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'SUNNI' TURKEY AND THE CONTAINMENT POLICY FAILURE
By Adel al-Toraifi
http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/04/26/210537.html
Thursday, 26 April 2012
When the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdošan visited Tehran
in May 2010, to offer support for the Brazilian project regarding
the Iranian nuclear file, the conservative press in Iran described
Erdošan as an example of wise leadership in the region. Some newspapers
also devoted extensive column inches to Erdošan’s statements
in support of Iran, particularly his critical stance towards Israel
and the Western world’s view of Muslim states.
Some commentators even considered Turkish-Iranian relations to be a
model of stability and cooperation, arguing that since the signing
of the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin - or the Treaty of Zuhab as it is
known in Turkey - in 1639 between the Ottoman and Safavid empires,
borders have continually been respected; this agreement remains the
basis for all border treaties between the two countries.
Over the past ten years, the government of the Turkish Justice and
Development Party [AKP] has been able to converge with Iran and Syria,
to the extent that Iran supported Turkey’s military campaign
against the strongholds of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party [PKK]
in 2006, and to the extent that Syria retracted its position regarding
the Iskenderun region, and abolished the need for visas to travel
between the two countries. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its
economic ties with both Syria and Iran to exceed record figures in
just a few years; even obtaining Iranian concessions in the oil and
gas sectors. Perhaps this is what prompted Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad to preach of a pro-resistance Iranian-Syrian axis including
both Turkey and Iraq, in the face of what he considered to be the
counter forces of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf States (al-Hayat
newspaper, 26 October 2010).
In truth, Turkey let down the expectations of observers after the
fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime; it did not seek to fill the
Sunni vacuum caused by the rise of Shia political Islam to power in
Iraq, nor did it show any desire to restore its Ottoman heritage in
old spheres of influence. On the contrary, Turkey’s Islamists
adopted a more conciliatory tone with the Syrian Baathist party,
and were less sensitive towards Iranian revolutionary activities
in the region, perhaps because the “containment policy”
[towards Syria and Iran] that Erdošan and his party take pride in had
reaped substantial benefits for Turkey. However, in the last year,
this policy has been exposed to a sizeable tremor, forcing Turkey to
significantly re-evaluate its relations.
When the popular uprisings began in some Arab capitals in early 2011,
Turkey tried to wait before declaring its support for the masses,
but showed resistance to foreign intervention in Libya, and Erdošan
himself issued strong criticism towards NATO. Even when the uprising
began in Syria, Turkey dispatched its diplomats to Damascus in an
attempt to contain the situation and convince al-Assad to conduct
reforms, but with the rising death toll on the Syrian streets, Ankara
issued a series of statements condemning the regime of President Bashar
al-Assad. Not long afterwards, Turkey was compelled to participate -
logistically at least - in NATO operations in Libya, and this damaged
its relations with Tehran significantly.
Turkey’s stance seemed hesitant; while Erdošan was releasing
statements threatening direct military intervention, and threatening
al-Assad with the same fate met by Gaddafi, Turkey’s diplomatic
apparatus appeared more cautious and less zealous than the speeches of
the Turkish leader. This prompted many observers to say that Turkey
was witnessing a divide, either in the military institution or in
the foreign affairs department, regarding the danger of intervention
or regime change in Syria due to security reasons, and because of
dimensions of ethnicity and sectarianism, which could extend into
Turkey itself if Syria turned into a scene of sectarian warfare
between Turkey, Iran and other Arab parties.
In order to understand the shift in Turkish foreign policy, we need
to review some historical facts, and here I am alluding to three
historical stages:
First: It is not true that the history of Turkish-Iranian relations
has always been stable, as claimed by the Turkish advocates of
rapprochement with Iran, because Turkish-Iranian relations remained
troubled and unstable until the last decade. In his book “Islam,
Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey” (2007), Soner
Cagaptay indicates that there is an illusion with regards to the
Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, confirming that the tension inherent in
Turkish-Iranian relations is based on nationalist and sectarian
reasons, which have remained constant even after the emergence of
a modern state in both countries. In fact, the Turkish-Iranian clash
goes far beyond the four major wars between the two parties. It is true
that Reza Shah was an admirer of Ataturk’s secular nationalist
project, but at the same time both countries fought a war in 1930 that
led to the amendment of the border treaty between them. After that,
Turkey broke off contacts with Tehran, in order to orientate towards
the West at the expense of the region.
