaijan to market is resources independently. A third was
close cooperation on security issues, which included America's efforts
to help resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, as well as
bilateral cooperation on defense, security, intelligence sharing and
counter-terrorism.
These three areas, then, formed a tripod upon which U.S. policy was
based. But in the past decade, that tripod has for all practical
purposes faltered. American engagement in energy issues was strong
down to the completion of initial pipeline infrastructure ten years
ago; it has declined since then. The position of a U.S. Special Envoy
for Eurasian Energy has been abolished; and America's role in the
efforts to bring Caspian natural gas to Europe is minimal. Security
interests gained salience after 9/11, but began a slow decline after
2003 as U.S. attention shifted to Iraq and European governments were
unwilling to pick up the slack. Not least, U.S. leadership in
resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been missing.
As a result, for most practical purposes, the promotion of democracy
and human rights has been the only leg of U.S. policy proceeding at
full speed, leading to an imbalance in the tripod that forms the
underpinning of American strategy. Furthermore, this is certainly the
way the relationship is seen from Baku's perspective. In large parts
of the elite, this is leading to a growing questioning of U.S.
motivations, and a growing inclination to entertain conspiracy
theories (propagated not least by Russian media) on alleged American
plots to overthrow governments.
To be clear, the argument here is not that the U.S. has engaged too
deeply in democracy promotion. The problem is that the U.S. has not
balanced that important commitment with equal attention to security
and energy, and has not adapted its methods to be successful in view
of evolving regional realities.
In this context, the period following the 2008 war in Georgia was a
watershed. That war laid bare the brute force Russia was willing to
deploy to achieve its interests; it also showed that the West did not
function as an effective deterrent against Russia. Not staying at
that, the two American initiatives that most affected Azerbaijan were
profoundly counter-productive for the bilateral relationship.
First, rather than causing Russia to pay a price for its invasion of
an independent state, the Obama administration rewarded Moscow with
the "Reset" initiative. U.S. officials claimed it would not come at
the price of relations with smaller post-Soviet states; but in
practice, it did. America's weak response to the invasion of Georgia,
it should be said in retrospect, led the Kremlin to conclude it could
get away with an even more brazen attack on Ukraine without lasting,
serious consequences. In Baku, it led Azerbaijani leaders to question
the rationale of the country's westward orientation.
Second, the Obama administration did not conclude from the Georgia war
that it should spend additional efforts and energy on resolving the
other unresolved conflict in the Caucasus - that between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Instead, it decided to embark on a project to normalize
Turkish-Armenian relations. The core of that initiative was to open
the Turkish-Armenian border, which Turkey had closed in 1993 because
of Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijan's territory. Since that time, a
link had been maintained between Turkish-Armenian relations and the
Armenia- Azerbaijan conflict. The United States now pushed to cut that
link, something that would heavily damage Azerbaijan's interests,
without offering Baku anything in the process. This initiative
effectively was understood in Baku to mean that Azerbaijan's most
important national security issue was no longer an American concern.
At roughly the same time, America's handling of the Arab upheavals,
and its perceived endorsement of revolutions that brought Islamist
forces to power, further exacerbated perceptions of American
intentions.
Further, the U.S. has failed to draw the implications of Azerbaijan's
complex and opaque internal political scene. Because the formal
opposition is marginalized, American observers have generally assumed
that President Aliyev exercises autocratic power. On this basis they
pay little attention to intra- government politics. Yet Azerbaijan's
internal politics are complex, and take place to a significant extent
within the government rather than between government and opposition.
Notwithstanding the formidable powers that the Constitution accords
the President, his power are in reality far from complete.
In fact, since the 1990s, Azerbaijan's government developed a number
of autonomous fiefdoms, the masters of which have shown an ability to
effectively check the chief executive's powers. Internal rivalries
exist in many countries, and can debilitate effective governance
anywhere. But in Azerbaijan, two factors exacerbate them: first, these
forces are strongest in the chief repressive organs of the state.
Second, they have a thinly disguised (and in some cases overtly
stated) affinity for Russia over the West, and maintain close ties to
counterparts in Moscow that date back to the Soviet period. These
forces have tended to oppose, and even undermine, Azerbaijan's
relations with the West. While President Aliyev and his appointees
have consistently sought to deepen Azerbaijan's relations with the
West, resilient forces whose positions date back to before Aliyev came
to power in 2003 have used their power to repress civil society
organizations and cracked down on dissidents at times often chosen
specifically to undermine the country's relations with the West.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has effectively linked improved bilateral
relations in all areas with the advancement of democratic reforms and
human rights. This is certainly laudable in principle. But in
practice, in the absence of a solid American strategy toward the
region, the implication has been to give the most anti-Western forces
in the government a de facto veto over Azerbaijan's relations with the
United States. This has benefited only the forces in the region
seeking to diminish U.S. influence.
