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VLADIMIR KAZIMIROV: AZERBAIJAN MEMBERSHIP IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL MODERATES ALIYEV'S ASPIRATIONS FOR "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY"
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
Wednesday, April 4, 12:28
ArmInfo's interview with Vladimir Kazimirov, First Vice Chairman of
the Association of Russian Diplomats, head of the mediation mission
of Russia, member and co-chair of the OSCE MG (1992-1996), Ambassador.
Participating in the Karabakh peace process, Azerbaijan keeps arming
intensively and took the 38th position in the world in terms of arms
procurement. Given the significant difference in the military budgets
of Baku and Yerevan, the relative military balance is fading away.
What mechanisms are needed to moderate Baku's unjustified hot temper?
Azerbaijan's leadership explains the aspirations to increase its
already bulging military budget with the fact that military spending
is proportional to the state budget and not more than the military
budgets of a number of other countries. That is, Azerbaijan presents
it as something quite natural. This would be perceived as such, but
for a 'trifle' i.e. permanent trigger-happy policy of Azerbaijan in
the Karabakh conflict. It is becoming anomaly: the country is in
the unresolved armed conflict. That country regards the ceasefire
agreement as not termless like it was signed under Heydar Aliyev
but a pause for rearming and resuming the war that is allegedly
'still unfinished'. That country allows resolution of the conflict
by force and actually calls for that. It is not just 'innocent'
growth of defensive military potential, but direct preparations for
resumption of offensive conflict.
It is improper use of funds that could be so useful for the
Azerbaijani people in the everyday life. I think that all this is too
abnormal to be neglected. All these abnormalities are explained with
another abnormality - "occupation" of seven regions of Azerbaijan
by Armenians. Why do they conceal how that occupation happened? Who
avoided reconciliation and peaceful resolution of the conflict through
negotiations? And, finally, who breached short ceasefires trying to
gain by force? Occupation is not good, indeed, but occupations vary.
Allies had to become occupants of Germany, but who was guilty? The
truth is not abstract, it is specific, and every phenomenon has its
origination and history, which some people very easily forget about.
What do you think does Azerbaijan's election as UN Security Council
non-permanent member moderate Aliyev's aspirations to "restore
territorial integrity?"
Besides a series of meetings of the Russian, Azerbaijan and Armenian
presidents, an extremely relative truce on the line of contact of
the Azerbaijani and Nagorno Karabakh armed forces is connected with
Azerbaijan's election to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent
member for 2012-2013. Yerevan and Stepanakert perceived that success
of Baku's diplomacy with jealousy and even negatively, without proper
assessment of the emerged positive deterrent effect.Over the last
years the Karabakh peace process has been more often discussed at the
level of the presidents, especially, the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan
and Armenia. Although the termless truce achieved in 1994 has been
repeatedly subjected to the threat of resumption of military actions
because of the incidents, arms race and the trigger-happy policy of
Baku, it were the efforts of the OSCE MG co-chair- states that helped
deterring hotheads from unreasonable steps in the heavy region.
Generally, Yerevan and Stepanakert welcome the Minsk process, unlike
Baku that makes quite contradictory assessments. The authorities in
Baku are extremely careful in their assessments, while Mass Media
lever harsh criticism at the OSCE MG for fruitless activity. Over
the last years Baku has been more frequently urging the mediators and
international organizations to exert pressure on Armenians in order
they "leave the occupied territories." These calls to press Armenians
are not effective, because the mandate of the co-chairs do not allow
any pressure on the parties regarding the core of the negotiations.
Nevertheless, one should not forget that pressure in the disputable
issues is hardly possible, but pressure regarding undisputable
issues is quite grounded, for instance, against forced resolution of
disputes or non-fulfillment of commitments. In this context, Baku's
positions are quite vulnerable. Advocating the forced resolution
of the Karabakh conflict, Baku yet long ago stopped fulfilling the
agreement on securing the ceasefire-regime dated Feb 4 1995 at the
same time concealing that it was signed by the direct order of the
'nation-wide leader' Heydar Aliyev. Thus, the policy of "giving no
peace to Armenian occupants" has become an obstacle to constructive
policy condemning official Baku to negativism, to refusal from useful
proposals, which do not bring them advantages in the eyes of the
mediators, other countries and the public. How else can one assess
detraction of the ceasefire, the statements like "war is not over",
sabotage of the agreement dated Feb 4 1995, unwillingness to withdraw
snipers from the frontline, avoidance of confidence building measures,
especially in the military sphere, as well as protraction of the
inquiries into incidents on the frontline etc..?
Many analysts think that Turkey is the only country to "allow" its
satellite Azerbaijan to unleash a new war against the Karabakh people.
What are Turkey's real possibilities in this context?
I'd not like to believe in direct incitement of military actions
in Karabakh by Turkey. Despite numerous drifts in Turkey's foreign
policy in favor of Azerbaiian, for instance, ignoring of the Zurich
documents and their
linking to the Karabakh issue, claims to replace France in the OSCE
MG etc, in Ankara they are well aware that serious complications that
a new war over Karabakh may create are hardly within the interests
of Turkey.
What may be the possible roles of all the recognized and, especially,
the unrecognized countries in the South Caucasus in case of the
US-Israel operation against Iran?
It is better opposing such an extremely dangerous "operation" in such
sensitive region already now. It is much better than to discuss what
the recognized and unrecognized states may do when the operation is
already launched. Its aftermaths will be painful not only for the
region, they will actually have a wide response in the world.
I have got an impression that formally participating in the talks,
neither the leadership of Armenia nor of Azerbaijan is striving for
final settlement of the Karabakh conflict because of certain local
reasons and as any settlement on the basis of a compromise is a blow
to their image. Don't you think so?
This is a problem not only of the parties to the conflict but also of
public conscience, including the role of mass media. Of course, it is
easier, grounding on sober understanding of the national interests
as well as irrational approaches, to raise the level of demands to
the opposite party up to the situation when a compromise cannot be
reached and turned into reality. This is easier than realistically
to explain to others the long lasting though mild benefit of peace
and cooperation with today's enemy. Self-deception is more available
than making oneself and other people understand reality.
The point is if the leadership of the parties to the conflict and the
press itself have been explaining the people that a compromise is more
important than a victory, as there are no everlasting and absolute
victories, they are always accompanied with shortcomings. The rational
compromise is more balanced as it has already put aside all extremity.
For this reason, the sooner societies start preparing to peace not
to war, the more effective will be the talks on Karabakh conflict
settlement. It is obvious that in Baku they have not started such a
process. They still go on preparing to the war like before. This should
be not only condemned, but also "shown" to those who "have not yet
noticed", although it is hard and simply impossible not to notice that.
From: Baghdasarian
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
Wednesday, April 4, 12:28
ArmInfo's interview with Vladimir Kazimirov, First Vice Chairman of
the Association of Russian Diplomats, head of the mediation mission
of Russia, member and co-chair of the OSCE MG (1992-1996), Ambassador.
Participating in the Karabakh peace process, Azerbaijan keeps arming
intensively and took the 38th position in the world in terms of arms
procurement. Given the significant difference in the military budgets
of Baku and Yerevan, the relative military balance is fading away.
What mechanisms are needed to moderate Baku's unjustified hot temper?
Azerbaijan's leadership explains the aspirations to increase its
already bulging military budget with the fact that military spending
is proportional to the state budget and not more than the military
budgets of a number of other countries. That is, Azerbaijan presents
it as something quite natural. This would be perceived as such, but
for a 'trifle' i.e. permanent trigger-happy policy of Azerbaijan in
the Karabakh conflict. It is becoming anomaly: the country is in
the unresolved armed conflict. That country regards the ceasefire
agreement as not termless like it was signed under Heydar Aliyev
but a pause for rearming and resuming the war that is allegedly
'still unfinished'. That country allows resolution of the conflict
by force and actually calls for that. It is not just 'innocent'
growth of defensive military potential, but direct preparations for
resumption of offensive conflict.
It is improper use of funds that could be so useful for the
Azerbaijani people in the everyday life. I think that all this is too
abnormal to be neglected. All these abnormalities are explained with
another abnormality - "occupation" of seven regions of Azerbaijan
by Armenians. Why do they conceal how that occupation happened? Who
avoided reconciliation and peaceful resolution of the conflict through
negotiations? And, finally, who breached short ceasefires trying to
gain by force? Occupation is not good, indeed, but occupations vary.
Allies had to become occupants of Germany, but who was guilty? The
truth is not abstract, it is specific, and every phenomenon has its
origination and history, which some people very easily forget about.
What do you think does Azerbaijan's election as UN Security Council
non-permanent member moderate Aliyev's aspirations to "restore
territorial integrity?"
Besides a series of meetings of the Russian, Azerbaijan and Armenian
presidents, an extremely relative truce on the line of contact of
the Azerbaijani and Nagorno Karabakh armed forces is connected with
Azerbaijan's election to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent
member for 2012-2013. Yerevan and Stepanakert perceived that success
of Baku's diplomacy with jealousy and even negatively, without proper
assessment of the emerged positive deterrent effect.Over the last
years the Karabakh peace process has been more often discussed at the
level of the presidents, especially, the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan
and Armenia. Although the termless truce achieved in 1994 has been
repeatedly subjected to the threat of resumption of military actions
because of the incidents, arms race and the trigger-happy policy of
Baku, it were the efforts of the OSCE MG co-chair- states that helped
deterring hotheads from unreasonable steps in the heavy region.
Generally, Yerevan and Stepanakert welcome the Minsk process, unlike
Baku that makes quite contradictory assessments. The authorities in
Baku are extremely careful in their assessments, while Mass Media
lever harsh criticism at the OSCE MG for fruitless activity. Over
the last years Baku has been more frequently urging the mediators and
international organizations to exert pressure on Armenians in order
they "leave the occupied territories." These calls to press Armenians
are not effective, because the mandate of the co-chairs do not allow
any pressure on the parties regarding the core of the negotiations.
Nevertheless, one should not forget that pressure in the disputable
issues is hardly possible, but pressure regarding undisputable
issues is quite grounded, for instance, against forced resolution of
disputes or non-fulfillment of commitments. In this context, Baku's
positions are quite vulnerable. Advocating the forced resolution
of the Karabakh conflict, Baku yet long ago stopped fulfilling the
agreement on securing the ceasefire-regime dated Feb 4 1995 at the
same time concealing that it was signed by the direct order of the
'nation-wide leader' Heydar Aliyev. Thus, the policy of "giving no
peace to Armenian occupants" has become an obstacle to constructive
policy condemning official Baku to negativism, to refusal from useful
proposals, which do not bring them advantages in the eyes of the
mediators, other countries and the public. How else can one assess
detraction of the ceasefire, the statements like "war is not over",
sabotage of the agreement dated Feb 4 1995, unwillingness to withdraw
snipers from the frontline, avoidance of confidence building measures,
especially in the military sphere, as well as protraction of the
inquiries into incidents on the frontline etc..?
Many analysts think that Turkey is the only country to "allow" its
satellite Azerbaijan to unleash a new war against the Karabakh people.
What are Turkey's real possibilities in this context?
I'd not like to believe in direct incitement of military actions
in Karabakh by Turkey. Despite numerous drifts in Turkey's foreign
policy in favor of Azerbaiian, for instance, ignoring of the Zurich
documents and their
linking to the Karabakh issue, claims to replace France in the OSCE
MG etc, in Ankara they are well aware that serious complications that
a new war over Karabakh may create are hardly within the interests
of Turkey.
What may be the possible roles of all the recognized and, especially,
the unrecognized countries in the South Caucasus in case of the
US-Israel operation against Iran?
It is better opposing such an extremely dangerous "operation" in such
sensitive region already now. It is much better than to discuss what
the recognized and unrecognized states may do when the operation is
already launched. Its aftermaths will be painful not only for the
region, they will actually have a wide response in the world.
I have got an impression that formally participating in the talks,
neither the leadership of Armenia nor of Azerbaijan is striving for
final settlement of the Karabakh conflict because of certain local
reasons and as any settlement on the basis of a compromise is a blow
to their image. Don't you think so?
This is a problem not only of the parties to the conflict but also of
public conscience, including the role of mass media. Of course, it is
easier, grounding on sober understanding of the national interests
as well as irrational approaches, to raise the level of demands to
the opposite party up to the situation when a compromise cannot be
reached and turned into reality. This is easier than realistically
to explain to others the long lasting though mild benefit of peace
and cooperation with today's enemy. Self-deception is more available
than making oneself and other people understand reality.
The point is if the leadership of the parties to the conflict and the
press itself have been explaining the people that a compromise is more
important than a victory, as there are no everlasting and absolute
victories, they are always accompanied with shortcomings. The rational
compromise is more balanced as it has already put aside all extremity.
For this reason, the sooner societies start preparing to peace not
to war, the more effective will be the talks on Karabakh conflict
settlement. It is obvious that in Baku they have not started such a
process. They still go on preparing to the war like before. This should
be not only condemned, but also "shown" to those who "have not yet
noticed", although it is hard and simply impossible not to notice that.
From: Baghdasarian