Second: The Turkish position was clear in its rejection of the
Iranian revolutionary model, and Turkey played a prominent role as a
member of NATO in addressing Iran’s aspirations to export its
revolution. Perhaps for this reason the Khomeini regime supported
left-wing Kurdish, Armenian and Islamist armed groups, such as the
Turkish Hezbollah, against Ankara during the 1980s, and the late
Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal led a clear policy in support
of Pakistan during the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Turkey
remained skeptical of the intentions of the Iranian regime. The 1990s
witnessed the assassination of several secular Turkish intellectuals
and journalists, and Ankara accused Tehran of being involved.
Third: The idea of rapprochement with Tehran was the initiative
of Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic Welfare Party, who is
considered the godfather of converging relations with the Islamic
Republic. He paved the way for the visit of President Mohammad
Khatami, and the signing of oil and security agreements between the
two countries. This approach was opposed by some leaders of military
and secular institutions, who saw it as an attempt by the Islamists
of Turkey to repeat the Khomeinist model in their own country.
Perhaps this explains Erbakan’s visit to Tehran after his
political ban was lifted in 2009, and also explains Ali Velayati,
Iran’s former Foreign Minister and adviser to the Supreme Guide,
saying that Erbakan has always been a friend of Iran.
Such historical milestones are important in order to explain the
Turkish shift from a policy of containment towards Iran and Syria
between 2003 and 2010, and the current state of verbal sparring
between the two sides. In recent months, Erdošan has received several
opponents of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki such as President
of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani, [Iraqi Vice President]
Tariq al-Hashemi and Iyad Allawi. He has gone even further than this
and accused al-Maliki of adopting a dictatorial and sectarian trend,
whereby he excludes his opponents. In return, al-Maliki reacted to
Erdošan's move by visiting Tehran, condemning what he termed the
'sectarian' - meaning Sunni - interference in his government in Iraq,
branding Turkey as a "hostile" state in the region.
There can be no doubt that Turkey is re-evaluating its relations
with Iraq and Syria. Yet, at the same time, I must emphasize that
there are two currents within the Turkish policymaking sphere: one
is eager to confront the Syrian-Iranian axis, and the other current
- which includes figures from within Erdošan’s own party -
continues to warn against abandoning the containment policy that has
been adopted towards these two countries.
Recent events have proven that the historical differences between
the two parties still exist; no matter how Turkey has tried to use
its containment policy, it has eventually been forced to resort to its
"Sunni" identity and "Turkish" nationalism, even if indirectly. This is
nothing new. When the Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in February 1988
between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in the Southern Caucasus,
Iran and Turkey adopted contrasting positions towards the crisis,
which sparked a diplomatic row between the two countries.
Iran had sought to embrace the Azerbaijanis with open arms, welcoming
them as Shiites and revolutionaries, whilst Turkey was wary of the
expansion of Khomeini's influence in the Southern Caucasus. This
prompted Prime Minister Turgut Ozal to overtly declare, during his
visit to the US in 1990, that "the Azerbaijanis are Shia, unlike the
Turks, and hence, of more concern to Iran, since Turkey does not have
pan-Turkic ambitions."
Today, Turkish-Iranian disagreements over Syria are being renewed.
The Turks have made no secret of their feeling that their interests
will be jeopardized so long as the Bashar al-Assad regime remains
in power. As for Iran, it considers the Turkish stance - especially
Turkey's sponsorship of the Syrian Transitional Council and the asylum
it is granting to the displaced Syrian Sunnis - to represent a hostile
approach towards its strategic interest, namely the survival of its
Baathist ally.
There is no doubt that, for the most part, politics is governed by
interests, which may explain Turkey reconsidering its containment
policy towards the Iranian-Syrian axis, for its interests are now at
stake. The Turks fear the danger of the Syrian Kurds rising to power
after al-Assad is overthrown, and they fear that relations with the
Alawite minority in Turkey may become strained, and they are therefore
now seeking a Muslim Brotherhood alternative to rule Syria.
In 1985, Turgut Ozal expressed his disappointment at the future of Iran
under the rule of the mullahs, and the Iranian press reacted by saying
"Turkey is nothing more than a pawn for US interests." 25 years later,
Erdošan directed similar words of criticism towards Iran, and this
prompted the Iranian press to react by saying "Turkey is implementing
an American agenda to spread the Turkish model of political Islam."
(The writer is the current Editor-in-Chief of al-Majalla. The article
was published in the London-based Asharq al-Awsat on April 26, 2012)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Adel al-Toraifi
http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/04/26/210537.html
Thursday, 26 April 2012
When the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdošan visited Tehran
in May 2010, to offer support for the Brazilian project regarding
the Iranian nuclear file, the conservative press in Iran described
Erdošan as an example of wise leadership in the region. Some newspapers
also devoted extensive column inches to Erdošan’s statements
in support of Iran, particularly his critical stance towards Israel
and the Western world’s view of Muslim states.
Some commentators even considered Turkish-Iranian relations to be a
model of stability and cooperation, arguing that since the signing
of the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin - or the Treaty of Zuhab as it is
known in Turkey - in 1639 between the Ottoman and Safavid empires,
borders have continually been respected; this agreement remains the
basis for all border treaties between the two countries.
Over the past ten years, the government of the Turkish Justice and
Development Party [AKP] has been able to converge with Iran and Syria,
to the extent that Iran supported Turkey’s military campaign
against the strongholds of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party [PKK]
in 2006, and to the extent that Syria retracted its position regarding
the Iskenderun region, and abolished the need for visas to travel
between the two countries. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its
economic ties with both Syria and Iran to exceed record figures in
just a few years; even obtaining Iranian concessions in the oil and
gas sectors. Perhaps this is what prompted Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad to preach of a pro-resistance Iranian-Syrian axis including
both Turkey and Iraq, in the face of what he considered to be the
counter forces of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf States (al-Hayat
newspaper, 26 October 2010).
In truth, Turkey let down the expectations of observers after the
fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime; it did not seek to fill the
Sunni vacuum caused by the rise of Shia political Islam to power in
Iraq, nor did it show any desire to restore its Ottoman heritage in
old spheres of influence. On the contrary, Turkey’s Islamists
adopted a more conciliatory tone with the Syrian Baathist party,
and were less sensitive towards Iranian revolutionary activities
in the region, perhaps because the “containment policy”
[towards Syria and Iran] that Erdošan and his party take pride in had
reaped substantial benefits for Turkey. However, in the last year,
this policy has been exposed to a sizeable tremor, forcing Turkey to
significantly re-evaluate its relations.
When the popular uprisings began in some Arab capitals in early 2011,
Turkey tried to wait before declaring its support for the masses,
but showed resistance to foreign intervention in Libya, and Erdošan
himself issued strong criticism towards NATO. Even when the uprising
began in Syria, Turkey dispatched its diplomats to Damascus in an
attempt to contain the situation and convince al-Assad to conduct
reforms, but with the rising death toll on the Syrian streets, Ankara
issued a series of statements condemning the regime of President Bashar
al-Assad. Not long afterwards, Turkey was compelled to participate -
logistically at least - in NATO operations in Libya, and this damaged
its relations with Tehran significantly.
Turkey’s stance seemed hesitant; while Erdošan was releasing
statements threatening direct military intervention, and threatening
al-Assad with the same fate met by Gaddafi, Turkey’s diplomatic
apparatus appeared more cautious and less zealous than the speeches of
the Turkish leader. This prompted many observers to say that Turkey
was witnessing a divide, either in the military institution or in
the foreign affairs department, regarding the danger of intervention
or regime change in Syria due to security reasons, and because of
dimensions of ethnicity and sectarianism, which could extend into
Turkey itself if Syria turned into a scene of sectarian warfare
between Turkey, Iran and other Arab parties.
In order to understand the shift in Turkish foreign policy, we need
to review some historical facts, and here I am alluding to three
historical stages:
First: It is not true that the history of Turkish-Iranian relations
has always been stable, as claimed by the Turkish advocates of
rapprochement with Iran, because Turkish-Iranian relations remained
troubled and unstable until the last decade. In his book “Islam,
Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey” (2007), Soner
Cagaptay indicates that there is an illusion with regards to the
Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, confirming that the tension inherent in
Turkish-Iranian relations is based on nationalist and sectarian
reasons, which have remained constant even after the emergence of
a modern state in both countries. In fact, the Turkish-Iranian clash
goes far beyond the four major wars between the two parties. It is true
that Reza Shah was an admirer of Ataturk’s secular nationalist
project, but at the same time both countries fought a war in 1930 that
led to the amendment of the border treaty between them. After that,
Turkey broke off contacts with Tehran, in order to orientate towards
the West at the expense of the region.