Put otherwise, American actions in response to deplorable acts of
repression have inadvertently reinforced the most retrograde elements
in the government and contributed to isolating the very forces in the
government that advocate for reform, and for integration with the
West. By curtailing engagement in other areas of common interest, e.g.
security and energy, American and European leaders have inadvertently
alienated some of their closest potential partners in the region.
In the final analysis, the problem with U.S. policy has been, at the
basic level, the absence of a concrete strategy that defines America's
interests in the region, appreciates the existence of separate
interests, while at all times taking into account the interactions
between these areas of interest.
The Way Forward
Taking as a starting point that the U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship is
important to the U.S. national interest, what can be done to improve
it?
It is sometimes implied that Azerbaijan is building closer ties with
Russia. In a sense, at least for the caricature of Azerbaijan
prevalent in Western media, turning toward Moscow would seem to be a
natural choice. But in fact, Azerbaijan is one of the former Soviet
states that has been the most determined in resisting Russian efforts
at Eurasian integration. Instead, Azerbaijan fundamentally remains
oriented toward the West, even though that orientation is increasingly
tenuous. Aside from pipeline infrastructure, the country is a member
of the Council of Europe, and joined the European Union's Eastern
Partnership in 2009. European identity remains an important element of
Azerbaijan's self-image, as the country's eagerness to host the first
European Games in 2015 shows.
As Baku's relationship with the West has cooled, it has nevertheless
moved gradually toward a position of non-alignment: while abstaining
from deeper integration with Russia, Azerbaijan also eschews
integration with Europe, attempting instead to "go it alone". In view
of the turbulence of its region, western missteps, and growing Russian
pressure detailed above, Azerbaijan's foreign policy orientation has
in fact been remarkably consistent. In many ways, Azerbaijan's view of
the United States is similar to that which can be found in numerous
other American allies from Israel to South Korea and from Bahrain to
Saudi Arabia: confusion bordering on disbelief over America's policies
and intentions, and a sense of frustration and abandonment. In other
words, it is indicative of a broader problem regarding America's place
in the world.
That said, at this time of considerable turmoil both to Azerbaijan's
north and south, the United States both can, and should, develop a new
approach to Azerbaijan and its region, as the current policy is
clearly not working. To this effect, several observers including
former senior officials, have argued for an approach that is even
tougher on Azerbaijan, including punitive measures. Such an approach
would be sure to fail, because it presupposes a level of American
leverage that is simply not in existence. In the current environment,
a policy that would make U.S. policy even more one-dimensional would
have almost no prospect of bringing positive results. The ruling elite
does not perceive that it benefits from its association with the U.S.
in key matters of national security; therefore, the U.S. simply does
not have the leverage it once had to influence Baku's policies by the
use of the proverbial stick.
Furthermore, singling out Azerbaijan makes little sense in the absence
of similar measures against regional countries with worse human rights
records. Frustration with western indifference to the plight of the
hundreds of thousands of displaced people from the Armenian-occupied
territories in Mountainous Karabakh and western Azerbaijan is already
high in Azerbaijan, and any further targeting of Azerbaijan would
reinforce the sense of western double standards, which officials at
very high levels already denounce.
In fact, given the prevailing frustration with the west and the
character of the country's intra-elite politics, such steps would be
likely to alienate Azerbaijan even further, and could in fact
extinguish whatever influence the U.S. still commands in the country.
The main victims of such an outcome would be not the ruling elite, but
the proponents of human rights and democracy in Azerbaijan itself.
Instead, what is needed is a policy rooted in a regional strategy,
which is based on a broad engagement of the region. A new American
policy must coordinate and find the right balance and sequence among
its priorities. In this context, a much stronger engagement in issues
pertaining to sovereignty and security will do more than anything else
to pave the way for progress in other areas, including human rights.
The history of the past twenty years shows that whenever the U.S. has
been strongly involved in energy and security affairs of the Caucasus,
the Azerbaijani government has been responsive to criticism. When that
has not been the case, as in the past several years, America's
leverage has declined.
In short, going forward, the U.S. cannot expect progress on governance
and human rights without a clear commitment to security issues;
concomitantly, Azerbaijan's leaders must understand that they cannot
expect Western support for their security without a commitment to
reforms in governance and human rights. As already noted, this does
not mean that a new policy should have less of an emphasis on human
rights issues. But it means the U.S. must do more also to address the
issues on which it worked effectively a decade ago: bolstering
sovereignty and independence, addressing security issues, working
seriously to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and
re-engaging on energy politics - all of which happen to be in U.S.
national interest. In sum, for both Azerbaijan's domestic situation
and the bilateral relationship to improve, America's presence must
once again be felt in the region.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress