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Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey
March 24 2012
France Obsessing Over Turkey's Rising Regional Profile, Scholar
Sunday, 25 March 2012 14:38
France is having difficulty grappling with a Turkey that is
increasingly moving into areas that Paris has long viewed as its
sphere of influence, according to a French scholar of international
relations. `The French Foreign Ministry is obsessed by Turkey's rising
profile in the region,' said Dorothée Schmid of the Institut français
des relations internationales (IFRI).
`Turkey is an indispensable country, but one that we don't know how to
cope with,' she recently told the Hürriyet Daily News, noting that it
had been `unbearable' for France to see Turkey calling itself a
natural player in Syria and Lebanon amid the tumult of the Arab
Spring.
Q: Does French President Nicolas Sarkozy have a personal obsession with Turkey?
A: Many in Turkey believe that French President Nicolas Sarkozy has a
personal obsession with Turkey.
He is not obsessed with Turkey, but he is negative; he does not want
to change his mind. This is one of the fixed points in his political
concepts: Turkey is not a European country, it is not exactly an easy
partner, and it is not always a friendly country.
I think it is very much to do with the relationship of competition
between the two countries and between the two leaders as well. The two
[Sarkozy and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an] have met
very rarely but don't like each other. They both have this sort of
authoritarian type. They like to show that they are the boss, and they
want to show that they can be in command.
Q: Where do Turkey and France compete?
A: In terms of diplomacy, in the Middle East. Sarkozy is not obsessed
with Turkey. But the French Foreign Ministry is obsessed by Turkey's
rising profile in the region. That's for sure. French diplomats [are
more likely] to work with the Turks; they take Turkey seriously. They
see Turkey as an indispensable partner but also a potential spoiler in
the region. For the French, [Turkey] is a spoiler because they are in
the French backyard. It has become increasingly popular among Arab
people and part of the Arab elite, while France is sort of a declining
figure and has had to face few incidents during the Arab Spring. Our
first reactions did not exactly assess the importance of the course of
the Arab revolts in due time.
Turks sided with the people quite firmly, and they have been [engaging
in] communication quite well ever since. But the French were not that
brave. In an effort to rehabilitate the image of France in the region,
France had to go to Libya to sort of make up for past mistakes like
getting closer to [former Libyan leader Moammar] Gadhafi and for not
understanding what was going on in Tunisia.
But France is still an important player in the Middle East and Turkey
is seen as a spoiler because it interferes with French affairs. To say
that Turkey is a natural player in Syria and Lebanon is really
unbearable for the French. But also in multilateral frames, when you
have to make up solutions with NATO or as in the case of Syria with
the Arab League, Turkey seems to be working ¦ to play its own line and
does not seem to be extremely eager to find an agreement with its
partners.
France does not consider Turkey as a reliable ally in terms of crises
in the Middle East. Turkey is an indispensable country, but one that
we don't know how to cope with.
Q: What do you mean when you said Turkey interferes in French affairs?
A: An example would be when ErdoÄ?an did his Middle East tour last
September and when Sarkozy managed to go to Libya before him.
The French view was that ErdoÄ?an's initiative was misplaced. He wanted
to reap the benefits of the whole operation when he was not in a
leading position.
Turkey was not a combatant in the Libyan crisis; it was unfair for
Turkey to reap the political profit of the whole Libya operation.
I think there was an agreement actually on this particular issue
between the French and British that the leading profile would be a
Franco-British [coalition] with the U.S. in the background; Turks
would not have the right to show off too much.
We should actually question the idea that Turkey is that wanted in the
Middle East. What we see from France is that there is a blurred vision
of what Turks have in mind on Syria at the moment.
The French believe that Turks are not ready to be fully in charge and
have difficulties living up to expectations.
Q: Is there a change in French public opinion toward Turkey?
A: The French public is not anti-Turkish. When you look at the polls,
Turkey has a better image in France that it has in Germany. The French
have sympathy for Turkish culture and history. So in a way, Sarkozy is
a bit at odds with the public. I was amazed to see how Turks receive
the negative signals emitted by Sarkozy and how strongly they reacted
to it. Reaction to the Armenian law [which would have criminalized
denials of the 1915 events as genocide until it was recently struck
down by the country's Constitutional Council] was massive. Turkey is a
hot-blooded country. This is something our diplomats have difficulty
[in understanding]. They think this is a phase, that Turks are
experimenting, that it is searching for a style and a place where it
has leverage, but that it is sometimes overplaying its hand.
Q: The Turks, however, think that it was their strong reaction that
led to the cancelation of the law. What do you think about this whole
controversy about the motion?
A: I was amazed to see how the whole thing backfired on the president.
He was not in control of his majority. There were divergences. What
looks strange to me is how Turks managed to appear to look like
victims. It's paradoxical; the objective was to bring up the Armenian
issue and have it discussed publicly, even if it was in an awkward
way. This is not the best way to raise the debate on the issue. It was
interesting to see that Turks showed their weaknesses more than their
strengths. They appeared as a victim of the Armenian lobby, which is a
very small community [in which few of the associations are radical].
But the mainstream is not anti-Turkish. There is a lot to be done for
Turks to understand what goes on in the mind of the Armenian diaspora.
There is more evolution in the diaspora toward dialogue, but you also
have organizations that think the right tactic is to hit the Turks
hard. But [the latest developments] have shown the limits of the
tactic inside France.
Q: What will happen to bilateral ties if Sarkozy is re-elected?
A: It will go through a new period of strain. It will have the same
background: flourishing economic relations with lots of French
investment in Turkey ` this [French] business community is becoming
more vocal. Even if the president remains anti-Turkish, French
diplomats and business elite are pro-Turkish and the public is rather
sympathetic to Turkey. That context should normally prevent big damage
from happening, except if Turks turn anti-French themselves.
Q: And what will happen if Socialist challenger François Hollande
becomes president?
A: Hollande is a very consensual type. He has been delivering rather
contradictory messages on Turkey. He said he would deal with the
Armenian issue in a spirit of appeasement, but he made promises to
Armenians saying he would go for the law again. He says he is not
against Turkish accession in the EU but there are conditions. The
community-based constituents who are biased against Turkey, Kurds and
Armenians, have had traditionally good relations with the Socialist
Party, and they are marginally affecting the Socialists' discourse.
Hollande would do more team work. Other Socialists who are more
favorable to Turkey will also have a say.
Q: Will diplomatic issues remain a challenging area in the future, too?
A: It will be difficult for Turkey and the EU to carve out common
positions. I don't see easy cooperation between the EU and Turkey on
Middle Eastern affairs. Turks have a veto psychology. When they come
together with allies, they say, `I want to have a say because I can
say `no.''
This is a big problem when you have difficulties in building a large
consensus. Turkey prefers being in the leading position rather than
adopting [itself to the larger] consensus.
HDN
March 24 2012
France Obsessing Over Turkey's Rising Regional Profile, Scholar
Sunday, 25 March 2012 14:38
France is having difficulty grappling with a Turkey that is
increasingly moving into areas that Paris has long viewed as its
sphere of influence, according to a French scholar of international
relations. `The French Foreign Ministry is obsessed by Turkey's rising
profile in the region,' said Dorothée Schmid of the Institut français
des relations internationales (IFRI).
`Turkey is an indispensable country, but one that we don't know how to
cope with,' she recently told the Hürriyet Daily News, noting that it
had been `unbearable' for France to see Turkey calling itself a
natural player in Syria and Lebanon amid the tumult of the Arab
Spring.
Q: Does French President Nicolas Sarkozy have a personal obsession with Turkey?
A: Many in Turkey believe that French President Nicolas Sarkozy has a
personal obsession with Turkey.
He is not obsessed with Turkey, but he is negative; he does not want
to change his mind. This is one of the fixed points in his political
concepts: Turkey is not a European country, it is not exactly an easy
partner, and it is not always a friendly country.
I think it is very much to do with the relationship of competition
between the two countries and between the two leaders as well. The two
[Sarkozy and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an] have met
very rarely but don't like each other. They both have this sort of
authoritarian type. They like to show that they are the boss, and they
want to show that they can be in command.
Q: Where do Turkey and France compete?
A: In terms of diplomacy, in the Middle East. Sarkozy is not obsessed
with Turkey. But the French Foreign Ministry is obsessed by Turkey's
rising profile in the region. That's for sure. French diplomats [are
more likely] to work with the Turks; they take Turkey seriously. They
see Turkey as an indispensable partner but also a potential spoiler in
the region. For the French, [Turkey] is a spoiler because they are in
the French backyard. It has become increasingly popular among Arab
people and part of the Arab elite, while France is sort of a declining
figure and has had to face few incidents during the Arab Spring. Our
first reactions did not exactly assess the importance of the course of
the Arab revolts in due time.
Turks sided with the people quite firmly, and they have been [engaging
in] communication quite well ever since. But the French were not that
brave. In an effort to rehabilitate the image of France in the region,
France had to go to Libya to sort of make up for past mistakes like
getting closer to [former Libyan leader Moammar] Gadhafi and for not
understanding what was going on in Tunisia.
But France is still an important player in the Middle East and Turkey
is seen as a spoiler because it interferes with French affairs. To say
that Turkey is a natural player in Syria and Lebanon is really
unbearable for the French. But also in multilateral frames, when you
have to make up solutions with NATO or as in the case of Syria with
the Arab League, Turkey seems to be working ¦ to play its own line and
does not seem to be extremely eager to find an agreement with its
partners.
France does not consider Turkey as a reliable ally in terms of crises
in the Middle East. Turkey is an indispensable country, but one that
we don't know how to cope with.
Q: What do you mean when you said Turkey interferes in French affairs?
A: An example would be when ErdoÄ?an did his Middle East tour last
September and when Sarkozy managed to go to Libya before him.
The French view was that ErdoÄ?an's initiative was misplaced. He wanted
to reap the benefits of the whole operation when he was not in a
leading position.
Turkey was not a combatant in the Libyan crisis; it was unfair for
Turkey to reap the political profit of the whole Libya operation.
I think there was an agreement actually on this particular issue
between the French and British that the leading profile would be a
Franco-British [coalition] with the U.S. in the background; Turks
would not have the right to show off too much.
We should actually question the idea that Turkey is that wanted in the
Middle East. What we see from France is that there is a blurred vision
of what Turks have in mind on Syria at the moment.
The French believe that Turks are not ready to be fully in charge and
have difficulties living up to expectations.
Q: Is there a change in French public opinion toward Turkey?
A: The French public is not anti-Turkish. When you look at the polls,
Turkey has a better image in France that it has in Germany. The French
have sympathy for Turkish culture and history. So in a way, Sarkozy is
a bit at odds with the public. I was amazed to see how Turks receive
the negative signals emitted by Sarkozy and how strongly they reacted
to it. Reaction to the Armenian law [which would have criminalized
denials of the 1915 events as genocide until it was recently struck
down by the country's Constitutional Council] was massive. Turkey is a
hot-blooded country. This is something our diplomats have difficulty
[in understanding]. They think this is a phase, that Turks are
experimenting, that it is searching for a style and a place where it
has leverage, but that it is sometimes overplaying its hand.
Q: The Turks, however, think that it was their strong reaction that
led to the cancelation of the law. What do you think about this whole
controversy about the motion?
A: I was amazed to see how the whole thing backfired on the president.
He was not in control of his majority. There were divergences. What
looks strange to me is how Turks managed to appear to look like
victims. It's paradoxical; the objective was to bring up the Armenian
issue and have it discussed publicly, even if it was in an awkward
way. This is not the best way to raise the debate on the issue. It was
interesting to see that Turks showed their weaknesses more than their
strengths. They appeared as a victim of the Armenian lobby, which is a
very small community [in which few of the associations are radical].
But the mainstream is not anti-Turkish. There is a lot to be done for
Turks to understand what goes on in the mind of the Armenian diaspora.
There is more evolution in the diaspora toward dialogue, but you also
have organizations that think the right tactic is to hit the Turks
hard. But [the latest developments] have shown the limits of the
tactic inside France.
Q: What will happen to bilateral ties if Sarkozy is re-elected?
A: It will go through a new period of strain. It will have the same
background: flourishing economic relations with lots of French
investment in Turkey ` this [French] business community is becoming
more vocal. Even if the president remains anti-Turkish, French
diplomats and business elite are pro-Turkish and the public is rather
sympathetic to Turkey. That context should normally prevent big damage
from happening, except if Turks turn anti-French themselves.
Q: And what will happen if Socialist challenger François Hollande
becomes president?
A: Hollande is a very consensual type. He has been delivering rather
contradictory messages on Turkey. He said he would deal with the
Armenian issue in a spirit of appeasement, but he made promises to
Armenians saying he would go for the law again. He says he is not
against Turkish accession in the EU but there are conditions. The
community-based constituents who are biased against Turkey, Kurds and
Armenians, have had traditionally good relations with the Socialist
Party, and they are marginally affecting the Socialists' discourse.
Hollande would do more team work. Other Socialists who are more
favorable to Turkey will also have a say.
Q: Will diplomatic issues remain a challenging area in the future, too?
A: It will be difficult for Turkey and the EU to carve out common
positions. I don't see easy cooperation between the EU and Turkey on
Middle Eastern affairs. Turks have a veto psychology. When they come
together with allies, they say, `I want to have a say because I can
say `no.''
This is a big problem when you have difficulties in building a large
consensus. Turkey prefers being in the leading position rather than
adopting [itself to the larger] consensus.
HDN