Second: The Turkish position was clear in its rejection of the
Iranian revolutionary model, and Turkey played a prominent role as a
member of NATO in addressing Iran’s aspirations to export its
revolution. Perhaps for this reason the Khomeini regime supported
left-wing Kurdish, Armenian and Islamist armed groups, such as the
Turkish Hezbollah, against Ankara during the 1980s, and the late
Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal led a clear policy in support
of Pakistan during the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Turkey
remained skeptical of the intentions of the Iranian regime. The 1990s
witnessed the assassination of several secular Turkish intellectuals
and journalists, and Ankara accused Tehran of being involved.
Third: The idea of rapprochement with Tehran was the initiative
of Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic Welfare Party, who is
considered the godfather of converging relations with the Islamic
Republic. He paved the way for the visit of President Mohammad
Khatami, and the signing of oil and security agreements between the
two countries. This approach was opposed by some leaders of military
and secular institutions, who saw it as an attempt by the Islamists
of Turkey to repeat the Khomeinist model in their own country.
Perhaps this explains Erbakan’s visit to Tehran after his
political ban was lifted in 2009, and also explains Ali Velayati,
Iran’s former Foreign Minister and adviser to the Supreme Guide,
saying that Erbakan has always been a friend of Iran.
Such historical milestones are important in order to explain the
Turkish shift from a policy of containment towards Iran and Syria
between 2003 and 2010, and the current state of verbal sparring
between the two sides. In recent months, Erdošan has received several
opponents of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki such as President
of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani, [Iraqi Vice President]
Tariq al-Hashemi and Iyad Allawi. He has gone even further than this
and accused al-Maliki of adopting a dictatorial and sectarian trend,
whereby he excludes his opponents. In return, al-Maliki reacted to
Erdošan's move by visiting Tehran, condemning what he termed the
'sectarian' - meaning Sunni - interference in his government in Iraq,
branding Turkey as a "hostile" state in the region.
There can be no doubt that Turkey is re-evaluating its relations
with Iraq and Syria. Yet, at the same time, I must emphasize that
there are two currents within the Turkish policymaking sphere: one
is eager to confront the Syrian-Iranian axis, and the other current
- which includes figures from within Erdošan’s own party -
continues to warn against abandoning the containment policy that has
been adopted towards these two countries.
Recent events have proven that the historical differences between
the two parties still exist; no matter how Turkey has tried to use
its containment policy, it has eventually been forced to resort to its
"Sunni" identity and "Turkish" nationalism, even if indirectly. This is
nothing new. When the Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in February 1988
between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in the Southern Caucasus,
Iran and Turkey adopted contrasting positions towards the crisis,
which sparked a diplomatic row between the two countries.
Iran had sought to embrace the Azerbaijanis with open arms, welcoming
them as Shiites and revolutionaries, whilst Turkey was wary of the
expansion of Khomeini's influence in the Southern Caucasus. This
prompted Prime Minister Turgut Ozal to overtly declare, during his
visit to the US in 1990, that "the Azerbaijanis are Shia, unlike the
Turks, and hence, of more concern to Iran, since Turkey does not have
pan-Turkic ambitions."
Today, Turkish-Iranian disagreements over Syria are being renewed.
The Turks have made no secret of their feeling that their interests
will be jeopardized so long as the Bashar al-Assad regime remains
in power. As for Iran, it considers the Turkish stance - especially
Turkey's sponsorship of the Syrian Transitional Council and the asylum
it is granting to the displaced Syrian Sunnis - to represent a hostile
approach towards its strategic interest, namely the survival of its
Baathist ally.
There is no doubt that, for the most part, politics is governed by
interests, which may explain Turkey reconsidering its containment
policy towards the Iranian-Syrian axis, for its interests are now at
stake. The Turks fear the danger of the Syrian Kurds rising to power
after al-Assad is overthrown, and they fear that relations with the
Alawite minority in Turkey may become strained, and they are therefore
now seeking a Muslim Brotherhood alternative to rule Syria.
In 1985, Turgut Ozal expressed his disappointment at the future of Iran
under the rule of the mullahs, and the Iranian press reacted by saying
"Turkey is nothing more than a pawn for US interests." 25 years later,
Erdošan directed similar words of criticism towards Iran, and this
prompted the Iranian press to react by saying "Turkey is implementing
an American agenda to spread the Turkish model of political Islam."
(The writer is the current Editor-in-Chief of al-Majalla. The article
was published in the London-based Asharq al-Awsat on April 26, 2012)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress